Murphy v. Miami-Dade County Government Authority et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 25-cv-21561 -BLOOM/Elfenbein
JAMES L. MURPHY,
Plaintiff,
v.
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY,
ELITE GROUP PROPERTIES LLC, and
MIAMI FL HOME SOLUTIONS LLC,
Defendants.
______________________________________________/
OMNIBUS ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant Miami-Dade County’s (“the County”)
Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, ECF No. [29], and Elite Group Properties LLC’s
(“Elite”) Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice, or in the Alternative, Motion to Decline Supplemental
Jurisdiction. ECF No. [34]. 	Plaintiff (“Murphy”) filed a Response in Opposition (“Response”),
ECF No. [38] and the County filed a Reply in Support. ECF No. [39]. The Court has reviewed the
Motions, the supporting and opposing submissions, the record, and is otherwise fully advised. For
the reasons that follow, the Motions are granted.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The Amended Complaint alleges that on January 7, 2021, Murphy was unlawfully evicted from
his property at 1195 NW 63 rd St, Miami, Florida 33150. ECF No. [18] ¶ 25. Defendants Miami FL
Home Solutions and Elite acquired Murphy’s interest in the property and commenced eviction
proceedings against him in state court. Id. ¶¶ 12-25. Ultimately, Miami FL Home Solutions and
Elite obtained a default final judgment and writ of possession. Id. The writ of possession ordered
the Miami-Dade County Sheriff to remove all persons from the property. Id. Murphy argues these
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proceedings were illegal because judgment was entered against “John Doe”. Id. ¶¶ 18, 39.
Nonetheless, Murphy received notice of the complaint and responded. Id. ¶ 24. Murphy asserts
three claims in his Amended Complaint. In Count I, he alleges fraudulent misrepresentation, Id. at
6, Count II, he alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the taking of his private property without
just compensation, Id. at 7, and in Count III, he alleges wrongful conversion. Id. at 8.
Defendants argue this Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate Murphy’s claims. ECF Nos. [29]
at 3, [34] at 2. Specifically, the County argues “this Court is barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine from second guessing the results of state of the state court proceedings Plaintiff wishes to
challenge.” ECF No. [39] at 1. In the alternative, the County asserts Murphy “does not otherwise
state facts sufficient to allege a classic taking.” Id. at 8. Elite adopts the County’s Motion to
Dismiss in its entirety and argues that because dismissal is appropriate as to Murphy’s § 1983
claim, the Court cannot assert supplemental jurisdiction over the other claims. ECF No. [34] at 2-
3.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine makes clear that federal district courts cannot review state
court final judgments because that task is reserved for state appellate courts or, as a last resort, the
United States Supreme Court.” Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009); see also
Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1271 (11th Cir. 2009) (federal district courts have “no authority
to review final judgments of a state court”); Doe v. Florida Bar, 630 F.3d 1336, 1340-41 (11th
Cir. 	2011) 	(where 	applicable, 	Rooker-Feldman 	deprives 	federal 	court 	of 	subject 	matter
jurisdiction). Rooker-Feldman is “confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired
its name: ‘cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court
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review and rejection of those judgments.’” Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 713 F.3d 1066,
1072 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284,
125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005)). The doctrine applies to claims actually raised before the
state court “and to those ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court's judgment.” Casale, 558
F.3d at 1260. “[A] federal claim is considered inextricably intertwined with the state court
judgment: (1) where the success of the federal claim would ‘effectively nullify’ the state court
judgment; and (2) where the federal claim ‘succeeds only to the extent that the state wrongly
decided the issues.’” Springer v. Perryman, 401 F. App'x 457, 458 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Casale, 558 F.3d at 1260).
B. Motion to Dismiss
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a pleading to contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (explaining that Rule 8(a)(2)’s pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”). In the same vein, a complaint may not rest on
“‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. These elements are required to survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, which requests dismissal for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
When reviewing a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court generally must accept the plaintiff's
allegations as true and evaluate all plausible inferences derived from those facts in the plaintiff's
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favor. See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. S. Everglades Restoration All., 304 F.3d 1076,
1084 (11th Cir. 2002). “‘Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted
by attorneys’ and are liberally construed.” Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir.
2011) (quoting Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998)). “Yet even
in the case of pro se litigants this leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel
for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell
v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of
Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998)).
Courts generally “do not consider anything beyond the face of the complaint and documents
attached thereto when analyzing a motion to dismiss.” Fin. Sec. Assur., Inc. v. Stephens, Inc., 500
F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). However, there is an exception when “a
plaintiff refers to a document in its complaint, the document is central to its claim, its contents are
not in dispute, and the defendant attaches the document to its motion to dismiss.” Id. (citation
omitted). Furthermore, courts may consider “matters of which a court may take judicial notice”
when ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S.
