PNC Bank, N.A. v. Dolce Marketing Corp. et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION
CASE NO. 25-cv-21635-WILLIAMS/LETT
PNC BANK, N.A.,
Plaintiff,
v.
DOLCE MARKETING CORP., et al.,
Defendants.
_______________________________________/
REPORT AND RECCOMENDATIONS
THIS MATTER is before the Court upon the Honorable Kathleen M. Williams’
Order Referring Motion to Magistrate Judge, referring Plaintiff PNC Bank, N.A.’s
Motion for Entry of Final Default Judgment Against Defendants, Dolce Marketing
Corp., and Nayvi Alberti (the “Motion”) [ECF No. 18] to the Undersigned for a report
and recommendation. See ECF No. 19. Having reviewed Plaintiff’s Motion, the record,
and relevant legal authorities, for the reasons provided herein, it is recommended
that Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment be granted.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, a National Banking Association, and Defendant Dolce Marketing
Corp. (“Dolce”) entered into the Small Business Line of Credit Agreement (the
“Agreement”) on or about December 6, 2022. Compl. ¶ 10; Compl., Ex. B. As part of
the Business Loan Application (the “Application”), Ms. Alberti jointly and severally
guaranteed, and became surety for, all Obligations (as that term is defined in the
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Application) of Dolce to PNC (the “Guaranty”). Compl. ¶ 9; Compl., Ex. A. Alberti is
the sole officer of Dolce. Mot. at 8; Mot., Ex. B. The Application, Agreement, and
Guaranty constitute a lending agreement pursuant to which Dolce borrowed up to
$95,000.00 through a line of credit with PNC. Compl. ¶ 11. The Agreement provides
that Dolce would be in default thereof if, among other things, Dolce failed to make
any payment when due. Compl. ¶ 14; Compl., Ex. B, ¶ 17. The Agreement further
provides that, in the event of a default, PNC has the right to: (i) declare the entire
outstanding principal, unpaid interest and charges under the Loan Documents to be
immediately due and payable to PNC; (ii) increase the interest margin up to 5
percentage points (5.0%) over the variable interest rate on the line of credit; and (iii)
require that Dolce pay costs incurred by PNC in the collection of the outstanding
amounts, including attorneys’ fees and court costs. Compl. ¶ 15; Compl., Ex. B ¶ 18.
Dolce failed to timely make the required payments when due under the
Agreement. Compl. ¶ 16. Accordingly, on October 11, 2024, PNC sent Dolce a Demand
for Payment Letter informing Dolce that it was in default under the Agreement, and
demanding repayment of the full outstanding amount of the Line of Credit. Compl. ¶
17; Compl., Ex. C. Dolce failed to timely make the required payments when due under
the loan documents. Compl. ¶ 18. As such, on or about January 24, 2025, PNC sent
Dolce and Alberti a second letter setting forth the payoff balance and demanding
payment. Compl. ¶ 19; Compl., Ex. D. Defendants have nonetheless failed to cure
their defaults under the loan documents, and as of March 28, 2025, there was due
and owing $122,993.11 consisting of $95,000 in unpaid principal, $27,557.57 in
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accrued and unpaid interest, and $435.54 in late charges. Compl. ¶ 20. Interest is
accruing on the outstanding principal balance of the line of credit at a per diem rate
of $47.01 and will continue to accrue in accordance with the terms of the loan
documents. Id. Accordingly, the full accelerated amount owed under the loan
documents is immediately due and payable to PNC. Compl. ¶ 21. To date, Alberti has
failed to ensure the payment and performance of Dolce’s obligations under the
Agreement to PNC, as required by the Guaranty, and is thus in default thereunder.
Compl. ¶ 22; Compl., Ex. A. PNC retained the law firm Adams & Reese, L.L.P. to
represent it in this matter. Compl. ¶ 23.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a two-count complaint in this action on April 10, 2025, alleging
a breach of agreement and breach of guaranty (the “Complaint”) [ECF No. 1]. On
June 25, 2025, Plaintiff filed its Returns of Non-Service as to Dolce and Alberti. [ECF
Nos. 7-8]. That same day, upon Plaintiff’s request, see ECF No. 10, Alias Summonses
were issued to both Defendants. [ECF No. 11]. Plaintiff served the Alias Summonses
in care of the Secretary of State on June 26, 2025. [ECF No. 12]. On or about July 9,
2025, Plaintiff sent the Notice of Filing Returns of Service to the last known addresses
for Defendants. Id.
