MCCOMAS v. UNIFIED GOVERNMENT OF ATHENS CLARKE COUNTY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATHENS DIVISION
CAREY LENEIL MCCOMAS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
UNIFIED GOVERNMENT OF ATHENS
CLARKE COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
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CASE NO. 3:24-cv-89 (CDL)
O R D E R
The 	Athens-Clarke 	County 	Police 	Department 	received
complaints on multiple occasions that Plaintiff Carey McComas was
trespassing 	on 	private 	property 	in 	Athens, 	Georgia. 	McComas
admitted 	to 	police 	officers 	that 	he 	was 	attempting 	to 	adversely
possess the property and had no documentation or consent from the
owners to be on the property. 	Clarence Dake, an apparent resident
of the property who provided officers with a contract and a website
listing him as the property manager, told officers that he wanted
to 	ban 	McComas 	from 	the 	property 	for 	two 	years. 	When 	McComas
returned 	to 	the 	property 	two 	weeks 	later, 	officers 	arrested 	him
for criminal trespass. 	McComas asserts that officers did not have
probable cause to arrest him. 	He brought this action against the
Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County (“ACC”), the ACC Police
Department, ACC Mayor Kelly Girtz, ACC Police Chief Jerry Saulters,
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and ACC Police Officers Jimmy King and Caleb Cameron.1 	Defendants
filed 	motions 	for 	summary 	judgment, 	asserting 	that 	they 	are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of McComas’s claims.
For the following reasons, Defendants’ motions (ECF Nos. 31 & 33)
are granted as to all federal law claims against Defendants.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary 	judgment 	may 	be 	granted 	only 	“if 	the 	movant 	shows
that 	there 	is 	no 	genuine 	dispute 	as 	to 	any 	material 	fact 	and 	the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 	Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). 	In 	determining 	whether 	a 	genuine 	dispute 	of 	material
fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the evidence
is viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment, 	drawing 	all 	justifiable 	inferences 	in 	the 	opposing
party’s favor. 	Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255
(1986). 	A fact is material if it is relevant or necessary to the
outcome of the suit. 	Id. at 248. 	A factual dispute is genuine if
the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for
the nonmoving party. 	Id.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Viewed 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	McComas, 	the 	record
reveals the following facts.
1 McComas initially named Austin Falcon and Stanley Denis as Defendants
but abandoned his claims against them in response to Defendants’ summary
judgment motions. 	Accordingly, Falcon and Denis are entitled to summary
judgment.
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In 	February 	of 	2023, 	Carey 	McComas 	applied 	online 	to 	rent 	a
house located at 150 Pine Lodge Road in Athens, Georgia. 	McComas
submitted 	four 	total 	applications 	and 	visited 	the 	property 	on
multiple occasions. 	On these visits to the property, McComas saw
Clarence 	Dake, 	an 	apparent 	resident 	of 	one 	of 	the 	houses 	at 	250
Pine Lodge Road. 	McComas Dep. 37:4-14, ECF No. 31-2. 	Dake claimed
to be the caretaker of the property located at 150 Pine Lodge Road
and 250 Pine Lodge Road, which bordered each other. 	Id. at 37:17-
23. 	McComas and Dake never discussed having McComas rent 150 Pine
Lodge. 	Id. at 39:1-14. 	When McComas did not receive any response
to his rental applications, McComas conducted online research and
claims he discovered that Douglas Hooker and Bradley Richards were
listed as the owners of the property. 	Id. at 34:11-16; 40:20-25.
In May of 2023, McComas called Hooker to inquire about moving onto
the property. 	Hooker told McComas: “I’m not going to tell you you
can, 	but 	I’m 	not 	going 	to 	tell 	you 	you 	can’t.” 	Id. 	at 	33:20-21.
McComas 	also 	claims 	that 	he 	talked 	with 	Richards 	about 	moving 	on
to 	the 	property, 	but 	Richards 	stated 	that 	he 	“d[id]n’t 	have
anything to do with the place anymore.” 	Id. at 40:8-11. 	Following
these 	conversations, 	McComas 	moved 	into 	150 	Pine 	Lodge 	in 	May 	of
2023 without any rental agreement and immediately changed the locks
to the house.
On 	May 	15, 	2023, 	Dake 	approached 	McComas 	while 	McComas 	was
ripping carpet from the house. 	Dake questioned why McComas was on
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the property. 	McComas responded by challenging Dake’s claim that
he was the caretaker of the property. 	Dake then called the police.
Officers Cameron and Lane responded to the scene and met with Dake.
Dake 	informed 	Officer 	Cameron 	that 	Pinecrest 	Lodge 	Village, 	LLC,
owned the property at 150 Pine Lodge Road and 250 Pine Lodge Road.
Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 3, Cameron May 15 Bodycam #1, 4:04-4:11;
13:11-13:20 	(05/15/2023), 	ECF 	NO. 	31-4.2 	He 	then 	showed 	Officer
Cameron 	a 	website 	with 	Dake’s 	name 	and 	email 	associated 	with 	the
company and the property. 	Id. at 15:45-15:52. 	Dake stated to the
officers that he would like to bar McComas from 150 Pine Lodge and
250 	Pine 	Lodge 	for 	two 	years. 	By 	the 	time 	Dake 	informed 	the
officers of these wishes, McComas had left the property.
That 	night, 	Dake 	called 	the 	police, 	informing 	them 	that
McComas 	had 	returned 	to 	150 	Pine 	Lodge. 	After 	arriving 	on 	the
scene, 	Officers 	Cameron 	and 	Lane 	spoke 	with 	Dake, 	who 	informed
them that another renter was moving into 150 Pine Lodge in June.3
Defs.’ 	Mot. 	Summ. 	J. 	Ex. 	4, 	Cameron 	May 	16 	Bodycam 	#2, 	4:51-5:30
(05/16/2023), 	ECF 	No. 	31-5. 	Dake 	claimed 	that 	Advantage, 	a
behavioral health service, would be paying rent on behalf of this
renter. 	Id. 	Officer Cameron validated this information by talking
on Dake’s phone with a female who purported to work at Advantage,
2 All video recordings referenced in this Order are on file with the
Court.
3 Based on the time stamps of the bodycam footage, police responded to
the call just after midnight on May 16. 	Therefore, the Court notes the
following events took place on May 16.
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and 	who 	confirmed 	that 	Dake 	was 	the 	contact 	for 	the 	property 	and
that 	a 	renter 	was 	planning 	to 	move 	into 	150 	Pine 	Lodge 	in 	June.
Id. 	at 	10:01-11:22. 	After 	the 	phone 	call, 	Dake 	again 	showed
Officer 	Cameron 	the 	website 	listing 	him 	as 	the 	property 	manager
and 	informed 	Cameron 	that 	he 	had 	worked 	in 	this 	capacity 	for 	a
couple 	of 	months. 	Id. 	at 	15:20-15:30; 	29:42-29:47. 	Officers
Cameron and Lane then spoke to McComas, who claimed he was legally
allowed to be on the property through adverse possession. 	McComas
failed to provide any documentation that he lived at 150 Pine Lodge
and 	claimed 	his 	authority 	to 	live 	on 	the 	property 	came 	from 	the
“common law.” 	Id. at 19:16-19:23. 	Sgt. King then arrived on the
scene, 	and 	McComas 	admitted 	to 	King 	that 	he 	had 	no 	paperwork
allowing 	him 	to 	be 	at 	150 	Pine 	Lodge. 	McComas 	did 	not 	point 	to
any 	evidence 	that 	he 	told 	the 	officers 	that 	he 	had 	permission 	to
be at the property. 	Dake told police that he wanted to bar McComas
from 	150 	Pine 	Lodge 	and 	250 	Pine 	Lodge 	for 	two 	years 	and 	that
McComas would be trespassing if he returned. 	Sgt. King instructed
McComas to hand over the keys to 150 Pine Lodge and to contact law
enforcement 	the 	next 	day 	to 	facilitate 	moving 	his 	belongings 	off
the property.
Three days later, Officer Abdul-Meid and Sgt. Blair responded
to 	a 	complaint 	from 	Dake 	that 	McComas 	had 	trespassed 	on 	the
property again. 	As McComas was no longer on the property when the
police arrived, Sgt. Blair spoke to McComas on the phone. 	McComas
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admitted 	that 	he 	had 	returned 	and 	placed 	items 	on 	the 	property.
After further questioning, Sgt. Blair determined that McComas did
not have any documentation or verbal consent from the owners to be
on the property. 	Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 9, Bodycam of Sgt. Blair
32:08-32:47 	(05/19/2023), 	ECF 	No. 	31-10. 	Sgt. 	Blair 	advised
McComas 	to 	remove 	his 	belongings 	from 	the 	property 	or 	to 	provide
documentation 	that 	the 	owners 	allowed 	him 	to 	be 	on 	the 	property.
Id. at 46:00-46:17.
On 	May 	30, 	2023, 	Officers 	Cameron 	and 	Lane 	responded 	after
Dake 	informed 	the 	police 	that 	McComas 	was 	back 	on 	the 	property.
When talking with McComas at the scene, the officers informed him
that 	Dake 	was 	listed 	on 	the 	online 	leasing 	page 	of 	the 	company
that allegedly owned the property and reminded McComas that he had
been barred from the property two weeks earlier. 	Defs.’ Mot. Summ.
J. Ex. 11, Cameron May 30 Bodycam 03:55-4:58 (05/30/2023), ECF No.
31-12. 	During 	this 	encounter, 	Dake 	also 	showed 	the 	officers 	a
written agreement between himself and Pinecrest Lodge Village Land
Trust, 	LLC. 	Defs.’ 	Mot. 	Summ. 	J. 	Ex. 	12, 	Property 	Management
Agreement, 	ECF 	No. 	31-13. 	This 	agreement 	stated 	that 	Dake 	was
appointed 	as 	the 	company’s 	agent 	and 	had 	the 	exclusive 	authority
to 	manage 	the 	property 	at 	“150 	- 	250 	Pinecrest 	lodge 	rd 	[sic].”
