SNEAD v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
BENNIE MAE SNEAD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.
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CASE NO. 4:23-CV-153 (CDL)
O R D E R
Plaintiff 	Bennie 	Mae’s 	brother 	Curtis 	Mincey 	was 	beaten 	to
death 	while 	he 	was 	incarcerated 	at 	Rutledge 	State 	Prison.
Plaintiff 	claims 	that 	the 	Georgia 	Department 	of 	Corrections
discriminated against Mincey because of a disability, in violation
of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (“§ 504”), and
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C.
§ 12131, et seq. 	The parties completed discovery on these claims,
and 	the 	Department 	now 	seeks 	summary 	judgment 	on 	them.1 	As
explained below, the Court grants the summary judgment motion (ECF
No. 38).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary 	judgment 	may 	be 	granted 	only 	“if 	the 	movant 	shows
that 	there 	is 	no 	genuine 	dispute 	as 	to 	any 	material 	fact 	and 	the
1 Based on the discovery completed to date, Plaintiff also seeks to amend
her complaint to add claims against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court addressed the motion for leave to amend in a separate order.
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movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 	Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). 	In 	determining 	whether 	a 	genuine 	dispute 	of 	material
fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the evidence
is viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment, 	drawing 	all 	justifiable 	inferences 	in 	the 	opposing
party’s favor. 	Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255
(1986). 	A fact is material if it is relevant or necessary to the
outcome of the suit. 	Id. at 248. 	A factual dispute is genuine if
the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for
the nonmoving party. 	Id.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Rutledge 	State 	Prison 	is 	operated 	by 	the 	Georgia 	Department
of Corrections (“GDC”). 	Mincey entered Rutledge in September 2020.
The 	Rutledge 	classification 	committee 	listed 	Mincey’s 	medical
limitations 	as 	“hearing 	aid, 	MH3, 	hearing 	impaired, 	slow 	eating,
bottom 	bunk, 	no 	strenuous 	activ.” 	Jones 	Dep. 	Ex. 	8, 	Mincey
Institutional 	File 	at 	GDC 	– 	000054, 	ECF 	No. 	52-5.2 	On 	his
intelligence 	profile, 	Mincey’s 	supervision 	level 	was 	listed 	as
“Medium/Mh III.” 	Jones Dep. Ex. 7, Mincey Intelligence Profile at
GDC – 000191, ECF No. 52-4. 	Mincey preferred to be housed without
a 	cellmate, 	and 	officers 	“guess[ed]” 	it 	was 	because 	he 	could 	not
2 Plaintiff also asserts that Mincey had “schizophrenia with religious
delusions,” but the evidence she cited on this point does not establish
this assertion. Pl.’s Fact Statement ¶ 3, ECF No. 41-2.
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hear. 	Bryant Dep. 59:17-60:22, ECF No. 44. 	One officer reported
that 	she 	could 	not 	understand 	Mincey 	when 	he 	tried 	to 	request
things from her; when that happened, she told her supervisor that
Mincey 	wanted 	the 	supervisor 	to 	“go 	over” 	to 	speak 	with 	Mincey.
Bryant Dep. 58:19-59:16, ECF No. 44.3
Mincey’s 	prison 	medical 	record 	states 	that 	he 	received 	new
hearing 	aids 	in 	February 	of 	2021. 	Jones 	Dep. 	Ex. 	60, 	Mincey
Medical File at GDC-002383, ECF No. 52-26. 	In March 2021, a prison
official 	noted 	that 	Mincey 	reported 	that 	he 	could 	not 	hear 	the
call-out 	for 	meals 	and 	that 	he 	was 	not 	getting 	enough 	food 	as 	a
result. 	Id. at GDC-002396. 	In April 2021, a prison official noted
in 	Mincey’s 	file, 	“Audiology 	written 	AGAIN 	for 	dysfunctioning
[hearing 	aids] 	to 	be 	repaired/replaced.” 	Id. 	at 	GDC-002394. 	In
a 	progress 	record 	dated 	June 	21, 	2021, 	a 	prison 	official 	noted
that 	Mincey 	“broke 	his 	hearing 	aids.” 	Id. 	at 	GDC-002391.
According 	to 	GDC, 	Mincey 	received 	a 	“hearing 	notification 	watch”
in July 2021. 	Jones Dep. Ex. 18, Mem. re Offender Mincey’s Watch
(July 	15, 	2021), 	ECF 	No. 	52-13. 	Plaintiff 	pointed 	to 	evidence
that although one officer saw Mincey with the watch, that officer
did not receive information about it or instructions to charge it.
