Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 25-80249-CIV-SMITH/D’ANGELO
SHALONDA LATRICE
MCCLOUD GARRETT,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FRANK BISGNANO,1
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
_____________________________/
OMNIBUS REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff Shalonda Latrice McCloud Garrett’s Motion
for Summary Judgment filed on August 4, 2025 (DE 17). 2 	Defendant Frank Bisgnano,
Commissioner of Social Security, filed his response in opposition and Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment on August 29, 2025 (DE 19). Plaintiff replied on September 11, 2025 (DE 22). Having
considered the Motions, the relevant legal authorities, and the pertinent portions of the record, and
being otherwise fully advised in the premises, for the reasons stated below, it is respectfully
recommended that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED and that Defendant’s
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED.
1 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on May 7, 2025. 	Pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Frank Bisignano should be substituted as the defendant in
this suit. No further action need be taken to continue this suit by reason of the last sentence of
Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
2 This case was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for all non-dispositive matters and
for a Report and Recommendation on any dispositive issues (DE 9).
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I. 	BACKGROUND
At thirty-four years old, Plaintiff filed her claim for disability on March 26, 2021 (R. 93).3
Plaintiff alleged disability due to “high blood pressure[,] and diabetes,” with an inability to work
as of March 25, 2021 (id.) (emphasis removed). 	On September 9, 2021, Plaintiff’s claim for
disability was denied (R. 134-35). On October 1, 2021, Plaintiff requested reconsideration, which
was likewise denied (R. 149, 152). 	Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”), two of which were held on January 31, 2023 and October 24, 2023 (R. 46, 57).
On December 7, 2023, ALJ Raymond Rodgers issued a written decision, concluding that Plaintiff
was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act (R. 17-36, 162). 	The Appeals
Council rejected Plaintiff’s appeal on January 16, 2025, finding that her “reasons do not provide a
basis for changing the Administrative Law Judge’s decision” (R. 1). Thereafter, Plaintiff filed the
instant action, claiming that the final decision contains errors of law and is not supported by
substantial evidence in the record (DE 1).
A. 	The January 31, 2023 Hearing
On January 31, 2023, ALJ Jose Perez Gonzalez held a hearing on Plaintiff’s claim of
disability (R. 57). Dr. Ricardo Buitrago, a licensed clinical psychologist, testified that he reviewed
the entire record and noted that Plaintiff had “major depressive disorder and a post-traumatic
distress disorder” (R. 65). 	Dr. Buitrago further stated that he does not believe Plaintiff has an
“impairment that is going to meet or equal a listing under the mental health disorders” (id.). 	In
reaching that opinion, Dr. Buitrago explained that after visits with her primary doctors, Plaintiff’s
“mental statuses were the normal limits,” and there was “zero endorsement of any type of
3 Citations to “R.__” refer to the Social Security Transcript (DE 11). The page numbers refer to
those found on the bottom right corner of each page in the transcript.
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depression or anxiety or any kind of mental health symptoms” (id.). There was “no depression,
no panic attacks, no bipolar disorder, no anxiety syndrome,” and Dr. Buitrago “saw no psychiatric
med[icine] management intervention at all in the records” (R. 66). 	According to Dr. Buitrago,
based on objective psychiatric evidence, Plaintiff’s “judgment was normal,” “her thought content
was normal,” she was “fully alert and fully oriented,” and “her behavior was normal” (R. 68).
Dr. Jospeh Gaeta also testified at the January 31, 2023 hearing (R. 70). Dr. Gaeta explained
that Plaintiff’s “severe impairment is her morbid obesity” (R. 71). 	There was “no evidence of
any. . . diabetic impairment” (id.). In Dr. Gaeta’s opinion, Plaintiff could sometimes lift twenty
pounds and could frequently lift ten pounds (id.). She could walk and sit for up to six hours a day,
but she was limited to walking and standing for a total of two hours per day (R. 72). Plaintiff could
occasionally climb stairs, but not ladders, scaffolds, or ropes (id.). Even with Plaintiff’s difficulty
bending over and balancing, Dr. Gaeta explained that he would not change his opinion (R. 73).
Plaintiff also testified before the ALJ at the January 31, 2023 hearing (R. 75). 	Plaintiff
explained she last stopped working somewhere between March 2020 or 2021 (R. 76). She stopped
working, because she was having seizures while driving (id.). Plaintiff testified that she worked
as a driver for First Transit, and in 2021, she worked as a babysitter for her sister’s daughter (R.