Id. at 1. 	The agreement, signed by an alleged owner of the company
and 	Dake, 	was 	notarized 	by 	Tracey 	Dake. 	Id. 	The 	officers 	asked
McComas 	if 	he 	had 	any 	proof 	that 	he 	was 	entitled 	to 	be 	at 	the
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property. 	McComas, who had no documentation to support his right
to 	be 	on 	the 	property, 	responded 	that 	Dake 	should 	provide
documentation 	that 	he 	was 	an 	authorized 	representative 	for 	the
property. 	Cameron 	arrested 	McComas 	for 	criminal 	trespass 	and
transported 	him 	to 	the 	Athens-Clarke 	County 	Jail, 	where 	he 	later
was released after posting bond.4
In 	October 	2023, 	the 	Solicitor 	General 	of 	Athens-Clarke
County filed two entries of dismissal in the State Court of Athens-
Clarke 	County, 	dropping 	both 	of 	the 	criminal 	trespass 	charges
against 	McComas. 	Defs.’ 	Mot. 	Summ. 	J. 	Ex. 	17, 	State 	Court 	of
Athens-Clarke 	County 	Entry 	of 	Dismissal 	and 	Order 	of 	Dismissal
(10/03/2023), 	ECF 	No. 	31-18; 	Defs.’ 	Mot. 	Summ. 	J. 	Ex. 	18, 	State
Court 	of 	Athens-Clarke 	County 	Entry 	of 	Dismissal 	and 	Order 	of
Dismissal 	(10/03/2023), 	ECF 	No. 	31-19. 	The 	Solicitor 	General
concluded 	for 	each 	charge 	that 	“[a]lthough 	there 	was 	sufficient
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant, the evidence is not
sufficient 	to 	prove 	guilt 	beyond 	a 	reasonable 	doubt.” 	Id. 	The
state court made both entries of dismissal the order of the Court.
Id.
In May 2024, the Magistrate Court of Athens-Clarke County, in
an 	action 	to 	set 	aside 	a 	Judgment 	and 	Order 	for 	Writ 	obtained 	by
4 Officers Falcon and Lane responded to another call at the property in
August 2023, and they arrested McComas for criminal trespass. 	McComas
did not bring any claims against Lane, he abandoned his claims against
Falcon, and he did not point to evidence that any other officers were
personally involved in the August 2023 arrest.
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Dake 	on 	behalf 	of 	Pinecrest 	Lodge 	Village 	Trust, 	LLC, 	entered 	an
Order 	finding 	that 	Pinecrest 	Lodge 	Village 	Land 	Trust, 	LLC, 	was
not the owner of the property, but rather Athens Pinecrest Village
Development 	Partners, 	LLC, 	was 	the 	rightful 	owner. 	Defs.’ 	Mot.
Summ. 	J. 	Ex. 	19, 	Magistrate 	Court 	of 	Athens-Clarke 	County 	Order
(05/06/2024), ECF No. 31-20. 	The Order noted that Athens Pinecrest
Village 	never 	entered 	into 	a 	property 	management 	agreement 	with
Dake, 	nor 	gave 	Dake 	authority 	to 	manage 	or 	lease 	the 	premises.
Id. 	Further, 	the 	Order 	stated 	that 	Athens 	Pinecrest 	Village 	had
to 	evict 	Dake 	from 	the 	property 	because 	he 	was 	a 	squatter. 	Id.
Athens Pinecrest Village also believed that Dake committed acts of
fraud by presenting a fraudulent property management agreement and
by leasing property that Dake did not have authority to lease. Id.
DISCUSSION
McComas filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming
as 	Defendants 	Athens-Clarke 	County 	(“ACC”), 	the 	ACC 	Police
Department, ACC Mayor Kelly Girtz, ACC Police Chief Jerry Saulters,
and 	ACC 	Police 	Officers 	Jimmy 	King 	and 	Caleb 	Cameron. 	McComas
alleges 	violations 	of 	the 	Fourth 	and 	Fourteenth 	Amendments. 	He
further 	contends 	that 	Defendants 	conspired 	to 	deprive 	him 	of 	his
constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 and violated
two federal criminal statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242. 	McComas
also 	asserts 	state 	law 	claims 	for 	intentional 	infliction 	of
emotional 	distress, 	false 	imprisonment, 	malicious 	prosecution,
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theft, 	and 	defamation. 	Defendants 	move 	for 	summary 	judgment 	on
all of McComas’s claims. 	The Court addresses each claim in turn.
