Micron Devices, LLC

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION
www.flsb.uscourts.gov
In re:
MICRON DEVICES, LLC. 	Case No. 20-23359-LMI
Chapter 7
Debtor.
_____________________________/
ORDER SANCTIONING LAURA PERRYMAN
On November 5, 2021, the Court entered an Order Granting Motion to
Sanction Laura Perryman (ECF #589) (the “Sanctions Order”). The Sanctions
Order imposed monetary sanctions on Laura Perryman (“Ms. Perryman”), a pro
Laurel M. Isicoff, Judge
United States Bankruptcy Court
___________________________________________________________________________
ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on December 16, 2025.
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se litigant, under 28 U.S.C. §1927.1 Ms. Perryman appealed the Sanctions Order
to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida (ECF
#592). The District Court affirmed the Sanctions Order (ECF #813) (the “District
Court Order”). Ms. Perryman then appealed the District Court Order to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (ECF #814). The Eleventh
Circuit vacated and remanded the Sanctions Order (ECF #851) (the “Eleventh
Circuit Order”) on the basis that “section 1927 cannot support sanctions against
a non-attorney pro se litigant.” The Eleventh Circuit Order further stated “[o]f
course, 	nothing 	prevents 	the 	bankruptcy 	court 	from 	imposing 	monetary
sanctions based on its inherent authority on remand.”
The Sanctions Order stems from a request for sanctions in the Motion for
Imposition of Monerary [sic] and Non-Monetary Sanctions against Laura Perryman
(ECF #482) (the “Trustee’s Motion”) filed by Tarek Kiem, the Subchapter V
Chapter 11 Trustee (the “Trustee”) and the Kennedy Lewis Parties’ Joinder to
Subchapter V Chapter 11 Trustee’s Motion for Imposition of Monetary and Non-
Monetary 	Sanctions 	against 	Laura 	Perryman 	(ECF 	#483) 	(the 	“Joinder”)
(collectively, 	the 	“Sanction 	Motions”) 	filed 	by 	Kennedy 	Lewis 	Investment
Management LLC (“KLIM”), KL Acquisition Corporation (“KL Acquisition Corp.”),
Richard Monje, and David Kho (collectively, the “Kennedy Lewis Parties” and with
the Trustee, the “Movants”). The Sanction Motions sought sanctions for the
reasons stated therein based on the Court’s inherent authority, 11 U.S.C.
1 The Sanctions Order also imposed non-monetary sanctions, but Ms. Perryman’s appeal of the
Sanctions Order was limited only to this Court’s imposition of monetary sanctions under section
1927. Accordingly, this Order only addresses the monetary sanctions.
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§105(a), 28 U.S.C. §1927, and Rule 9011 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure2. The Court entered the Sanctions Order solely on the basis of section
1927. However, the Court finds that sanctions are appropriately awarded based
on the Court’s inherent authority to sanction as well. 	Because the grounds for
assessing 	sanctions 	against 	Ms. 	Perryman 	based 	on 	the 	Court’s 	inherent
authority, and further authority under section 105, are the same as those that
supported the Sanctions Order, there is no need for further hearing.
Having considered the Sanction Motions, and as authorized 	by the
Eleventh Circuit Order, the Court enters this order imposing monetary sanctions
against Ms. Perryman pursuant to its inherent authority and pursuant to section
105.
The 	Court 	finds 	that 	monetary 	sanctions 	are 	appropriate 	because,
throughout the course of this bankruptcy case, Ms. Perryman has repeatedly
filed frivolous and baseless pleadings with the Court that were untimely, asserted
facts not before the Court, attempted to relitigate issues already decided, and
improperly sought relief on behalf of third parties.
Factual Background
This matter initially came before the Court for hearing on August 11, 2021
(the “Hearing”) upon the Sanction Motions and Laura Perryman [sic] Objection to
Trustee 	[sic] 	Motion 	for 	Sanctions 	and 	Injunctive 	Relief 	(ECF 	#571) 	(the
“Response”) filed by Ms. Perryman. 	The Court has reviewed the Sanction
2 The Trustee’s Motion also cited to 28 U.S.C. §1651(a), the All Writs Act, as additional authority
for the imposition of sanctions in the form of an injunction. (ECF #482 at ¶19).
