BROWN v. COUNTRYMAN et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
JESSIE LEE BROWN, 	:
:
Plaintiff, 	:
v. 	: 	Case No. 4:25-cv-276-CDL-AGH
:
Sheriff COUNTRYMAN, et al., 	:
:
Defendants. 	:
__________________________________
RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL
Pro se Plaintiff Jessie Lee Brown, an inmate incarcerated at the Muscogee
County Jail in Columbus, Georgia, filed a complaint seeking relief pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	ECF No. 1. 	Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
ECF No. 2. For the reasons discussed below, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s
motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis be DENIED and that this action be
DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 	It is further
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s complaint be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted.
I. 	Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)
Federal law bars a prisoner from bringing a civil action in federal court in
forma pauperis
if [the prisoner] has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or
detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the
United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
unless the prisoner is under 	imminent danger of serious physical
injury.
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28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 	This is known as the “three strikes provision.” 	Under
§ 1915(g), a prisoner incurs a “strike” any time the prisoner has a federal lawsuit or
appeal dismissed on the grounds that it is (1) frivolous, (2) malicious, or (3) fails to
state a claim. 	See Medberry v. Butler, 185 F.3d 1189, 1192 (11th Cir. 1999); see also
Daker v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 820 F.3d 1278, 1283-84 (11th Cir. 2016)
(confirming that “these three grounds are the only grounds that can render a
dismissal a strike”). 	Once a prisoner incurs three strikes, the ability to proceed in
forma pauperis in federal court is greatly limited: leave to proceed in forma pauperis
may not be granted unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical
injury. 	Medberry, 	185 	F.3d 	at 	1192. 	The 	Eleventh 	Circuit 	upheld 	the
constitutionality of § 1915(g) because it does not violate an inmate’s right to access
the courts, the doctrine of separation of powers, an inmate’s right to due process of
law, or an inmate’s right to equal protection. Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 723 (11th
Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Jones v. Bock,
549 U.S. 199 (2007).
A review of court records on the Federal Judiciary’s Public Access to Court
Electronic Records (“PACER”) database reveals that Plaintiff filed numerous federal
lawsuits and at least three of his complaints have been dismissed as frivolous,
malicious, or for failure to state a claim.1 	See, e.g., Order Dismissing Compl., Brown
1 The Georgia Department of Corrections online offender query system shows that Plaintiff spells his
first 	name 	both 	as 	“Jessie” 	and 	as 	“Jesse” 	and 	that 	he 	has 	other 	aliases 	as 	well.
https://services.gdc.ga.gov/GDC/OffenderQuery/jsp/OffQryRedirector.jsp (searched “Brown, Jessie”)
(last visited Nov. 10, 2025) (showing known aliases include “Brown, Jesse Lee,” Brown, Jessie Lee,”
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v. Abbot, ECF No. 22 in Case No. 4:03-cv-108-BAE (S.D. Ga. June 1, 2004) (dismissing
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)); Order Dismissing Compl., Brown v. McLane,
ECF No. 4 in Case No. 7:03-cv-101-HL-RLH (M.D. Ga. Jan. 13, 2004) (dismissing as
frivolous); Order on Mot. Recons., Brown v. Nix, ECF No. 12 in Case No. 7:03-cv-98-
HL-RLH (M.D. Ga. Jan. 6, 2004) (dismissing as frivolous and pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g)); Order Dismissing Compl., Brown v. Nance, ECF No. 6 in Case No. 4:01-
cv-127-HL (M.D. Ga. Oct. 19, 2001) (adopting recommendation to dismiss for failure
to state claim); R. & R. & Order Dismissing Compl., Brown v. Mitchell, ECF Nos. 18,
24 in Case No. 4:24-cv-144 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 17, 2025) (dismissing as malicious for
abuse of the judicial process for failure to truthfully disclose litigation history and
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). 	Additionally, Plaintiff has been identified as
having three strikes in multiple other federal lawsuits where he was denied leave to
proceed in forma pauperis under § 1915(g) and the cases were dismissed. 	See, e.g.,
Brown v. Ezell, Case No. 4:06-cv-121-CDL (M.D. Ga. Oct. 23, 2006); Brown v.
Stracker, Case No. 4:12-cv-260 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 3, 2012); Brown v. Owens, Case No.
1:14-cv-177 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 10, 2014); Brown v. Owens, Case No. 7:14-cv-170 (M.D. Ga.
Dec. 5, 2014); Brown v. Lynch, Case No. 4:20-cv-53 (M.D. Ga. Sep. 30, 2020); Brown
v. Thomas, Case No. 4:20-cv-98 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 14, 2021); Brown v. Kemp, Case No.
and “Brown, Jessie A.”). 	The Court has confirmed that Plaintiff has filed more than two dozen other
cases under the first names “Jesse” and “Jessie” by cross-referencing PACER records with Plaintiff’s
Georgia Department of Corrections identification numbers, Georgia Department of Corrections case
numbers, and Muscogee County Sheriff’s Office online jail records. 	See id.; 	https://portal-
gamuscogee.tylertech.cloud/app/JailSearch/#/search (searched “Jessie Brown”) (last visited Nov. 10,
2025).
