MOORE v. PEARSON et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
VALDOSTA DIVISION
SEDREICK MOORE, 	:
:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	: 	CASE NO.: 7:25-CV-00133 (WLS)
:
JAMES PEARSON, et al., 	:
:
Defendants. 	:
:
ORDER
This case arises from the wrongful conviction of Sedrick Moore for rape. Moore spent
over twenty-three years in prison before the state court granted his Extraordinary Motion for
New Trial, finding that a 2018 DNA test excluded Moore as a possible DNA match for the
rapist and that witness Tyrone White lied multiple times during the investigation. Moore now
sues James Pearson, a GBI DNA analyst, the GBI, officers James Harshbarger, Joseph Smith,
and their estates, officer Tommy Raybon, the City of Moultrie, and Colquitt County.
Defendants Pearson and the GBI move to dismiss the lawsuit. (Docs. 29). After review,
the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 29) is granted in part, and denied in part. Because of state
sovereign immunity and Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the procedural requirements of the
Georgia Tort Claims Act, all claims against GBI and Pearson are dismissed, excluding
Plaintiff’s federal claims against Pearson, except for those claims arising out of Pearson’s trial
testimony.
I. 	RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Sedrick Moore sued Pearson and the GBI in the Northern District of Georgia
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Monell, and Georgia state law for their role in the wrongful conviction
of Moore. (Doc. 17). Pearson and the GBI moved to dismiss (Doc. 29), Plaintiff responded
(Doc. 35), and Defendants replied (Doc. 43). The Northern District of Georgia Court
transferred the case to this Court on October 20, 2025. (Doc. 48). Because the Motion to
Dismiss is fully briefed, it is ripe for ruling.
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II. 	MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendants move under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) to
dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1). After discussing the standard of review and the
allegations, the Court considers Defendants’ arguments in turn.
A. Standard of Review
1. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) permits a party to move to dismiss a claim if a complaint fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court should not grant a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss unless a plaintiff fails to plead enough facts to state a claim for relief that is
plausible, and not merely conceivable, on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). “[I]f the factual allegations are not ‘enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level[,]’” the Court should dismiss the complaint. Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d
1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010). In other words, the allegations “must possess enough heft to set
forth a plausible entitlement to relief.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
The Court conducts its analysis “accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and
construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335
(11th Cir. 2003). The Court “make[s] reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor, but [need not]
draw plaintiff’s inference.” Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009)
(quotation marks and citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Mohamad v. Pal. Auth., 566
U.S. 449 (2012). Even though the Court accepts all allegations in a complaint as true, this
principle “is inapplicable to legal conclusions,” which “must be supported by factual
allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
B. The Allegations
With these principles in mind, the Court turns to the allegations. On February 15, 1993,
three men raped Pearlie McGee. (Doc. 17 ¶ 24). The investigation was led by Moultrie Police
Department (MPD) Investigators and Police Officers, but involved the GBI, which performed
DNA analysis for the case. (Id. ¶ 28). Defendant Harshbarger was the lead MPD investigator,
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Defendants Raybon and Smith1 were MPD officers who assisted Harshbarger in the investigation,
and Defendant Pearson was the GBI DNA analysis supervisor. (Id. ¶¶ 29-31).
Two days after being raped, McGee identified Tyrone White and Derrick Smith2 using a
yearbook. (Id. ¶ 33). She never identified Sedrick Moore. (Id.) There was no physical evidence
connecting Moore to the crime. (Id. ¶ 34). The Law Enforcement Defendants arrested and
questioned White, who agreed to testify against other suspects in exchange for certain other
charges being dropped. (Id. ¶ 35). Defendant Harshbarger wrote down that he agreed to suggest
to his supervisor or DA that White should have charges dropped in exchange for testimony against
Kerry Robsinon and Sedrick Moore. (Id. ¶ 37). A supervisor or policymaker at the City of Moultrie
would have had actual knowledge about the plea deal, because the Law Enforcement Defendants
lacked the authority to grant a plea deal on their own. (Id. ¶ 70). White named Moore and Kerry
Robinson3 as his accomplices, claiming that Derrick Smith, a man he was with before and after
the crime, was not involved. (Id. ¶ 38). At trial, White contradicted McGee’s testimony at least five
times. (Id. ¶ 77). In exchange for his testimony, White’s sentences ran concurrently, significantly
reducing his prison time. (Id. ¶ 71).
