ATMORE v. BIBB COUNTY LAW ENFORCEMENT CENTER et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
WILLIE JAMES ATMORE, 	:
:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	:
:
BIBB COUNTY LAW 	: 	Case No. 5:25-cv-519-CAR-ALS
ENFORCEMENT CENTER, 	:
et al., 	:
:
Defendants. 	:
____________________________:
ORDER & RECOMMENDATION
In accordance with the Court’s previous orders and instructions, Plaintiff Willie
James Atmore, a pretrial detainee at Central State Hospital in Milledgeville, Georgia, has
filed a pro se Amended Complaint seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 13).
His Amended Complaint is now ripe for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and/or
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).1 For the following reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint be DISMISSED without prejudice. Plaintiff’s pending motion
for subpoenas (Doc. 14) is DENIED as moot.
DISCUSSION
I. 	Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)
Federal law bars a prisoner from bringing a civil action in federal court IFP
if [he] has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in
any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that
was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state
1 The Amended Complaint is now the operative pleading in this case. See Pintando v. Miami-Dade Hous.
Agency, 501 F.3d 1241, 1243 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that generally, “[a]n amended pleading supersedes
the former pleading; the original pleading is abandoned by the amendment, and is no longer a part of the
pleader’s averment against his adversary” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
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a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under
imminent danger of serious physical injury.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). This is known as the “three strikes provision.” Under § 1915(g), a
prisoner incurs a “strike” any time he has a federal lawsuit or appeal dismissed on the
grounds that it is (1) frivolous, (2) malicious, or (3) fails to state a claim. See Medberry v.
Butler, 185 F.3d 1189, 1192 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Daker v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Corr.,
820 F.3d 1278, 1283-84 (11th Cir. 2016) (confirming that “these three grounds are the
only grounds that can render a dismissal a strike”). Once a prisoner incurs three strikes,
his ability to proceed IFP in federal court is greatly limited: leave to proceed IFP may not
be granted unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
Medberry, 185 F.3d at 1192. The Eleventh Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of §
1915(g) because it does not violate an inmate’s right to access the courts, due process of
the law, or equal protection, nor does it violate the doctrine of separation of powers.
Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 723 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that dismissal of case for abuse
of judicial process when plaintiff “lied under penalty of perjury about the existence of a
prior lawsuit,” counts as a strike even if the court “may not have uttered the words
‘frivolous’ or ‘malicious’”) (citations omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). In fact, a “dismissal for abuse of the judicial process is precisely
the type of strike that Congress envisioned when drafting Section 1915(g).” Id. (citation
omitted). Once a prisoner incurs three strikes, his ability to proceed IFP in federal court
is greatly limited. Leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) may not be granted unless
the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. Medberry, 185 F.3d at
1192.
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A review of court records on the Federal Judiciary’s Public Access to Court
Electronic Records (“PACER”) database reveals that Plaintiff has filed numerous federal
lawsuits and that at least three of his complaints or appeals have been dismissed as
frivolous, or malicious, or for failure to state a claim. See, e.g., Atmore v. Stembridge, No.
5:06-cv-326-WDO-CWH (M.D. Ga. Sept. 21, 2006) (Doc. 4) (adopting recommendation
and dismissing complaint as frivolous and/or for failure to state a claim); Atmore v.
Stembridge, Case No. 5:06-cv-325-WDO-CWH (M.D. Ga. Sept. 27, 2006) (Doc. 4)
(adopting recommendation and dismissing complaint as frivolous); Atmore v. Bibb Cnty.
Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 5:06-cv-327-DF-CWH (M.D. Ga. Oct. 31, 2006) (Doc. 10) (adopting
recommendation and dismissing as frivolous). Plaintiff has also been identified as a three-
striker pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See, e.g., Atmore v. Mincey, No. 5:25-cv-520-
MTT-ALS (M.D. Ga. Feb. 23, 2026) (Doc. 13) (dismissing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)
and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted). Consequently, Plaintiff
is barred from prosecuting this action IFP unless he is in “imminent danger of serious
physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
“[T]he issue is whether [Plaintiff’s] complaint, as a whole, alleges imminent danger
of serious physical injury.” Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1350 (11th Cir. 2004). To
qualify for this exception, a prisoner must allege specific facts that describe an “ongoing
serious physical injury,” or “a pattern of misconduct evidencing the likelihood of
imminent serious physical injury.” Daker v. Ward, 999 F.3d 1300, 1311 (11th Cir. 2021)
(quoting Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1350 (11th Cir. 2004)). Complaints of past
injuries are not sufficient. See Medberry, 185 F.3d at 1193 (holding that the exception was
not triggered where threat of assault by other prisoners ceased to exist when the plaintiff
was placed in administrative confinement prior to filing his complaint); Brown, 387 F.3d
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at 1349 (noting that the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit holds that
“a prisoner must alleged a present imminent danger, as opposed to a past danger, to
proceed under section 1915(g)”) (citations omitted). Vague and unsupported claims of
possible dangers likewise do not suffice. See White v. State of Colo., 157 F.3d 1226, 1231-
32 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Daker, 999 F.3d at 1311 (noting that “[g]eneral assertions”
are insufficient to establish entitlement to imminent danger exception). “[G]eneralized
references to being in danger or being subject to abuse, [which] are conclusory, vague,
and unsupported by any well-pleaded factual allegations [do not] support a claim of
imminent danger.” Rodriguez v. Am. Civil Liberty Union, No. 3:23cv16482-LC-HTC,
2023 WL 11937262, at *2 (N.D. Fla. July 5, 2023). The exception to § 1915(g) is to be
applied only in “genuine emergencies,” when (1) “time is pressing,” (2) the “threat or
prison condition is real and proximate,” and (3) the “potential consequence is ‘serious
physical injury.’” Lewis v. Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 531 (7th Cir. 2002).
Plaintiff’s allegations are difficult to read and decipher, but as best as the Court can
tell his claims arise from his arrest at Mattie Hubbard Public Park and his subsequent
incarceration in the Bibb County Law Enforcement Center (hereafter, “LEC”) beginning
in December of 2022. (Doc. 13, at 3, 5). Plaintiff appears to contend that an unnamed
police officer arrested him for trespassing and setting a fire at the park. Id. at 5. Plaintiff
was not allowed to call anyone after he was arrested. Id. He also appears to allege he was
assaulted at the jail, but unnamed law enforcement officials did nothing to assist him. See,
e.g., id. (stating that “[t]hey had dudes to jump me and hit me and spit in my face,” “the
house man threw 3 mop buckets of water on me,” and “[a] female officer threaten[ed] me
with a taser”). Plaintiff was “lock[ed] down in a suicide cell,” and an “officer left 3 times
with [Plaintiff’s] invention.” Id. Plaintiff also contends he was forced to go to court
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without an attorney, and he complained to the Bibb County Sheriff, Defendant David
Davis, about this situation. Id. In an attachment to the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff also
briefly alludes to the fact that he was required to take medication and was given
insufficient food at the LEC. (Doc. 13-1, at 2).
In this same attachment, Plaintiff also appears to raise claims concerning the state
criminal proceedings against him. He alleges that the trial court judge, Judge Sinclair,
“did not read [him] any charges,” did not ask Plaintiff how he was going to plead, and did
not ensure that Plaintiff had an attorney. (Doc. 13-1, at 1). Plaintiff also appears to
complain about another judge’s prior determination that Plaintiff is incompetent to stand
trial. Id. He further challenges the fact that his criminal case was dead-docketed in July
of 2023, which “confined [Plaintiff] to Central State on force[d] meds for a trespassing
and arson charge that was never proven in any court[.]” Id. at 3.
In the portion of the Court’s form requiring him to identify potential witnesses,
Plaintiff states that he “was operated on Mar. 6, 2026 at Baldwin Hospital,” had staples
removed on March 20, 2026, and “was rushed to Macon emergency room bleeding
rectum caused by a shot with a longer needle in the hip.” Id. at 6. It is unclear how these
allegations relate to his arrest and incarceration.
