SAMPSON v. WILLIAMS et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATHENS DIVISION
JAMIRA C. SAMPSON, 	:
:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	: 	Case No. 3:26-cv-2-TES-AGH
:
Officer WILLIAMS, 	:
:
Defendant. 	:
________________________________
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider appointment of counsel
(ECF No. 24), in which Plaintiff asserts additional grounds for appointed counsel.
For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion is denied.
First, to the extent Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Court’s denial of
appointed counsel, pursuant to Local Rule, “Motions for Reconsideration shall not be
filed as a matter of routine practice.” 	M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.6. 	The Court has previously
held that
[m]otions for reconsideration are only appropriate if the movant can
show: (1) there has been an intervening change in the law, (2) new
evidence has been discovered that was not previously available to the
parties at the time the original order was entered, or (3) reconsideration
is necessary to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.
Court opinions are not intended as mere first drafts, subject to revision
and reconsideration at a litigant’s pleasure.
Thomas v. Owens, No. 5:08-CV-414 (CAR), 2009 WL 3747162, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 4,
2009) 	(quotations 	omitted) 	(internal 	citations 	omitted). 	In 	his 	motion 	for
reconsideration, 	Plaintiff 	makes 	no 	attempt 	to 	show 	any 	proper 	ground 	for
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reconsideration. Plaintiff should note that simply reasserting an issue the Court has
already considered—and rejected—is an insufficient showing for the purposes of
reconsideration. 	Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff moves the Court to reconsider
its denial of appointed counsel, his motion (ECF No. 24) is DENIED.
Second, to the extent that Plaintiff asserts that counsel is necessary because
he continues to be unable to retain counsel and has been granted leave to proceed in
forma pauperis (IFP), as the Court previously informed Plaintiff, there is “no absolute
constitutional right to the appointment of counsel” in a § 1983 lawsuit. 	Poole v.
Lambert, 819 F.2d 1025, 1028 (11th Cir. 1987). Appointment of counsel is “instead a
privilege that is justified only by exceptional circumstances, such as where the facts
and legal issues are so novel or complex as to require the assistance of a trained
practitioner.” Id. While Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed IFP under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915, that same statute does not mandate the appointment of counsel. 	Plaintiff
also asserts that his incarceration limits his ability to litigate his case. 	Pl.’s Mot.
Recons. Couns. 1-2, ECF No. 24. Although incarceration does “pose difficulties with
respect 	to 	conducting 	discovery,” 	Plaintiff 	still 	retains 	options 	for 	“conducting
discovery” and prosecuting his claims at this stage in the proceedings. 	F.T.C. v.
Lalonde, 545 F. App’x 825, 833-34 (11th Cir. 2013).
Finally, as the Court explained to Plaintiff when it denied his first motion to
appoint counsel, at this stage of litigation, it is not yet clear that the case will proceed
to trial, given that dispositive motions have yet to be filed. Should it become evident
that appointment of counsel is necessary, the Court, on its own motion, will consider
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assisting Plaintiff with securing counsel. 	Thus, Plaintiff should not file additional
motions to appoint counsel.
SO ORDERED, this 14th day of October, 2026.
s/ Amelia G. Helmick
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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