WILLIAMS v. PRICE

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PANAMA CITY DIVISION
JAMES WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 5:25-cv-63-MCR-MJF
DANIEL PRICE,
Defendant.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff is a prison inmate who alleges that Defendant Daniel Price
rammed a golf cart into another cart that ran over Plaintiff’s leg and foot.
Doc. 15. Defendant Daniel Price moves to dismiss the complaint based on
failure to state a claim, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and
qualified immunity. Doc. 23. Williams opposes the motion. Doc. 25. The
District Court should deny Price’s motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
Williams is an inmate of the Florida Department of Corrections
(“FDC”) housed at the Blackwater River Correctional Facility. Williams’s
third 	amended 	complaint 	names 	one 	Defendant: 	Daniel 	Price, 	a
maintenance employee at the Calhoun Correctional Facility. Doc. 15.
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Williams claims that Price violated the Eighth Amendment when Price
intentionally drove a golf cart into a cart of chairs Williams was pulling
on foot. As a result of Price ramming his golf cart into Williams’s cart,
the cart of chairs ran over Williams’s right leg and foot causing severe
pain 	and 	damage 	to 	a 	blood 	vessel. 	Id. 	at 	4–7. 	Williams 	seeks
compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 7.
Price moves to dismiss this civil action because: (1) Williams’s
allegations fail to state an Eighth-Amendment violation; (2) Williams
failed to properly exhaust available administrative remedies as required
by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); and (3) Price is entitled to qualified immunity.
Doc. 23. Williams opposes the motion on each point. Doc. 25.
MOTION TO D ISMISS STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes a defendant to
move to dismiss a claim for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For a claim to survive dismissal, the
“complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
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that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” rather than the
mere possibility that the defendant acted unlawfully. Id. In applying the
foregoing standard, courts accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations in
the complaint as true and evaluates all reasonable inferences derived
from those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Hunnings
v. Texaco, Inc., 29 F.3d 1480, 1483 (11th Cir. 1994).
D ISCUSSION
A. 	Williams States an Eighth-Amendment Violation
Williams claims that Price’s ramming his golf cart into Williams’s
cart “was done maliciously and sadistically and constituted cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Doc. 15 at
7. Price argues that Williams fails to allege an excessive-force claim
because “any force used against Plaintiff was accidental” and Williams
“failed to allege that Defendant Price acted maliciously or sadistically.”
Doc. 23 at 3.
The appropriate standard is the Eighth Amendment’s deliberate-
indifference standard because of the nature of the alleged constitutional
violation. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5–7 (1992) (explaining
how the nature of the constitutional violation affects which Eighth-
Amendment standard applies); 	Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320
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(1986) (the applicable Eighth-Amendment standard is determined with
“due regard for differences in the kind of conduct against which an Eighth
Amendment objection is lodged”). Price was not confronted with a prison
disturbance or other situation that entailed competing administrative
concerns, such as balancing a need to maintain order through force—
against the risk of injury to Williams. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5–7; Whitley,
475 U.S. at 320.
Rather, Williams alleges a situation where Price exposed Williams
to a confinement condition or circumstance that created a substantial
risk of serious harm to Williams’s future health or safety. Helling v.
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993). Thus, the Eighth Amendment imposes
a deliberate-indifference standard. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,
302–03 (1991); Helling, 509 U.S. at 35.
Under either standard, however, Williams’s allegations state a
plausible Eighth-Amendment violation.
1. 	The Excessive-Force Standard
Under the Eighth Amendment, “[f]orce that is ‘applied in a good-
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline’ is acceptable, while force
that 	is 	inflicted 	‘maliciously 	and 	sadistically 	to 	cause 	harm’ 	is
prohibited.” Williams v. Radford, 64 F.4th 1185, 1196 (11th Cir. 2023)
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(citing Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010)).