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Motions, the Response, and the notices of fees and costs filed by both the
Trustee3 and the Kennedy Lewis Parties4 and finds it is appropriate to sanction
Ms. Perryman in the amount of $5,165.00 to the Kennedy Lewis Parties, and
$3,990.00 to the estate for the additional fees incurred by the Trustee’s counsel.
On December 7, 2020 (the “Petition Date”), the Debtor filed a voluntary
petition (ECF #1) (the “Petition”) for relief under subchapter V of chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of Florida. 	On February 19, 2021, the Court entered an Order to Show
Cause Why Debtor Should Not Be Removed as Debtor-In-Possession and Setting
Hearing (ECF #180) (the “Order to Show Cause”). The Order to Show Cause noted
that there were “disputes as to who is in charge of the Debtor, concerns regarding
alleged interference by the co-founder/majority shareholder, and concerns about
the majority shareholder taking action ultra vires.” On March 8, 2021, following
a hearing, the Court entered an Order Removing the Debtor-in-Possession and
Expanding the Powers of Subchapter V Trustee (ECF #206). Subsequently, the
Trustee took over operating the business of the Debtor and possession of all
property of the Debtor’s estate. On April 1, 2021, the Trustee filed Trustee’s
Motion for Approval of the Settlement Agreement Entered into by the Subchapter V
Chapter 11 Trustee, Kennedy Lewis Investment Management, LLC, and Stimwave
3 See Notice of Filing Itemization of Fees and Costs, Pursuant to Order on Trustee’s Motion for
Imposition of Monetary and Non-Monetary Sanctions against Laura Perryman ECF No. 550 (ECF
#568).
4 See Notice of Filing Declaration of Stephen Baldini, Esq. as to Excess Fees (ECF #569).
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Technologies Inc. (ECF #234) (the “9019 Motion”) which the Court approved5,
after conducting a two-day trial.
The 	Sanction 	Motions 	seek 	sanctions 	against 	Ms. 	Perryman 	for 	the
unnecessary expenses incurred by the Trustee and the Kennedy Lewis Parties
due to Ms. Perryman’s numerous frivolous filings in this case.
The following are examples of Ms. Perryman’s filings that were frivolous,
untimely, asserted facts not before the Court, attempted to relitigate issues
already decided, and/or improperly sought relief on behalf of third parties:
a. Motion to Quash 2004 Exam (ECF #156) (the “Motion to Quash”);
withdrawn at (ECF #164);
b. Continuously purporting to act as Debtor’s principal after having
“resigned” on February 8, 2021.6 (See ECF ##160, 161, 175, and Tr.
of 2/19/2021 Hearing 13:11-14:3; 24:25-27:3; 30:12-31:2 (ECF
#190));
c. 	Motion to Terminate Arbitration and Enjoin District Court Action (ECF
#192), denied because the Court has no jurisdiction over actions
that only involve Ms. Perryman, a non-debtor party (ECF #221) ;
d. Motion for Protective Order (ECF #231) denied because the Motion for
Protective Order filed by Ms. Perryman sought relief on behalf of the
Debtor7 (ECF #242);
e. 	Creditor Laura Perryman Objection to Debtors’ [sic] Motion for Entry
of an Order Approving Compromise and Settlement Under Bankruptcy
Rule 9019 (ECF #383) (the “Objection to Approval Order”) overruled
as untimely (it was filed after the conclusion of the evidentiary
5 Order Granting Trustee’s Motion for Approval of Settlement Agreement (ECF #234) and Approving
Settlement Agreement (ECF #393) (the “Approval Order”).
6 Debtor’s former counsel alleged “As of February 8, 2021, Ms. Perryman is no longer employed
in any capacity by the Debtor… However, since that time, Ms. Perryman continues to hold herself
out to the public as an agent of the Debtor. Moreover, since Ms. Perryman’s separation from the
Debtor she actively interfered with the company’s ability to operate and its continued existence.”
(ECF #175 at para. 6).
