Goldenberg v. Miami FCI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 25-cv-23399-BLOOM
LOUIS GOLDENBERG,
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN HEUETT,
Respondent.
/
ORDER DENYING 28 U.S.C. § 2241 PETITION
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Petitioner Louis Goldenberg’s (“Petitioner”) pro
se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, ECF No. [1] (the “Petition”), filed
on July 20, 2025. Petitioner, a federal prisoner, asserts that the United States Bureau of Prisons
(“BOP”) has improperly determined the date that he became eligible to earn First Step Act (“FSA”)
Earned Time Credits (“ETCs”). See ECF No. [1-1] at 1-8. Respondent filed a Response, arguing
that the Petition should be denied on the merits and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
See ECF No. [6]. Petitioner filed a Reply, arguing that his failure to exhaust administrative
remedies should excused because exhaustion would be futile. ECF No. [7]. The Court has reviewed
the Petition, the Respondent’s Response, the Petitioner’s Reply, the record, and the applicable law
and is otherwise fully advised. For the following reasons, the Petition is DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On January 27, 2025, Petitioner was sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment in the
United States District Court District of New Jersey. ECF No. [6-3] at 1. The district court
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recommended that Petitioner be designated to FCI Miami. Id. at 2. On January 27, 2025, Petitioner
was committed to the custody of the BOP. Id.
Petitioner arrived at FCI Miami on April 10, 2025, ECF No. [6-4] at 2. At issue here is the
ten (10) week period between the date that Petitioner was committed to the custody of the BOP
and the date that Petitioner arrived at his designated facility. Petitioner contends that he was
eligible to begin earning FSA time credits on January 27, 2025, the date he was sentenced and
remanded to BOP custody. ECF No. [1-1] at 9. Respondent contends that Petitioner was eligible
to begin earning FSA time credits ten (10) weeks later, the date that he arrived at FCI Miami. ECF
No. [6] at 6-10.
Respondent argues the Petition should be denied for three reasons: (1) Petitioner failed to
exhaust administrative remedies; (2) Petitioner was not eligible to earn FSA ETCs because he was
in transit to his designated institution; and (3) Petitioner did not engage in any FSA programming
or complete any needs/risks evaluations pursuant to the FSA. ECF No. [6] at 2-3.,
Petitioner concedes that he has not exhausted administrative remedies but argues that
exhaustion would be futile. ECF No. [1-1] at 4. Petitioner argues that exhaustion is unnecessary
when the issue presented is one that consists purely of statuary interpretation. Id. Petitioner
submitted a copy of his BP8, which states that Petitioner’s administrative request is denied
pursuant to BOP Policy. Id. at 10.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Section 2241 authorizes a district court to grant a writ of habeas corpus whenever a
petitioner is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Under the saving clause of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), a federal prisoner may
bring a habeas petition under § 2241 if “the remedy by [§ 2255] motion is inadequate or ineffective
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to test the legality of his detention.” § 2255(e). Therefore, “an action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 is the proper vehicle to challenge the execution of a sentence, rather than the validity of the
sentence itself.” United States v. Kinsey, 393 F. App’x 663, 664 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Antonelli
v. Warden, U.S.P. Atlanta, 542 F.3d 1348, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008)). “It is the petitioner’s burden to
establish his right to habeas relief[,] and he must prove all facts necessary to show a constitutional
violation.” Blankenship v. Hall, 542 F.3d 1253, 1270 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
Federal prisoners are required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a § 2241
petition. See Santiago-Lugo v. Warden, 785 F.3d 467, 475 (11th Cir. 2015). Although the
exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional, courts may not “disregard a failure to exhaust . . . if
the respondent properly asserts the defense.” Id. “And because exhaustion is non-jurisdictional,
even when the defense has been preserved and asserted by the respondent throughout the
proceeding, a court may skip over the exhaustion issue if it is easier to deny (not grant, of course,
but deny) the petition on the merits without reaching the exhaustion question.” Id.
III. 	DISCUSSION
In the Petition, Petitioner concedes that all administrative steps have not been exhausted
but argues that exhaustion is futile because the issue presented is one that consists purely of
statutory construction. ECF No. [1-1] at 4 (quoting Vasquez v. Strada, 684 F.3d 431, 433-34 (3d
Cir. 2012)). Respondent counters that “[v]arious district courts have concluded that there is no
‘futility’ exception to the exhaustion requirement for claims seeking ETCs under the FSA.” ECF
No. [6] at 6 (citing Carrera v. United States, No. 25-CV-60045-RAR, 2025 WL 1233979 (S.D.
Fla. Apr. 29, 2025), reconsideration denied, No. 25-CV-60045-RAR, 2025 WL 1650340 (S.D.
Fla. June 11, 2025)).
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When deciding whether a petitioner has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies,
district courts follow the two-step process set forth in Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1082
(11th Cir. 2008). See Blevins v. FCI Hazelton Warden, 819 F. App’x 853, 854, 856 (11th Cir.
