Burgess v. Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 25-CV-80494-RS
THOMAS BURGESS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DEPUTY WILLIAM ROTHMAN,
Defendant.
____________________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT [ECF No. 23]
Defendant, Palm Beach Sheriff’s Office (“PBSO”) Deputy William Rothman,
moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint of pro se Plaintiff, Thomas Burgess, for
failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). [ECF
No. 23]. Judge Smith referred the Motion to Dismiss to me for a Report and
Recommendation. [ECF No. 36]. I have reviewed the Amended Complaint [ECF No.
16], the Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 23], Plaintiff’s Response [ECF No. 24],
Defendant’s Reply [ECF No. 28], and pertinent parts of the record. For the reasons
discussed below, it is RECOMMENDED that the Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED
with leave to amend.
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BACKGROUND
Mr. Burgess brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that Deputy
Rothman violated his constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause. [ECF No. 16]. The allegations below are taken from the Amended
Complaint and accepted as true for purposes of the Motion to Dismiss.
Mr. Burgess alleges that in May 2021, he had been staying at the Capri
Apartments, a motel in Lake Worth Beach, Florida, for approximately a week. Id.
¶¶11–12.1 One morning, Mr. Burgess went to the motel offices to locate the manager
and arrange to continue his stay; however, he could not find him, so he called and left
a voice mail to inform the manager he would pay for another night. ¶¶15–20. He then
left for a doctor’s appointment and returned to the motel later that day to find his
belongings “out of the room” where he had been staying. ¶¶21–23. Mr. Burgess
explained to the manager that he had tried to reach him, and that the manager “was
wrong for the way he treated the plaintiff.” ¶24. Mr. Burgess placed his property in
his car and drove to a different motel. ¶25. At the new motel, he noticed some of his
items were missing, so he returned to the Capri Apartments on May 25, 2025, to
inquire about those items. ¶26. When he arrived, the manager began yelling at him
and walking toward him, which scared Mr. Burgess and caused him to dial 911.
¶¶27–28.
1 Unless otherwise noted, all paragraph citations reference the Amended Complaint,
ECF No. 16.
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Deputy Rothman responded to Mr. Burgess’ 911 call. ¶32. Upon his arrival,
Deputy Rothman “began to Racially Profile the plaintiff and he was talking to the
plaintiff as if the plaintiff did something wrong.” ¶34. Deputy Rothman also spoke
with the motel manager and issued Mr. Burgess a trespass warning. ¶¶69–70, ECF
No. 16-1. Then, in 2024, Mr. Burgess accessed Deputy Rothman’s police report from
the incident and believed it contained false statements, including that Mr. Burgess
refused to leave the Capri Apartments property, that he had left his property for five
days without paying, and that the manager was the 911 caller. ¶¶37–42. Mr. Burgess
is an African-American male, and the motel manager is a white male. ¶¶51–52.
Count I asserts that Deputy Rothman violated Mr. Burgess’ rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause by crediting the manager’s version
of events, lying on the police report, and issuing Mr. Burgess a trespass warning. He
claims that Deputy Rothman’s actions constituted racial profiling because he believed
the manager, a white male, rather than Mr. Burgess, an African-American male.
¶¶62–64, 74.
Count II attempts to bring a Monell claim and provides a list of grievances
against the Lake Worth Police Department and PBSO over approximately 18 years,
most of which do not relate to the incident that is the subject of this lawsuit. ¶¶76–
111. In addition, it asserts that PBSO failed to train and supervise Deputy Rothman,
and that “Deputy Rothman has an unlawful custom and practice of lying in police
reports.” ¶¶97–98.
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STANDARD ON MOTION TO DISMISS
A pleading in a civil action must contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To satisfy
the Rule 8 pleading requirements, a claim must provide the defendant fair notice of
plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
N.A., 534 U. S. 506, 512 (2002). While a claim “does not need detailed factual
allegations,” it must provide “more than labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the
Rule 8(a)(2) pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”). Nor can a claim rest on “‘naked assertion[s]’
devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U. S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U. S. at 557 (alteration in original)).
On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must view the well-
pleaded factual allegations in a claim in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. Dusek v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 832 F.3d 1243, 1246 (11th Cir. 2016). Viewed
in that manner, the factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the claim are true
(even if doubtful in fact). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The Supreme
Court has emphasized that “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Id. at 570.