I. 	42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims
McComas 	asserts 	§ 	1983 	claims 	against 	all 	Defendants. 	He
maintains 	that 	King 	deprived 	him 	of 	his 	property 	without 	due
process 	by 	removing 	him 	from 	the 	property 	and 	taking 	his 	keys 	on
May 	16, 	2023. 	He 	further 	contends 	that 	Cameron 	arrested 	him
without probable cause on May 30, 2023, in violation of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 	In his initial
complaint, McComas brought his claims against King and Cameron in
their 	individual 	capacities, 	while 	his 	claims 	against 	Girtz 	and
Saulters were official capacity claims only. 	Compl. at 4, ECF No.
1. 	In 	his 	amended 	complaint, 	the 	operative 	pleading 	in 	this
action, 	McComas 	did 	not 	specify 	whether 	his 	claims 	against 	the
individual 	defendants 	were 	individual 	capacity 	or 	official
capacity claims, so Defendants’ motions presume that all the claims
against 	the 	individual 	Defendants 	included 	individual 	capacity
claims. 	The Court will do the same.
A. 	Individual Capacity Claims Against King and Cameron
Defendants 	King 	and 	Cameron 	argue 	that 	they 	are 	entitled 	to
qualified 	immunity 	from 	McComas’s 	claims. 	Qualified 	immunity
“protects government officials performing discretionary functions
from 	suits 	in 	their 	individual 	capacities 	unless 	their 	conduct
violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
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which 	a 	reasonable 	person 	would 	have 	known.” 	Shaw 	v. 	City 	of
Selma, 	884 	F.3d 	1093, 	1098 	(11th 	Cir. 	2018) 	(quoting 	Andujar 	v.
Rodriguez, 	486 	F.3d 	1199, 	1202 	(11th 	Cir. 	2007)). 	Because 	there
is 	no 	dispute 	that 	King 	and 	Cameron 	were 	acting 	within 	the 	scope
of 	their 	discretionary 	authority 	when 	the 	challenged 	conduct
occurred, McComas must demonstrate that “qualified immunity is not
appropriate” in his case. 	Myrick v. Fulton Cnty., 69 F.4th 1277,
1297 	(11th 	Cir. 	2023). 	To 	carry 	this 	burden, 	McComas 	must 	point
to 	facts 	that, 	when 	viewed 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	him,
show 	(1) 	the 	officers’ 	conduct 	violated 	a 	constitutional 	right,
and 	(2) 	that 	the 	violated 	right 	was 	clearly 	established 	at 	the
time 	the 	alleged 	violation 	occurred. 	Id. 	“Qualified 	immunity
affords 	‘protection 	to 	all 	but 	the 	plainly 	incompetent 	or 	those
who 	knowingly 	violate 	the 	law.’” 	Crawford 	v. 	Carroll, 	529 	F.3d
961, 978 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,
341 (1986)).
King and Cameron focus on McComas’s claims arising out of the
criminal trespass arrests, contending that arguable probable cause
supported McComas’s May 30, 2023, arrest.5 	Since McComas pointed
to 	no 	evidence 	that 	King 	was 	present 	on 	the 	night 	of 	McComas’s
5 As explained above, McComas no longer asserts any claims against the
officers who were personally involved in the August 2023 arrest, so the
Court finds that any claims based on that arrest were abandoned.
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arrest 	in 	May 	or 	personally 	participated 	in 	that 	arrest, 	King 	is
entitled to qualified immunity on McComas’s false arrest claim.
“Although ‘an arrest made without probable cause violates the
Fourth Amendment,’ an officer is entitled to qualified immunity if
he 	has 	‘arguable 	probable 	cause.’” 	Richmond 	v. 	Badia, 	47 	F.4th
1172, 	1181 	(11th 	Cir. 	2022) 	(quoting 	Redd 	v. 	City 	of 	Enterprise,
140 	F.3d 	1378, 	1382 	(11th 	Cir. 	1998)). 	“[T]he 	arguable 	probable
cause 	inquiry 	in 	a 	false 	arrest 	case 	is 	no 	different 	from 	the
clearly established law inquiry.” 	Edger v. McCabe, 84 F.4th 1230,
1236 (11th Cir. 2023) (footnote omitted) (quoting Garcia v. Casey,
75 	F.4th 	1176, 	1187 	(11th 	Cir. 	2023)). 	Thus, 	if 	Cameron 	had
arguable probable cause to arrest McComas, then his “violation of
the law was not clearly established and vice-versa.” 	Id.
