Williams v. United States of America

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF HAWAII
JAMIE WILLIAMS ET AL.
Plaintiffs,
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ET AL.,
Defendant.
CIV. NO. 23-00028 LEK-KJM
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF
SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION THE CLAIMS OF PLAINTIFFS ELLISTON,
SIMIC, STEPHENS, TORRES, WILSON, WOODSON, AND DINGLE
Before this Court is Defendant United States of
America’s (“United States”) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction the Claims of Plaintiffs Elliston,
Simic, Stephens, Torres, Wilson, Woodson, and Dingle, filed on
May 29, 2026 (“Motion”). [Dkt. no. 225.] On June 15, 2026,
Plaintiffs filed their memorandum in opposition to the Motion
(“Memorandum in Opposition”). [Dkt. no. 232.] The United States
filed its reply on June 22, 2026. [Dkt. no. 233.]
This matter came on for hearing on July 15, 2026. At
the hearing, this Court orally granted the Motion, but the
instant Order supersedes the oral ruling. The United States’
Motion is granted for the reasons set forth below.
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BACKGROUND
The operative pleading in this action is the Second
Amended Complaint, [filed 12/18/23 (dkt. no. 53)]. This Court
discusses only the factual allegations relevant to the instant
Motion.
This case arises out of the May 6 and November 20,
2021 fuel leaks from the United States Navy’s (“the Navy”) Red
Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility on Joint Base Pearl Harbor-
Hickam (“Red Hill” and “JBPHH”). [Second Amended Complaint at
¶¶ 100-09.] Plaintiffs allege that the United States, through
the Navy and other agencies, owned and operated Red Hill and
staffed it with its agents, servants, and employees. [Id. at
¶¶ 99, 101.] Plaintiffs allege that there have been at least
seventy-six reported incidents of fuel releases at Red Hill,
involving nearly 200,000 gallons of fuel. [Id. at ¶ 102.]
Plaintiffs allege that the November 20, 2021 fuel
release at Red Hill (“November 2021 Release”) caused the Red
Hill Shaft, a drinking-water source for the United States
military, to be contaminated with fuel. Plaintiffs further
allege that, approximately one week after the November 2021
Release, fuel flowed from the Red Hill Shaft to the homes of
residents in military housing. As a result of that
contamination, Plaintiffs allege that they drank, bathed in, and
used the contaminated water. [Id. at ¶¶ 105-08.]
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Plaintiffs allege that the United States negligently
failed to prevent the contamination of their water in their
homes and negligently failed to prevent the contamination of
their water supply with fuel, which resulted in Plaintiffs’
ingestion and exposure to contaminated water. This ingestion and
exposure, Plaintiffs submit, caused them physical harm and
mental anguish. See id. at ¶¶ 110-11.
Plaintiffs assert claims for negligence (“Count I”),
public/private nuisance (“Count II”), and negligent infliction
of emotional distress (“Count III”). [Id. at pgs. 16-19.]
The United States seeks dismissal, under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), of all claims asserted by
Plaintiffs Jevaughn Elliston, Brian Simic, Jesse Stephens, Adam
Torres, Daniel Wilson, Cade Woodson, and Wayne Dingle (“Dingle”
and collectively the “Service Member Plaintiffs”). [Motion, Mem.
in Supp. at 1, 4.] The United States argues that the Service
Member Plaintiffs’ claims arose out of activity incident to
their military service and are thus barred under the doctrine
promulgated by the United States Supreme Court in Feres v.
United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). See Motion, Mem. in Supp. at
5-7. The United States argues separately that Dingle’s personal
injury claims are barred by the Federal Tort Claims Act’s
(“FTCA”) foreign country exception because Dingle was stationed
in South Korea when his asserted personal injuries allegedly
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arose, and that, to the extent Dingle asserts property-damage
claims, those claims are barred by the Feres doctrine. See id.
at 13-15.
