Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No.: 26-cv-25687-JB
RICARDO RODRIGUES GOMES,
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN, KROME NORTH
SERVICE PROCESSING CENTER,
Respondents.
_____________________________________________/
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Petitioner Ricardo Rodrigues
Gomes’ Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”). 	ECF No. [1].
Respondents filed a Response in opposition to the Petition, and Petitioner filed a
reply. 	ECF Nos. [9], [16]. 	Upon due consideration of the parties’ submissions, the
pertinent portions of the record, and the applicable law, for the reasons explained
below, the Petition is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Brazil. ECF No. [7-1] ¶ 6. On January 12,
2022, Petitioner was admitted to the United States at the Miami International
Airport as a nonimmigrant visitor. 	Id. ¶ 7. 	According to Respondents, Petitioner
procured his admission by presenting a Brazilian passport and nonimmigrant visa in
the name “Paulo Gomes Junior,” a false identity, and has never been admitted to any
lawful status in his true name. Id. ¶ 8.
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On March 4, 2025, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement and
Removal Operations (“ICE”) officers encountered and arrested Petitioner in South
Florida. Id. ¶ 9; ECF No. [12-1] at 7–8. That same day, the United States Department
of Homeland Security (“DHS”) served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear (“NTA”),
charging him as inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) for having procured
admission to the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material
fact, specifically by his use of a passport and visa in the false identity of “Paulo Gomes
Junior.” Id. at 2–3. DHS also issued a Form I-286 Notice of Custody Determination,
ordering Petitioner detained without bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, and Petitioner
requested a custody redetermination by an Immigration Judge (“IJ”). Id. at 10. On
that same day, ICE transferred Petitioner to the Krome North Service Processing
Center in Miami, Florida, where he remained in DHS custody. ECF No. [7-1] at 19.
On March 11, 2025, DHS filed the NTA with the Miami Krome Immigration
Court thereby initiating removal proceedings. ECF No. [7-1] ¶ 13. On June 25, 2025,
Petitioner appeared for a master calendar hearing with the Immigration Court and
was represented by counsel, who waived a reading of the NTA, conceded proper
service, admitted the factual allegations, and conceded removability under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). Id. ¶ 18. The IJ sustained the charge and designated Brazil as the
country of removal. Id. ¶ 19. Petitioner filed for relief, and the IJ scheduled an
individual hearing for August 14, 2025. Id. ¶ 20.
Petitioner’s individual hearing was ultimately held on October 10, 2025. ECF
No. [12-1] at 15–18. At the hearing, Petitioner, through counsel, requested voluntary
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departure in lieu of pursuing his previously filed relief. ECF No. [7-1] ¶ 22. DHS
opposed 	voluntary 	departure, 	but 	the 	IJ 	granted 	Petitioner’s 	request 	for
pre-conclusion voluntary departure under 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1), under safeguards.
Id. ¶ 23.
In the October 10, 2025, written order, the IJ found Petitioner inadmissible
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i); noted that Petitioner’s applications for relief were
withdrawn with prejudice; and granted voluntary departure under safeguards,
ordering Petitioner to depart the United States on or before December 10, 2025.
Id. ¶ 24. The order provided that if Petitioner failed to voluntarily depart by that
date, an alternate order of removal to Brazil would automatically take effect.
Id. ¶ 25. Both parties waived appeal, and no petition for review was filed. Id. ¶ 26.
Petitioner did not depart the United States by the December 10, 2025,
voluntary departure deadline. Id. ¶ 31. As a result, the alternate order of removal to
Brazil 	immediately 	took 	effect 	and 	Petitioner’s 	order 	of 	removal 	became
administratively final. Id. ¶¶ 32, 33.
Thereafter, DHS took steps to obtain valid travel documentation for Petitioner
in his true name. Id. ¶ 34. On December 29, 2025, ICE requested a travel document
from Brazilian authorities and on February 17, 2026, ICE received a Brazilian travel
document for Petitioner. Id. ¶¶ 35–36. With a valid travel document in hand and a
final order of removal in effect due to Petitioner’s failure to voluntarily depart, ICE
scheduled Petitioner for transfer and removal to Brazil. Id. ¶ 37. On March 7, 2026,
ICE transferred Petitioner to the Alexandria Staging Facility in Louisiana and then
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to the Central Louisiana ICE Processing Center on March 9, 2026, in preparation for
removal. Id. ¶ 38.
