CAMPBELL v. BRADLEY-LOVING

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER BERNARD 	:
CAMPBELL, 	:
:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	: 	Case No. 4:24-cv-73-CDL-AGH
:
Deputy PRESTON 	:
BRADLEY-LOVING, 	:
:
Defendant. 	:
________________________________
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgement (ECF
No. 22). For the reasons explained below, it is recommended that Defendant’s motion
be granted.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint on the Court’s standard form for
complaints under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, in which he alleged no cause of action and
provided no statement of his claim. 	See generally Compl., ECF No. 1. 	On June 2,
2024, Plaintiff amended his complaint, alleging that “[he] was attacked by CO Love1
while exercising [his] freedom of speech.” 	Am. Compl. 4, ECF No. 4. 	On June 21,
2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
(ECF Nos. 2, 5) and conducted a preliminary screening of Plaintiff’s complaint. 	See
1 Defendant’s correct name is Preston Bradley-Loving.
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generally Order & R., ECF No. 6. 	On July 17, 2024, the Court ordered Plaintiff’s
excessive force claim against Defendant to proceed for further factual development.
Order, ECF No. 10.
The Court ordered an entry of default against Defendant on October 4, 2024
(ECF No. 16), for failing to respond to service, but set aside the default on February
7, 2025, upon Defendant’s showing of good cause (ECF No. 19). Defendant then filed
his answer on February 19, 2025 (ECF No. 20) and moved for summary judgement
on June 20, 2025 (ECF No. 22). 	Despite multiple attempts to notify Plaintiff of
Defendant’s motion for summary judgement, Plaintiff did not file a response.2
Defendant’s motion is ripe for review.
DISCUSSION
Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff failed
to exhaust his administrative grievances and because he is entitled to qualified
immunity. 	Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 1, ECF No. 22. 	Because the Court finds that
Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, it recommends summary
judgment on that ground and declines to address qualified immunity.
2 The Court’s first notice of Defendant’s motion for summary judgement, mailed to Plaintiff at
Muscogee County Jail, was returned as undeliverable bearing a notation informing the Court that
Plaintiff was no longer housed there. 	Mail Returned, July 14, 2025, ECF No. 24. 	The Court
subsequently discovered that Plaintiff had been transported to Baldwin State Prison. Thus, the Court
ordered Defendant to reserve his motion for summary judgement and directed the Clerk’s office to
resend the Court’s notice, both addressed to Plaintiff at Balwin State Prison. Order, Oct. 31, 2025,
ECF No. 25. 	In compliance with the Court’s order, Defendant filed his certificate of service on
November 3, 2025 (ECF No. 26). The Court’s notice was returned a second time but was successfully
delivered after the Clerk’s office updated the envelope with Plaintiff’s GDOC number. Mail Returned,
Nov. 25, 2025, ECF No. 27. Only after the Court and Defendant experienced issues mailing Plaintiff
did he provide notice of his changed address (ECF Nos. 28, 29).
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I. 	Exhaustion Standard
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides that “[n]o action shall be
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title . . . by a
prisoner 	confined 	in 	any 	jail, 	prison, 	or 	other 	correctional 	facility 	until 	such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). When
a grievance procedure is provided for prisoners, “an inmate alleging harm suffered
from prison conditions must file a grievance and exhaust the remedies available
under that procedure before pursuing a § 1983 lawsuit.” 	Brown v. Sikes, 212 F.3d
1205, 1207 (11th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). “To exhaust administrative remedies
in accordance with the PLRA, prisoners must properly take each step within the
administrative process. 	If their initial grievance is denied, prisoners must then file
a timely appeal.” 	Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1378 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted). “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with
an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative
system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the course
of its proceedings.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006).
“The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance
procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the prison’s
requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.”