A sexual assault kit was performed on McGee and DNA belonging to people other than
her was found. (Id. ¶ 44). The Law Enforcement Defendants collected clothing from the crime
scene; the GBI tested it, and found seminal fluid containing White’s DNA. (Id. ¶¶ 45-46). From
the sexual assault kit, the GBI DNA analysts collected thirteen alleles, eleven of which matched
White’s DNA. (Id. ¶¶ 48-49). Defendant Pearson compared the two unaccounted for alleles to
Moore. (Id. ¶ 51). The results were “inconclusive,” meaning Moore’s DNA did not match the
DNA collected from the sexual assault kit. (Id.) Despite this, Defendant Pearson testified at trial
in the presence of the jury that Moore’s DNA matched the sexual assault kit DNA. (Id. ¶ 52).
1 Defendants Harshbarger, Raybon, and Smith are collectively referred to as the “Law Enforcement
Defendants.”
2 Derrick Smith was arrested, placed in a juvenile facility, and ultimately let go. (Id. ¶ 39). Smith is related
to Defendant Joseph Smith, one of the investigating police officers. (Id. ¶ 40). Smith’s DNA was never
tested. (Id. ¶ 41).
3 White initially named Kerry Lewis but corrected himself and named Kerry Robinson and Moore.
(Id. ¶ 68).
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Despite inconclusive DNA testing results, Pearson further testified that “[a]dditional alleles that
were present in the vaginal cervical swabs matched them as well.” (Id. ¶¶ 53-54).
In 2002, the GBI followed a policy directing agents to use “suspect-centric” language,
which means that analysis will favor not excluding suspects when the DNA result is inconclusive.
(Id. ¶ 58). In practice, this meant that when a DNA test is either unclear or inconclusive, instead
of excluding a suspect-defendant, the GBI would mark the result as “non-exclusion,” ensuring
the suspect-defendant is still included in the DNA results. (Id. ¶ 59). This policy allowed GBI
analysts, such as Pearson, to use the terms “non-excluded” from DNA evidence and “matched”
the DNA evidence interchangeably. (Id. ¶ 60). GBI policymakers and final decisionmakers had
actual and constructive knowledge of the policy and its effects. (Id. ¶ 63).
Defendant Harshbarger and the other Law Enforcement Defendants fabricated a witness
statement identifying Moore coming from McGee’s house on the night of the rape and read it
into evidence before the jury. (Id. ¶¶ 86-92). Moore was ultimately arrested six years after the rape,
found guilty at trial where the Law Enforcement Defendants and Pearson presented fabricated
and misleading evidence, and sentenced to seventy-five years in prison. (Id. ¶ 97).
C. Law & Analysis
1. Claims Against GBI
Turning to the merits, Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against GBI,
asserting sovereign immunity. (Doc. 29-1 at 5). The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a
state by that state’s own citizens. Presnell v. Paulding Cnty., Ga., 454 F. App'x 763, 766 (11th Cir.
2011). “A State may waive its sovereign immunity at its pleasure, and in some circumstances
Congress may abrogate it by appropriate legislation. But absent waiver or valid abrogation,
federal courts may not entertain a private person's suit against a State.” Va. Office for Prot. &
Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S.Ct. 1632, 1638 (2011).
“Section 1983 ‘creates a species of tort liability that on its face admits of no
immunities.’” Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (1992) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417
(1976)). In this way and with certain limitations, § 1983 validly abrogates state sovereign
immunity. One limitation is that certain government officials still receive absolute or qualified
immunity from suit based on the tradition of immunity at common law. See Id. And “Congress,
in passing § 1983, did not intend to override the immunity guaranteed to the states by the
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Eleventh Amendment.” Robinson v. Ga. Dep't of Transp., 966 F.2d 637, 640 (11th Cir.1992).