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When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6):
[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by
identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions,
are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can
provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court
should 	assume 	their 	veracity 	and 	then 	determine 	whether 	they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Factually unsupported allegations based “on information and
belief” are not entitled to the assumption of truth. See Scott v. Experian Info. Sols.,
Inc., No. 18-CV-60178, 2018 WL 3360754, at *6 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2018) (“Conclusory
allegations made upon information and belief are not entitled to a presumption of
truth, and allegations stated upon information and belief that do not contain any
factual support fail to meet the Twombly standard.”).
DISCUSSION
Section 1983 creates a private right of action against persons who, under color
of law, subject a plaintiff to a deprivation of federally protected rights. 42 U.S.C. §
1983. To state a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted
under color of state law and that the defendant’s actions deprived the plaintiff of a
federal right. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks,
436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978). “Section 1983 is no source of substantive federal rights.
Instead, to state a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must point to a violation of a specific
federal right.” Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581, 583 (11th Cir.1996) (citing Albright v.
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994)).
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A. Count I: Equal Protection Claim Against Deputy Rothman
“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that
no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws, which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be
treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985); see
also 	Campbell 	v. 	Rainbow 	City, 	434 	F.3d 	1306, 	1313 	(11th 	Cir. 	2006). “A
successful equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment requires proof of
both an intent to discriminate and actual discriminatory effect.” Greater Birmingham
Ministries v. Sec'y of State for State of Ala., 992 F.3d 1299, 1321 (11th Cir. 2021)
(emphasis in original).
To make a claim of discriminatory motive plausible on its face, it must be
accompanied by factual allegations that can show the alleged improper actions were
motivated by race. See Smith v. Reg’l Dir. of Fla. Dep’t of Corrections, 368 F. App’x 9,
12–13 (11th Cir. 2010) (equal protection claim failed where defendants allegedly
falsified documents, segregated a prisoner-plaintiff, and denied him privileges, but
there was no indication the acts were driven by race); Smith v. Lopez, No. 24-CV-
25133, 2025 WL 471203, at *3-4 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2025) (conclusory allegations that
the defendant threatened to have the plaintiff arrested for trespass and wrote a false
police report because of the plaintiff’s race were insufficient to sustain an equal
protection claim) (appeal dismissed, No. 25-10441 (11th Cir. Sept. 23, 2025)).
In this case, Mr. Burgess contends Deputy Rothman discriminated against him
by crediting the motel manager’s account of events, making false statements on the
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police report, and issuing him a trespass warning because of race, but he provides no
facts to support this contention. He speculates that because he is African-American
and the manager is white, Deputy Rothman’s actions must have been motivated by
race. The Amended Complaint is devoid of any facts that could plausibly allege that
Deputy 	Rothman 	harbored 	discriminatory 	intent 	or 	that 	his 	actions 	had 	a
discriminatory effect. In addition, “the filing of a false police report is not itself a
constitutional violation.” Rivera v. Marin R, No. 23-CV-62034, 2024 WL 3298989, at
*5 (S.D. Fla. May 16, 2024) (quoting Jones v. Gordon, No. 21-CV-1251, 2021 WL
4465194, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 2021)). In Rivera, the court noted that the police
report did not lead to the plaintiff’s arrest or prosecution, had not been used against
him in court, and did not lead to deprivation of a liberty interest or other right. Id. at
*6. The court then dismissed the claim that was based on the false police report.
Similarly, in this case, assuming Deputy Rothman included false statements
in his police report, there are no allegations that the report led to Mr. Burgess’ arrest
or prosecution or deprived him of any federal right. See Lee v. City of Phila., 627 F.
App’x 175 (3d Cir. 2015) (allegations that police officer improperly sided with a party
in a domestic violence dispute and filed a false police report did not support a § 1983
claim when the report was not used against him in court proceedings). Here, the
Amended Complaint contains no allegations that the police report was ever used
against Mr. Burgess in any way or that Mr. Burgess was arrested or prosecuted. In
fact, Mr. Burgess was unaware of the report’s contents until he “decided to pull the
police report” in 2024, approximately three years after the incident. ¶37. Accordingly,
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the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause.
B. Qualified Immunity
1. 	Qualified Immunity Generally
Deputy Rothman argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity, which offers
“complete protection for government officials sued in their individual capacities if
their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.’” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340,
1346 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The
Supreme Court has stressed that qualified immunity represents an immunity from
suit rather than a defense to liability, and that it should therefore be addressed in
the earliest possible stage of a case. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991).
Although the defense of qualified immunity is usually raised at the summary
judgment stage, it may be raised and considered on a motion to dismiss. Corbitt v.
Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting St. George v. Pinellas Cnty.,
285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002)).