A prisoner asserting an Eighth-Amendment excessive-force claim
must prove two elements, one subjective and the other objective. Sconiers
v. Lockhart, 946 F.3d 1256, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020). The prisoner must
establish that the prison official “acted with a sufficiently culpable state
of mind” and that the official’s conduct was “objectively harmful enough
to establish a constitutional violation.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8.
Courts use primarily five factors to evaluate the subjective element:
“[1] the need for application of force, [2] the relationship between that
need and the amount of force used, [3] the threat ‘reasonably perceived
by the responsible officials,’ . . . [4] ‘any efforts made to temper the
severity of a forceful response,’” and “[5] [t]he absence of serious injury.”
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321).
Under the objective element, the use of force must be “harmful
enough” or “sufficiently serious.” DeJesus v. Lewis, 14 F.4th 1182, 1195
(11th Cir. 2021). That is because the Eighth Amendment does not
preclude de minimis uses of force. Id. at 1195.
2. 	The Deliberate-Indifferent Standard
An 	Eighth-Amendment 	deliberate-indifference 	claim 	requires
sufficient factual allegations on four elements:
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1. the 	plaintiff 	suffered 	a 	deprivation 	that 	was 	“objectively,
‘sufficiently 	serious’”—one 	that 	posed 	a 	substantial 	risk 	of
serious harm to the plaintiff;
2. the defendant was deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk
of serious harm;
3. the plaintiff suffered an injury; and
4. the defendant’s deliberate 	indifference 	caused the plaintiff’s
injury.
Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1255, 1262 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)); Chandler v. Crosby, 379
F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004).
The Supreme Court has set a high bar for the objective component
of a claim challenging 	a condition of confinement. “The 	challenged
condition must be ‘extreme’”: the prisoner must show, at the very least,
“that a condition of his confinement ‘poses an unreasonable risk of serious
damage to his future health’ or safety.” Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1289 (first
quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9; and then quoting Helling, 509 U.S. at 35).
To satisfy the deliberate indifference element, a plaintiff must
allege that the defendant “was actually, subjectively aware that his own
conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff.” Wade,
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106 F.4th at 1262 (quoting 	Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839). “[D]eliberate
indifference 	describes 	a 	state 	of 	mind 	more 	blameworthy 	than
negligence.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835.
3. 	Williams Alleges an Eighth-Amendment Violation
Williams’s 	description 	of 	the 	incident 	alleges 	an 	Eighth-
Amendment violation. Williams was inside the garage of the vocational
building working as a vocational orderly. Williams was ordered by his
supervisor to stack chairs onto a cart and take them to the education
building. Doc. 15 at 5.
Williams stacked the chairs onto the cart and began pulling the cart
to the education building. Price drove out of the vocational building
garage in a golf cart. Williams heard Price say, “Road rage!” Id. Williams
turned around and saw Price staring at Williams. Williams turned back
around and continued pulling the cart of chairs. Price then drove the golf
cart parallel to Williams on the opposite side of the path. Then suddenly,
Price swerved the golf cart and rammed it into Williams’s cart of chairs.
The cart ran over Williams’s leg. Price then sped off while stating: “Road
rage. I told you I was gonna get you nigger!” Id. at 5–6.
Under Williams’s version of events, Price’s conduct was deliberate
and intentional, not “accidental” as Price’s motion to dismiss suggests.
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Doc. 23 at 3. Price’s alleged statement—“Road rage. I told you I was
gonna 	get 	you 	nigger!”—further 	indicates 	that 	Price 	intentionally
rammed the cart of chairs into Williams, not that this was an accident.
Williams’s allegations also plausibly indicate that Price had no
penological justification to ram the golf cart into Williams’s cart of chairs.
Engaging in “road rage” with a prisoner-pedestrian who poses no threat
and is simply following orders has no penological purpose.
Williams’s allegations further indicate that Price exposed Williams
to a substantial risk of serious harm, and that Price actually was aware
that his conduct posed a substantial risk of serious harm to Williams.
Again, Price’s alleged statements before and after the incident support
this inference.