Therefore, Moore can only sue the GBI in federal court if Georgia has waived its sovereign
immunity. See Presnell v. Paulding Cnty., Ga., 454 F. App'x 763, 766 (11th Cir. 2011).
GBI maintains that it can be sued under neither § 1983 nor Monell. Moore concedes
that state agencies are not “persons” suable under § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dpt. Of State Police,
491 U.S. 58 (1989). And Moore makes compelling public policy arguments against granting
the GBI sovereign immunity under § 1983. (Doc. 35 at 5). Indeed, “[t]he GBI maintained a
policy that was a blatant violation of constitutional rights” and “[w]ithout § 1983 actions, the
GBI is free to violate the constitutional rights of the accused while maintaining more power
than any local police agency within the state.” (Id. at 5-6). However, “determination of absolute
immunity under § 1983 is not a policy determination, but involves a historical exercise.” Jones
v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999). For better or worse, the Court is not a
policymaker. Plaintiff does not identify any waiver of state sovereign immunity as to the GBI.
Absent a waiver of sovereign immunity, the GBI cannot be sued under § 1983. Plaintiff’s
federal law claims against the GBI are DISMISSED without prejudice.
2. Individual-Capacity Claims
Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiff’s individual-capacity claims alleged against
Pearson. (Doc. 29-1 at 8). Defendants assert that claims against Pearson are barred by both
absolute immunity and sovereign immunity. Indeed, absolute immunity bars some of
Plaintiff’s claims. Sovereign immunity bars none.
Pearson first asserts absolute immunity for his trial testimony. (Doc. 29-1 at 8).
“Witnesses are granted absolute immunity for their testimony during trials.” Jones v. Cannon,
174 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983)). And
“[p]olice officers enjoy the same absolute immunity as lay witnesses for their testimony at
trial.” (Id.) But the mere fact an individual testified at trial does not bar all suits against them
for actions undertaken outside the courtroom that concerned the same matter as the trial
testimony. In determining absolute immunity against § 1983 actions, “Courts must look to
“‘the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.’” Id. at
1282 (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988)).
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Absolute immunity is given based on function, not status or title. Merely being a
witness at trial does not immunize a police officer from claims against him for actions he took
outside the courtroom concerning the matter about which he testified. Person has absolute
immunity for his trial testimony, not his fabrication of evidence as a DNA analyst for the GBI.
(Doc. 35 at 7). Pearson claims that “Moore’s § 1983 claim against Pearson is based on the
allegedly false testimony Pearson gave at trial” and not any “involvement in the initial
investigation.” (Doc. 43 at 3). However, Moore’s amended complaint alleges “all of the
evidence against Sedrick Moore was fabricated by the Law Enforcement Defendants, GBI and
Defendant Pearson.” (Doc. 17 ¶ 110). And it describes in detail the GBI policy that Pearson
would have followed to fabricate said evidence. (Id. ¶¶ 51, 58-61). Therefore, at least some of
Moore’s complaint concerns Pearson’s actions allegedly undertaken not during his testimony
at trial. Moore’s federal claims against Pearson may proceed only insofar as they concern
actions not taken while testifying at trial. Plaintiff’s federal law claims against Pearson are
DISMISSED, in part.
Defendants argue that “Plaintiff misrepresents Pearson’s trial testimony and the
allegations against Pearson are false.” (Doc. 43 at 4). These arguments go to the factual
plausibility of the claims alleged. At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court “accept[s] the
allegations in the complaint as true and constru[e]s them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff.” Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003). Defendants’ arguments about
the truthfulness of the allegation are not relevant at the motion to dismiss stage. Such
arguments are properly reserved for the factfinder at trial or possibly on a motion for summary
judgment. Furthermore, these factual arguments concern Pearson’s trial testimony, the claims
regarding which the Court dismissed above. Therefore, the Court does not consider these
factual arguments now.