Defendants 	failed 	to 	file 	an 	answer 	or 	otherwise 	respond 	to 	Plaintiff’s
Complaint. Subsequently, on July 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Entry of
Clerk’s Default against Defendants. [ECF No. 13]. On July 25, 2025, the Clerk
entered a Clerk’s Default against the Defendants, see ECF No. 14, and the Court
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entered an Order Directing the Filing of a Motion for Final Default Judgment. [ECF
No. 15]. On August 25, 2025, Plaintiff filed its Motion for Entry of Final Default
Judgment. [ECF No. 18]. In support of Plaintiff’s Motion, Plaintiff also filed the
Affidavit of Angela N. Grewa, Mot., Ex. A, and Plaintiff’s Declaration, executed by
Lyndsey Guggenmos, Mot., Ex. F.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, “[w]hen a party against whom a
judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and
that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s
default.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). “After the clerk enters a default, the Court is
authorized to enter a final default judgment if the party seeking it applies for one.”
Univ. of Miami v. Caneup, LLC, No. 23-cv-23829, 2024 WL 4500790, at *3 (S.D. Fla.
Oct. 16, 2024) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) (“In all
other cases, the party must apply to the court for a default judgment.”). However,
“entry of default judgment is only warranted when there is a sufficient basis in the
pleadings for the judgment entered, with the standard for ‘a sufficient basis’ for the
judgment being akin to that necessary to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim.” Singleton v. Dean, 611 F. App’x 671, 671 (11th Cir. 2015). “Thus, before
entering a default judgment for damages, the complaint must state sufficient facts to
support a substantive cause of action and include a sufficient basis for the particular
relief sought.” Tyco Fire & Sec., LLC v. Alcocer, 218 F. App’x 860, 863 (11th Cir. 2007).
“A ‘defendant, by his default, admits the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of fact’ as
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set forth in the operative complaint.” Univ. of Miami, 2024 WL 4500790 at *3 (quoting
TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Hernandez, 196 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1298 (S.D. Fla. 2016)).
Once liability has been established, the Court must assess damages. The Court
may examine affidavits submitted and, at its own discretion, conduct a hearing to
determine the amount of damages, establish the truth of any allegation by evidence,
or investigate any other matter. See PNC BANK, N.A. v. Kool Stuff Designs, LLC, No.
24-cv-61283, 2024 WL 4652130, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2024) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
P. 55(b)(2)).
ANALYSIS
A. JURISDICTION
“Before delving into the Motion for Entry of Default Final Judgment itself, we
must verify that we have subject matter jurisdiction over this case, that we can
exercise personal jurisdiction over the Defaulting Defendants, and that venue is
proper in our District.” Eumori v. Buufan, No. 25-cv-23426, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3332, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 8, 2026).
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(2) because the diversity jurisdiction requirements are satisfied. First, the
parties are diverse. Plaintiff is a national banking association with its main office
located in Delaware. Compl. ¶ 1; Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 318
(2006) (“one would sensibly ‘locate’ a national bank for the very same purpose, i.e.,
qualification for diversity jurisdiction, in the State designated in its articles of
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association as its main office”). Defendant Dolce is a Florida corporation with its
principal place of business in Florida. Compl. ¶ 2. Defendant Alberti is a Florida
resident with her primary residence located in Miami-Dade County. Compl. ¶ 2.
Second, the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See Compl. ¶¶ 20, 24 (seeking a
judgment to recover the $ $122,993.11 due and owing to Plaintiff in addition interest,
costs, and attorneys’ fees).
2. Personal Jurisdiction
This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Dolce inasmuch as
Defendant’s principal place of business is in Miami-Dade County, Florida, which is
within the jurisdiction of the Southern District of Florida. See Compl. ¶ 2; see, e.g.,
Alcala v. Michael Dawkins Grp., No. 23-cv-24789, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99055, at
*3 (S.D. Fla. June 4, 2024) (“And, because [Defendant] is a Florida Profit Corporation
with headquarters in Miami-Dade County, Florida, doing business in Miami, Florida,
[] we’re also satisfied that we have personal jurisdiction over the Defendant.”).
