MCCOY v. DOUGHERTY COUNTY, GEORGIA et al

IN THE U NITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ALBANY DIVISION
MICHAEL McCOY,
Plaintiff,
v .
DO UGHTERY CO UNTY, GEORGIA,
etal,
Defendants.
ORDER
CASE NO :
1:25-cv-5-WLS
B efore the Court is D efendants' Motion for Reconsideration or in the Alternative
Motion for Amendment of the Rule 16 / 26 Scheduling Order (Doc. 27) ("Motion"). Therein
D efendants seek reconsideration of the Court's September 8, 2026 Order (Doc. 26) denying
D efendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc . 23). Alternatively, D efendants
request an extension of the expired dispositive motion deadline so they may file a motion for
summary judgment. Plaintiff did not file a response to the Motion. After review, the Court
DENIES the Motion .
I. 	MOTIO N FOR RE CONS IDERATION
A. Standard of Review
Under the Local Rules of this Court, motions for reconsideration shall not be filed as
a matter of routine practice. M.D . Ga. L.R. 	7.6. Motions for reconsideration, whether
considering final or non-final judgments, are within "the sound discretion of the district
judge." Region 8 Forest 5 erv. T imber Purchasers Council v. Alcock, 993 F .2d 800, 805- 06 (11th Cir.
1993). It is the practice of this Court, in both civil and criminal cases, to grant a motion for
reconsideration only when the movant timely demonstrates that: " (1) there has been an
intervening change in the law; (2) new and previously unavailable evidence has been discovered
through the exercise of due diligence; or (3) the court made a clear error of law." Fla. Fo und
Seed Producers, I nc. v. Geor;giaFarmsServs., ILC, 977 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1337- 38 (M.D . G a. 2013);
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see McCoy v. Maco n WaterAuth., 966 F . Supp . 1209, 1222-23 (M.D . G a. 1997) (same). "TI1e only
grounds for granting a R ule 59 motion are newly- discovered evi dence or manifest errors of
law or fact. A R ule 59 (e) motion cannot be used to relitigate old matters, raise argumen t or
present evi dence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgmen t." Arthur v. King,
500 F.3d 1335, 13 43 ( 11 th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (modified). "A motion for reconsideration
is not an opportuni ty for the moving party ... to instruct the court on how the cour t 'could
have done it bett er' the firs t time." Pres. E ndangered A reas of Co bb's Hist. , I nc. v. U.S. A rmy Corps
ofEng'rs, 916 F. Supp. 1557, 1560 (N.D . Ga . 1995), ajfd, 87 F.3d 1242 (11 th Cir . 1996).
B. Analy sis
In its September 8, 2026 Order (Doc . 26), the Cour t declined to take ju dicial notice of
cer tain partially quoted D ougherty Coun ty G eorgia Ordinances cit ed by the parties on the
bases that neither par ty requested that the Court take judicial notice of any Ordinance and,
more significantly, nei ther party produced certified copies of tl1e complete text of any ci ted
Ordinances or provided citations to tl1e source of such Ordinances . (S ee D oc. 26 at 6- 8) .
D efendants now seek to provide certified copies of the Ordinances to correct their error in
tl1e record by failing to provide certified copies of tl1e Ordinances witl1 tl1eir motion to dismiss.
H owever , as noted above, a motion for recons i deration canno t be used to present evidence
tl1at could have been presented pri or to entry of judgment. Nor is it an error of law or fact on
tl1e part of a party tl1at is subject to reconsideration . R ather , it is an error of tl1e court that may
justify a reconsideration of a cour t's order or judgment. See F la. Fo und Se ed Producers, 977 F.
Supp. 2d at 1337; McCoy, 966 F. Supp . at 1223. D efendants have not provi ded any other basis
on which tl1e Court should recons i der its decision denyi ng their motion for judgment on tl1e
pleadings.
Accordingly, D efendan ts' Motion (D oc . 27) is DENIED to the ex t en t it requests the
Court recons i der its September 8, 2026 Order (Doc. 26).