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). “The critical function of the grievance process
is that it provides the institution with notice of a problem such that they have an
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opportunity to address the problem internally.” Toenniges v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 600
F. App’x 645, 649 (11th Cir. 2015).
“Because exhaustion of administrative remedies is a matter in abatement and
not generally an adjudication on the merits, an exhaustion defense . . . is not
ordinarily the proper subject for a summary judgment; instead, it should be raised in
a motion to dismiss, or be treated as such if raised in a motion for summary
judgment.”3 	Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1374-75 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Further, since dismissal for failure to exhaust is not an adjudication on the merits,
the Court can resolve factual disputes using evidence from outside the pleadings. Id.
at 1376.
“[D]eciding a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies
is a two-step process.” 	Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir. 2008).
“First, the court looks to the factual allegations in the defendant’s motion to dismiss
and those in the plaintiff’s response, and if they conflict, takes the plaintiff’s version
of the facts as true.” 	Id. 	If, taking plaintiff’s facts as being true, the defendant is
entitled to dismissal for failure to exhaust, then the complaint should be dismissed.
Id. 	“If the complaint is not subject to dismissal at the first step . . . the court then
proceeds to make specific findings in order to resolve the disputed factual issues
3 Such is the case here. Although Defendant argues exhaustion in a summary judgment motion, this
defense will be treated as if raised in a motion to dismiss. Defendant specifically raised exhaustion as
a defense in his answer, so it is not waived. Answer 2, ECF No. 20; see Black v. Camon, No. 7:06-cv-
75-HL, 2008 WL 2119914, at *2 (M.D. Ga. May 19, 2008) (finding exhaustion was not waived and could
be asserted in a motion for summary judgment because defendants raised it as a defense in their
answer); see also Gomez v. Jackson, No. 1:18-cv-963, 2020 WL 4048061, at *9 n.9 (N.D. Ga. July 20,
2020) (citing cases to illustrate that “the Eleventh Circuit routinely affirms orders granting
post-answer motions to dismiss (styled as motions for summary judgment) for lack of exhaustion”).
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related to exhaustion.” 	Id. 	The defendant bears the burden of proof during this
second step. 	Id. 	In resolving the factual dispute, a Court is authorized to make
credibility determinations. 	See Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1377-78 (finding that district
court did not clearly err in determining that plaintiff’s allegation that he was denied
access to grievance forms was not credible); see also Whatley v. Smith, 898 F.3d 1072,
1082-83 (11th Cir. 2018) (upholding district court finding that one of inmate’s
grievances was not filed).
A prisoner need only exhaust administrative remedies that are available. Ross
v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016). 	In Ross, the Supreme Court held that an
administrative procedure is unavailable under the PLRA when either (1) “it operates
as a simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any
relief to aggrieved inmates,” (2) it is “so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking,
incapable 	of 	use,” 	or 	(3) 	“prison 	administrators 	thwart 	inmates 	from 	taking
advantage 	of 	a 	grievance 	process 	through 	machination, 	misrepresentation, 	or
intimidation.” Id. at 643-44. For a remedy to be available, it “must be capable of use
for the accomplishment of [its] purpose.” Turner, 541 F.3d at 1084 (quotation marks
omitted) (alteration original). 	The burden is on the defendant to show that an
administrative remedy is available, but “once that burden has been met, the burden
of going forward shifts to the plaintiff, who . . . must demonstrate that the grievance
procedure was subjectively and objectively unavailable to him.” 	Geter v. Baldwin
State Prison, 974 F.3d 1348, 1356 (11th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing Turner, 541 F.3d at 1085). 	District courts must use the two-step Turner
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analysis when addressing the availability of the grievance process. 	See Jenkins v.
Sloan, 826 F. App’x 833, 839 (11th Cir. 2020) (directing district courts to apply “the
two-step Turner test when addressing the question of exhaustion and the availability
of the grievance process”).