“In the false arrest context, arguable probable cause exists
where a reasonable officer, looking at the entire legal landscape
at 	the 	time 	of 	the 	arrests, 	could 	have 	interpreted 	the 	law 	as
permitting the arrests.” 	Id. at 1236-37 (quoting Garcia, 75 F.4th
at 1186). 	To determine whether Cameron had arguable probable cause
for McComas’s arrest, the Court “‘must look at the totality of the
circumstances,’ 	. . . 	including 	what 	[the 	officer] 	knew 	at 	the
time 	of 	the 	arrest.” 	Garcia, 	75 	F.4th 	at 	1187-88 	(quoting
Washington v. Howard, 25 F.4th 891, 902 (11th Cir. 2022)). 	Here,
Cameron 	contends 	that 	based 	on 	McComas’s 	own 	admissions 	that 	he
was 	adversely 	possessing 	the 	property 	and 	additional 	evidence
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provided to him by Dake, he had arguable probable cause to arrest
McComas for criminal trespass when McComas returned to the property
despite having been banned. 	McComas contends that Cameron did not
have 	arguable 	probable 	cause 	because 	McComas 	told 	Cameron 	on
multiple occasions that Dake had no claim to the property and that
Cameron should have conducted a more thorough investigation before
arresting him.
The 	Court 	finds 	that 	although 	Cameron 	turned 	out 	to 	be
mistaken 	in 	his 	belief 	that 	Dake 	had 	authority 	or 	ownership 	over
the property, he had arguable probable cause to arrest McComas for
trespassing 	on 	it. 	A 	person 	commits 	the 	offense 	of 	criminal
trespass 	when 	he 	“knowingly 	and 	without 	authority” 	enters 	“upon
the land . . . of another person . . . for an unlawful purpose” or
enters “upon the land . . . of another person . . . after receiving,
prior to such entry, notice from the owner, rightful occupant, or,
upon 	proper 	identification, 	an 	authorized 	representative 	of 	the
owner or rightful occupant that such entry is forbidden.” 	O.C.G.A.
§ 16-7-21(b)(1)-(2). 	A person also commits the offense of criminal
trespass 	when 	he 	“intentionally 	damages 	any 	property 	of 	another
without 	consent 	of 	that 	other 	person 	and 	the 	damage 	thereto 	is
$500.00 	or 	less 	or 	knowingly 	and 	maliciously 	interferes 	with 	the
possession or use of the property of another person without consent
of that person.” 	Id. § 16-7-21(a). 	Here, the record demonstrates
that 	McComas 	admitted 	to 	Cameron 	multiple 	times 	that 	he 	did 	not
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own 	150 	Pine 	Lodge 	and 	had 	no 	documentation 	showing 	that 	he 	was
allowed to be on the property. 	Rather, he claimed that the “common
law” 	and 	adverse 	possession 	allowed 	him 	to 	legally 	reside 	on 	the
property. 	He contends that if Cameron had investigated his adverse
possession 	argument, 	he 	would 	have 	learned 	that 	McComas 	had
authority over the property under that legal principle.
McComas’s bare assertion that he was adversely possessing the
property 	does 	not 	help 	him. 	Instead, 	it 	is 	an 	admission 	that 	he
did not have permission to be at the property and that he did not
have 	title 	to 	the 	property. 	As 	McComas 	acknowledges, 	lack 	of
consent is an essential element of adverse possession. 	In Georgia,
a person can obtain title to property by adverse possession after
twenty years of “public, continuous, exclusive, uninterrupted, and
peaceable” 	possession 	that 	is 	“accompanied 	by 	a 	claim 	of 	right.”
O.C.G.A. 	§§ 44-5-161(a)(3)-(4) 	& 	-163. 	But 	“knowledge 	that 	the
property belongs to someone else is fatal to an adverse possession
claim 	because 	it 	is 	well 	settled 	that 	‘no 	prescription 	runs 	in
favor 	of 	one 	who 	took 	possession 	of 	land 	knowing 	that 	it 	did 	not
belong 	to 	him.’” 	Houston 	v. 	James, 	855 	S.E.2d 	714, 	717 	(Ga. 	Ct.
App. 	2021) 	(quoting 	Kelley 	v. 	Randolph, 	763 	S.E.2d 	858, 	860 	n.1
(Ga. 2014)). 	“To enter upon the land without any honest claim of
right 	to 	do 	so 	is 	but 	a 	trespass 	and 	can 	never 	ripen 	into
prescriptive title.” 	Id. (quoting Halpern v. Lacy Inv. Corp., 379
S.E.2d 	519, 	521 	(Ga. 	1989)). 	Thus, 	if 	Cameron 	had 	investigated
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McComas’s 	adverse 	possession 	argument 	as 	McComas 	contends 	he
should 	have, 	he 	would 	have 	discovered 	that 	the 	doctrine 	did 	not
apply 	to 	McComas’s 	situation 	or 	provide 	him 	with 	any 	authority
over 	the 	property, 	which 	would 	bolster 	Cameron’s 	conclusion 	that
McComas 	was 	knowingly 	on 	the 	property 	without 	any 	authority.
Furthermore, to the extent that McComas attempted to assert a due
process 	claim 	against 	King 	and 	Cameron 	based 	on 	a 	protected
property 	interest 	in 	150 	Pine 	Lodge, 	that 	claim 	fails 	because
McComas 	did 	not 	present 	any 	evidence 	that 	he 	had 	a 	legitimate
protected property interest in 150 Pine Lodge.