Further, pursuant to Dolce’s Articles of Incorporation, Dolce was incorporated in
Miami-Dade County, Florida, making Dolce a “citizen of its state of incorporation,”
Florida. DO Rests., Inc. v. Aspen Specialty Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1345 (S.D.
Fla. 2013); Mot., Ex. B (Dolce Articles of Incorporation and 2025 Annual Report).
Likewise, this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Alberti as she is an
individual domiciled in Miami-Dade County. To be a citizen of a state, a natural
person must be both a citizen of the United States and a domiciliary of a state. Las
Vistas, S.A. v. Petersen, 788 F. Supp. 1202 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (citing Willis v. Westin
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Hotel Co., 651 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y.1986)). The address found in Miami-Dade
County Official Records in a Notice of Lis Pendens for Alberti is a Miami address.
Mot., Ex. C.
The service of process components for this Court to have personal jurisdiction
over Defendants are also satisfied. PNC properly effectuated substitute service on
Dolce and Alberti pursuant to Fla. Stat. §§ 48.081 and 48.161. As a Florida
corporation, Dolce must be served pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.081, which permits a
domestic corporation to be “served with process required or authorized by law by
service on its registered agent designated by the corporation.” Fla. Stat. § 48.081(2).
If service cannot be made on the registered agent “after one good faith attempt”, then
process can be served on certain corporate officers, or “[a]ny person listed publicly by
the domestic corporation . . . on its latest annual report.” Id. §§48.081(3), (3)(a)-(b).
Alberti is the only person listed publicly on Dolce’s latest annual report and is Dolce’s
registered agent. Mot. at 7-8; Mot., Ex. B. 	Plaintiff attempted service five times at
the address designated by the Defendant corporation as the address of its registered
agent, its principal place of business, and its mailing address. Mot., Ex. C.
If the plaintiff can serve neither the corporation’s registered agent nor a person
publicly listed by the corporation on its latest annual report, a plaintiff may effectuate
service of process on the Florida Secretary of State. See Fla. Stat. §48.081(4) (a)-(b).
Finally, if “after due diligence” service cannot be completed and “[t]he only person
listed publicly by the domestic corporation … on its latest annual report, is also the
registered agent on whom service was attempted” then “the process may be served as
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provided in s. 48.161 on the Secretary of State as an agent of the domestic
corporation.” Id. PNC engaged in a comprehensive search of public records, see Mot.
at 13, and utilized the information obtained by investigation to make thirteen (13)
attempts to serve Dolce and Alberti at a variety of addresses. Accordingly, PNC
satisfied Fla. Stat. § 48.161’s due diligence requirement and was thus entitled to serve
Alberti through the Secretary of State. Coastal Capital Venture, LLC v. Integrity
Staffing Solutions, Inc., 153 So.3d 283, 285 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (personal service is
obtained through reasonable diligence where “the complainant reasonably employed
knowledge at his command, made diligent inquiry, and exerted an honest and
conscientious effort appropriate to the circumstances, to acquire the information
necessary to enable him to effect personal service on the defendant”) (citation
omitted).
PNC satisfied all subsequent mailing and notice requirements prescribed by
Fla. Stat. § 48.161. On the same day, the Florida Secretary of State accepted service
of process for Dolce and Alberti, PNC sent copies of the acceptance of service with its
Notice of Filing Returns of Service to Defendants. Mot., Ex. D. On August 1, 2025,
PNC sent, via certified mail, return receipt requested, a true copy of PNC’s Notice of
Filing Returns of Service, the Secretary of State’s letter accepting service of process,
the Complaint in this cause with exhibits, and the Alias Summons to Dolce and
Alberti. Mot. at 15; Mot., Ex. D. As required by Fla. Stat. § 48.161(3), PNC filed its
Affidavit of Compliance on August 5, 2024, which is within 40 days of the date that
service was made on, and accepted by, the Secretary of State. Mot.at 16, Mot., Ex. D.