II. 	MCJ Administrative Procedures
Defendants submitted the declaration of Stacy Horan—whose responsibilities
include serving as Grievance Investigator at Muscogee County Jail (“MCJ”)—to
establish that administrative remedies were available to Plaintiff at MCJ. 	Horan
Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 22-4. According to MCJ grievance standard operating procedures,
grievances that cannot be resolved informally may be submitted using the Kiosk
system within five days of when an inmate discovers or should have discovered the
subject incident of the grievance. Id. ¶ 4; Inmate Handbook (2025) ¶ F, ECF No. 33-
2.4 	The grievance officer must then “provide a written response within 15 days of
receiving the complaint.” 	Inmate Handbook ¶ L; Horan Decl. ¶ 4. . 	Then, after
“receiving the formal response to the grievance, [the inmate] may accept the findings
and action taken . . . or appeal the decision to the Jail Commander or designee.”
Inmate Handbook ¶ M; Horan Decl. ¶ 4. 	The grievance system is terminated only
4 Because Defendant failed to file MCJ’s standard operating procedures for inmate grievances in their
motion for summary judgement, the Court ordered Defendant to supplement the record with them.
Order, Jan. 26, 2026, ECF No. 30. Defendant timely complied with the Court’s order. Resp. to Ct.
Order, ECF No. 33. The Court notes that parties moving to dismiss based on a failure to exhaust
typically file the jail or prison’s grievance procedures along with a declaration by the institution’s
grievance coordinator or investigator. It is essential that the Court have the opportunity to review the
procedures when conducting its step-two analysis under Turner. Therefore, counsel for Defendant is
reminded that any subsequent motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust should include the grievance
procedures.
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after the Jail Commander or designee responds to the appeal. 	Horan Decl. ¶ 4;
Inmate Handbook ¶ P.
III. 	Plaintiff’s Grievance
According to Horan, Plaintiff submitted Grievance Number 2368889 on May
24, 2024. Horan Decl. ¶ 5; Ex. A. at 5, ECF No. 22-4. In his grievance, Plaintiff stated
that he was attacked because of his “freedom of speech.” 	Ex. A at 5. 	He requested
that internal affairs become involved in the situation because “the officer attacked
[him] knowing [that he had] back problems prior to the situation.” 	Id. 	At the time
his grievance was filed, he explained that his “head and back still hurt from the
situation.” Id. The Grievance Investigator responded on August 22, 2024, informing
Plaintiff that the Use of Force Incident was already under investigation by the Office
of Professional Standards, as required per Muscogee County Sheriff’s Office Policy.
Horan Decl. ¶ 5; Ex. A. at 5.
Plaintiff then appealed his grievance on November 5, 2024. 	Horan Decl. ¶ 5;
Ex. A. at 6. Lieutenant Foster responded to Plaintiff’s appeal on November 20, 2024,
explaining that Internal Affairs thoroughly investigated Defendant’s use of force and
found that it was justified. 	Ex. A at 6. 	Then, on December 17, 2024, Lieutenant
Foster once again informed defendant that “[t]he incident was investigated by the
Office of Professional Standards-Internal Affairs, and was cleared as justified.” 	Id.
Horan explained that any delay in response to Plaintiff’s appeal was due to the
Internal Affairs investigation. Horan Decl. ¶ 5.
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IV. 	Plaintiff Failed to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
because Plaintiff did not file a grievance with MCJ before filing his complaint. Def.’s
Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 11, ECF No. 22-1. The Court agrees.
According to Defendant, the excessive force incident occurred on April 17,
2024.5 Id. at 1. Plaintiff filed his complaint on May 16, 2024.6 Compl. 6, ECF No. 1.
According to Plaintiff’s grievance record and his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff did
not file a grievance concerning the incident until May 24, 2024, which was over one
month after the incident occurred and eight days after he filed his complaint. Ex. A
at 5; Am. Compl. Attach. 1, ECF No. 4-1. 	In his initial complaint, Plaintiff stated
that he had presented the issues in his complaint to MCJ as a grievance because he
“told the sergeant.” 	Compl. 4. 	However, merely informing the sergeant about the
incident does not suffice as a substitute for filing a grievance. 	In his amended
complaint, Plaintiff states that he submitted a grievance, but that “nothing has taken
place since I’ve filed my grievance.” Am. Compl. 2. As stated above, the handwritten
copy of the grievance attached to his amended complaint states that it was submitted
5 In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the incident occurred on May 24, 2024, at 4:12 PM.
Am. Compl. 4, ECF No. 4. However, Plaintiff filed his complaint on May 16, 2024. Compl. 6, ECF No.
