DOZIER v. FINNEY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
KWANE DOZIER, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:25-cv-516 (MTT)
)
MARTINEZ FINNEY, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
__________________ 	)
ORDER
Pro se plaintiff Kwane Dozier filed this trademark infringement action against
Martinez Finney. ECF 1. Dozier simultaneously moved to proceed in forma pauperis
(IFP). ECF 2. As discussed below, Dozier satisfies the requirements of poverty, and his
motion to proceed IFP (ECF 2) is GRANTED. Along with granting Dozier IFP status, the
Court must also screen his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). After screening,
the Court concludes that Dozier plausibly alleges some claims while others are
deficient. Accordingly, within twenty-one days of the entry of this order Dozier is
ORDERED TO AMEND his complaint as stated in this order. Failure to fully and timely
comply with this order may result in the dismissal of this action.1
1 See Brown v. Tallahassee Police Dep’t, 205 F. App’x 802, 802 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
41(b) and Lopez v. Aransas Cty. Indep. Sch. Dist., 570 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1978)); see also Bonner v.
City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting as binding precedent the
decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to October 1, 1981).
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I. DISCUSSION2
A. Financial Status
When considering a motion to proceed IFP filed under § 1915(a), “[t]he only
determination to be made by the court … is whether the statements in the affidavit
satisfy the requirement of poverty.” Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305,
1307 (11th Cir. 2004). To show poverty, the plaintiff need not show that he is “absolutely
destitute.” Martinez, 364 F.3d at 1307 (quoting Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 335 U.S. 331, 338-40 (1948)). Instead, the affidavit must demonstrate that the
plaintiff, “because of his poverty, is unable to pay for the court fees and costs, and to
support and provide necessities for himself and his dependents.” Martinez, 364 F.3d at
1307. Where a plaintiff demonstrates economic eligibility to file IFP, the court should
docket the case and then “proceed to the question ... of whether the asserted claim is
frivolous.” Id.
Here, Dozier’s financial affidavit states that he is unemployed with an average
monthly income of $0.00. ECF 2 at 1-2. Accordingly, having read and considered
Dozier’s financial affidavit, the Court finds that Dozier is unable to pay the costs and
fees associated with this lawsuit, and his motion to proceed IFP (ECF 2) is GRANTED.
2 Motions to proceed IFP are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Section 1915(a) provides:
[A]ny court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense
of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of
fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of
all assets such prisoner possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or give
security therefor.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). “Despite the statute’s use of the phrase ‘prisoner possesses,’ the affidavit
requirement applies to all persons requesting leave to proceed IFP.” Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364
F.3d 1305, 1306 n.1 (11th Cir. 2004).
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B. Frivolity Review
Along with granting Dozier IFP status, the Court must review and dismiss his
complaint if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A claim is frivolous if it “has little or no chance of
success,” meaning that it appears “from the face of the complaint that the factual
allegations are ‘clearly baseless’ or that the legal theories are ‘indisputably meritless.’”
Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). “A dismissal under §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim is governed by the same standard as a
dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”3 Thomas v. Harris, 399
F. App’x 508, 509 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th
Cir. 1997)).
Dozier filed this action against Martinez, claiming false designation of origin
under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), fraudulent trademark applications and bad faith registration,
and common law trademark infringement and unfair competition. ECF 1 ¶¶ 14-21. Dozier
asserts that he has trademark ownership in the name of a brand he founded, “Young
Black Man Inc.,” and has used the name “Young Black Man Inc.” in commerce “to
identify his creative ventures, including clothing sales, musical recordings, … and
authored books bearing that imprint.” Id. ¶¶ 1, 9. Dozier alleges that his brand acquired
recognition in Georgia and through online commerce, creating consumer association
3 To avoid dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain
specific factual matter to “‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). On a motion to dismiss,
“all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Galectin Therapeutics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 843 F.3d 1257, 1269 n.4
(11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006)).
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between the mark “Young Black Man” and his goods and services. Id. ¶ 10. He alleges
that while he was incarcerated, Martinez filed two federal trademark applications for the
identical mark covering clothing and children’s books—“the same fields in which
[Dozier] was already active.” Id. ¶¶ 2, 11.
1. False Designation of Origin
“‘Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act [15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)] creates a federal cause
of action for unfair competition’ in interstate commerce, and ‘forbids unfair trade
practices involving infringement of … trademarks, even in the absence of federal
trademark registration.’” Custom Mfg. & Eng'g, Inc. v. Midway Servs., Inc., 508 F.3d
641, 647 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Univ. of Florida v. KPB, Inc., 89 F.3d 773, 775-76
(11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam)). To prevail on his claim for false designation of origin
under § 43(a), a plaintiff must establish that the defendant used in commerce, in
connection with any goods or services, “any word, term, name, symbol or device, or any
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin” that is “likely to cause confusion,
or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association” of
defendant with plaintiff, or “as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of” defendant’s
goods, services, or commercial activities by the plaintiff. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
Liberally construing the complaint, Dozier plausibly alleges that Martinez falsely
designated the origin of his products using Dozier’s designation of origin, because
Martinez allegedly filed two federal trademark applications for “Young Black Man”
covering clothing and children’s books. ECF 1 ¶¶ 2, 11, 12. Likewise, Dozier plausibly
alleges that Martinez’s use of his designation of origin was likely to cause consumer
confusion, because Martinez’s products—clothing and children’s books—were Dozier’s
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“established commercial fields” and Martinez “intended to appropriate his brand
identity.” Id.