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3. Venue
Finally, venue is proper in this district because this is the judicial district in
which Dolce maintains its principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)(1) & (c)(2).
B. LIABILITY
Plaintiff is seeking final default judgment against Defendants’ breach of
contract and breach of guaranty. Compl. ¶¶ 26-38. The contract at issue is governed
by Delaware law, thus Delaware law controls here. Compl., Ex. B; Travelers Prop.
Cas. Co. v. Kan. City Landsmen, L.L.C., 592 F. App’x 876, 881 (11th Cir. 2015)
(explaining that in a diversity action, a federal court must apply the choice-of-law
rules of the forum state).
1. Breach of Contract
Under Delaware law, to sustain a claim for breach of contract, the plaintiff
must prove (1) the existence of a contract, whether express or implied; (2) breach of
one or more of the contract’s obligations; and (3) damages resulting from the breach.
Geico Gen. Ins. Co. v. Green, 308 A.3d 132, 140 (Del. 2022). Through the entry of the
default against the Defendants, the well-pleaded factual allegations of the Complaint
are taken as true. PNC Bank, N.A. v. Bldg. Founds. Therapy Servs., No. 25-cv-23600,
2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25185, at *18 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 2026). Thus, PNC has
established that (1) a contract exists between PNC and Dolce, as evidenced by the
Agreement, Compl. ¶¶ 8, 10, 11; (2) the contract was breached by Dolce’s failure to
make timely payments under the Agreement, Compl. ¶¶ 14-16; and (3) as a direct
and proximate cause of Dolce’s breach and default of the Agreement, PNC has
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suffered damages, and Dolce owes to PNC the full amount of the outstanding unpaid
Agreement, including principal, interest, attorney’s fees and costs, and any and all
sums hereto and hereinafter expended or to be expended by PNC pursuant to the
terms of the Agreement. Compl. ¶¶ 14-16; 20-21; 23-25. As pertains to this instant
action, Plaintiff has established through its pleadings, and through the filing of
Plaintiff’s Declaration in Support of Entry of Final Default Judgment, the necessary
elements for its breach of contract/agreement claim. See Geico, 308 A.3d at 140.
Plaintiff’s Declaration provides that as of August 25, 2025, there was due and owing
$129,968.38, consisting of $95,000.00 in unpaid principal, $34,532.84 in accrued and
unpaid interest, and $435.54 in late charges. Mot., Ex. E. Additionally, interest is
currently accruing on the outstanding principal balance of the line of credit and will
continue to accrue in accordance with the terms of the loan documents. Mot., Ex. E.
2. Breach of Guaranty
Under Delaware law, “a contract of guaranty is the promise to answer for the
payment of some debt or for the performance of some obligation by another on the
default of that on a third person who is liable in the first instance” Falco v. Alpha
Affiliates, Inc., No. Civ A. 97-494, 1997 WL 782011, at *5 (D. Del. Dec. 10, 1997)
(citing Jones Motor Co. v. Teledyne, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 310, 313 (D. Del. 1988)).
Therefore, the guaranty is a separate contract involving duties and responsibilities
that are distinct from the basic contract to which it is collateral. Id. (citing Jones, 690
F. Supp. at 313, n.4). As stated above, the elements for breach of contract under
Delaware Law are a) the existence of a contract; b) the breach of an obligation
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imposed by that contract; and c) resulting damages to the plaintiff. Geico, 308 A.3d
at 140. Through the entry of the default against the Defendants, the well-pleaded
factual allegations of the Complaint are taken as true. See Bldg. Founds. Therapy
Servs., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25185, at *18. 	Thus, PNC has established (1) the
existence of a contract between Alberti and PNC (the Guaranty), whereby Alberti
committed to jointly and severally guaranty the obligations of Dolce to PNC Compl.,
¶¶ 8-9; (2) Alberti has breached the contract by defaulting under the terms of the
Guaranty by failing to ensure the prompt payment and performance of Dolce’s
obligations under the Agreement, as required by the Guaranty; Compl. ¶ 12; and (3)
as a direct and proximate result of Alberti’s default, PNC has suffered monetary
damages, and there is now due and owing from Alberti the full amount of outstanding
unpaid indebtedness under the Agreement including principal, interest, attorneys’
fees and costs, and for such further relief that is just and proper. Compl. ¶ 20-24].