77, 78). 	Before working as a babysitter and as a driver, Plaintiff worked as security guard, an
employee at a manufacturing warehouse, a hairstylist, and in customer service at Walmart (R. 81,
83, 84). 	During the hearing, the ALJ stated that he would not “go through [] [Plaintiff’s]
impairment testimony,” and instead sent “her in for a psychological evaluation. So, it would be
depression, anxiety inventory, a mental status exam with RFC” (R. 86-87). However, the ALJ did
take testimony from a Vocational Expert (“VE”), Elizabeth Shultz (R. 87). Ms. Shultz classified
Plaintiff’s previous jobs as a driver, assembler at a warehouse, and a cashier (R. 89). The driving
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and assembler positions were categorized as SVP 3, while Shultz classified the cashier position as
an SVP 2 (id.).4
B. 	The October 24, 2023 Hearing
On October 24, 2023, another hearing was held by ALJ Ray Rodgers, who took over
Plaintiff’s case (R. 46). 	The ALJ took judicial notice of the January 31, 2023 hearing and took
updated testimony from Plaintiff (R. 47). As to her conditions, Plaintiff testified that “everything
is pretty much still the same” (R. 48). Plaintiff explained that she had significant fibroid pain:5
I can’t really sit for a long time. I can’t stand for a long time. The pain, it comes
[as] like very sharp pain[,] like it’s like[,] I’m getting stabbed or something, and
then it’s like they’ll freeze. I mean, like[,] its like a gas pocket that’ll hold on to
[sic] it[,] and press it down and the pain is just very crucial. I can’t move. I can’t do
nothing.
(R. 49). 	According to Plaintiff, “it’s just getting worse and worse,” and her doctors stopped
prescribing her medication (id.). Plaintiff explains that she cannot go anywhere, and “can’t really
do anything” as her pain is “not getting any better” (id.).
VE Joyce Courtright also testified at the October 24, 2023 hearing (R. 50). Considering
Plaintiff’s past work as a driver, security guard, assembler, and cashier, the ALJ asked the VE two
hypotheticals (R. 50-52). 	First, with the same past work experience, the ALJ asked the VE to
assume a hypothetical person could lift and carry ten pounds occasionally, but five pounds
frequently, and sit for six hours out of an eight-hour workday (R. 51). This hypothetical person
could also stand, and stretch after thirty minutes, could occasionally climb ramps or stairs, but not
4 “SVP” means specific vocational preparation, or the amount of time required for a typical claim
to learn the job. See https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0425001001 (last accessed Jan. 16, 2026).
An SVP of 2 takes time “[a]nything beyond short demonstration up to and including 1 month” to
learn the job, while and SVP 3 takes “Over 1 month up to and including 3 months.” Id.
5 “Uterine fibroids are a common type of noncancerous tumor that can grow in and on your uterus.”
https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/diseases/9130-uterine-fibroids (last accessed Dec. 18, 2025).
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ladders, ropes, scaffolds (id.). 	This person similarly could not crawl, but could occasionally
balance, stoop, kneel and crouch (id.). 	The VE testified that this person’s exertion level was
“sedentary,” and this person could perform other work, such as a lens inserter, lens block gauger,
and a stone setter (R. 52). For the next hypothetical, the ALJ “change[d] the standing and walking
to a total for one hour in an eight-hour workday, sitting a total of five hours in an eight-hour
workday” (id.). When asked if this person can work, VE Courtright testified, “[N]ot on a full-time
competitive basis” (id.).
C. 	The ALJ’s December 7, 2023 Decision
On December 7, 2023, the ALJ issued a written decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for
disability (R. 36). The ALJ applied a five-step sequential evaluation process, as set forth in Title
20, Code of Federal Regulations, Sections 404.1520(a) and 416.920(a) (R. 18). At step one, the
ALJ reasoned that Plaintiff “worked after the alleged disability onset date[,] but this work activity
did not rise to the level of substantial gainful activity” (R. 20). 	The ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s
earnings were “below substantial gainful activity levels” (id.). 	As a result, the ALJ concluded
Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 25, 2021—the alleged onset
date (id.). At step two, the ALJ explained that Plaintiff’s lateral displacement of her patella in both
knees was “non-severe,” because the displacement was not present for more than a twelve-month
period, was responsive to medicine, was accounted for in her residual functional capacity, did not
require significant medical intervention, and did not result in any continuous exertional functional
limitations (id.). 	At any rate, the ALJ explained that Plaintiff had the following severe
impartments: diabetes mellitus, hypertension, uterine fibroids, obesity, posttraumatic stress
disorder, and depression (id.).