3 	Plaintiff 	contends 	that 	“there 	was 	nothing 	done 	to 	determine 	what
Mincey needed or was requesting,” but she did not point to any evidence
to support this contention. 	Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Fact Statement ¶ 5,
ECF No. 41-1.
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Bryant Dep. 155:8-23. 	Plaintiff pointed to evidence that another
officer never saw the watch. 	West Dep. 177:17-178:10, ECF No. 47.
Mincey 	was 	moved 	to 	the 	prison’s 	administrative 	segregation
unit 	on 	June 	23, 	2021, 	where 	he 	was 	housed 	with 	inmate 	Joshua
Starks. 	Jones 	Dep. 	42:13-44:13, 	ECF 	No. 	52. 	Mincey 	died 	in 	his
cell on July 21, 2021. 	His death was ruled a homicide; Starks was
charged with murder in connection with Mincey’s death. 	One of the
officers who packed Mincey’s personal property following his death
did not recall packing a watch. 	West Dep. 178:5-12.
DISCUSSION
Title 	II 	of 	the 	ADA 	and 	§ 504 	of 	the 	Rehabilitation 	Act
prohibit 	public 	entities 	from 	discriminating 	against 	qualified
individuals 	with 	disabilities. 	Title 	II 	of 	the 	ADA 	states, 	“no
qualified 	individual 	with 	a 	disability 	shall, 	by 	reason 	of 	such
disability, 	be 	excluded 	from 	participation 	in 	or 	be 	denied 	the
benefits 	of 	the 	services, 	programs, 	or 	activities 	of 	a 	public
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 	42
U.S.C.A. 	§ 	12132. 	“Section 	504 	is 	pretty 	much 	identical[.]”
Silberman 	v. 	Miami 	Dade 	Transit, 	927 	F.3d 	1123, 	1133 	(11th 	Cir.
2019). 	It provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with
a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of
her 	or 	his 	disability, 	be 	excluded 	from 	the 	participation 	in, 	be
denied 	the 	benefits 	of, 	or 	be 	subjected 	to 	discrimination 	under
any 	program 	or 	activity 	receiving 	Federal 	financial 	assistance.”
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29 	U.S.C. 	§ 	794(a). 	“Given 	the 	textual 	similarities 	between 	the
two statutes,” the same standards govern Title II and § 504 cases.
Silberman, 927 F.3d at 1133.
To 	prevail 	on 	a 	claim 	under 	either 	Title 	II 	or 	Section 	504,
a plaintiff must establish: “(1) that he is a qualified individual
with 	a 	disability; 	(2) 	that 	he 	was 	either 	excluded 	from
participation 	in 	or 	denied 	the 	benefits 	of 	a 	public 	entity’s
services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated
against 	by 	the 	public 	entity; 	and 	(3) 	that 	the 	exclusion, 	denial
of 	benefit, 	or 	discrimination 	was 	by 	reason 	of 	the 	plaintiff’s
disability.” 	Christmas v. Nabors, 76 F.4th 1320, 1333 (11th Cir.
2023) (quoting J.S., III ex rel. J.S. Jr. v. Houston Cnty. Bd. of
Educ., 	877 	F.3d 	979, 	985 	(11th 	Cir. 	2017)). 	And 	where, 	as 	here,
a 	plaintiff 	seeks 	damages 	for 	alleged 	disability 	discrimination,
the 	plaintiff 	“must 	clear 	an 	additional 	hurdle” 	and 	“prove 	that
the entity that he has sued engaged in intentional discrimination,
which requires a showing of deliberate indifference.” 	Id. (quoting
Ingram 	v. 	Kubik, 	30 	F.4th 	1241, 	1257 	(11th 	Cir. 	2022)).
“‘Deliberate 	indifference’ 	. . . 	is 	an 	‘exacting 	standard.’”
Silberman, 	927 	F.3d 	at 	1134 	(quoting 	J.S, 	877 	F.3d 	at 	987). 	“It
requires 	proof 	that 	‘the 	defendant 	knew 	that 	harm 	to 	a 	federally
protected 	right 	was 	substantially 	likely 	and 	. . . 	failed 	to 	act
on 	that 	likelihood.’” 	Id. 	(quoting 	Liese 	v. 	Indian 	River 	Cnty.
Hosp. 	Dist., 	701 	F.3d 	334, 	344 	(11th 	Cir. 	2012)). 	To 	hold 	a
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government entity liable for deliberate indifference, a plaintiff
must show that an official with authority “to address the alleged
discrimination and to institute corrective measures” on behalf of
the 	public 	entity 	had 	“actual 	knowledge 	of 	discrimination 	in 	the
[entity’s] programs” but failed “adequately to respond.” 	Ingram,
30 F.4th at 1259.
Here, 	GDC 	does 	not 	dispute 	that 	Mincey 	was 	a 	qualified
individual 	with 	a 	disability 	because 	of 	his 	hearing 	loss.