2. Fraudulent Procurement
Dozier alleges that Martinez knowingly made false representations to the USPTO
when filing applications for “Young Black Man” and asks the Court to invalidate and
cancel his mark(s). ECF 1 ¶¶ 18, 19. While Dozier’s complaint cites 15 U.S.C. § 1064, he
appears to be bringing a claim for fraudulent procurement of a trademark under 15
U.S.C. § 1120. Under this statute, “[a]ny person who shall procure registration in the
[USPTO] of a mark by a false or fraudulent declaration or representation, oral or in
writing, or by any false means, shall be liable in a civil action by any person injured
thereby for any damages sustained in consequence thereof.” However, Dozier’s
allegations do not clearly identify that Martinez has procured a trademark—a
requirement to state a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1120. See GMA Accessories, Inc. v.
Idea Nuova, Inc., 157 F. Supp.2d 234, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[B]y its terms Section 38,
15 U.S.C. § 1120, does not apply to trademark applications that have not been
registered.”).
3. Common Law Trademark Infringement and Unfair Competition
Georgia common law trademark claims involve the same analysis as claims
under the Lanham Act. CCA & B, LLC v. F + W Media, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1324
(N.D. Ga. 2011) (citation omitted). To prevail on a trademark infringement claim, the
plaintiff must establish “(1) that it had prior rights to the mark at issue and (2) that the
defendant had adopted a mark or name that was the same, or confusingly similar to its
mark, such that consumers were likely to confuse the two.” Planetary Motion, Inc. v.
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Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1193 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Lone Star Steakhouse
& Saloon, Inc. v. Longhorn Steaks, Inc., 106 F.3d 355, 360 (11th Cir. 1997)).
To determine whether Dozier had common law rights in “Young Black Man,” the
Court must determine (1) whether Dozier was the primary user of the mark at issue, and
(2) whether the mark was either inherently distinctive or had acquired distinctiveness
through secondary meaning. See, e.g., Tarsus Connect, LLC v. Cvent, Inc., 452 F.
Supp. 3d 1334, 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2020) (citation omitted). Additionally, the mark must be
capable of distinguishing Dozier’s goods from those of others. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e), (f).
Liberally construing the complaint, the Court finds that Dozier has plausibly alleged he
had common law rights in “Young Black Man” because he “is the first and continuous
user” of the mark and “Young Black Man” is, allegedly, sufficiently distinctive to “creat[e]
consumer association between the mark … and Plaintiff’s goods and services.” ECF 1
¶¶ 10, 20.
To evaluate likelihood of consumer confusion, courts in the Eleventh Circuit
employ a seven-factor balancing test. See Dieter v. B & H Indus. of Sw. Fla., Inc., 880
F.2d 322, 326 (11th Cir. 1989).4 In screening Dozier’s complaint, the Court need not
examine these factors in detail but finds that Dozier has plausibly alleged a likelihood of
consumer confusion because he alleges that the marks and covered goods used by the
parties are identical and Martinez adopted the mark in bad faith. ECF 1 ¶¶ 11, 12, 13.
In sum, the Court finds that Dozier plausibly states a claim for false designation
of origin under the Lanham Act and a claim for common law trademark infringement and
4 The seven factors are: “(1) type [or strength] of mark; (2) similarity of mark; (3) similarity of the products
the marks represent; (3) similarity of the parties’ retail outlets and customers; (5) similarity of advertising
media; (6) defendant's intent; and (7) actual confusion.” Dieter, 880 F.2d at 326 (internal citations
omitted).
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unfair competition, but that his fraudulent procurement allegations are lacking. Given
Dozier’s pro se status, the Court will give him an opportunity to amend his complaint
before dismissing his fraudulent procurement claim. See Duff v. Steub, 378 F. App’x
868, 872 (11th Cir. 2010). The Court will not look back to the facts alleged in the original
complaint once the amended complaint is filed; the Court will only consider the facts in
the amended complaint when it conducts the frivolity review required by §
1915(e)(2)(B). Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding
that the filing of an amended pleading renders the previous pleading a “legal nullity”).
II. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Dozier’s motion to proceed IFP (ECF 2) is
GRANTED. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), Dozier is ORDERED TO AMEND his
complaint as stated in this order within twenty-one days of the entry of this order.
Failure to fully and timely comply with this order may result in the dismissal of this
action.
SO ORDERED, this ___ day of January, 2026.
S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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