1. Because the events complained of logically must have occurred before the complaint was filed, and
because the surveillance footage provided by Defendant is date-stamped, the Court finds that the
incident occurred on April 17, 2024.
6 Under the Prison Mailbox Rule, “a pro se prisoner’s court filing is deemed filed on the date it is
delivered to prison authorities for mailing. . . . [A]bsent evidence to the contrary, [the court assumes
that the] prisoner delivered a filing to prison authorities on the date that he signed it.” Daniels v.
United States, 809 F.3d 588, 589 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff signed
his complaint on May 16, 2024. Compl. 6. Thus, the Court considers Plaintiff’s complaint to be filed
on that date.
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on May 24, 2024.7 Am. Compl. Attach. 1. Pursuant to the grievance policy at MCJ,
Plaintiff was required to submit his grievance through the MCJ kiosk system within
five days after the date of the incident in order to properly invoke the administrative
remedy. See Horan Decl. ¶ 4. Plaintiff did not submit his grievance through the kiosk
system until after he filed his initial complaint.8 	And, because Plaintiff failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing this action against Defendant,
Plaintiff has run afoul of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirements.9 	See 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a). 	As such, 	it is recommended that Defendant’s 	motion for summary
judgement (ECF No. 22) be granted based upon Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 22) be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s complaint
be dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.
7 Even assuming the incident complained about took place on May 24, 2024, and that Plaintiff filed a
grievance that same day, he still failed to exhaust prior to filing his amended complaint. Plaintiff
states in his Amended Complaint that he had not appealed the grievance denial. Am. Compl. 3. This
is consistent with the documentation submitted by Defendant that shows that Plaintiff did not appeal
the grievance until November 5, 2024. 	Ex. A at 2. 	Regardless, as explained infra, in footnote 9,
Plaintiff cannot cure the exhaustion defect with the filing of an amended complaint.
8 The Court notes that the grievance investigator “listed [Plaintiff’s] grievance as non-grievable” given
that “[his] particular incident was already being investigated.” 	Ex. A at 5. 	The MCJ standard
operating procedures set out specific topics that cannot be grieved by inmates, and use of force
incidents are not included in that list. See Inmate Handbook (2022) 3, ECF No. 33-1; Inmate Handbook
(2025) 2, ECF No. 33-2 (detailing topics that cannot be grieved, which include (1) any matter over
which MCJ has no control, (2) disciplinary actions, and (3) routine administrative transfers). Thus,
based upon MCJ’s standard operating procedures, the Court declines to interpret this comment as
excusing excessive force incidents from the grievance process.
9 Defendant also argues that Plaintiff failed to complete the appeals process prior to filing his amended
complaint. Def.’s Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 11. However, “[t]he only facts pertinent to determining
whether a prisoner has satisfied the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement are those that existed when he
filed his original complaint.” Smith v. Terry, 491 F. App’x 81, 83 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Harris v.
Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 981 (11th Cir. 2000)). As such, Plaintiff’s amended complaint could not “cure
the exhaustion defect.” Id.
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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to
this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections, within fourteen
(14) days after being served with a copy hereof. 	The district judge shall make a de
novo determination of those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is
made. All other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed for clear error.
The parties are hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1,
“[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations
contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order
based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the
time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the
absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error
if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO RECOMMENDED, this 28th day of January, 2026.
s/ Amelia G. Helmick
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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