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4:25-cv-00037 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 25, 2025).
Plaintiff is thus barred from prosecuting this action in forma pauperis unless
he is in “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 	28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 	To
qualify for this exception, a prisoner must allege specific facts that describe an
“ongoing serious physical injury,” or “a pattern of misconduct evidencing the
likelihood of imminent serious physical injury.” 	Sutton v. Dist. Att’y’s Office, 334
F. App’x 278, 279 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	Complaints
of past injuries are not sufficient. 	See Medberry, 185 F.3d at 1193. 	Vague and
unsupported claims of possible dangers likewise do not suffice. 	See White v. State
of Colo., 157 F.3d 1226, 1231 (10th Cir. 1998). 	The exception to § 1915(g) is to be
applied only in “genuine emergencies,” when (1) “time is pressing,” (2) the “threat
or prison condition is real and proximate,” and (3) the “potential consequence is
serious physical injury.” Lewis v. Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 531 (7th Cir. 2002).
Plaintiff states that an inmate at the Muscogee County Jail tested positive for
Covid 19 on August 28, 2025. 	ECF No. 1 at 2. 	Plaintiff further states that his dorm
was placed on quarantine while “no one else was tested [and] face mask was passed
out to all of the other inmates.” 	Id. 	Plaintiff complains that this put him in
immediate danger because he is 62 years old and has “other health problems.” 	Id.
Plaintiff further complains that on August 29, 2025, he “came down with a bad head”
and requested that Defendant Keroc contact medical personnel. 	Id. 	Plaintiff states
that Defendant Keroc spoke with an unnamed nurse who stated that Plaintiff would
be seen at pill call. 	Plaintiff complains that “around 8:30 the Nurse Ms. B. came to
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the floors [Plaintiff] spoke with her but she did nothing.” 	Id. 	Plaintiff appears to
seek $400,000 in damages. 	Id. at 3.
Plaintiff’s vague allegations in no way suggest that he is in imminent danger
of serious physical injury. 	See Daker, 999 F.3d at 1311 (noting that “[g]eneral
assertions” are insufficient to establish entitlement to imminent danger exception);
O'Connor v. Suwannee Corr. Inst., 649 F. App’x 802, 805 (11th Cir. 2016) (observing
imminent danger cannot be based on claims which are “speculative and not factually
supported”). Indeed, allegations regarding potential risks of exposure to COVID-19
while incarcerated have repeatedly been recognized as insufficient to support the
application of the imminent-danger exception. See, e.g., Garrett v. Murphy, 17 F.4th
419, 433 (3d Cir. 2021) (finding Plaintiff did not qualify for imminent danger
exception to §1915(g) where Plaintiff alleged that he faced “a serious risk of death or
injury if he gets sick with COVID-19 given his poor health.”); Ortiz v. Collier, 855 F.
App’x 966 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding that speculative and conclusory allegations
regarding potential exposure to Covid-19 “are insufficient to make the showing
required to avoid application of the three strikes bar under § 1915(g).”); Crain v.
Mancuso, No. 20-30777, 2021 WL 4841127, at *1 (5th Cir. Oct. 15, 2021) (declining to
grant Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal and affirming district
court dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint under § 1915(g) where Plaintiff argued “he is
under imminent danger because he is infected with tuberculosis, which could be
reactivated by exposure to other diseases, including COVID-19.”); Frederick v.
Wakulla Corr. Inst. Admin. & Staff, 4:20-CV-219-AW, 2020 WL 3066652, at *3 (N.D.
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Fla. May 13, 2020) (citing cases).
Thus, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma
pauperis (ECF No. 2) be DENIED and that this civil action be DISMISSED without
prejudice pursuant to § 1915(g). 	See Dupree v. Palmer, 284 F.3d 1234, 1236 (11th
Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (“[T]he proper procedure is for the district court to dismiss the
complaint without prejudice when it denies the prisoner leave to proceed in forma
pauperis pursuant to the three strikes provision of § 1915(g).”).
II. 	Dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
A. 	Standard of Review
The Prison Litigation Reform Act directs courts to conduct a preliminary
screening of every complaint filed by a prisoner who seeks redress from a government
entity, official, or employee. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 	“Pro se filings are generally held
to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys and are liberally
construed.” 	Carmichael v. United States, 966 F.3d 1250, 1258 (11th Cir. 2020)
(citation omitted). 	Still, the Court must dismiss a prisoner complaint if it “(1) is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2)
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 	28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). 	On
preliminary review, the Court may dismiss claims that are based on “indisputably
meritless legal” theories and “claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”
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Id. (citations omitted). 	A claim can be dismissed as malicious if it is knowingly
duplicative or otherwise amounts to an abuse of the judicial process. 	Daker v. Ward,
999 F.3d 1300, 1308, 1310 (11th Cir. 2021) (affirming dismissal of duplicative
complaint “in light of [prisoner’s] history as a prolific serial filer”).
A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not include “sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 	“Factual allegations [in a complaint] must be enough to raise
a right to relief above the speculative level[.]” 	Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations
omitted). 	In other words, the complaint must allege enough facts “to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” supporting a claim. 	Id.
at 556. 	“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555).