The United States relies on this Court’s recent order
dismissing the claims of service members pursuant to the Feres
doctrine in Whaley et al. v. United States of America, CV 23-
00457 LEK-KJM (“Whaley”). See, e.g., Motion, Mem. in Supp. at 1
(citing Whaley, Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Whaley First Amended Complaint for Lack of Subject-Matter
Jurisdiction, filed 5/5/26 (dkt. no. 333) (“Whaley Order”)).1 The
United States urges this Court to reach the same conclusion as
it did in the Whaley Order because the Service Member Plaintiffs
were active-duty service members who allegedly were injured by
being exposed to contaminated tap water while residing in
military housing. See id. at 5-7.
Plaintiffs disagree and argue that the Feres doctrine
does not bar the Service Member Plaintiffs’ claims because their
1 The Whaley Order is also available at 2026 WL 1236183. The
Whaley Order was also filed as docket number 739 in Feindt et
al. v. United States of America, CV 22-00397 LEK-KJM, and docket
number 319 in Hughes et al. v. United States of America, CV 24-
00059 LEK-KJM, cases that were previously consolidated with
Whaley. See Whaley, Minute Order - EO: Order Amending the Order
Granting United States’ Motion to Consolidate, filed 6/3/26
(dkt. no. 348). An appeal of the Whaley Order and the Whaley,
Judgment in a Civil Case, [filed 5/20/26 (dkt. no. 338),] is
pending before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See Whaley,
Plaintiffs’ Notice of Appeal, filed 7/17/26 (dkt. no. 349).
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alleged injuries occurred primarily in their homes, during off-
duty hours, and while they were engaged in personal activities
rather than participating in military operations or following
orders. [Mem. in Opp. at 2-3.] Plaintiffs characterize the Feres
doctrine as a narrow exception to the FTCA’s waiver of liability
for service members who sustain injuries incident to service.
[Id. at 3.] Plaintiffs contend that this Court should apply the
four factors from Johnson v. United States, 704 F.2d 1431 (9th
Cir. 1983), which consider: 1) the situs of the tortious act;
2) the plaintiff’s duty status at the time of the tortious act;
3) the military benefits the plaintiff had; and 4) the type of
activities the plaintiff was engaged in at the time of the
tortious act. [Id. (citing Johnson, 704 F.2d at 1436-39).]
Plaintiffs argue that none of the Johnson factors weigh in favor
of applying the Feres doctrine to bar the Service Member
Plaintiffs’ claims. [Id. at 4-7.]
As to Dingle, Plaintiffs argue that his claims are not
barred by the FTCA’s foreign country exception or the Feres
doctrine. [Id. at 7-8.] Plaintiffs, however, do not respond to
the United States’ assertions that Dingle’s alleged personal
injuries first arose while he was stationed in South Korea, nor
the United States’ argument that his property-damage claims are
barred by the Feres doctrine. See id.
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STANDARDS
I. 	Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
authorizes a defendant to move for dismissal of
an action for “lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction[.]” “Once challenged, the party
asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the
burden of proving its existence.” Robinson v.
United States, 586 F.3d 683, 685 (9th Cir. 2009)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). . . .
. . . .
“A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may
be facial or factual.” Safe Air for Everyone v.
Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004)
(citation omitted). “A ‘facial’ attack accepts
the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations but
asserts that they are insufficient on their face
to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Leite v. Crane,
749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation and
some internal quotation marks omitted). “A
‘factual’ attack . . . contests the truth of the
plaintiff’s factual allegations, usually by
introducing evidence outside the pleadings.” Id.
(citations omitted).
Pub. Int. Legal Found., Inc. v. Nago, CIV. NO. 23-00389 LEK-WRP,
2024 WL 3233994, at *2-3 (D. Hawai`i June 28, 2024) (some
alterations in Pub. Int.). Here, the United States attached a
declaration and exhibits to the Motion, thereby “convert[ing]
the motion to dismiss into a factual motion by presenting
affidavits or other evidence properly brought before the
court[.]” See Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039 (quotation
marks and citation omitted). Therefore, the Motion is considered
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as a Rule 12(b)(1) motion and need not be treated as a summary
judgment motion.