For 	all 	of 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	above, 	Williams’s 	Eighth-
Amendment claim has facial plausibility and survives Price’s motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim.
B. 	Williams Exhausetd His Administrative Remedies
Price also argues that Williams failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies because, although Williams filed an informal grievance which
was 	approved, 	“[t]here 	are 	no 	allegations 	in 	the 	Third 	Amended
Complaint that Plaintiff ever went through the formal grievance or
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appeal process.” Doc. 23 at 6; see also Doc. 15 at 6 (Pl.’s allegation that
informal grievance was approved); Doc. 25 at 1 (same).
1. 	The PLRA’s Exhaustion Requirement
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides that: “No
action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section
1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any
jail, 	prison, 	or 	other 	correctional 	facility 	until 	such 	administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This
exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits that concern prison
life. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002).
“[F]ailure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA.”
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). “[I]nmates are not required to
specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.” Id. at
216.
“[P]roper exhaustion of administrative remedies . . . means using
all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the
agency addresses the issues on the merits).” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.
81, 	90 	(2006) 	(internal 	quotation 	marks 	and 	citation 	omitted). 	“To
determine ‘proper exhaustion’ in prisoner civil rights actions, courts must
look to the requirements of the ‘prison grievance system.’” Gipson v.
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Renninger, 750 F. App’x 948, 951 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Woodford, 548
U.S. at 95). In other words, courts “look to the requirements of the
applicable prison grievance system to determine the boundaries of proper
exhaustion.” Sims v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 75 F.4th 1224, 1230 (11th
Cir. 2023).
Generally, the FDC’s administrative remedy program requires an
inmate 	to 	begin 	the 	grievance 	process 	by 	submitting 	an 	informal
grievance to the designated staff member, who forwards the informal
grievance to the staff member responsible in the particular area of the
problem. Fla. Admin. Code r. 33-103.005. “If that fails, the prisoner files
a formal grievance with the institution’s warden or assistant warden.”
Sims, 75 F.4th at 1230 (citing Fla. Admin. Code r. 33-103.006(1)). If the
inmate is dissatisfied with the response to the formal grievance, he may
file an appeal to the Office of Secretary. Sims, 75 F.4th at 1230 (citing
Fla. Admin. Code r. 33-103.007(1)).
2. 	The Framework for Evaluating an Exhaustion Defense
A failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative
defense that the defendant bears the burden of proving. Jones, 549 U.S.
at 216; 	Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir. 2008).
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Addressing a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust involves two steps.
Turner, 541 F.3d at 1082.
First, the court looks to the factual allegations in the defendant’s
motion, and those in the plaintiff’s response. See id. at 1082. 	If they
conflict, the court accepts the plaintiff’s version of the facts as true. “If,
in that light, the defendant is entitled to have the complaint dismissed
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, it must be dismissed.” Id.
at 1082.
If the complaint is not subject to dismissal at the first step—where
the plaintiff’s allegations are assumed to be true—“the court proceeds to
make specific findings in order to resolve the disputed factual issues
related to exhaustion.” Turner, 541 F.3d at 1082 (citing Bryant v. Rich,
530 F.3d 1368, 1373–74, 1376 (11th Cir. 2008)). Upon making findings
on the disputed issues of fact, the court then decides whether, under
those findings, the plaintiff has exhausted his available administrative
remedies. “A district court may properly consider facts outside of the
pleadings to resolve a factual dispute regarding exhaustion where the
factual dispute 	does not 	decide 	the 	merits 	and the 	parties have 	a
sufficient opportunity to develop the record.” Singleton v. Dep’t of Corr.,
323 F. App’x 783, 785 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1376)).
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3. 	Application of the Turner Procedure
The parties agree that Williams filed an informal grievance relating
to Price’s conduct: informal grievance log #105-2401-0051. Doc. 15 at 6 ¶
14; Doc. 23 at 6; Doc. 25 at 1. The parties also agree that informal
grievance log #105-2401-0051 was approved. Doc. 15 at 6 ¶ 14; Doc. 23 at
6; Doc. 25 at 1.