To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) an act
or 	omission 	deprived 	him 	of 	a 	right, 	privilege, 	or 	immunity 	secured 	by 	the
Constitution or a statute of the United States; and (2) the act or omission was
committed by a person acting under color of state law. 	Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50
F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). 	If a litigant cannot satisfy these requirements or
fails to provide factual allegations in support of his claim or claims, the complaint is
subject to dismissal. 	See, e.g., Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1176-77 (11th
Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal of certain claims at preliminary screening because
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prisoner failed to allege sufficient facts to show a violation of his rights), abrogated
on other grounds by Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc).
B. 	Plaintiff’s claims and analysis
Plaintiff appears to be claiming that the Defendants have been deliberately
indifferent to the risk that potentially contracting Covid-19 poses to his safety. 	See
ECF No. 1. 	Plaintiff does not specify in his complaint whether he is a pretrial
detainee or a convicted prisoner but nonetheless whether his claim arises under the
Fourteenth Amendment as applied to detainees or the Eighth Amendment as applied
to convicted prisoners, the standard is the same for deliberate indifference to safety
claims. 	Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Dang ex rel.
Dang v. Sheriff, Seminole Cnty. Fla., 871 F.3d 1272, 1279 (11th Cir. 2017) (“Although
the plaintiffs’ claim technically arises under the Fourteenth Amendment because
they are pretrial detainees rather than convicted prisoners, it is ‘evaluated under the
same 	standard 	as 	a 	prisoner’s 	claim 	of 	inadequate 	care 	under 	the 	Eighth
Amendment.’”). 	“To establish a deliberate-indifference claim, a plaintiff must make
both an objective and a subjective showing.” 	Swain, 961 F.3d at 1285 (citing Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). 	The objective showing requires an inmate to
show “a substantial risk of serious harm.” 	Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The subjective showing requires an inmate to demonstrate a correction official’s
deliberate indifference to that risk “by making three sub-showings: (1) subjective
knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is
more 	than 	mere 	negligence.” 	Id. 	(internal 	quotation 	marks 	omitted). 	This
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“deliberate-indifference standard sets an appropriately high bar . . . . Ordinary
malpractice or simple negligence won't do[.]” 	Id. 	Rather, “the plaintiff must show
subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law.” 	Id. at 1285-86 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that another inmate tested positive for Covid-19 on
August 28, 2025 and that his dorm was provided masks and placed in quarantine.
ECF No. 1 at 2. 	Plaintiff contends that the next day he asked Defendant Keroc to
be seen by medical due to “a bad head” and Plaintiff was seen by “Nurse Ms. B” at
8:30 pm. 	Id. at 4. 	Plaintiff then wrote up this complaint on the day after his fellow
inmate’s Covid test and on the day he was seen by a nurse. 	See id. at 3, 4, 5, 6
(showing Plaintiff’s signature as dated “29th day of Aug, 2025” four different times).
As to the objective element of Plaintiff’s claim, the Eleventh Circuit has
suggested that the risk of Covid-19 poses a substantial risk of serious harm and thus
Plaintiff has potentially established the objective element. 	See Swain, 961 F.3d at
1285 (noting that “the defendants seem to agree—wisely, we think—that the risk of
COVID-19 satisfies [the substantial risk of serious harm] requirement”). However,
Plaintiff fails to satisfy the subjective component of a claim for in the twenty-four to
forty-eight hours that Plaintiff allowed Defendants to respond to his exposure to
Covid-19 before filing this lawsuit,2 Plaintiff does not show any Defendant acted with
2 The Prison Litigation Reform Act states, “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail,
prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.” 	42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 	Here, Plaintiff states he did not file a grievance on August 29,
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subjective recklessness or in any way disregarded the risk of Covid-19 exposure. 	On
the contrary, Plaintiff alleges that he was seen by a nurse and that the other
detainees were quarantined and provided masks. 	Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state
a claim for deliberate indifference to his medical needs. 	See, e.g., id. at 1288-89
(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839-40). 	Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that
Plaintiff’s complaint also be DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to §1915A
for failure to state a claim.
III. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) be DENIED and that this action be
DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 	It is further
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s complaint be DISMISSED without prejudice
a under § 1915A for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted.
OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written
objections to these recommendations with the Clay D. Land, United States District
Judge, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of this
Recommendation. 	Any objection is limited in length to TWENTY (20) PAGES.
2025 “because the inmate kiosk was down and space needed to be freed in order to file a time
grievance.” 	ECF No. 1 at 5. 	This Court is unconvinced that Plaintiff made a good faith effort to
exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this lawsuit. 	Plaintiff is thus advised that he
should do more to address his administrative remedies than he did in this case before filing any future
federal lawsuits.
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See M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.4. 	The parties may seek an extension of time in which to file
written objections, provided a request for an extension is filed prior to the deadline
for filing written objections. 	Failure to object in accordance with the provisions of §
636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district judge’s order based on
factual and legal conclusions to which no objection was timely made. 	See 11th Cir.
R. 3-1.
SO RECOMMENDED, this 17th day of November, 2025.
s/ Amelia G. Helmick
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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