McComas 	also 	contends 	that 	if 	Cameron 	had 	conducted 	a 	more
thorough 	investigation, 	he 	would 	have 	learned 	that 	Dake 	was
fraudulently holding himself out as the authorized representative
of 	the 	property’s 	true 	owner 	and 	had 	fabricated 	the 	evidence 	he
used 	to 	convince 	the 	officers 	that 	he 	was 	the 	authorized
representative. 	McComas, though, did not point to any evidence of
what 	information 	Cameron 	could 	have 	learned 	that 	would 	have
eliminated arguable probable cause if Cameron had conducted a more
thorough 	investigation. 	Again, 	McComas 	admitted 	to 	Cameron 	that
he 	did 	not 	have 	title 	to 	the 	property 	or 	permission 	to 	be 	there.
Cameron 	thus 	knew 	that 	McComas 	entered 	the 	property, 	changed 	the
locks, 	and 	intended 	to 	live 	there 	despite 	knowing 	that 	he 	had 	no
legal 	claim 	to 	it, 	other 	than 	some 	fantastical 	claim 	that 	he 	had
adverse 	possession 	rights. 	Based 	on 	these 	facts, 	Cameron
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reasonably 	believed 	that 	McComas 	was 	trespassing 	on 	the 	property
and 	had 	arguable 	probable 	cause 	to 	arrest 	him 	for 	violating
O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21. 	McComas did not point to any authority clearly
establishing 	that 	his 	arrest 	under 	these 	circumstances 	violated
his rights. 	For all these reasons, Cameron and King are entitled
to qualified immunity on the false arrest claim.6
B. 	Individual Capacity Claims Against Girtz and Saulters
Defendants 	Girtz 	and 	Saulters 	seek 	summary 	judgement 	on 	the
supervisory 	liability 	claims 	based 	on 	qualified 	immunity.
Supervisory officials like Girtz and Saulters “are not liable under
§ 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the
basis 	of 	respondeat 	superior 	or 	vicarious 	liability.” 	Christmas
v. 	Harris 	Cnty., 	51 	F.4th 	1348, 	1355 	(11th 	Cir. 	2022) 	(quoting
Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003), overruled
in 	part 	on 	other 	grounds 	by, 	Pearson 	v. 	Callahan, 	555 	U.S. 	223
(2009)). 	“Instead, 	supervisory 	liability 	under 	§ 1983 	occurs
either when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged
unconstitutional 	conduct 	or 	when 	there 	is 	a 	causal 	connection
between 	the 	actions 	of 	a 	supervising 	official 	and 	the 	alleged
6 To the extent that McComas also attempts to assert a § 1983 malicious
prosecution claim based on the May 30, 2023, arrest, that claim fails.
A 	§ 1983 	malicious 	prosecution 	claim 	“requires 	a 	seizure 	‘pursuant 	to
legal process,’” such as “an arrest warrant.” 	Black v. Wigington, 811
F.3d 	1259, 	1267 	(11th 	Cir. 	2016) 	(quoting 	Heck 	v. 	Humphrey, 	512 	U.S.
477, 	484 	(1994)). 	The 	May 	30, 	2023, 	arrest 	was 	warrantless, 	and 	the
present 	record 	does 	not 	include 	any 	evidence 	that 	McComas 	was 	seized
pursuant to legal process.
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constitutional 	deprivation.” 	Id. 	(quoting 	Cottone, 	326 	F.3d 	at
1360). 	“[T]he 	standard 	by 	which 	a 	supervisor 	is 	held 	liable 	in
[his] 	individual 	capacity 	for 	the 	actions 	of 	a 	subordinate 	is
extremely rigorous.” 	Id. (quoting Braddy v. Fla. Dep’t of Lab. &
Emp. Sec., 133 F.3d 797, 802 (11th Cir. 1998)).
Because Girtz and Saulters did not personally participate in
the 	alleged 	unconstitutional 	conduct, 	neither 	can 	be 	held 	liable
under 	§ 	1983 	unless 	a 	causal 	connection 	exists 	between 	their
actions 	and 	the 	alleged 	constitutional 	deprivation. 	This 	causal
connection “can be established when a history of widespread abuse
puts 	the 	responsible 	supervisor 	on 	notice 	of 	the 	need 	to 	correct
the 	alleged 	deprivation, 	and 	he 	fails 	to 	do 	so” 	or 	when 	a
supervisor’s custom or policy “results in deliberate indifference
to 	constitutional 	rights 	or 	when 	facts 	support 	an 	inference 	that
the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew
that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them
from doing so.” 	Id. (quoting Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360).
McComas points to no evidence that ACC police officers had a
history 	of 	arresting 	individuals 	without 	conducting 	proper
investigations. 	Nor does McComas produce any evidence that Girtz
or 	Saulters 	directed, 	or 	had 	knowledge 	of, 	any 	unlawful 	activity
committed 	by 	ACC 	police 	officers. 	Therefore, 	Girtz 	and 	Saulters
are entitled to qualified immunity.