The question in this case—and where the parties disagree—is
whether 	Williams’s 	informal 	grievance 	was 	sufficient 	to 	constitute
exhaustion. Price asserts that Williams was required to 	appeal the
approved grievance. Doc. 23 at 6. Williams counters that he was not
required to appeal because his grievance was approved. Doc. 25 at 1.
Williams adds that after he received the response approving the informal
grievance, he was transferred to Blackwater River CF. Id. There, the
grievance coordinator (R. Bethea) told Williams that Williams “could not
use the response to advance to the next level.” Id. at 1–2.
When 	the 	FDC 	addresses 	and 	approves 	an 	inmate’s 	informal
grievance, to exhaust his administrative remedies, the inmate is not
required to submit any further grievances regarding the relevant issue.
Williams v. Dep’t of Corr., 678 F. App’x 877, 880–81 (11th Cir. 2017)
(because 	inmate’s 	informal 	grievance 	was 	addressed 	and 	approved,
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inmate was not required to submit any further grievances about the issue
in question); Harvard v. Inch, 411 F. Supp. 3d 1220, 1248 (N.D. Fla. 2019)
(Florida prisoner whose informal grievance was approved “did not need
to appeal his grant in order to exhaust his administrative remedies”); cf.
Whatley v. Smith, 898 F.3d 1072, 1085 n.60 (11th Cir. 2018) (“A grievance
can 	be exhausted without 	being appealed all the way through 	the
grievance 	resolution 	process.”). 	Price 	does 	not 	address—much 	less
distinguish—these decisions.
Price also does not identify any provision of the FDC’s inmate
grievance procedure that requires an inmate to appeal the approval of an
informal grievance. The only provision of the FDC’s grievance procedure
that 	addresses 	approved 	grievances 	relates 	to 	approved 	formal
grievances and provides instructions to staff. See, e.g., Fla. Admin. Code
r. 33-103.016.
Additionally, 	even 	if 	the 	FDC’s 	grievance 	procedure 	required
Williams to appeal the approved grievance, the grievance coordinator (R.
Bethea) informed Williams (erroneously or not) that he could not grieve
the issue further. “An administrative remedy is not ‘available,’ and
therefore need not be exhausted, if prison officials erroneously inform an
inmate that the remedy does not exist or inaccurately describe the steps
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he needs to take to pursue it.” See Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 906 (7th
Cir. 2011); see also Geter v. Baldwin State Prison, 974 F.3d 1348, 1358
(11th Cir. 2020) (allegations that prison officials provided misleading
assistance or advice could render the grievance process “unavailable”).
The conclusion that Williams satisfied § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion
requirement is consistent with the holdings of numerous courts that an
inmate sufficiently exhausted his administrative remedies by filing a
grievance that was marked “approved” by the FDC with confirmation
that the incident was, or would be, referred to the inspector general for
investigation. See Perea v. Smith, 2024 WL 559260, at *2–3 (N.D. Fla.
Jan. 17, 2024) (rejecting defendants’ exhaustion argument in identical
circumstances), adopted, 2024 WL 554153 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2024);
Blake v. Carter, 2024 WL 4246679 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2024); Johnson v.
Shuler, 2022 WL 17811970, at *4 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 18, 2022), adopted, 2022
WL 17811959 (N.D. 	Fla. 	Dec. 	19, 2022); 	Luckey 	v. May, 	2016 WL
1128426, at *9–10 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 17, 2016), adopted, 2016 WL 1169481
(N.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2016); Tierney v. Hattaway, 2022 WL 18159995, at *2
(N.D. Fla. Dec. 9, 2022), adopted, 2023 WL 139132 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 9,
2023); see also Manago v. Glass, 2019 WL 1014440, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Mar.
4, 2019).