It is also unclear which individuals Plaintiff wishes to name as Defendants in this
action. In the caption of his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff lists “Bibb County Law
Enforcement Center et al.” as the only Defendant. Id. at 1. Where he is asked to list the
full name of each Defendant, he additionally identifies Defendant Davis. Id. at 4. The
relief Plaintiff seeks is equally unclear, although it primarily appears he is seeking his
release. See id. at 1, 6.
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Plaintiff fails to establish that he was in imminent danger of serious physical injury
at the time he filed his Complaint. Plaintiff was no longer housed in the LEC when he filed
this action, and thus any allegations that law enforcement officials endangered him in that
facility relate only to past conduct and cannot support his claim that he is presently in
imminent danger of serious physical injury. Owens v. Schwartz, 519 F. App’x 992, 994
(11th Cir. 2013) (holding that “even if [prisoner] had been in imminent danger of serious
physical injury from his cell mate and the failure of prison officials to protect him, that
danger had passed” when he was transferred after he filed his complaint and “[a]n
allegation of past imminent danger will not invoke the ‘imminent danger’ exception”).
The only potentially arguable claim that could relate to an imminent danger
Plaintiff is facing is that he may be required to take unspecified medication at Central
State Hospital. See Doc. 13-1 at 1. But in the absence of any specific facts that could show
that Plaintiff is in imminent danger at Central State Hospital, his vague statement
concerning forced medication—which fails to identify the medication he claims he is being
forced to take—is not enough to invoke the imminent danger exception. See, e.g., Daker,
999 F.3d at 1311; see also O’Connor v. Suwannee Corr. Inst., 649 F. App’x 802, 805 (11th
Cir. 2016) (holding the plaintiff’s fears concerning medical treatment were “speculative
and not factually supported” and therefore failed to establish imminent danger). Plaintiff
should not be permitted to proceed IFP pursuant to § 1915(g), and his Complaint should
be dismissed without prejudice to his right to refile with pre-payment of the full $405.00
filing fee. See Dupree v. Palmer, 284 F.3d 1234, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he proper
procedure is for the district court to dismiss the complaint without prejudice when it
denies the prisoner leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to the three strikes
provision of § 1915(g).”).
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II. 	Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and/or § 1915(e)
A. Standard of Review
If the § 1915(g) exception does not apply to Plaintiff, then he may proceed in forma
pauperis (“IFP”). However, his claims are still subject to dismissal because he failed to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”) directs courts to conduct a preliminary screening of every complaint filed by a
prisoner who seeks redress from a government entity, official, or employee. 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(a). Courts must also screen complaints filed by a plaintiff proceeding IFP. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e). Both statutes apply in this case, and the standard of review is the same. “Pro se
filings are generally held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys and
are liberally construed.” Carmichael v. United States, 966 F.3d 1250, 1258 (11th Cir.
2020) (citation omitted). Still, the Court must dismiss a prisoner complaint if it “(1) is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
A claim is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Miller v.
Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). On preliminary review,
the Court may dismiss claims that are based on “indisputably meritless legal” theories and
“claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Id. (citations omitted). A claim
can be dismissed as malicious if it is knowingly duplicative or otherwise amounts to an
abuse of the judicial process. Daker v. Ward, 999 F.3d 1300, 1308, 1310 (11th Cir. 2021)
(affirming dismissal of duplicative complaint “in light of [prisoner’s] history as a prolific
serial filer”).
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A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not include “sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“Factual allegations [in a complaint] must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). In other words, the
complaint must allege enough facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will
reveal evidence” supporting a claim. Id. at 556. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) an act or
omission deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or a
statute of the United States; and (2) the act or omission was committed by a person acting
under color of state law. Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995).
If a litigant cannot satisfy these requirements or fails to provide factual allegations in
support of his claim or claims, the complaint is subject to dismissal. See, e.g., Bingham v.
Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1176-77 (11th Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal of certain claims at
preliminary screening because prisoner failed to allege sufficient facts to show a violation
of his rights), abrogated on other grounds by Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1255
(11th Cir. 2024) (en banc).