However, on March 10, 2026, after DHS obtained valid travel documents and
scheduled 	Petitioner’s 	removal, 	Petitioner 	filed 	a 	motion 	to 	reopen 	with 	the
Immigration Court, together with a motion to stay removal. Id. ¶ 39. That same day,
the Immigration Court granted a stay of removal while the motion to reopen
remained pending. 	ECF No. [12-1] at 20. 	ICE returned Petitioner to the Krome
North Service Processing Center on March 11, 2026, where he remained in custody.
ECF No. [7-1] at 19.
On April 7, 2026, Petitioner filed his first habeas petition, and the Court
entered an order stating that “Respondent[s] SHALL NOT transfer or otherwise move
Petitioner from his current place of detention until further order of the Court.”
Rodrigues Gomes v. Warden, No. 26-cv-22377-KMW, ECF No. [4], Paperless Order
filed on April 7, 2026 (S.D. Fla. 2026).
On June 1, 2026, the Immigration Court denied Petitioner’s motion to reopen
removal proceedings, thereby lifting the stay preventing Petitioner’s removal. ECF
No. [7-1] at 49–50.
On August 14, 2026, the Court denied Petitioner’s first habeas petition.
Rodrigues Gomes v. Warden, No. 26-cv-22377-KMW, ECF No. [17], Order filed on
August 14, 2026 (S.D. Fla. 2026).
On August 20, 2026, three days later, Petitioner filed the instant habeas
petition. ECF No. [1]. Petitioner asserts that the first requirement under Zadvydas
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v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001) is met because he has been detained more than six
months since his removal order became administratively final. 	ECF No. [1-2] at 7.
Petitioner further asserts that he provides “good reason to doubt” that his removal is
reasonably 	foreseeable, 	namely 	that 	Respondents 	did 	not 	remove 	him 	despite
obtaining travel documents in February 2026 and scheduling his removal in March
2026. 	Id. 	Petitioner also states that he “fear[s] death in Brazil” and “would accept
lawful removal to Canda, Mexico, or Colombia if one of those countries agrees to
admit [him].” Id. at 4, 16. Petitioner also adds that his “documented fear of death in
Brazil should not be recast as obstruction” and that he “remain[s] willing to cooperate
and accept removal to a third country that lawfully admits [him].” Id. at 8. Among
other relief, Petitioner requests an order requiring his release under an order of
supervision with reasonable conditions. Id. at 10.
On August 25, 2026, Respondents filed their Response to the Petition. 	ECF
No. [9]. 	Respondents argue that the Petition should be denied because the Court
lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the Petition under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). 	Id. at 6−7.
Next, Respondents argue that the Petition lacks merit because it is premature. 	Id.
at 8−9. 	Specifically, Respondents argue that “even if one ignores Petitioner’s own
conduct in delaying the procurement of travel documents,” the Petition is premature
because it was filed twenty-two days before the expiration of the six-month period
held to be presumptively reasonable under Zadvydas. Id. at 9. Finally, Respondents
argue that the Petition also lacks merit because Petitioner has not met his burden
under Zadvydas to demonstrate that his removal is not likely in the reasonably
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foreseeable future. 	Id. at 9−11. 	On this point, Respondents add that “but for this
Court’s order prohibiting transfer of Petitioner out of the jurisdiction of this Court,
there are no other impediments to removal, and removal is likely in the reasonably
foreseeable future as ICE ERO has already successfully verified the Petitioner’s
identity with the Brazilian consulate.” Id. at 11. Respondents also assert that “some
of the delay about which Petitioner complains is his own doing,” referencing his filing
of the motion to reopen and motion to stay with the Immigration Court and his filing
of habeas petitions which resulted in an order prohibiting his removal while the
petitions remained pending. Id. at 10.
In reply, Petitioner maintains that his claim under Zadvydas is ripe because
he has been detained in excess of six months following his removal order becoming
final. ECF No. [16] at 1−2. Next, Petitioner argues that Respondents have failed to
provide evidence rebutting that removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably
foreseeable future. Id. at 2. Petitioner notes that Respondents have failed to provide
evidence such as currently a valid travel document or a flight, itinerary, reservation,
or removal date.1 Id.
II. 	ANALYSIS
District courts have the authority to grant writs of habeas corpus. 	See 28
U.S.C. § 2241(a). Habeas corpus is fundamentally “a remedy for unlawful executive
1 Petitioner also states that “Respondent’s principal factual source is the declaration
of Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer James R. Gamboa dated April 13,
2026, originally prepared [in connection with his first habeas petition]” and asserts
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detention.” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008) (citation omitted). A writ may
be issued to a petitioner who shows that he is being held in custody in violation of the
Constitution or federal law. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 	The Court’s jurisdiction
extends to challenges involving immigration detention. 	See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 687 (2001).
A. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)
Section 1252 is “Congress’s comprehensive scheme for judicial review of
removal orders.” 	Canal A Media Holding, LLC v. USCIS, 964 F.3d 1250, 1256–57
(11th Cir. 2020). 	To be sure, this provision bars judicial review over “any cause or
claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney
General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders
against 	any 	alien[.]” 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1252(g). 	It 	“is 	specifically 	directed 	at 	the
deconstruction, fragmentation, and hence prolongation of removal proceedings.”
Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 487 (1999). That
said, “1252(g) is not to be construed broadly as a ‘zipper’ clause applying to the full
universe of deportation-related claims, but instead as applying narrowly to only the
three ‘discrete’ governmental actions enumerated in that subsection.” 	Wallace v.
Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 616 F. App’x 958, 960 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing
A.A.D.C., 525 U.S. at 472–73). 	“And although many other decisions or actions may
be part of the deportation process, only claims that arise from one of the covered
that the declaration is now “stale.” 	Id. at 3. 	The Court notes, however, that the
declaration relied upon by Respondents was prepared by Deportation Officer Luis A.
Crespo and dated August 24, 2026. ECF No. [7-1] at 2–7.
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actions are excluded from [a court’s] review. . . .” 	Camarena v. Dir., Immigr. &
Customs Enf’t, 988 F.3d 1268, 1272 (11th Cir. 2021) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
Here, Petitioner’s claim does not implicate the Attorney General’s decision to
commence 	proceedings, 	adjudicate 	cases, 	or 	execute 	removal 	orders. 	Rather,
Petitioner challenges the legality of his detention. 	Such claim is reviewable. 	See
Canal A Media Holding, LLC, 964 F.3d at 1257–58 (claim was not barred by § 1252(g)
where action did not fall into one of three categories as “[w]hen asking if a claim is
barred by § 1252(g), courts must focus on the action being challenged.”); see also
Maldonado v. Olson, No. 25-cv-3142, 2025 WL 2374411, at *6 (D. Minn. Aug. 15,
2025) (petitioner’s due process challenge was not barred by § 1252(g) as it did not
“challenge the actions of Respondents in commencing proceedings, adjudicating
cases, or executing removal orders.”); Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 25-cv-01542, 2025 WL
2676082, at *8 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025) (“[B]ecause Petitioner challenges the
lawfulness of his detention during the pendency of his removal proceedings, it is not
a challenge to one of the ‘three discrete events along the road to deportation’ that §
1252(g) applies to.”); Leal-Hernandez v. Noem, No. 25-cv-02428, 2025 WL 2430025,
at *5 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2025) (“Petition[er] mounts a challenge solely to his continued
custody. 	None of the cases the Government relies on pertain to cases in which a
petitioner . . . pursued judicial review of his allegedly unconstitutional custody. 	In
accordance with Supreme Court precedent and the plain language of the text, §
1252(g) does not bar [jurisdiction].”); Sanchez v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-2396, 2025 WL
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2770629, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025) (“Petitioner seeks only review of the legality
of her detention, which does not require judicial intervention into the Attorney
General's decisions to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, and execute removal
orders. . . . Adopting [the government’s] interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) . . . would
eliminate judicial review of immigration detainee’s claims of unlawful detention[.]”);
Campos Leon v. Forestal, No. 25-cv-01774, 2025 WL 2694763, at *1–2 (rejecting
respondents’ § 1252(g) argument and concluding that the court had jurisdiction to
hear habeas petition challenging DHS’ refusal to abide by the IJ’s bond order).
Accordingly, section 1252(g) does not prevent this Court from exercising
jurisdiction over the Petition.
B. Detention Does Not Violate Zadvydas
The Court has jurisdiction over the Petitioner’s claim that the length of his
detention violates due process. 	See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2001) (Ҥ
2241 habeas corpus proceedings remain available as a forum for statutory and
constitutional challenges to post-removal-period detention.”). Petitioner is subject to
a final removal order and, thus, his detention is governed by Title 8 U.S.C. § 1231.
Section 1231(a)(1) requires the Government to effectuate an alien’s removal within a
ninety-day “removal period.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1). 	During this removal period, the
Government must detain the alien. 	8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A) (“During the removal
period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.”). 	The government may detain
an alien beyond the ninety-day removal period only for a length of time “reasonably
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necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States.” Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 689.