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At step three, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination
of impairments that meets, or medically equals, the severity of one of the listed impairments in
Sections 404.1520(d), 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926 (id.). 	In reaching this
conclusion, the ALJ stated that “the record does not reflect the claimant having peripheral
neuropathy with disorganization of motor function in two extremities, resulting in sustained
disturbance of gross and dexterous movements, or gait and station in spite of prescribed treatment”
(R. 21). Further, Plaintiff’s mental impairments, “do not meet or medically equal criteria of listings
12.04, 12.06, 12.15” (id.). 	According to the ALJ, “[t]reatment notes generally indicate[d] the
claimant having intact memory” and understanding comments and questions without difficulty,
and at her examinations, Plaintiff was able to recall 2/3 words after 10 minutes (R. 21-22). Plaintiff
had a moderate limitation when interacting with others, as the evidence showed that she was
consistently polite and cooperative, while also routinely displaying normal behavior during her
appointments (R. 22). 	Additionally, the ALJ stated that “treatment notes generally reflect the
claimant being alert and do not indicate any significant problems with distractibility” (id.). As to
Plaintiff’s obesity, the ALJ determined that it was “severe, but does not preclude the performance
of all work” (R. 21).
After a review of the entire record, the ALJ next determined Plaintiff’s residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) (R. 23).6 According to the ALJ, Plaintiff’s RFC allows her to:
lift and carry 10 pounds occasionally and 5 pounds frequently; sit for six hours in
an eight hour workday; stand and or walk for two hours in an eight hour workday;
permitted to stand and stretch after 30 minutes of work while being off task for one
minute; occasional climbing of ramps or stairs, but no climbing of ladders, ropes,
or scaffolds; occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, and crouching; no crawling;
must avoid concentrated exposure to pulmonary irritants such as fumes, odors, dust,
and gases; no exposure to hazardous machinery or unprotected heights; able to
6 An individual’s RFC represents the most the individual can do in a work setting despite the effects
from his or her physical and mental limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1) (2012).
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understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions; able to use judgment to
make simple work-related decisions; able to deal with changes in a routine work
setting; occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors; and no interaction
with the public.
(id.) (emphasis removed). The ALJ found that when Plaintiff spoke about her pain and symptoms,
it was “not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record” (id.).
The ALJ noted that the objective medical evidence showed that Plaintiff is capable of sedentary
work activity, and Plaintiff’s testimony of debilitating pain and limitation was “inconsistent with
the numerous examinations that have shown . . . [Plaintiff] to have intact strength, a normal
musculoskeletal range of motion, and normal cardiac and pulmonary examinations” (R. 24). The
ALJ further noted that treatment notes showed Plaintiff could do usual activities, and Plaintiff’s
diabetes was controlled (id.). 	At step four, the ALJ analyzed whether Plaintiff had the RFC to
perform the requirements of her past relevant work (R. 23). The ALJ agreed that the demands of
Plaintiff’s past relevant work exceeded her RFC (id.).
Lastly, at step five, the ALJ found that considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work
experience, and RFC, jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy that she could
have performed (R. 35). Specifically, Plaintiff could work as a lens inserter, lens block gauger,
and a stone setter, as Plaintiff “is capable of making a successful adjustment to other work” (R.
35-36). The ALJ concluded that “a finding of ‘not disabled’ was therefore appropriate” (id.).
D. 	The Medical Opinion of Dr. Daniel Ward
Dr. Daniel Ward, a licensed psychologist, conducted two examinations of Plaintiff on
August 25, 2021 and March 1, 2023 and issued reports on those same dates.
a. 	The August 25, 2021 Evaluation
On August 25, 2021, Dr. Ward examined Plaintiff and noted that Plaintiff drove herself to
his office in West Palm Beach, Florida (R. 882). Plaintiff told Dr. Ward that her primary problems
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were uterine fibroids, obesity, seizures, diabetes, high blood pressure, depression, and sometimes
having a short memory (id.). 	During the examination, Plaintiff explained that she had her first
seizure in December 2020 and then two more in January 2021, which was her last seizure (id.).
As to her mental health, Plaintiff stated that she was diagnosed with depression three or four years
ago and took an antidepressant until she lost her insurance (id.). 	Plaintiff reported a history of
chronic trauma-related symptoms from watching her father commit suicide in front of her when
she was five years-old, as well as multiple instances of sexual abuse, manifesting in post-traumatic
stress disorder (id.). 	Plaintiff denied any psychiatric hospitalization, though she participated in
outpatient mental health treatment, which included seeing a therapist for two months (id.). Plaintiff
did not report any substance abuse history, nor could Dr. Ward find any evidence of antisocial
behavior, such as criminal convictions (id.).
During the examination, Dr. Ward made several physical and behavioral observations (R.
884). Dr. Ward noted that Plaintiff was morbidly obese, and she walked and moved slowly (id.).
Plaintiff did not display any bizarre mannerisms, nor were any repetitive gestures observed (id.).