II. 	MOTIO N FOR EXTEN SION OF DI SPOSITIVE MOTION DEADLIN E
Alternatively, D efendants request that the Court extend tl1e April 9, 2026 dispos itive
motion deadline that was set by the Court's August 27, 2025 D i scovery/ Scheduling Order
(Doc. 21) so tl1at they may file a motion for summary judgment. D efendan ts state tl1at tl1eir
motion for judgment on the pleadings was pending during the expiration of tl1e dispositive
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motion deadline, "and it contained the same arguments that would have been advanced in
[their motion for summary judgment]." (Doc. 27 at 5). The Court finds this argument
unpersuasive. In its September 8, 2026 Order, the Court found that there are material
questions of fact that are in dispute in this matter. If D efendants' motion for summary
judgment merely advances the same arguments as those in D efendants' motion for judgment
on the pleadings, the Court finds those material disputed questions of fact are unlikely to be
resolved by the D efendants' providing certified copies of the Ordinances that were missing
from its motion for judgment on the pleadings. For instance, in its September 8, 2026 Order,
the Court identified the following disputed material questions of fact:
Defendants contend that the 2023 Employ ment Agreement cannot be ratified
because the 2022 Board did not have authority to enter into the agreement in
December 2022. In support of this argument , the Board argues that the
Dougherty County Code provides that the county administrator shall be
appointed in January of each year for a term of one year. TI1ey further assert
that none of the severance, retirement, or heath [sic] care benefits provided for
in the 2023 Employment Agreement are authorized by any local ordinance or
Dougherty County policy. Plaintiff counters that there is 	nothing in the
Ordinances that prevents such contractual provisions, and that the Ordinances
are silent as to when the Board can execute an employ ment contract with the
county administrator. TI1ese are material questions of fact that are in dispute.
In addition, P laintiff asserts that the 2023 Employment Agreement was ratified
by 	the 2023 	Board performing under 	the 	agreement until 	Plaintiff was
terminated effective June 26 , 2023. More significantly, Plaintiff notes that the
2023 Board paid him the severance benefits due under tl1e 2023 Employment
Agreement for almost two years after his termination , or until April 2025 when
he filed this action. Plaintiff asserts these actions constitute ratification of the
2023 Employ ment Agreement.
(Order Doc. 26 at 9- 10). Providing certified copies of the Ordinances does not of necessity
resolve these issues. As to appointment of the county administrator, the Code of Dougherty
County, Georgia, provides that "[t]he county administrator shall be appointed by majority vote
of the board of commissioners of Dougherty County.... " (Doc. 27-1 at 3, Dougherty County
Code § 1-3- 21 ). As P laintiff argued, there is nothing in this provision titled "Appointment;
restrictions" that states when the county administrator is to be appointed or the contract
entered into. However, as Defendant points out, the provision for the county administrator's
"[t]erm; removal; suspension and removal ... " provides:
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The county administrator shall be appointed in J anuary of each year fa r a term of one
(1) year. The county administrator shall be subject to suspension or removal
from office at any time for just cause. In case of suspension or removal the
county administrator shall be given a written statement of the reasons for such
action . H e may within five (5) days from receipt thereof request a public hearing
thereon before the board of commissioners of D ougherty County, which
request shall 	be 	filed 	w ith 	the 	board . 	. . . T he 	action 	of the board 	of
commissioners in suspending or removing the county administrator shall be by
majority vote and sh all be final.
(Doc. 27-2 at 3, D ougherty County Code § 1-3-23 (emphasis added)). Whether or not
P laintifPs 2023 E mployment Agreement is void ab initio, voidable, against public policy, or
whether it was ratified, involve questions of material fact to be resolved by a jury. In any case,
the deadline for filing dispositive motions was set and known to all parties w ithout conditions
and no party timely moved the Court to extend that deadline . TI1e Court does not find the
mere existence of a separate motion sufficient excuse for failing to do so .
Accordingly, D efendants ' request for an extension of time to file a motion for summary
judgment is DENIED.
Ill. 	CO N CLUSION
Upon a full review, D efendants' Motion for R econsideration or in the Alternative
Motion for Amendment of the R ule 16/ 26 Scheduling Order (Doc. 27) is DENIED .
SO ORDERED, this 8th day of October 2026.
/s/W. Louis Sands
W. LOUIS SANDS, SR. JUDGE
U NITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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