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C. 	Claims Against ACC
McComas’s remaining § 1983 claims are against ACC.7 	A local
government is liable under § 1983 only when its “official policy”
causes a constitutional violation. 	Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). 	Thus, McComas must show that he suffered
a 	constitutional 	violation 	caused 	by 	an 	“(1) 	an 	officially
promulgated county policy or (2) an unofficial custom or practice
of 	the 	county 	shown 	through 	the 	repeated 	acts 	of 	a 	final
policymaker 	for 	the 	county.” 	Grech 	v. 	Clayton 	Cnty., 	335 	F.3d
1326, 	1329 	(11th 	Cir. 	2003) 	(en 	banc). 	“A 	policy 	is 	a 	decision
that 	is 	officially 	adopted 	by 	the 	municipality, 	or 	created 	by 	an
official of such rank that he or she could be said to be acting on
behalf of the municipality.” 	Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117
F.3d 	488, 	489 	(11th 	Cir. 	1997). 	“A 	custom 	is 	a 	practice 	that 	is
so settled and permanent that it takes on the force of law.” 	Id.
“‘Proof 	of 	a 	single 	incident 	of 	unconstitutional 	activity 	is 	not
sufficient to impose liability’ against a municipality.” 	Craig v.
Floyd Cnty., 643 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting City of
7 	Because 	a 	municipal 	police 	department 	is 	an 	arm 	of 	the 	municipality
and not a legal entity capable of being sued, the Court construes all
of McComas’s claims against the ACC Police Department as claims against
ACC. 	See Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992) (“[P]olice
departments are not usually considered legal entities subject to suit.”).
The 	Court 	also 	construes 	all 	of 	McComas’s 	official 	capacity 	claims
against 	the 	individual 	Defendants 	as 	claims 	against 	ACC. 	Kentucky 	v.
Graham, 	473 	U.S. 	159, 	165 	(1985) 	(noting 	that 	official 	capacity 	suits
“generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an
entity 	of 	which 	an 	officer 	is 	an 	agent”) 	(quoting 	Monell 	v. 	Dep’t 	of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)).
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Okla. 	City 	v. 	Tuttle, 	471 	U.S. 	808, 	823-24 	(1985) 	(plurality
opinion)).
Here, McComas argues that his “banishment” from 150 Pine Lodge
without a court order was an ACC policy or custom. 	Pl.’s Resp. to
Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. 16-17, ECF No. 36. 	McComas, though, did not
point to any evidence of such a policy or custom. 	And, as discussed
above, 	McComas 	did 	not 	point 	to 	any 	evidence 	that 	would 	permit 	a
reasonable 	juror 	to 	conclude 	that 	he 	had 	a 	legitimate 	property
interest 	in 	150 	Pine 	Lodge. 	Accordingly, 	to 	the 	extent 	that
McComas attempts to assert a § 1983 claim based on his banishment
from 150 Pine Lodge, that claim fails.
McComas does invoke ACC Policy and Procedure 5A.02.01, which
states that police officers should “thoroughly and professionally
investigate all criminal activity.” 	Id. at 17. 	McComas does not
contend 	that 	this 	policy 	was 	a 	moving 	force 	behind 	any
constitutional violation. 	Instead, he appears to contend that he
was 	arrested 	as 	a 	result 	of 	the 	officers’ 	failure 	to 	comply 	with
the 	policy. 	An 	officer’s 	failure 	to 	comply 	with 	an 	official
policy, 	however, 	does 	not 	give 	rise 	to 	a 	Monell 	claim 	against 	a
local government under these circumstances. 	“It is only when the
‘execution of the government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the
injury’ 	that 	the 	municipality 	may 	be 	held 	liable 	under 	§ 	1983.”
City 	of 	Canton 	v. 	Harris, 	489 	U.S. 	378, 	385 	(1989) 	(quoting 	City
of 	Springfield 	v. 	Kibbe, 	480 	U.S. 	257, 	267 	(1987) 	(O’Connor, 	J.,
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dissenting)). 	McComas’s reliance on the investigation policy does
not demonstrate an ACC policy or custom was the moving force behind
any constitutional violation.8
II. 	Claims Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242
In addition to his § 1983 claims, McComas asserts claims under
18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 against Defendants King and Cameron. 	But
neither of these criminal statutes provides a private civil cause
of 	action. 	See 	O’Berry 	v. 	State 	Att’ys 	Off., 	241 	F. 	App’x 	654,
657 	(11th 	Cir. 	2007) 	(per 	curiam) 	(“[Section] 	1983 	‘provides 	for
private 	relief 	in 	civil 	actions 	from 	the 	deprivation 	of 	rights
secured 	by 	the 	Constitution 	and 	its 	laws,’ 	whereas 	§§ 	241 	and
242 ‘provide 	for 	criminal 	penalties 	for 	the 	deprivation 	of 	such
rights.’”) 	(quoting 	In 	re 	Estelle, 	516 	F.2d 	480, 	486 	(5th 	Cir.