There we no difficulties with Plaintiff’s posture, gait, or coordination, and her attire, grooming,
and hygiene appeared appropriate (id.). Plaintiff’s speech was normal, articulable within normal
limits, and the conversation was mostly limited to her answering direct questions (id.). According
to Dr. Ward, Plaintiff appeared to understand comments and questions without difficulty (id.). He
noted that during the examination, Plaintiff appeared depressed, but she was able to talk about
herself and her problems (id.). 	As the examination progressed, Plaintiff detailed how “she has
rarely been as happy as most people throughout her life” (id.). Plaintiff described the following
symptoms: “[D]epressed mood more days than not, difficulty concentrating, persistent fatigue, and
a lack of energy, chronic irritability, anhedonia, social withdrawal, sleep difficulties including
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difficulty falling and staying asleep and premature awakening, loss of appetite, hopelessness,
feelings of worthlessness, excessive inappropriate guilt, and uncontrollable crying ‘almost every
day’” (id.). Plaintiff denied suicidal ideation and denied considering suicide at the examination
(id.). 	Dr. Ward observed that Plaintiff’s report symptoms were consistent with post-traumatic
stress disorder (id.). 	When describing these symptoms, Plaintiff stated that she had “recurrent
intrusive distressing memories, nightmares ‘like three to four times a week, I wake up, sit up and
start crying then I can’t get back to sleep,’ flashbacks ‘like three to four times a week’” (id.).
Plaintiff 	also 	reported 	“chronic 	irritability, 	hypervigilance, 	exaggerated 	startle 	response,
concentration difficulties[,] and sleep disturbance” (R. 885).
Throughout the examination, Plaintiff’s thought expression appeared rational and coherent
(id.). 	There were no “loosened association, neologisms, word salad, flight of ideas, rambling
speech, preoccupations[,] or delusional thinking” (id.). Plaintiff’s verbal structure was logical and
relevant, and she was able to attend throughout the entire interview (id.). Plaintiff “was oriented
to time, place, person and situation,” and was able to successfully name President Biden as the
then-current president, and President Trump as the prior president (id.). In a ten-minute period,
Dr. Ward gave Plaintiff three words to remember, but she could only recall two of them (id.). Dr.
Ward did not observe any mumbling, distraction to internal or unseen stimuli, odd verbalization
or movements, unusual laughter or crying, or any other over signs of hallucinations (id.). 	As a
result of the examination, Dr. Ward diagnosed Plaintiff with major depressive disorder with mood-
congruent psychotic features (id.). Even so, Plaintiff “was able to attend throughout the interview
without a need for redirection,” and appeared to follow verbal and written instructions (R. 886).
According to Dr. Ward, Plaintiff was also able to “interact appropriately” with someone she just
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met (id.). As to her ability to work, Dr. Ward opined that Plaintiff’s “current physical condition
[was] likely causing an equal if not greater impediment to work activity at this time” (id.).
b. 	The March 1, 2023 Examination
Dr. Ward conducted a second examination on March 1, 2023, which largely mirrored the
August 25, 2021 examination (R. 1272). 	Plaintiff again complained of her weight, high blood
pressure, diabetes, fibroids, and depression (id.). Plaintiff denied any substance abuse issues, and
Dr. Ward found no signs of serious conflict with society (R. 1273). 	Dr. Ward observed that
Plaintiff is “an immensely obese female adult” (R. 1274). As with the first examination, Plaintiff’s
attire and hygiene were normal, she was consistently polite and cooperative, her speech was normal,
she articulated within normal limits, and she understood the purpose of the examination (id.).
Plaintiff was not tearful during the interview and denied any suicidal ideation (id.). 	Dr. Ward
noted that Plaintiff’s thought expression appeared rational and coherent (R. 1275). 	She was
oriented to time, place, person, and situation (id.). Once again, Plaintiff remembered two out of
three words in a ten-minute period (id.). Plaintiff knew the current and prior president and did not
report any hallucinatory symptoms (id.). 	Dr. Ward diagnosed Plaintiff with major depressive
disorder and recurrent and post-traumatic stress disorder (R. 1276).
Like his first examination, Dr. Ward opined that Plaintiff “was able to attend throughout
the interview without a need for redirection” (id.). Further, Dr. Ward stated, “Despite protracted
depression and reported physical limitations, [] [Plaintiff] appears to see to her own immediate
needs without unusual assistance” (id.). 	Plaintiff explained to Dr. Ward that “due to physical
limitations” she is only able to complete very limited housekeeping and chores (id.). 	Dr. Ward
observed that Plaintiff “was able to interact appropriately with someone she did not know” (id.).