7 At the hearing on the Motion for Protective Order, the Court advised Ms. Perryman: “you only
represent yourself. You don't represent the debtor. So if the debtor has concerns regarding
discovery, then [the debtor] will raise those objections if and at such time discovery is requested
from the debtor.” Tr. of 4/7/2021 Hearing 17:7-13 (ECF #292).
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hearings) and for laying out facts that were never introduced into
evidence, although Ms. Perryman and Micron Medical Corporation
(represented by counsel at the evidentiary hearing) were given an
opportunity to do so (ECF #393)8;
f. 	Creditor Laura Perryman Motion for Reconsideration of Compromise
and Settlement Under Bankruptcy Rule 9019 and Injunctive Relief for
Declartory [sic] Judgement [sic] on Perryman 3rd Party Work Product
(ECF 	#405) 	(the 	“Motion 	for 	Reconsideration”), 	wherein 	Ms.
Perryman 	attempted 	to 	relitigate 	numerous 	issues 	previously
addressed by this Court during the two-day trial on the 9019 Motion
and impermissibly sought relief on behalf of third parties. Further,
Ms. Perryman alleged, without any basis to do so, that the “Trustee
has stolen and refused to return tangible assets of the Creditor and
MMC” and “MMC and StimGuard plan to file a stolen property report
if these items cannot be returned.” (ECF #405, at paras. 5, 24);
g. 	Ms. 	Perryman’s 	appeal 	of 	the 	Approval 	Order 	(ECF 	#422) 	(the
“Appeal”) only to allow it to be dismissed for not complying with the
associated deadlines (ECF #473);
h. 	Perryman 	Objection 	to 	3 rd 	Party 	Asset 	Inventory 	Turnover 	and
Injunctive Relief Pending Appeal (ECF #470) which improperly made
arguments 	on 	behalf 	of 	Micron 	Medical 	Corporation 	and 	was
overruled by the Court (ECF #476). The Court warned Ms. Perryman
“once again,” “that as a non-attorney, she has no authority to
represent the interests of third parties, including Micron Medical
Corporation.” The Court also reminded Ms. Perryman that she is
subject to Rule 9011 sanctions;9
i. 	Perryman Motion to Compel Deposition of Tarek Kiem (ECF #467) (the
“Motion to Compel”) where the Court stated “There is no basis for a
motion to compel until Tarek Kiem fails to appear at a properly
scheduled and noticed deposition or says he will not appear.” (ECF
#469);
j. 	Complaint for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Aiding and Abetting Breach
of 	Fiduciary 	Duty, 	Professional 	Negligence, 	Unjust 	Enrichment,
8 The Court is not unsympathetic to Ms. Perryman’s loss of her mother during the final moments
of the last day of trial, but that situation did not excuse the untimely objection, nor justify the
failure to submit evidence, which deadlines all expired prior to the first day of trial.
9 At the June 24, 2021, hearing on the Perryman Objection to 3 rd Party Asset Inventory Turnover
and Injunctive Relief Pending Appeal (ECF #470), the Court advised Ms. Perryman: “I want you
to know that I find that your filing of your objection is a violation of Rule 9011, and I will remind
you that you are subject to that same rule, which means that you have to have a good faith basis
in law and in fact before you file a pleading before this Court.” Tr. of 6/24/2021 Hearing 17:9-
14 (ECF #480).
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Tortious Interference, Fraudulent Conveyance, and Demand for Jury
Trial (Case No. 21-01152-LMI, ECF #1) (the “Perryman Adversary
Proceeding”), which improperly sued the Trustee and his counsel
including allegations which, on their face, were untrue.10;
k. Plaintiff Perryman’s Motion to Withdraw the Reference of Adversary
Proceeding Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §157(d); Memorandum of Points and
Authorities 	(Case 	No. 	21-01152-LMI, 	ECF 	#17) 	(the 	“Motion 	to
Withdraw 	the 	Reference”) 	and 	then 	dismissing 	the 	adversary
proceeding when the Court advised her that, even if the reference
was withdrawn, the case would probably stay before the Court
unless and until it was ready for trial;
l. 	Pro Se Motion for Continuance of Hearing (Case No. 21-01152-LMI.