1975)). 	Thus, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on these
claims.
III. Claims Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986
McComas also asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986
against 	Defendants 	King 	and 	Cameron. 	McComas 	contends 	that 	ACC
police 	officers 	had 	a 	conspiracy 	to 	deprive 	him 	of 	his 	civil
rights, 	in 	violation 	of 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1985(3). 	Even 	if 	McComas
8 	McComas 	does 	not 	appear 	to 	assert 	a 	§ 1983 	failure-to-train 	claim
against 	ACC 	based 	on 	the 	shortcomings 	in 	the 	officers’ 	investigation.
Even if he had, he did not point to evidence that ACC failed to train
its 	officers 	on 	the 	policy 	and 	that 	failure 	reflected 	deliberate
indifference to the constitutional rights of its citizens. 	See Harris,
489 	U.S. 	at 	392 	(explaining 	when 	municipal 	liability 	may 	exist 	for 	a
failure to train).
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presented 	enough 	evidence 	to 	show 	that 	ACC 	officers 	committed 	a
constitutional violation, his § 1985(3) claim fails because of the
intracorporate 	conspiracy 	doctrine, 	which 	“applies 	to 	claims
arising under § 1985(3)” and holds that “acts of corporate agents
are 	attributed 	to 	the 	corporation 	itself, 	thereby 	negating 	the
multiplicity 	of 	actors 	necessary 	for 	the 	formation 	of 	a
conspiracy.” 	Hogan 	v. 	City 	of 	Fort 	Walton 	Beach, 	817 	F. 	App’x
717, 	723 	(11th 	Cir. 	2020) 	(per 	curiam) 	(quoting 	McAndrew 	v.
Lockheed 	Martin 	Corp., 	206 	F.3d 	1031, 	1036 	(11th 	Cir. 	2000) 	(en
banc)). 	Thus, “a corporation cannot conspire with its employees,
and 	its 	employees, 	when 	acting 	in 	the 	scope 	of 	their 	employment,
cannot 	conspire 	among 	themselves.” 	Id. 	(quoting 	McAndrew, 	206
F.3d at 1036). 	This doctrine “applies to public entities such as
a city and its personnel.” 	Id. (quoting Denney v. City of Albany,
247 F.3d 1172, 1190 (11th Cir. 2001)). 	Because there is no dispute
that King and Cameron were acting in the scope of their employment
as ACC officers and McComas points to no evidence that any actors
outside the city were a part of the alleged conspiracy, the Court
finds that McComas’s § 1985 claims are barred by the intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine.
The Court acknowledges that 42 U.S.C. § 1986 “provides a cause
of 	action 	against 	anyone 	who 	knows 	about 	a 	§ 	1985 	conspiracy 	and
has the power to prevent the planned unlawful action, but neglects
or 	declines 	to 	do 	so.” 	Nassar 	v. 	Fla. 	Dep’t 	of 	Agric., 	754 	F.
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21
App’x 	903, 	907 	(11th 	Cir. 	2018) 	(per 	curiam). 	But 	to 	assert 	a
claim 	under 	§ 	1986, 	“a 	plaintiff 	must 	first 	allege 	facts 	showing
the existence of a § 1985 conspiracy.” 	Id. 	As McComas failed to
show 	the 	existence 	of 	a 	§ 	1985 	conspiracy, 	his 	§ 	1986 	claims
against 	King 	and 	Cameron 	also 	fail. 	Accordingly, 	Defendants 	are
entitled to summary judgment on these claims.
IV. 	State Law Claims
McComas’s remaining claims all arise under Georgia state law.
Under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1367(c)(3), 	“district 	courts 	may 	decline 	to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the
district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction.” 	District 	courts 	are 	encouraged 	to 	exercise 	that
discretion 	“to 	dismiss 	any 	remaining 	state 	claims 	when, 	as 	here,
the federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial.” 	Murphy v.
City 	of 	Aventura, 	383 	F. 	App’x 	915, 	919 	(11th. 	Cir. 	2010) 	(per
curiam) 	(quoting 	Raney 	v. 	Allstate 	Ins. 	Co., 	370 	F.3d 	1086, 	1089
(11th 	Cir. 	2004) 	(per 	curiam)). 	Having 	dismissed 	all 	federal
claims, 	the 	Court 	declines 	to 	exercise 	supplemental 	jurisdiction
over the remaining Georgia state law claims.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants Defendants’
motions 	for 	summary 	judgment 	(ECF 	Nos. 	31 	& 	33) 	as 	to 	all 	of
McComas’s 	federal 	law 	claims. 	Having 	declined 	to 	exercise
supplemental 	jurisdiction 	over 	McComas’s 	state 	law 	claims, 	the
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Court 	directs 	the 	Clerk 	to 	remand 	these 	claims 	to 	the 	Superior
Court of Clarke County, Georgia.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 14th day of January, 2026.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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