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Just as in the first examination, Dr. Ward stated that Plaintiff’s “current physical condition [was]
likely causing an equal if not greater impediment to work activity” (id.).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. Statutory Framework
A claimant seeking to qualify for disability benefits must show the “inability to engage in
any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last
for a continuous period of not less than 12 months . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2020). 	A
physical or mental impairment is “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques.” Id. § 423(d)(3). Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that he is
disabled and producing evidence to support his claim. Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276
(11th Cir. 2003) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a) (2000)).
Pursuant to the Social Security regulations, the ALJ must follow a five-step process to
determine whether a claimant is disabled. 	20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-
(v) (2012). At step one, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is currently employed. Id.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i). 	If the claimant is working, and the work constitutes substantial gainful
activity, the inquiry concludes.7 Id. § 404.1520(b). At step two, the ALJ must determine whether
the claimant suffers from “severe” impairment(s).8 Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). 	At step three, the
7 “Substantial gainful activity is work activity that is both substantial and gainful . . . .” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1572 (2000). 	“Substantial work activity is work activity that involves doing significant
physical or mental activities.” Id. § 404.1572(a). “Gainful work activity is . . . work usually done
for pay or profit, whether or not a profit is realized.” Id. § 404.1572(b).
8 A severe impairment, or combination of impairments, “significantly limits . . . physical or mental
ability to do basic work activities” for a continuous period of at least twelve months. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(b), 404.1522(a)-(b) (2017).
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ALJ must determine the medical severity of the claimant’s impairment, namely whether the
claimant suffers from an impairment that meets, or equals, a listed impairment found under Section
404.1520(d), subpart P, appendix 1. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii).
The ALJ must then determine the claimant’s RFC and at step four, whether the claimant’s
impairments prevent him from performing his past relevant work. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). When
determining a claimant’s RFC, “the ALJ must consider all medical opinions in the claimant’s case
record together with other pertinent evidence.” Duffy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 736 F. App’x 834,
836 (11th Cir. 2018). 	The ALJ’s RFC assessment informs the “claimant’s remaining ability to
work despite his impairment.” Castle v. Colvin, 557 F. App’x 849, 852 (11th Cir. 2014). Although
the ALJ’s decision need not refer to every piece of evidence, the “decision must contain sufficient
detail so that [the reviewing court] can conclude that the ALJ considered the claimant’s medical
condition as a whole in assessing [his] residual functional capacity assessment.” Sims v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 706 F. App’x 595, 601-02 (11th Cir. 2017); Lewen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 605 F.
App’x 967, 968 (11th Cir. 2015). Where one source offers multiple opinions, the ALJ only needs
to address the source, not each opinion. 	Medina v. Kijakazi, No. 21-CIV-62281, 2022 WL
6572349, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 2022) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(1) (2017)).
In determining a claimant’s RFC, the applicable Social Security regulations state that the
ALJ “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any
medical opinion(s) . . . including those from [a claimant’s] medical sources.” 	20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(a) (2017). 	Rather, the ALJ must specify how persuasive the medical opinions are
using the following factors: supportability, consistency, the medical source’s relationship with the
claimant, the medical source’s specialization, and any other factors that may support or contradict
a medical opinion. Id. § 404.1520c(b)-(c). The two most important factors are supportability and
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consistency, and the ALJ must explain how she considered them. 	Id. § 404.1520c(b)(2). 9
“Supportability relates to the extent to which a medical source has articulated support for the
medical source’s own opinion[.]” Bell, 2023 WL 5275994, at *2; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1)
(“The more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a
medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s)
will be.”). “[C]onsistency relates to the relationship between a medical source’s opinion and other
evidence within the record.” 	Bell, 2023 WL 5275994, at *2; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2)
(“The more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the
evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the
medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.”).
At step five, the ALJ considers whether the claimant, despite his impairments, can perform
work in the national economy given his age, education, RFC, and work experience. 	20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v). At this last step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant can adjust to other
work in the national economy by applying the Medical Vocational Guidelines or by relying on a
vocational expert. Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1239-40 (11th Cir. 2004), superseded on
other grounds by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c.
B. 	Standard of Review
The Court’s review of an ALJ’s final decision is limited to whether the ALJ applied the
correct legal standards and whether substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s findings.
9 “The ALJ may, but is not required to, explain how she considered the remaining three factors
(relationship with claimant, specialization, and ‘other factors’).” Bell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
22-CIV-2174, 2023 WL 5275994, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 2023) (quoting 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(b)(2)).
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42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2023); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002). “Substantial
evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Bloodsworth v. Heckler,
703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971));
see also Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1220 (“Substantial evidence ‘must do more than create a suspicion of
the existence of the fact to be established.’” (quoting McRoberts v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 1077, 1080
(11th Cir. 1988))). The ALJ’s factual findings are conclusive if they are supported by substantial
evidence, and the Court must defer to the ALJ’s final decision. Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
363 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2004).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence,
because the ALJ did not properly evaluate Dr. Ward’s opinion (DE 17 at 4). Specifically, Plaintiff
alleges that the ALJ did not consider the consistency factor in evaluating the persuasiveness of Dr.