Plaintiff’s argument is not a model of clarity, but she appears to
claim 	that 	Mincey 	was 	subjected 	to 	discrimination 	because 	of 	his
hearing loss when his cellmate attacked and killed him. 	The record
reflects that prison officials were aware of Mincey’s hearing loss,
but Plaintiff did not point to any evidence that a prison official
had actual knowledge that Mincey was substantially likely to face
discrimination 	because 	of 	his 	hearing 	loss.4 	Plaintiff 	also 	did
not point to evidence that prison officials failed to act despite
actual 	knowledge 	of 	risks 	due 	to 	Mincey’s 	hearing 	loss. 	Rather,
the 	record 	reflects 	that 	the 	prison’s 	medical 	personnel 	provided
Mincey 	with 	hearing 	aids 	and 	made 	multiple 	attempts 	to 	fix 	them
when 	Mincey 	complained 	that 	they 	weren’t 	working. 	Pointing 	to 	a
July 15, 2021 memo issued by the prison’s warden and deputy warden
4 GDC’s present summary judgment focuses on the narrow issue of disability
discrimination and does not address the issue of whether prison officials
were 	deliberately 	indifferent 	to 	a 	known 	risk 	of 	harm 	to 	Mincey 	from
other inmates.
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of 	security, 	Plaintiff 	argues 	that 	the 	prison 	warden—the 	highest
ranking official within the prison—was aware of Mincey’s need for
accommodations 	for 	his 	hearing 	loss. 	Jones 	Dep. 	Ex. 	18, 	Mem. 	re
Offender 	Mincey’s 	Watch 	(July 	15, 	2021), 	ECF 	No. 	52-13; 	also
docketed at 31-4. 	That same memo states that Mincey was issued a
hearing notification watch. 	Id. 	Plaintiff contends that there is
no evidence that prison officials issued the watch to Mincey, but
the 	evidence 	she 	cited 	in 	support 	of 	that 	contention 	establishes
that at least one officer saw Mincey with the watch. 	Bryant Dep.
155:12-23. 	For all these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff
failed 	to 	present 	sufficient 	evidence 	to 	create 	genuine 	fact
dispute 	that 	a 	prison 	official 	with 	authority 	to 	institute
corrective 	measures 	knew 	that 	Mincey 	faced 	harm 	to 	a 	federally
protected 	right 	due 	to 	his 	hearing 	loss 	or 	that 	the 	official 	did
not act despite such knowledge.
Plaintiff also suggests that GDC was deliberately indifferent
to 	Mincey’s 	disabilities 	because 	officers, 	knowing 	that 	Mincey
preferred 	a 	single 	person 	cell 	due 	to 	his 	hearing 	loss,
nevertheless assigned Mincey to a cell with a cellmate. 	In support
of 	this 	argument, 	Plaintiff 	cites 	GDC’s 	standing 	operating
procedures 	on 	reasonable 	accommodations 	for 	offenders 	with
disabilities. 	The 	policy 	states 	that 	“[s]ingle 	occupancy 	cells
will 	be 	made 	available 	for 	offenders 	with 	severe 	medical
disabilities, serious mental illness and other special needs, when
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necessary.” 	Jones Dep. Ex. 17, GDOC Policy No. 103.63 § IV.C.1.,
ECF No. 52-12.
Plaintiff 	did 	not 	point 	to 	evidence 	that 	Mincey 	suffered 	a
severe 	medical 	disability, 	serious 	mental 	illness, 	or 	other
special 	needs 	within 	the 	meaning 	of 	the 	policy 	that 	made 	it
necessary 	for 	him 	to 	be 	housed 	in 	a 	single 	occupancy 	cell. 	Even
if 	Plaintiff 	had 	pointed 	to 	such 	evidence, 	failure 	to 	follow 	a
prison policy “does not, by itself, rise to the level of deliberate
indifference.” 	Taylor 	v. 	Adams, 	221 	F.3d 	1254, 	1259 	(11th 	Cir.
2000). 	Rather, there must be some evidence that prison officials
had a subjective awareness of a risk of harm to Mincey due to his
disability, 	yet 	failed 	to 	act. 	The 	absence 	of 	such 	evidence
defeats Plaintiff’s argument.
CONCLUSION
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	above, 	the 	Court 	grants 	GDC’s
summary 	judgment 	motion 	on 	Plaintiff’s 	disability 	discrimination
claims (ECF No. 38).
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 29th day of January, 2026.
S/Clay D. Land
CLAY D. LAND
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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