ECF 	#27) 	(the 	“Motion 	to 	Continue”) 	seeking 	to 	continue 	the
hearings 	on 	the 	motions 	to 	dismiss 	the 	Perryman 	Adversary
Proceeding filed by the Trustee and the Kennedy Lewis Parties to a
date after a hearing on Ms. Perryman’s Motion to Withdraw the
Reference, which the Court denied. See Order Denying Pro Se Motion
for Continuance of Hearing (Case No. 21-01152-LMI, ECF #34).
m. Notice of Dismissal Without Prejudice of the Perryman Adversary
Proceeding, in which Ms. Perryman alleged this Court has a conflict
of interest. (Case No. 21-01152-LMI, ECF #42).
ANALYSIS
Bankruptcy courts possess inherent power to impose sanctions on parties
for bad faith conduct. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991)
(internal citation and quotation omitted) (“These powers are governed not by rule
or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own
affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.”). A court
may assess attorney’s fees under its inherent authority “when a party has acted
10 This complaint was ultimately replaced by an Amended Complaint - Amended Complaint for
Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Professional Negligence,
Unjust Enrichment, Tortious Interference, Fraudulent Conveyance, Conspiracy, and Demand for
Jury Trial (Case No. 21-01152-LMI, ECF #10).
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in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” Id. at 45-46, 50
(internal citation and quotation omitted).
A finding of bad faith is warranted where [a party] knowingly or
recklessly raises a frivolous argument, or argues a meritorious claim
for the purpose of harassing an opponent. A party also demonstrates
bad faith by delaying or disrupting the litigation or hampering
enforcement of a court order.
Gwynn v. Walker (In re Walker), 532 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal
citation and quotation omitted).
In addition to the Court’s inherent power, section 105 of the Bankruptcy
Code 	provides 	this 	Court 	with 	broad 	statutory 	power 	to 	address 	wrongful
conduct. Section 105(a) states:
The 	court 	may 	issue 	any 	order, 	process, 	or 	judgment 	that 	is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No
provision of this title providing for the raising of an issue by a party
in interest shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte,
taking 	any 	action 	or 	making 	any 	determination 	necessary 	or
appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to
prevent an abuse of process.
11 U.S.C. §105(a). Section 105(a) “uses the broad term ‘any’ which encompasses
all forms of orders including those that award monetary relief.” Jove Eng'g, Inc.
v. I.R.S., 92 F.3d 1539, 1554 (11th Cir. 1996). “A Bankruptcy Court may invoke
its statutory powers of Section 105(a) to redress Rule 9011 violations, bad faith,
and unreasonable, vexatious litigation.” In re Evergreen Sec., Ltd., 384 B.R. 882,
932 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2008), aff'd, 391 B.R. 184 (M.D. Fla. 2008), aff'd, 570 F.3d
1257 (11th Cir. 2009).
Lastly, Rule 9011 applies to pro se parties and provides:
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(b) Representations 	to 	the 	Court. 	By 	presenting 	to 	the 	court 	a
petition, pleading, written motion, or other document—whether by
signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney or
unrepresented 	party 	certifies 	that, 	to 	the 	best 	of 	the 	person's
knowledge, 	information, 	and 	belief 	formed 	after 	an 	inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances:
(1) it is not presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase litigation
costs;
(2) 	the 	claims, 	defenses, 	and 	other 	legal 	contentions 	are
warranted 	by 	existing 	law 	or 	by 	a 	nonfrivolous 	argument 	to
extend, modify, or reverse existing law, or to establish new law;
(3) the allegations and factual contentions have evidentiary
support—or 	if 	specifically 	so 	identified, 	are 	likely 	to 	have
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the
evidence—or if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on
a lack of information or belief.
(c) Sanctions.
(1) In General. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to
respond, the court determines that (b) has been violated, the court
may, subject to the conditions in this subdivision (c), impose an
appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that
committed the violation or is responsible for it. Absent exceptional
circumstances, a law firm must be held jointly responsible for a
violation committed by its partner, associate, or employee.