B. Factual Allegations and Plaintiff’s Claims
As discussed above, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint raises claims concerning his
December 2022 arrest and his treatment at the Bibb County LEC. (Doc. 13 at 5). The latest
specific events about which Plaintiff appears to complain are his March 6, 2026 operation
and its aftermath. Id. at 6. Plaintiff also appears to challenge his current placement in
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Central State Hospital, given that he seeks his release therefrom. Id. As also discussed
above, however, the only individuals Plaintiff is clearly intending to sue are Sheriff Davis
and the LEC. A county jail, such as the LEC is not a legal entity subject to suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 or Georgia law. See Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992);
Brannon v. Thomas Cnty. Jail, 280 F. App’x 930, 934 n.1 (11th Cir. 2008). Accordingly,
any claims against the LEC must therefore be dismissed.
In addition, Plaintiff appears to seek two forms of relief that this Court cannot
grant him: his release from prison and the arrest of Defendant Davis. Plaintiff cannot
obtain a dismissal of pending charges or speedier release through a § 1983 action. See
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487, 489 (1973). “[H]abeas corpus is the exclusive
remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and
seeks immediate or speedier release[.]” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994).
Thus, to the extent Plaintiff seeks his release from prison as a remedy for the
constitutional violations he alleges, such relief is not available in this § 1983 case.
Similarly, the United States District Courts have no authority to order state or federal law
enforcement agencies or prosecutors to initiate investigations or prosecutions. Otero v.
U.S. Attorney Gen., 832 F.2d 141, 141 (11th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff, a private citizen, likewise
has no power to originate criminal pleadings on his own initiative. Id. Thus, the Court
cannot order the arrest of Defendant Davis.
To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to raise § 1983 claims concerning his criminal
case, the only other potential Defendants he mentions are two judges, Sinclair and
Mincey. “Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages under section
1983 for those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial capacity unless they acted
in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” McBrearty v. Koji, 348 F. App’x 437, 439 (11th
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Cir. 2009). “A judge does not act in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction’ when he acts
erroneously, maliciously, or in excess of his authority, but instead, only when he acts
without subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. In this case, the conduct of each of the judges
occurred entirely during Plaintiff’s various state court criminal proceedings; there is no
suggestion that they acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Thus, to the extent
Plaintiff seeks damages against Judge Sinclair or Judge Mincey, those claims must also
be dismissed.
To the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against Judges Sinclair or Mincey, his
claims are likewise barred. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that “in any action brought against
a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive
relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief
was unavailable.” Plaintiff does not allege that either judge violated a declaratory decree
or that declaratory relief was unavailable. To the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief
against Judges Sinclair and Mincey, those claims are also subject to dismissal.2
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant Davis responsible for the
remaining alleged constitutional violations he describes in his Amended Complaint, he
2 The Court also notes that it is likely that Plaintiff’s claims concerning his current incarceration are barred
by the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Pursuant to
Younger, federal courts must refrain from intervening with pending state criminal proceedings when the
party requesting federal intervention has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury.
Id. at 53. Younger abstention is thus required where (1) state judicial proceedings are pending; (2) the state
proceedings involve important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford adequate opportunity to
raise the constitutional issue. See, e.g., Newsome v. Broward Cnty. Public Defenders, 304 F. App’x 814,
816 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432
(1982)); see also Doby v. Strength, 758 F.2d 1405, 1406 (11th Cir. 1985) (extending Younger to § 1983
actions for money damages). Plaintiff acknowledges that the criminal charges against him have been dead
docketed. (Doc.13-1 at 3). “Under Georgia law, a dead docketed criminal case remains pending and is not
terminated because dead docketing is simply a ‘procedural device by which the prosecution is postponed
indefinitely but may be reinstated at any time at the pleasure of the court.’” Parris v. Taft, 630 F. App’x
895, 899 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting State v. Creel, 454 S.E.2d 804, 805 (1995)). Thus, for Younger purposes,
Plaintiff’s criminal case “remained ongoing” at the time he initiated this action. Id.