Qualified immunity is a “muscular doctrine that impacts on the reality of the
workaday world as long as judges remember that the central idea is this pragmatic
one: officials can act without fear of harassing litigation only when they can
reasonably anticipate—before they act or do not act—if their conduct will give rise to
damage liability for them.” Maddox v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 1109, 1120 (11th Cir. 2013)
(citing Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984)). “If objective observers cannot
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predict—at the time the official acts—whether the act was lawful or not, and the
answer must await full adjudication in a district court years in the future, the official
deserves immunity from liability for civil damages.” Id. (citing Elder v. Holloway, 510
U.S. 510, 513–15 (1994)).
“In order to receive qualified immunity, the public official must first prove that
he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly
wrongful acts occurred.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Courson v. McMillian, 939 F.2d 1479, 1487 (11th Cir. 1991)). A government
official acts in his discretionary authority when he or she is “(a) performing a
legitimate job-related function (that is, pursuing a job-related goal), (b) through
means that were within his power to utilize.” Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland,
370 F.3d 1252, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004).
“Once the defendant establishes that he was acting within his discretionary
authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is not
appropriate.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194. In addressing a motion to dismiss on qualified
immunity, the Court may begin by addressing either the existence of a constitutional
violation or the question of whether the right being violated has been “clearly
established.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 235 (2009). Qualified immunity
applies to damages claims only. Id. at 242–43.
A right may be clearly established for qualified immunity purposes in one of
three ways: “(1) case law with indistinguishable facts clearly establishing the
constitutional right; (2) a broad statement of principle within the Constitution,
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statute, or case law that clearly establishes a constitutional right; or (3) conduct so
egregious that a constitutional right was clearly violated, even in the total absence of
case law.” Lewis, 561 F.3d at 1291–92 (internal citations omitted).
A “clearly established right must be defined with specificity. . . .” City of
Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2019). Supreme Court cases, Eleventh
Circuit caselaw, and state Supreme Court caselaw can ‘clearly establish’ law in the
Eleventh Circuit. Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950, 955 (11th Cir.
2003) (citation omitted). In addition, “persuasive decisions from other circuits can be
considered in determining whether a violation was one of ‘obvious clarity’ for purposes
of qualified immunity.” Gilmore v. Ga. Dep’t of Corrections, 144 F.4th 1246, 1263
(11th Cir. 2025).
The 	category 	of 	egregious 	conduct 	is 	“narrow” 	and 	“encompasses 	those
situations where ‘the official’s conduct lies so obviously at the very core of what the
[relevant constitutional provision] prohibits that the unlawfulness of the conduct was
readily apparent to the official, notwithstanding the lack of case law.’” Loftus v.
Clark–Moore, 690 F.3d 1200, 1205 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Terrell v. Smith, 668 F.3d
1244, 1257 (11th Cir. 2012)). See also Maddox, 727 F.3d at 1121. “The inquiry
whether a federal right is clearly established ‘must be undertaken in light of the
specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.’” Id. at 1204 (quoting
Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999, 1013 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc)).
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2. 	Qualified Immunity applies to Deputy Rothman.
Here, 	there 	is 	no 	dispute 	that 	Deputy Rothman 	was 	acting within his
discretionary authority, as the Amended Complaint alleges that he responded to a
911 call, investigated the circumstances relating to that call, and issued a trespass
warning, which are legitimate job-related functions performed through means he has
the power to utilize. ¶¶32–42. Thus, the burden shifts to Mr. Burgess to allege
sufficient facts to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate, namely that
Deputy Rothman violated a clearly established federal right. Baker v. City of
Madison, Ala., 67 F.4th 1268, 1278 (11th Cir. 2023).
As discussed above, the Amended Complaint fails to allege facts that could
support a violation of the Equal Protection Clause or any other constitutional or
federal right, clearly established or otherwise. Mr. Burgess alleges that Deputy
Rothman suspected him of wrongdoing rather than the motel manager and issued
him a trespass warning when he should not have done so. The Amended Complaint
further speculates, with no factual support, that Deputy Rothman’s actions were
based on racial discrimination. Thus, Mr. Burgess has not met his burden to show
that qualified immunity is not appropriate. Accordingly, Deputy Rothman is entitled
to qualified immunity and Count I against him should be dismissed. See Valsaint v.
City of Miami Beach, Fla., No. 21-CV-24143, 2022 WL 16635693, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Nov.
2, 2022) (officer entitled to qualified immunity when plaintiff failed to allege facts
supporting racial animus or discriminatory conduct).
