Copeland et al v. BDC United LLC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 0:24-CV-60719-LEIBOWITZ/AUGUSTIN-BIRCH
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR COSTS AND MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
This cause comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Bill of Costs and Motion for
Attorney’s Fees. DE 75; DE 78. The Honorable David S. Leibowitz, United States District Judge,
referred both Motions to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a report and
recommendation. DE 80. Defendants have not responded to Plaintiffs’ Motions, and the time for
Defendants to do so has passed. Having carefully considered the record and the briefing and being
otherwise fully advised, the Court RECOMMENDS GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART Plaintiffs’ Motion for Bill of Costs [DE 75] and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorney’s Fees [DE
78].
I. Background
Plaintiffs George Ronald Copeland, Bernadin Etiene, Lester Delgado, and Rusty Barefoot
sued Defendants BDC United LLC, Melanie Cahow, and Joseph Callejo under the Fair Standards
Labor Act (“FLSA”) for failing to pay them minimum and overtime wages. DE 1. Defendants
appeared in this matter and answered Plaintiffs’ Complaint. DE 16. However, after Defendants’
counsel withdrew from this matter and Defendant BDC United––a company unable to proceed pro
se––failed to timely obtain substitute counsel, Judge Leibowitz ordered the Clerk’s Office to enter a
GEORGE RONALD COPELAND, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
BDC UNITED LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
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default as to Defendant BDC United. DE 33; DE 42. Defendants Cahow and Callejo later failed to
appear for a status conference before Judge Leibowitz and also failed to respond to Judge Leibowitz’s
order to show cause regarding their failure to appear at that status conference. As a result, Judge
Leibowitz permitted Plaintiffs to move for a clerk’s entry of default as to Defendants Cahow and
Callejo. DE 57; DE 58. Plaintiffs subsequently moved for, and obtained, a clerk’s entry of default as
to Defendants Cahow and Callejo. DE 59; DE 60. With all Defendants in default, Plaintiffs moved
for, and obtained, final default judgment against Defendants. DE 64; DE 74. Now, Plaintiffs have
moved to recover their costs and attorney’s fees. DE 75; DE 78.
II. Costs and Attorney’s Fees
Having obtained final default judgment in their favor, Plaintiffs are the prevailing party in this
FLSA matter. See Caplan v. C4S LLC, No. 22-CV-20285, 2023 WL 3026619, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Apr.
4, 2023) (“Plaintiff is the prevailing party because his Motion for Final Default Judgment was
granted.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 22-CV-20285, 2023 WL 3026057 (S.D. Fla.
Apr. 20, 2023). As such, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their costs and attorney’s fees. Williams v.
R.W. Cannon, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1306 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (“It is well established that a
prevailing FLSA plaintiff is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs, based upon the plain
language of the FLSA . . . .” (citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b))). The Court will evaluate Plaintiffs’ costs
and attorney’s fees in turn.
A. Costs
Plaintiffs seek to recover $929 in costs, consisting of the $405 filing fee and $524 in service
of process costs. DE 75. The costs awardable under the FLSA are those enumerated in 28 U.S.C. §
1920. James v. Wash Depot Holdings, Inc., 242 F.R.D. 645, 648 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (“Courts in the
Eleventh Circuit read [Supreme Court precedent] to require that cost awards under the FLSA be
limited to the costs enumerated in § 1920.”). Filing fees are recoverable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920.
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Incarcerated Ent., LLC v. Cox, No. 18-21991-CIV, 2019 WL 8989846, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2019)
(“Plaintiff seeks $400.00 for the clerk’s filing fee incurred in initiating the action. This cost is
recoverable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920.”). Thus, Plaintiffs can recover the $405 filing fee.
Service of process fees paid to private process servers are also recoverable under 28 U.S.C. §
1920, provided the process server’s rate does not exceed $65.00 per item served––the rate the United
States Marshal charges to effectuate service. Club Madonna, Inc. v. City of Mia. Beach, No. 16-
25378-CIV, 2022 WL 16701244, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2022), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 16-25378-CIV, 2022 WL 16701615 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 3, 2022). Plaintiffs’ cost records
indicate that Plaintiffs’ process server charged $54 per item served and that Plaintiffs’ process server
served six items, for a total of $324. DE 75-1. Plaintiffs’ process server also charged $100 per hour
for waiting time, totaling $200 for two hours of waiting. Id. at 3. A process server’s waiting time is
recoverable so long as the charge does not exceed $65 per hour. See Walker v. Grampa’s Real Est.
Inc., No. 20-CV-61557, 2022 WL 1157423, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2022) (concluding that waiting
time costs incurred in connection with service of process are recoverable at a rate of $65 per hour in
accordance with 28 C.F.R. § 0.114(a)(3)), report and recommendation adopted, No. 0:20-CV-61557-
WPD, 2022 WL 1154764 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2022). Accordingly, Plaintiffs can recover $324 in
service costs and $130 in waiting time costs, for a total of $454 in service of process costs. In total,
the Court recommends awarding Plaintiffs $859 in costs.
B. Attorney’s Fees
To determine reasonable attorney’s fees, the Court must employ the “lodestar” method. See
Norman v. Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988). The first step
of the lodestar method is determining a reasonable rate. Id. After determining a reasonable hourly
rate, the second step of the lodestar method is to arrive at the total hours reasonably expended. Id. at
1301. The last step of the lodestar method is to calculate the lodestar amount, which “is determined
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by multiplication of a reasonable hourly rate times hours reasonably expended.” Id. at 1302. The
Court will address these steps in turn.