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has likewise failed to state an actionable claim. As best as the Court can tell, Plaintiff is
suing Defendant Davis regarding his treatment at the LEC because Defendant Davis is the
Sheriff and therefore “has all and complete authority of the Bibb County Law Enforcement
Center.” (Doc. 13-1, at 2). In other words, Plaintiff appears to sue Defendant Davis as the
supervisor of the largely unidentified deputies who allegedly directly violated Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights.
It is well-settled in the Eleventh Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable
under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat
superior or vicarious liability. See, e.g., Christmas v. Nabors, 76 F.4th 1320, 1330 (11th
Cir. 2023); Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003). Instead, supervisors
can only be held liable under § 1983 if they personally participated in the alleged
constitutional violations or if a causal connection exists between the supervisor’s actions
and a subordinate’s conduct. Christmas, 76 F.4th at 1330. This causal connection can be
established if
(1) “a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on
notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation and he fail[ed] to
do so”; (2) “the supervisor’s improper custom or policy le[d] to
deliberate indifference to constitutional rights”; or (3) “facts support an
inference 	that 	the 	supervisor 	directed 	the 	subordinates 	to 	act
unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and
failed to stop them from doing so.”
Hendrix v Tucker, 535 F. App’x 803, 805 (11th Cir. 2013) (alterations in original) (quoting
Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008)). “The standard by which a
supervisor is held liable in [his] individual capacity for the actions of a subordinate is
extremely rigorous.” Id. (quoting Doe v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 604 F.3d 1248, 1266
(11th Cir. 2010)).
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Plaintiff fails to meet this rigorous standard in this case. Plaintiff complains of
more than a half-dozen incidents that he believes may have violated his constitutional
rights, including (1) his arrest by a “policeman” at Mattie Hubbard Park and the officer’s
failure to read him his rights, (Doc. 13, at 5, 6); (2) the denial of a phone call after his
arrest, id. at 5; (3) several incidents where other inmates assaulted Plaintiff by “jump[ing
him],” hitting and spitting on him, and throwing water on him, id.; (4) a threat by a female
officer to shoot him with a taser, id.; (5) actions of an officer who may have taken
Plaintiff’s “invention,” id.; (6) Plaintiff’s placement in a suicide cell and the provision of
“four pills which is attempted murder,” (Doc. 13-1, at 2); and (7) the failure to provide
Plaintiff sufficient food at the jail, id. Plaintiff, however, has not alleged any facts showing
a history of widespread abuse regarding any of these issues; that Defendant Davis had any
unlawful customs or policies that could have caused these alleged violations; or that
Defendant Davis knew that any of his subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop
them. Absent such facts, Plaintiff fails to state a claim that Defendant Davis is liable in his
supervisory capacity. Any such claims Plaintiff intended to raise in this case should also
be dismissed without prejudice.3
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff is denied leave to
proceed in forma pauperis; that his claims be DISMISSED without prejudice
3 Plaintiff also contends that he “wrote Sheriff David Davis about . . . going to court without an attorney.”
(Doc. 13, at 5). Should the Court assume that Plaintiff’s attendance in court without his attorney violated
his constitutional rights, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that could suggest Defendant Davis knew of this
violation before it occurred and had the authority or opportunity to rectify it. Therefore, this brief statement
does not state an actionable claim.
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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and/or § 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff’s
pending motion for subpoenas (Doc. 14) is DENIED as moot.
OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections
to these recommendations with the Honorable C. Ashley Royal, United States District
Judge, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of this
Recommendation. 	Any objection is limited in length to TWENTY (20) PAGES. 	See
M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.4. 	The parties may seek an extension of time in which to file written
objections, provided a request for an extension is filed prior to the deadline for filing
written objections. 	Failure to object in accordance with the provisions of § 636(b)(1)
waives the right to challenge on appeal the district judge’s order based on factual and legal
conclusions to which no objection was timely made. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
SO RECOMMENDED, this 29th day of July, 2026.
s/ ALFREDA L. SHEPPARD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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