Plaintiff argues that Pearson is not entitled to sovereign immunity or qualified
immunity as to the federal law claims. (Doc. 35 at 8-9). Defendants do not assert sovereign
immunity or qualified immunity as to the federal law claims against Pearson. Therefore,
Moore’s arguments on the matter are irrelevant and the Court will not address them at this
time.
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3. State-law Claims
As discussed above, states enjoy sovereign immunity from suit by citizens of that state.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is enshrined in the Georgia Constitution and “bars suits
against the State and its employees in their official capacities unless a statute or the
Constitution itself specifically waives that immunity.” State v. SASS Grp., LLC, 315 Ga. 893,
893 (2023). Therefore, Moore’s state law claims against GBI and Pearson can only proceed if
Georgia has waived its sovereign immunity.
Moore sued under the Georgia Tort Claim Act, a waiver of state sovereign immunity.
O.C.G.A. § 50-21-23. Defendants note that Moore failed to comply with the Act’s ante litem
notice, service, and certification requirements, sued the wrong defendant, and his claims are
barred by the Act’s intentional torts exception. (Doc. 29-1 at 10).
The Act requires plaintiffs to “name as a party defendant only the state government
entity for which the state officer or employee was acting and shall not name the state officer
or employee individually.” O.C.G.A. § 50-21-25. As alleged, Pearson was a state employee
acting under the color of law and in his individual capacity within the scope of his employment.
(Doc. 17 ¶ 13). Plaintiff does not dispute this point. Therefore, GBI is the proper defendant,
not Pearson. Moore’s state tort claims against Pearson are DISMISSED.
As to Moore’s state tort claims against the GBI, his failure to comply with the ante
litem notice requirements bars the claims. O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26 requires a plaintiff to provide
an ante litem notice within twelve months of the loss and attach to their complaint a copy of
the notice along with a delivery receipt as exhibits. O.C.G.A. § 50-21-26(a)(4). Plaintiff did not
attach the required items as exhibits in his complaint. (See Doc. 17). Plaintiff acknowledges
this requirement and notes that he did not send the required notices to the State within the
statutory time period required because he was unable to obtain representation during that time.
(Doc. 35 at 12). Nor does Plaintiff contest the applicability of the ante litem notice
requirements to a suit in federal court. (See Doc. 35) This procedural bar to Plaintiff’s claims
due to the inaccessibility of legal counsel is regrettable. Nonetheless, Plaintiff’s state tort claims
against GBI are procedurally barred and accordingly DISMISSED. The Court does not and
need not reach Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by his failure to comply
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with the Act’s service and certification requirements and its intentional torts exception because
the above discussed reasons bar his claims.
III. 	CONCLUSION
In sum, Plaintiff cannot sue the GBI under § 1983 because of state sovereign immunity.
Plaintiff cannot sue Pearson under § 1983 for his testimony at trial, but can for other actions
alleged. Plaintiff cannot sue Pearson under the Georgia Tort Claims Act because the Act did
not abrogate state sovereign immunity as to state employees. While Plaintiff could sue the GBI
under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, his failure to comply with the Act’s procedural
requirements bars his instant state tort claims.
Hence Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 29) is GRANTED, in part, and
DENIED, in part. Plaintiff’s claims against GBI under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are DISMISSED,
without prejudice. His claims against Pearson under § 1983 as to Pearson’s trial testimony are
DISMISSED, with prejudice, while the rest remain pending. His state-law claims against
Pearson and the GBI are DISMISSED, with prejudice. The lawsuit remains pending as to
Moore’s federal claims against Pearson, excluding those pertaining to his trial testimony.
SO ORDERED, this 6th day of February 2026.
/s/ W. Louis Sands
W. LOUIS SANDS, SR. JUDGE
UNITED STATESDISTRICT COURT
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