Ward’s opinion, as required by the regulations (id.). In Plaintiff’s view, the entirety of the ALJ’s
analysis only discussed supportability, and the ALJ’s failure to discuss consistency in his analysis
requires remand (id. at 5). 	Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ erred in failing to consider that
Plaintiff’s subjective reporting supported Dr. Ward’s findings, and the ALJ improperly limited his
consideration to unremarkable, objective aspects of Dr. Ward’s opinion (id. at 7-8). 	Lastly,
Plaintiff asserts that these errors by the ALJ were not harmless (id. at 8-9).
Defendant argues that remand is not appropriate, because the ALJ’s RFC determination
was more restrictive than what Dr. Ward opined (DE 19 at 4). Put differently, the ALJ’s mental
RFC assessment contained greater social limitations than what Dr. Ward suggested (id. at 5).
Therefore, even if the ALJ did not address the consistency factor in evaluating Dr. Ward’s opinion,
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remand is not appropriate, because Dr. Ward’s opinion ultimately supports the outcome reached
by the ALJ (id.). In Defendant’s view, any error that the ALJ may have committed was harmless,
and remand is not required (id. at 6).
A. 	The ALJ’s Evaluation of Dr. Ward’s Opinion
The ALJ determined that he was “not persuaded” by Dr. Ward’s opinion (R. 32). Indeed,
the ALJ stated the following in his decision regarding Dr. Ward:
Their examinations of the claimant found her to have an appropriate appearance, to
be consistently polite and cooperative, to have normal speech, to understand
comments or questions without difficulty, to have rational and coherent thought
expression, and to be able to attend throughout the interviews. The claimant
displayed some memory deficits during the examinations, but the objective mental
status 	examination 	findings 	of 	the 	claimant 	were 	largely 	unremarkable.
Consequently, their examinations of the claimant were inconsistent with the
assessments that the claimant appeared to have deficits in task persistency, that she
would need assistance managing funds, that she would have reduced ability to
participate in social interactions, that she would have impediments to occupational
achievement, that she would have difficulty effectively managing expectations of
employment, and that she would need more encouragement and support than most
when encountering work difficulties or social challenges. Further, this examiner’s
opinions 	include 	multiple 	statements 	concerning 	limitations 	related 	to 	the
claimant’s physical impairments, and they are not a medical doctor.
(id.). 	According to Plaintiff, absent from the ALJ’s discussion of Dr. Ward’s opinion is any
mention of how Dr. Ward’s opinion compares to other medical evidence or any other evidence in
the record, which constitutes sufficient error to compel remand (DE 17 at 6; DE 22 at 3).
The applicable Social Security regulations require the ALJ to “articulate in [his]
determination or decision how persuasive [he] find[s] all of the medical opinions and all of the
prior administrative medical findings” and “explain how [he] considered the supportability and
consistency factors for a medical source’s medical opinions or prior administrative medical
findings . . . .” 	20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b), (b)(2). 	Here, while the ALJ’s findings address the
supportability of Dr. Ward’s medical opinion, there is no analysis of whether and how Dr. Ward’s
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opinion is consistent, or not, with the other evidence in the record. As Plaintiff correctly points
out, though the ALJ used the term “inconsistent” in comparing Dr. Ward’s observations during his
examinations with his conclusions, the entirety of the analysis references medical evidence and
supporting explanations from Dr. Ward – not other medical and non-medical sources. This is a
supportability analysis, not a consistency analysis. 	See Hardy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 24-
CIV-587, 2025 WL 925849, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2025) (“Consistency requires ‘the evidence
from other medical sources and nonmedical sources’ to be consistent with the medical opinion
presented.” (citation omitted)). Tellingly, Defendant does not advance any real argument that the
ALJ addressed the consistency factor when evaluating Dr. Ward’s opinion. Nor does Defendant
point to any specific language in the ALJ’s opinion that constitutes a discussion of consistency.
Instead, Defendants move directly to their argument that any failure by the ALJ to address the
consistency of Dr. Ward’s opinion does not require remand, because Dr. Ward’s opinion does not
support Plaintiff’s claim and instead support the ALJ’s determination. 	Unable to locate any
discussion of consistency with respect to Dr. Ward’s opinion in the ALJ’s decision, the Court now
turns to whether that error was harmless.
B. 	Any Error by the ALJ was Harmless
“When . . . an incorrect application of the regulations results in harmless error because the
correct application would not contradict the ALJ’s ultimate findings, the ALJ’s decision will stand.”
Denomme v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 518 F. App’x 875, 877 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Diorio v.
Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 728 (11th Cir. 1983)); see also Whitten v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 778
F. App’x 791, 793 (11th Cir. 2019) (“If the ALJ commits an error that does not affect the outcome,
it’s harmless and doesn’t require reversal or remand.”). Defendant argues that the ALJ’s mental
RFC assessment contained greater limitations than what Dr. Ward suggested, so the ALJ fully
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accounted for the functional limitations that Dr Ward identified (DE 19 at 5). Plaintiff counters
that the ALJ’s RFC limitations did not account for the entirety of the limitations proposed by Dr.
Ward; therefore, the ALJ’s error in evaluating Dr. Ward’s opinion was not harmless (DE 22 at 2).
In particular, Plaintiff identifies two functional limitations put forth by Dr. Ward that she claims
were not addressed by the ALJ’s RFC determination – Dr. Ward opined that: (i) “[Plaintiff] would
require more encouragement and support than do most people when encountering work difficulties
or social challenges,” and (ii) Plaintiff would likely have “significant difficulty effectively
managing the expectations of employment at this time” (id.; R. 886, 1276).
The ALJ concluded that the following limitations were appropriate with respect to
Plaintiff’s mental RFC assessment: “[Plaintiff is] able to understand, remember, and carry out
simple instructions; able to use judgment to make simple work-related decisions; able to deal with
changes in a routine work setting; occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors; and no
interaction with the public” (R. 23). Turning to Dr. Ward’s proposed limitations, the record belies
Plaintiff’s contention that the deficiency in the ALJ’s discussion of Dr. Ward’s opinion precludes
the Court’s meaningful review of the decision. 	To the contrary, while the ALJ found that Dr.
Ward’s opinion was “not persuasive,” his RFC determination incorporated limitations that Dr.
Ward suggested. See Wright v. Barnhart, 153 F. App’x 678, 684 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding although
the ALJ did not explicitly weigh certain medical opinions, where “none of their opinions directly
contradicted the ALJ’s findings, . . . any error regarding their opinions is harmless”).
For example, the ALJ specified that Plaintiff would be required only to use judgment to
make simple work-related decisions and would be subject only to occasional interaction with
colleagues and no interaction with the public. 	This RFC determination aligns with Dr. Ward’s
opinion that Plaintiff’s impairments result in a response to work difficulties and social challenges
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that requires additional consideration, and that Plaintiff demonstrates an inability to do well “in
occupations requiring frequent, protracted[,] or demanding social interactions” (R. 886, 1277); see
also Kreiner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 16-CIV-1013, 2017 WL 2729873, at *4 (M.D. Fla. May
31, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 16-CIV-1013, 2017 WL 2731319 (M.D. Fla.
June 23, 2017) (finding harmless error where the ALJ failed to weigh medical treatment records
that did not show plaintiff’s impairments caused functional limitations greater than those contained
in the ALJ’s RFC determination). 	To the extent Dr. Ward opined that Plaintiff’s impairments
would cause significant difficulty in managing or maintaining employment, courts have found
such statements are not medical opinions that must be evaluated by the ALJ. See Denomme, 518
F. App’x at 878 (finding a doctor’s statement that the plaintiff’s condition would likely prevent
her from maintaining employment was not a medical assessment); see also 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520b(c); 416.920b(c).
The cases that Plaintiff relies on to establish reversible error are unpersuasive. In Johnson
v. Commissioner of Social Security, the Court remanded the action to the ALJ, as the written
decision failed to connect the ALJ’s findings to the evidence to allow for proper review. 2025 WL
720927, at *3. By contrast, the ALJ’s decision in this case is robust and discusses a plethora of
evidence in the record—making clear that the ALJ considered the totality of the record and relied
on substantial evidence that supported his conclusions. Similarly, in Pierson v. Commissioner of
Social Security, the ALJ used conclusory statements when discussing a doctor’s opinion. No. 19-
CIV-01515, 2020 WL 1957597, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2020), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 19-CIV-1515-37, 2020 WL 1955341 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2020). 	As a result, the
ALJ’s statements were “insufficient to allow the Court to determine that the ALJ’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence.” 	Id. 	As mentioned, the ALJ’s decision here discussed the
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various opinions and evidence in the record and articulated what evidence he found persuasive and
why. Finally, in Storey v. Berryhill, the Eleventh Circuit vacated a remanded an action to the ALJ,
as the ALJ mischaracterized records and substituted his own opinion for that of a medical expert.
776 F. App’x 628, 637 (11th Cir. 2019). 	In this case, there is no suggestion that the ALJ
mischaracterized the record or improperly relied upon his own opinion.
Further, even if the ALJ’s RFC determination does not encompass all limitations that Dr.