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C. Count II: Monell Claim
The Amended Complaint attempts to assert a claim against Deputy Rothman
under Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978); ECF
No. 16 ¶76. However, a Monell claim may only be asserted against a local government
entity, not an individual government official. Id. Thus, the Court will interpret Count
II as being asserted against PBSO. To state a Monell claim against PBSO, Mr.
Burgess must allege facts to show that “action pursuant to official municipal policy”
caused his injury. Id. at 691.
A plaintiff has two methods by which to establish a municipal policy or custom
under Monell: identify either (1) an officially promulgated policy or (2) an unofficial
custom or practice shown through the repeated acts of a final policymaker for the
municipality. Grech v. Clayton Cty., Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329–30 (11th Cir. 2003).
Rarely can a plaintiff point to a municipality’s officially-adopted policy of permitting
a particular constitutional violation. Most plaintiffs must show that the municipality
has an unofficial custom or practice of permitting the violation and that the custom
or practice is the “moving force” behind the constitutional violation. Doe v. Sch. Bd.
of Miami-Dade Cnty., 403 F. Supp. 3d 1241, 1264 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (citing Grech, 335
F.3d at 1330). A “custom” is “a practice that is so settled and permanent that it takes
on the force of the law.” McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098, 1105 (11th Cir. 1999)). A “custom” must be
“so pervasive as to be the functional equivalent of a policy adopted by the final
policymaker.” Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1343 (11th Cir. 1994).
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Actual or constructive knowledge of such customs must be attributed to the governing
body of the municipality. Id. at 1345 (quoting Depew v. City of St. Marys, 787 F.2d
1496, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986)).
A “[m]unicipal policy or custom may [also] include a failure to provide adequate
training if the deficiency ‘evidences a deliberate indifference to the rights of its
inhabitants.’” Lewis v. City of W. Palm Beach, 561 F.3d 1288, 1293 (11th Cir. 2009)
(quoting 	City 	of 	Canton 	v. 	Harris, 	489 	U.S. 	378, 	385 	(1989)). 	“‘[D]eliberate
indifference’ is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor
disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of
Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997).
In order to establish deliberate indifference, the “plaintiff must present
some evidence that the municipality knew of a need to train and/or
supervise in a particular area and the municipality made a deliberate
choice not to take any action.” Lewis, 561 F.3d at 1293 (internal
quotation omitted). A municipality may be put on notice if either (1) the
municipality is aware that a pattern of constitutional violations exists,
and nevertheless fails to provide adequate training, or (2) the likelihood
for a constitutional violation is so high that the need for training would
be obvious. Id.
Hoti v. Barkley Master Assoc., Inc., No. 18-cv-80484, 2019 WL 11660558, at *4 (S.D.
Fla. Mar. 26, 2019).
Thus, the Court must determine whether the Amended Complaint alleges that
PBSO’s actions deprived Mr. Burgess of a federal right. It does not. The Amended
Complaint fails to provide any concrete facts to support a theory that any PBSO
custom or policy is the driving force behind a constitutional violation. Again, as
explained above, the Amended Complaint fails to allege a constitutional violation or
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deprivation of a federal right of any kind. Further, Count II simply sets forth a list of
Mr. Burgess’ encounters with the Lake Worth Police Department and PBSO, along
with unsuccessful court proceedings, to insinuate that these entities have a practice
of targeting Mr. Burgess and ignoring complaints against their officers. ¶¶76–111. It
does not allege a custom or policy of racial profiling, nor does it provide facts that
could support such an allegation. The Amended Complaint further asserts that “[t]he
unlawful custom & practice of [D]eputy Rothman was the moving force behind the
violation of the plaintiff’s [c]onstitutional [r]ights,” indicating his intent to pursue the
Monell claim against Deputy Rothman rather than PBSO. ¶111. As a result, I
recommend dismissal of Count II.
RECOMMENDATION
For these reasons, I RECOMMEND that the Complaint be DISMISSED,
without prejudice and with leave to amend, so that Mr. Burgess may have one final
opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the Amended Complaint.
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NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
A party shall serve and file written objections, if any, to this Report and
Recommendation with the Honorable Rodney Smith, within FOURTEEN (14)
DAYS of being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. Failure to
timely file objections shall constitute a waiver of a party's "right to challenge on
appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions."
11th Cir. R. 3-1 (2016).
If counsel do not intend to file objections, they shall file a notice
advising 	the 	District 	Court 	within 	FIVE 	DAYS 	of 	this 	Report 	and
Recommendation.
DONE and SUBMITTED in Chambers at West Palm Beach, Palm Beach
County, in the Southern District of Florida, this 29th day of October 2025.
__________________________________
BRUCE E. REINHART
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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