2020) (extending Turner to cases under § 2241). First, the court looks at the petitioner’s and the
respondent’s factual allegations and, if they conflict, accepts as true the petitioner’s version of the
facts. Id. If the petitioner’s allegations establish his failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the
court must deny the petition at Turner’s first step. Id. If the petitioner’s factual allegations do not
support dismissal at the first step, the court proceeds to the second step. Id. At Turner’s second
step, the court must “make specific findings in order to resolve the disputed factual issues related
to exhaustion.” Id. The respondent bears the burden of establishing that the petitioner failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies. Id.
To exhaust his administrative remedies in this case, Petitioner was required to comply with
the BOP’s “Administrative Remedy Program,” which allows an inmate “to seek formal review of
an issue relating to any aspect of his/her own confinement.” 28 C.F.R. § 542.10(a); see also
Blevins, 819 F. App’x at 857 (“Because Blevins is a federal prisoner, the BOP’s Administrative
Remedy Program procedural rules apply to her.”). This entails a four-step process. See Krist v.
Eichenlaub, 386 F. App’x 920, 923 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing 28 C.F.R. § 542.10-.19) (explaining
the BOP’s exhaustion process). First, the inmate must attempt to resolve the issue informally with
institution staff. Id. (citing § 542.13). Second, if the issue cannot be resolved informally, the inmate
must submit a formal written Administrative Remedy Request using a BP-9 form to the designated
staff member. Id. (citing § 542.14(a), (c)(4)). Third, if the inmate is not satisfied with the response
to his BP-9 form, he may appeal to the BOP Regional Director using a BP-10 form. Id. (citing
§ 542.15(a)). And fourth, if the inmate is not satisfied with the Regional Director’s response, he
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may appeal to the BOP General Counsel using a BP-11 form designed for Central Office Appeals.
Id. (citing § 542.15(a)). The Warden or other official must respond to a BP-9 within twenty days;
the Regional Director must respond to a BP-10 within thirty days; and the General Counsel must
respond to a BP-11 within forty days. 28 C.F.R. § 542.18. If the inmate does not receive a response
within these times, he “may consider the absence of a response to be a denial at that level.” Id.
Here, the parties’ allegations regarding exhaustion do not conflict, so this Court must
resolve the exhaustion issue at Turner’s first step. 541 F.3d at 1082. Petitioner concedes that he
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See ECF No. [1-1] at 4. On June 24, 2025, Petitioner
filed an informal complaint with his unit team. ECF No. [6-5] at 2. On July 8, 2025, Petitioner
filed an administrative remedy with the Warden’s office. Id. at 9. On July 31, 2025, the Warden
denied Petitioner’s request for administrative remedy, informing Petitioner that “[i]f you are
dissatisfied with this response, you may appeal to the Regional Director[.]” Id. at 10. Petitioner
did not appeal to the Regional Director. Accordingly, the Petition is due to be denied without
prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Davis v. Warden, FCC Coleman-USP
I, 661 F. App’x 561, 562-63 (11th Cir. 2016) (“the district court did not err by dismissing Davis’s
§ 2241 petition without prejudice based on its determination that he failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. . . . However, because the failure to exhaust administrative remedies is
no longer a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, we construe the district court’s dismissal as a
denial”).
Petitioner’s futility argument is unpersuasive. In the Eleventh Circuit, “there are grounds
for doubt that a futility exception is available on a § 2241 petition[.]” Tankersley v. Fisher, No.
08-CV-382-MCR/EMT, 2008 WL 4371797, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2008). The Eleventh Circuit
has recognized that there is no futility exception applicable to the exhaustion requirement in a
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§ 2241 proceeding. McGee v. Warden, FDC Miami, 487 F. App’x 516, 518 (11th Cir. 2012)
(rejecting argument that futility exception applicable to exhaustion prior to bringing a § 2254
petition is applicable to exhaustion requirement for a § 2241 petition); Moore v. Colon, No. 20-
22032-CV, 2020 WL 5868179, at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 27, 2020), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 20-22032-CIV, 2020 WL 5848687 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2020) (finding argument that
exhaustion would be futile inapplicable to § 2241 cases).
Assuming that Petitioner can argue futility, “exceptions to the exhaustion requirement
apply 	only 	in 	‘extraordinary 	circumstances,’” 	and 	“the 	petitioner 	‘bears 	the 	burden 	of
demonstrating the futility of administrative review.’” Jaimes v. United States, 168 F. App’x 356,
359 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Fuller v. Rich, 11 F.3d 61, 62 (5th Cir.1994)). Petitioner has not
satisfied his burden of demonstrating extraordinary circumstances sufficient to demonstrate the
futility of administrative review. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies, and the Petition is due to be denied without prejudice.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
1. 	The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, ECF No. [1], is
DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
2. 	The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to CLOSE this case and DENY all pending
motions as MOOT.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on December 30, 2025.
_______________________________________
BETH BLOOM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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Copies provided to:
Counsel of Record
Louis Goldenberg, pro se
70137-066
Miami FCI
Federal Correctional Institution
Inmate Mail/Parcels
Post Office Box 779800
Miami, FL 33177
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