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011. “Sanctions under Bankruptcy Rule 9011 are warranted
when 	(1) 	the 	papers 	are 	frivolous, 	legally 	unreasonable 	or 	without 	factual
foundation, or (2) the pleading is filed in bad faith or for an improper purpose.”
In re Mroz, 65 F.3d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir. 1995).
As the Court detailed above, Ms. Perryman has filed multiple pleadings
with this Court since the inception of this case that have led to the unreasonable
multiplication of proceedings. The Court finds that procedurally some of the
pleadings filed by Ms. Perryman may have been “proper” – that is, her right to
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file a motion for reconsideration, her right to file an appeal, and her right to
respond to relief sought. However, most of Ms. Perryman’s pleadings were not
proper. Some pleadings were filed late11; some were filed “too early”12; some were
baseless (either already adjudicated or never brought up when it should have
been brought up)13; some asserted rights of third parties when told repeatedly
she could not do so14; and some were never pursued or were withdrawn.15 In
addition, Ms. Perryman’s filing of the complaint in the Perryman Adversary
Proceeding was another attempt by Ms. Perryman to raise her objections to the
Approval Order and her dismissal of the complaint after finding out that this
Court would probably end up keeping the case until at least trial, is further
evidence that the filing of the Perryman Adversary Proceeding was objectively
done in bad faith.
In determining to what extent the Court should sanction Ms. Perryman,
the Court takes into account that Ms. Perryman purportedly acted at all times
pro se. Balanced against that, however, are this Court’s multiple, repeated
warnings to Ms. Perryman about her frivolous and unfounded filings. 	The fact
that procedurally, as Ms. Perryman argues, she may have had the technical right
to file something (e.g. a motion to reconsider, or an appeal), this Court reminded
11 See supra para. e.
12 See Motion to Compel where Ms. Perryman sought to compel the Trustee’s attendance at a
deposition that the Trustee had never stated he would not attend.
13 See supra paras. e. and f.
14 See supra paras. e., f. and h.
15 See supra paras. a., g. and m.
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Ms. Perryman that anything she filed was required to be based on law and fact,
neither of which was satisfied in virtually anything Ms. Perryman filed.
Accordingly, the Court finds Ms. Perryman’s pleadings were frivolous and
filed in bad faith, such that it is appropriate to impose monetary sanctions
against her. Ms. Perryman filed pleadings that were not supported by law or fact
and chose to continue to seek relief even after being told multiple times that the
relief she was seeking was not hers to seek. A Court may sanction such behavior
under its inherent authority, section 105, and Rule 901116. The Court finds the
appropriate sanctions are the costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably
incurred because of such conduct.
The Court already assessed the reasonableness of the fees and costs
sought by the Trustee and the Kennedy Lewis Parties in the Sanctions Order and
adopts those same findings and conclusions in this order.
Therefore, the Court finds that Ms. Perryman is responsible for monetary
sanctions 	in 	the 	amount 	of 	$5,165.00 	to 	the 	Kennedy 	Lewis 	Parties, 	and
$3,990.00 to the estate for the additional fees incurred by the Trustee’s counsel.
CONCLUSION
The 	record 	in 	this 	case 	is 	clear, 	Ms. 	Perryman 	repeatedly 	raised
unreasonable and frivolous arguments despite numerous warnings from the
Court, and therefore Ms. Perryman acted in bad faith. Accordingly, for the
reasons set forth above, it is
16 Because there is no evidence that either the Kennedy Lewis Parties or the Trustee sent Ms.
Perryman the required notice under Rule 9011, the Court is not issuing sanctions under Rule
9011.
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ORDERED:
1. 	Monetary sanctions in the amount of $3,990.00 are awarded to the
Trustee.
2. 	Monetary sanctions in the amount of $5,165.00 are awarded to the
Kennedy Lewis Parties.
3. 	Ms. Perryman will have 45 days from the date of this Order to make
the payments described in paragraphs 1 and 2.
###
Copies furnished to:
Laura Perryman, pro se
All counsel of record
The Clerk of Court shall serve a copy of this order upon all interested parties who
do not receive service by CM/ECF.
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