Ward proposed, it was nevertheless supported by substantial evidence in the record. Other medical
evidence, including evaluations and records from Dr. Eric Wiener, a psychologist, and Dr. Claudia
Tejera Quesada, shows that despite Plaintiff’s physical and mental impairments, she was capable
of walking and sitting for periods of time throughout a workday, could manage money, and had
coherent thoughts and the ability to express herself effectively (R. 95-96, 1282-97). On August
28, 2021, Dr. Wiener examined Plaintiff and noted that she had some difficulty walking, “but she
is able to do so without an assistive device” (R. 94). Dr. Wiener further noted that Plaintiff was
morbidly obese but with “no apparent observations or complaints of any mental symptoms” (R.
94-95). According to Dr. Wiener, Plaintiff’s physical issues caused the primary limitation to her
physical activities of daily living (id.). Dr. Wiener opined that Plaintiff could stand and walk with
normal breaks for two hours of the day, and Plaintiff could sit with normal breaks for about six
hours in an eight-hour workday (R. 96). 	Similarly, Dr. Tejera examined Plaintiff on March 4,
2023 and noted that Plaintiff could do all activities of daily life without major assistance, except
putting shoes and socks on (R. 1282-83). 	Plaintiff was alert and oriented, spoke normally, and
cooperated with the exam (R. 1284). 	Plaintiff scored 5/5 in her strength, right and left upper
extremities, right and left lower extremities, and in her grip (R. 1285). Based on her examination,
Dr. Tejera found that Plaintiff had no limitations in sitting but had moderate limitations in standing
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(R. 1289). 	Plaintiff also had moderate limitations in walking, which she could occasionally
perform in 10–15-minute intervals due to morbid obesity and worsening joint pain given
degenerative joint disease (id.). Dr. Tejera also opined that Plaintiff had no limitations in lifting
and carrying (id.). Additionally, Dr. Robert Hodes, a psychologist, stated that he “did not notice
any mental difficulties” (R. 112, 114). Dr. Hodes noted that there were “no apparent observations
of complaints of any mental symptoms” (R. 113).
In light of the substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision, remanding this action to
the ALJ to analyze Dr. Ward’s opinion under the consistency factor is likely a “wasteful corrective
exercise.” Sanchez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 507 F. App’x 855, 856 (11th Cir. 2013). Even though
the ALJ erred in his analysis of Dr. Ward’s opinion, “the error is harmless because it did not affect
the administrative law judge’s ultimate determination.” 	Hunter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 609 F.
App’x 555, 558 (11th Cir. 2015). It is clear that the ALJ considered Dr. Ward’s opinion, even if
ultimately deeming it unpersuasive, and the totality of the record evidence shows substantial
evidence supported the ALJ’s decision to discount Dr. Ward’s opinion, as it was inconsistent with
his observations during his examinations, inconsistent with other medical evidence in the record,
and spoke to issues ultimately reserved for the Commissioner. 	Tillman v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec.
Admin., 559 F. App’x 975, 976 (11th Cir. 2014).
To the extent Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred in failing to consider that Plaintiff’s subjective
reporting supported Dr. Ward’s findings and only discussing unremarkable aspects of Dr. Ward’s
opinion, those arguments too are unavailing. The ALJ need not cite every single piece of evidence
in the record to support his findings and conclusions, “so long as the decision does not broadly
reject the claimant’s case and is sufficient for a reviewing court ‘to conclude that the ALJ
considered the claimant’s medical condition as a whole.’” See Brito v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin.,
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687 F. App’x 801, 804 (11th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). 	The ALJ cited sufficient, probative
evidence, allowing the Court to conclude that the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s medical condition as
a whole. 	In sum, notwithstanding the error from the ALJ’s incomplete analysis of Dr. Ward’s
opinion, such error is harmless in this case, as the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff was not disabled is
supported by substantial evidence. 	See Griffin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 560 F. App’x 837, 841
(11th Cir. 2014) (“This Court may not reweigh evidence and decide facts anew, and must defer to
the ALJ’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence.”).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (DE 17) be DENIED and that Defendant’s Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment (DE 19) be GRANTED.
V. 	OBJECTIONS
The Parties will have fourteen (14) days from the date of this Report and Recommendation
to file written objections, if any, with the Honorable Rodney Smith, United States District Judge.
Failure to file objections timely shall bar the parties from a de novo determination by the District
Judge of an issue covered in this Report and shall bar the parties from attacking on appeal
unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report, except upon grounds of plain
error, if necessary, in the interest of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.
140, 149 (1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989); 11th Cir. R. 3-1 (2016).
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED in Chambers in Miami, Florida on this 26th day of
January, 2026.
____________________________________
ELLEN F. D’ANGELO
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
cc: 	All Counsel of Record
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