In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court considered the petitions of two resident aliens
who challenged the constitutionality of their detentions pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(6), which permits the Government to detain an alien subject to a final order
of removal beyond the 90-day statutory removal period set forth in § 1231(a)(1). Id.
at 682. Although no country was willing to accept either alien once they were ordered
removed, the Government continued to 	detain them after the expiration of §
1231(a)(1)’s 90-day removal period. Id. at 684-86. 	The Supreme Court held that a
detainee may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus to challenge the reasonableness
of their continued detention when the Government is unable to effectuate removal
within the 90-day removal period. Id. at 687.
The Supreme Court further held that “once removal is no longer reasonably
foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute” because “[a]
statute 	permitting 	indefinite 	detention 	of 	an 	alien 	would 	raise 	a 	serious
constitutional problem.” Id. at 690, 699. In so ruling, the Supreme Court explained
that it is presumptively reasonable for the Government to detain an individual for a
period of six months while it effectuates that individual’s removal. Id. at 701. That
said, after this six-month period, “if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court
should hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute”
and grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus, “conditioned on any of the various
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forms of supervised release that are appropriate in the circumstances . . . .” 	Id. at
699–700.
Accordingly, to state a valid claim under Zadvydas, a petitioner must show (1)
“post removal order detention in excess of six months,” and (2) “a good reason to
believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future.” Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002). Thereafter, the
burden shifts to Respondents to “respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that
showing.” Id. (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701 (“After this 6–month period, once
the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with
evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.”).
Here, Petitioner has not provided any evidence to establish that his removal is
not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. 	Indeed, Respondents
have provided a sworn declaration of an ICE deportation officer, which provides that
“[b]ut for this Court’s order prohibiting transfer of Petitioner out of the jurisdiction of
this Court, there are no other impediments to removal, and removal is likely in the
reasonably foreseeable future as ICE ERO has already successfully verified the
Petitioner’s identity with the Brazilian consulate.”2 Id. ¶ 52. Respondents have also
2 As mentioned, Petitioner asserts in his Petition that he has a fear of returning to
Brazil. 	See ECF No. [1-2] at 4, 16. 	The Court notes, however, that Petitioner’s
applications for asylum, withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3), withholding
of removal under the Convention Against Torture, and deferral of removal under the
Convention Against Torture were all withdrawn with prejudice. 	ECF No. [12-1] at
15. 	In addition, Petitioner’s fear is not presently an impediment to his removal
because 	Respondents 	have 	not 	yet 	determined 	that 	his 	fear 	is 	credible. 	If
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submitted evidence showing that they had previously obtained travel documents for
Petitioner and had scheduled his transfer and removal to Brazil. 	Id. ¶¶ 34−39.
Respondents were unable to effectuate his removal because after obtaining valid
travel documents and scheduling his removal, Petitioner filed a motion to reopen and
a motion to stay removal with the Immigration Court, and the Immigration Court
granted the stay of removal while the motion to reopen remained pending. 	Id.
¶¶ 38−40. 	However, the Immigration Court’s stay of removal has since been lifted
following the denial of Petitioner’s motion to reopen removal proceedings. Id. ¶¶ 45–
46. After the Immigration Court’s stay of removal was lifted, Respondents were still
unable to effectuate his removal because they were subject to an order prohibiting his
removal while his first habeas petition remained pending. Id. ¶¶ 43–45. Three days
after his first habeas petition was denied, Petitioner filed the instant Petition, and
the Court entered an order prohibiting Petitioner’s removal while the instant Petition
remained pending. 	Id. ¶¶ 49–50. 	Petitioner offers no evidence showing that
Petitioner’s removal process cannot be replicated and culminate in his removal to
Brazil once the Court’s order prohibiting his removal is lifted. 	Because the second
prong of the Zadvydas is not met, Petitioner’s claim under Zadvydas fails.3
Respondents 	determine 	that 	his 	fear 	is 	not 	credible, 	they 	can 	proceed 	with
effectuating his removal to Brazil. If Respondents determine that his fear is credible,
Petitioner has expressed a willingness to be removed to a third country. See ECF No.
[1] at 8. 	And, on this record, there is no evidence that Respondents could not
effectuate his removal to a third country, if needed.
3 Petitioner and Respondents disagree on whether the first prong is met. 	See ECF
Nos. [1-2] at 7; [9] at 8–9. 	For purposes of this analysis, the Court assumes that
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II. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that
Petitioner’s Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, ECF No. [1], is DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 	The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case and DENY
any pending motions as MOOT.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida this 7th day of
October, 2026.
________________________________________
JACQUELINE BECERRA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Petitioner has met the first prong because even if this prong is met, his claim still
fails under the second prong.
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