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Because Price has not carried his burden of establishing that
Williams failed to exhaust available administrative remedies, Price is not
entitled to dismissal under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
C. 	Price Is Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity
Price also argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because
“[a]ll 	actions 	taken 	by 	the 	Defendant 	Price” 	were 	“within 	his
discretionary authority.” Doc. 23 at 8. Williams responds that Price
violated a clearly established right. Doc. 25 at 2–3.
1. 	The Qualified Immunity Standard
“Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from suit under §
1983 unless their conduct violates clearly established law.” 	Zorn v.
Linton, ___ U.S. ___, 2026 WL 795469, at *2 (U.S. Mar. 23, 2026) (citing
Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021)). “For a constitutional
right to be clearly established, its contours must be sufficiently clear that
a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right. This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified
immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held
unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the
unlawfulness must be apparent.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In a situation where
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there is not a case with materially similar facts, a right can be clearly
established by “identify[ing] a broader, clearly established principle that
should govern the novel facts of a situation[,]” or when “the conduct at
issue 	so 	obviously 	violated 	the 	Constitution 	that 	prior 	case 	law 	is
unnecessary.” J W ex rel. Williams v. Birmingham Bd. Of Educ., 904 F.3d
1248, 1259–60 (11th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
“A right is not clearly established if existing precedent does not
place 	the 	constitutional 	question 	‘beyond 	debate.’” 	Zorn, 	2026 	WL
795469, at *2 (quoting Rivas-Villegas, 595 U.S. at 5).
2. 	Price Is Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity
By 1986—long before Price’s conduct in this case—the Supreme
Court clearly held that in the prison setting, force inflicted “maliciously
and 	sadistically 	to 	cause 	harm” 	and 	for 	no 	penological 	purpose 	is
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37; Whitley,
475 U.S. at 319; see also Williams, 64 F.4th at 1196; Skrtich v. Thornton,
280 F.3d 1295, 1302 (11th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
Also, 	by 	1993—long 	before 	Price’s 	conduct 	in 	this 	case—the
Supreme Court clearly held that a prison official who, with deliberate
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indifference, exposes a prisoner to “an unreasonable risk of serious
damage to [the prisoner’s] future health” violates the Eighth Amendment
because it constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain
contrary to contemporary standards of decency. See Helling, 509 U.S. at
33–35; Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262.
As alleged here, Price used a motorized vehicle as a weapon to ram
a prisoner-pedestrian who was following orders. Price’s conduct was not
justified by any penological purpose, nor was it compelled by necessity or
exigency. Rather, according to Williams’s allegations, Price rammed
Williams to release “road rage” and to “get” Williams. Doc. 15 at 5–6. This
suggests 	that 	Price 	knew 	that 	ramming 	Williams’s 	cart 	created 	a
substantial risk of serious harm to Williams.
No reasonable prison employee could have concluded that, under
these circumstances, Price’s conduct was constitutionally permissible.
See Hope, 	536 U.S. at 741 (in novel factual situations, “‘a general
constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law may apply
with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question’” (quoting United
States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997))); Id. at 745 (“The obvious
cruelty inherent” in putting inmates in certain wantonly “degrading and
dangerous” situations provides officers “with some notice that their
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alleged conduct violate[s]” the Eighth Amendment). Accordingly, Price
has not demonstrated that he is entitled to qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	above, 	the 	undersigned 	respectfully
RECOMMENDS that the District Court DENY Defendant’s motion to
dismiss, Doc. 23.
At Panama City, Florida, this 24th day of March 2026.
/s/ Michael J. Frank
Michael J. Frank
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
The District Court referred this case to a magistrate
judge to make recommendations regarding dispositive
matters. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Objections to
these proposed findings and recommendations must be
filed within fourteen days of the date of the report and
recommendation. 	Any 	different 	deadline 	that 	may
appear 	on 	the 	electronic 	docket 	is 	for 	the 	court’s
internal use only. A party must serve a copy of any
objections on all other parties. A party who fails to
object to this report and recommendation waives the
right to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order
based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions.
See 11th Cir. R. 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.
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