C. Attorney’s Fees and Costs
PNC seeks $3,434.00 in attorneys’ fees and $1,334.00 in costs. When a party’s
claim for attorneys’ fees sounds in state law and reaches federal court by way of
federal diversity jurisdiction, courts should apply the substantive law of the forum
state. See Trans Coastal Roofing Co., v. David Boland, Inc., 309 F.3d 758, 760 (11th
Cir. 2002); see also PNC Bank, N.A. v. Pro. Nurses Homecare Inc., No. 25-cv-80723,
2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3328, at *10 n.2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 8, 2026) (applying Florida law
to determine entitlement to attorneys’ fees where Florida was the forum state despite
applying Delaware law to breach of contract claims). Therefore, PNC’s claim for
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attorneys’ fees is governed by Florida law.
Under Florida law, the prevailing party in a breach of contract action is
entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs. Prior v. Neurospine Inst. LLC, No. 23-cv-60676-
MD, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189680, at *5 (S.D. Fla. July 16, 2025); see Moritz v. Hoyt
Enterprises, 	Inc., 	604 	So. 	2d 807, 810 (Fla. 	1992). 	Additionally, 	the 	parties’
Agreement provides that PNC is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs upon breach.
See Compl. ¶ 24; Compl., Ex. B ¶ 18. However, before granting such an award to a
prevailing party, the court must assess whether the amount of attorney’s fees
requested is reasonable. See Corey Sipkin Photography LLC v. El Extrabase Inc., No.
24-cv-23887, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94898, at *7 (S.D. Fla. May 19, 2025).
In support of its requests for fees and costs, PNC submitted both Plaintiff’s
Declaration, Mot., Ex. F, and the Affidavit of Reasonableness of Attorneys’ Fees and
Costs, Mot. Ex. G. Plaintiff’s submissions provided the Court billing records and other
materials that speak to the factors the Court must consider in its reasonableness
determination, such as “the attorney’s customary fee, the skill required to perform
the 	legal 	services, 	the 	attorney’s 	experience, 	reputation 	and 	ability, 	the 	time
constraints involved . . . the attorney’s relationship to the client, and awards in
similar cases.” Mallory v. Harkness, 923 F. Supp. 1546, 1555 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (citing
Johnson 	v. 	Ga. 	Highway 	Express, 	Inc., 	488 	F.2d 	714, 	718 	(5th 	Cir. 	1974)).
Subsequently, the Court finds that the attorneys’ fees and costs sought by Plaintiff
are reasonable.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECCOMENDS that Plaintiff PNC
Bank, N.A.’s Motion for Entry of Final Default Judgment be GRANTED and that
final default judgment be entered against Defendants, Dolce Marketing Corp. and
Nayvi Alberti. The Court specifically recommends that the District Court:
(i) 	Enter 	Final 	Default 	Judgment 	against 	Defendants, 	jointly 	and
severally, 	in 	the 	amount 	of 	$129,968.38, 	plus 	additional 	interest
accruing between August 25, 2025, and the date of the judgment; plus,
an award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of $3,434.00, plus an award of
costs in the amount of $1,334.00.
(ii) 	Require Defendants, Dolce Marketing Corp. and Nayvi Alberti, to
complete, under oath, Form 1.977, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, Fact
Information Sheets and return those to counsel for Plaintiff within forty-
five (45) days; and
(iii) 	Retain jurisdiction to enter such further relief this Court deems just and
proper.
OBJECTIONS
Within seven (7) days after being served with a copy of this Report and
Recommendation, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the
proposed findings and recommendations. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). “A party may
respond to another party’s objections within 7 days after being served with a copy.”
See id. A party’s failure to serve and file specific objections to the proposed findings
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and recommendations alters the scope of review by the District Judge and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, including waiver of the right to
challenge anything to which no specific objection was made. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); 11th Cir. R. 3-1; S.D. Fla. Mag. R. 4(a).
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED in Chambers in Miami, Florida on this 12th
day of February, 2026.
_____________________________________
ENJOLIQUÉ A. LETT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
cc: All Counsel of Record
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