308, 322 (2007).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. Count II - Murphy’s Takings Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The County argues Murphy’s “grievances” result from the “execution of what he considers to
be an unlawful state-court order”, and the appropriate avenue to challenge that order is through “a
timely appellate proceeding in state court”. ECF No. [29] at 3. As such, the County argues the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine “prohibits federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought
by ‘state-court losers’ challenging ‘state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced.” Id. (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544
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U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). The County contends that Murphy’s § 1983 claim satisfies the Rooker-
Feldman criteria as Murphy lost in state court, the state court decision formed the basis of or is
intertwined with the injuries complained of in the Amended Complaint, and this action was
instituted after the conclusion of the state proceedings. Id. In support of their argument, the County
cites to Burlison v. Angus, pointing out that the court dismissed a similar § 1983 claim for
“improper eviction”. Id at 4.
In Burlison, the plaintiff filed a pro se complaint against a deputy clerk at the Fifth Judicial
Circuit of Florida under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights due
to an alleged seizure of Plaintiff’s property. Burlison v. Angus, No. 517CV570OCJSMPRL, 2018
WL 10096455, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 2018), aff'd, 737 F. App'x 523 (11th Cir. 2018). Plaintiff
alleged the deputy clerk issued a writ of possession before the entry of a judgment in favor of the
landlord, which caused Plaintiff’s eviction and loss of his mobile home without a valid court order.
Id. Ultimately, the court determined plaintiff’s claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
because they were a “thinly veiled attempt to overrule or interfere with the state court proceedings
and judgment.” Id.
Here, Murphy’s Takings Clause claim is distinguishable as the “Rooker-Feldman doctrine does
not apply in situations where the plaintiff ‘lacked a reasonable opportunity to raise his federal
claim in state proceedings.’” Ray v. Jud. Correction Servs., Inc., 270 F. Supp. 3d 1262, 1292 (N.D.
Ala. 2017) (quoting Powell v. Powell, 80 F.3d 464, 467 (11th Cir. 1996)). “For example, a
plaintiff's Takings Clause claim against a government entity for a regulatory taking is not barred
by Rooker–Feldman due to the plaintiff's appeal of the initial regulatory decision because the
plaintiff cannot raise a Takings Clause claim until the regulatory decision denying the property
interest is final.” Id. (Agripost, Inc. v. Miami–Dade Cty., ex rel. Manager, 195 F.3d 1225, 1233
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(11th Cir. 1999)). While Murphy’s Takings Clause claim is not regulatory in nature, the claim
nonetheless was not ripe until the conclusion of the state court proceeding as Murphy’s claim seeks
“just compensation” after the resulting “unlawful eviction”. ECF No [18] ¶¶ 35-40.
As such, the Court turns to address whether the Takings Clause claim is sufficiently pled. To
establish a § 1983 Takings Clause claim, the Plaintiff must prove (1) the property at issue was the
plaintiff’s property when the state took custody, (2) the state appropriated that property for the
state’s own use, and (3) the state failed to provide just compensation. Maron v. Chief Fin. Officer
of Fla., 136 F.4th 1322, 1334 (11th Cir. 2025). Here, as the County correctly points out, Murphy’s
Takings Clause claim fails because the Complaint fails to allege the County acquired the property
or put it to public use. ECF No. [29] at 8. To the contrary, Murphy’s allegations concern two state
court proceedings brought by private Defendants Miami FL Home Solutions and Elite. ECF No.
[18] ¶¶ 18-20. Accordingly, Murphy has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Rhodes v. City of Jacksonville, Fla., No. 3:20-CV-559-J-34JRK, 2020 WL 3205858, at *2 (M.D.
Fla. June 15, 2020) (“The Takings Clause does not require compensation unless private property
has been taken ‘for public use.”) (quoting Support Working Animals, Inc. v. DeSantis, No.
4:19CV570-MW/MAF, 2020 WL 1991479, at *11 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 2020)).
Because Murphy’s allegations fail to allege either that the County acquired the property or that
the property was put to public use, the Court finds any attempt to further amend this claim would
be futile. Cavero v. One W. Bank FSB, 617 F. App'x 928, 930 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that where
a more carefully drafted complaint could not state a claim and amendment would be futile,
dismissal with prejudice is proper). As such, Count II is dismissed with prejudice.
B. Count I – Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Count III – Wrongful Conversion
As the Amended Complaint makes clear, the Plaintiff and Defendants are residents of or are
incorporated in or have their principal places of business in the state of Florida. ECF No. [1] ¶¶ 1-
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4. While the Court has jurisdiction over Count II because it raises a federal question, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, Counts I and III neither raise a federal question nor are the Parties sufficiently diverse to
satisfy jurisdictional requirements. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Moreover, because the Court has
dismissed Count II, it declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Counts I and III. As such,
Counts I and III are dismissed without prejudice.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. 	Defendant Miami-Dade County’s Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint, ECF
No. [29], is GRANTED;
2. 	Elite Group Properties LLC’s Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice, or in the Alternative,
Motion to Decline Supplemental Jurisdiction, ECF No. [34], is GRANTED;
3. 	Count II is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;
4. 	Count I and III are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and
5. 	The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on January 26, 2026.
__________ ______________________
BETH BLOOM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc:
counsel of record
James L. Murphy
5601 NW 11th Avenue
Miami, FL 33127
786-307-6401
PRO SE
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