1. Reasonable Hourly Rate
“A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for
similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Id. at 1299.
The attorney moving to receive his or her fees bears the burden of justifying the reasonableness of
the requested rate. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984) (“In seeking some basis for a
standard, courts properly have required prevailing attorneys to justify the reasonableness of the
requested rate or rates. To inform and assist the court in the exercise of its discretion, the burden is
on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence—in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits––
that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by
lawyers of reasonably 	comparable skill, experience and reputation.”). 	Moreover, courts are
considered experts on the matter of reasonable hourly rates for attorneys and may rely on their own
knowledge and experience when determining a reasonable hourly rate. Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d
776, 781 (11th Cir. 1994).
Here, Plaintiffs seek to recover attorney’s fees for two attorneys: Attorney Elliot Kozolchyk
and Attorney Dillon Cuthbertson. DE 78 at 4. Attorney Kozolchyk billed at an hourly rate of $450,
and Attorney Cuthbertson billed at an hourly rate of $300. Id.; see also DE 78-1 at 6. This Court has
consistently found $375 to be a reasonable hourly rate for Attorney Kozolchyk. See, e.g., Allen v.
Nat’l Pool Partners Inc., No. 0:24-CV-61352, 2025 WL 2144428, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2025)
(“[T]he undersigned has concluded that an hourly rate of no more than $375 is reasonable for Attorney
Kozolchyk.”), report & recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2144678 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2025); Leon
v. Grass Roots Complete LLC, No. 0:24-CV-60474, 2025 WL 746846, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 25, 2025)
(“This Court has held that an hourly rate of $375 is reasonable for Attorney Kozolchyk and will
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continue to utilize that rate as his reasonable hourly rate.”). The Court sees no reason to find a higher
hourly rate reasonable at this time. Accordingly, $375 is a reasonable hourly rate for Attorney
Kozolchyk.
As for Attorney Cuthbertson, the Court has previously found $250 to be a reasonable hourly
rate. Leon, 2025 WL 746846, at *3; Keefe v. Britt’s Bow Wow Boutique, Inc., No. 0:22-CV-62138,
2025 WL 3282441, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2025). The Court sees no reason to find a higher hourly
rate reasonable at this time. Accordingly, $250 is a reasonable hourly rate for Attorney Cuthbertson.
2. Hours Reasonably Expended
Attorney Kozolchyk billed 50 hours for work on this matter, and Attorney Cuthbertson billed
16.1 hours. DE 78-1 at 6. However, Attorneys Kozolchyk and Cuthbertson have voluntarily agreed
to reduce their total hours billed by 9.6%. Id. This results in a total of 45.6 billed hours for Attorney
Kozolchyk and a total of 14 billed hours for Attorney Cuthbertson. Id. After reviewing counsel’s
billing records, the Court identified some hours that the Court would normally recommend excluding
from a fee award. For instance, Attorney Kozolchyk billed to update his clients about the status of
their case on several occasions. See, e.g., id. (Attorney Kozolchyk billing .3 hours on August 1, 2025,
to update his clients about the case). In the past, this Court has recommended excluding such hours
from an award of attorney’s fees. See Santiago v. Peacock’s 17, LLC, No. 0:22-CV-62272, 2024 WL
582880, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 29, 2024) (recommending excluding hours billed to update client about
status of case from attorney’s fee award), report and recommendation approved, No. 22-CV-62272,
2024 WL 580358 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2024). Nonetheless, after reviewing counsel’s billing records,
the Court concludes that Attorneys Kozolchyk and Cuthbertson’s voluntary reduction meets or
exceeds the hours the Court would have recommended excluding. The Court further concludes that
the 45.6 hours Attorney Kozolchyk billed and the 14 hours Attorney Cuthbertson billed are reasonable
and commensurate with the work this case necessitated. Specifically, there are four Plaintiffs in this
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matter, which multiplied the work required of their counsel. Accordingly, the 45.6 hours Attorney
Kozolchyk billed and the 14 hours Attorney Cuthbertson billed, after voluntarily reducing the hours
billed, are reasonable.
C. Lodestar Amount
The Court utilizes the following table to calculate the lodestar amount:
Hourly Rate 	Reasonable Hours 	Total
Attorney Kozolchyk 	$375 	45.6 	$17,100
Attorney Cuthbertson 	$250 	14 	$3,500
III. Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART Plaintiffs’ Motion for Bill of Costs [DE 75] and Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Attorney’s Fees [DE 78]. The Court recommends awarding Plaintiffs $859 in costs and $20,600 in
attorney’s fees, for a total award of $21,459.
Within fourteen days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation, any
party may serve and file written objections to any of the above findings and recommendations. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); S.D. Fla. Mag. R. 4(a). The parties are hereby notified that a failure to timely
object waives the right to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order based on unobjected-to factual
and legal conclusions contained in this Report and Recommendation. 11th Cir. R. 3-1 (2014).
DONE AND SUBMITTED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 22nd day of
December, 2025.
_______________________________ 	_
PANAYOTTA AUGUSTIN-BIRCH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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