II. 	Sovereign Immunity
“‘Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the
Federal Government and its agencies from suit’” and deprives the
court of jurisdiction. See Harger v. Dep’t of Lab., 569 F.3d
898, 903 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Dep’t of the Army v. Blue Fox,
Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 260, 119 S. Ct. 687, 142 L. Ed. 2d 718
(1999)). As a result, the United States may challenge a federal
court’s subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) on the
basis of sovereign immunity. See Pistor v. Garcia, 791 F.3d
1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2015) (collecting cases) (“Rule 12(b)(1) is
. . . a proper vehicle for invoking sovereign immunity from
suit.” (citations omitted)).
“Jurisdiction over any suit against the
Government requires a clear statement from the
United States waiving sovereign immunity,
together with a claim falling within the terms of
the waiver.” United States v. White Mountain
Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 472, 123 S. Ct. 1126,
155 L. Ed. 2d 40 (2003) (citations omitted).
“[L]imitations and conditions upon which the
Government consents to be sued must be strictly
observed and exceptions thereto are not to be
implied.” Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270,
276, 77 S. Ct. 269, 1 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1957).
Mollison 	v. 	United 	States, 	568 	F.3d 	1073, 	1075 	(9th 	Cir. 	2009)
(alteration in Mollison). The Feres doctrine is a “jurisdictional
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bar” to tort claims against the United States. See Daniel v. United
States, 889 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 2018).
DISCUSSION
I. 	The Feres Doctrine
Plaintiffs do not cite, discuss, or refer to the
Whaley Order. See generally Mem. in Opp. This Court concludes
that each Johnson factor weighs in favor of applying the Feres
doctrine to bar the claims of the Service Member Plaintiffs for
largely the same reasons as discussed in the Whaley Order.2
These factors “cannot be blindly applied to
determine whether an injury occurred in the
course of activity incident to service. The only
way to decide whether an injury is incident to
service is to consider the facts of each
individual case.” Jackson v. Tate, 648 F.3d 729,
734 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the Ninth
Circuit has “reached the unhappy conclusion that
the cases applying the Feres doctrine are
irreconcilable, and thus, comparison of fact
patterns to outcomes in cases that have applied
the Feres doctrine is the most appropriate way to
resolve Feres doctrine cases.” Costo [v. United
States], 248 F.3d [863,] 867 [(9th Cir. 2001)]
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
2 This Court need not decide whether it is free to rely
exclusively on Feres precedent or whether it is required to
apply the Johnson factors, see Motion, Mem. in Supp. at 6
(arguing that examination of the Johnson factors is
unnecessary), because it would reach the same result regardless
of the analytical framework. See Whaley Order, 2026 WL 1236183,
at *3 n.4.
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Whaley Order, 2026 WL 1236183, at *3 (some alterations in
Whaley). In Whaley, this Court compared the Whaley action “to
actions where the United States and its military departments
were accused of negligently contaminating drinking water
resulting in service member injuries because such actions are
the most factually analogous to the dispute before the Court.”
Id. This Court determined that actions where “[f]ederal courts
in the Ninth Circuit and other circuits have applied the Feres
doctrine to cases related to the Camp Lejeune water
contamination crisis” were analogous to the Whaley action. See
id. (citing Swanson v. United States, Case No. 3:18-cv-02148-JR,
2019 WL 7633157, at *1-2 (D. Or. Nov. 6, 2019);3 Clendening v.
United States, 19 F.4th 421, 425-32 (4th Cir. 2021); Foster v.
Dep’t of the Navy, NO. 5:19-CV-429-FL, 2020 WL 1542092 (E.D.N.C.
Mar. 31, 2020); O’Connell v. Dep’t of the Navy, Civil Action
No. 10-10746-NMG, 2010 WL 5572928 (D. Mass. Dec. 21, 2010);
Perez v. United States, CASE NO. 09-22201-CIV-JORDAN, 2010 WL
11505507 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2010)). Because this action, like
the Whaley action, arises out of the May 6 and November 20, 2021
fuel leaks from Red Hill, compare supra Background, with Whaley
Order, 2026 WL 1236183, at *1, this Court looks to the Camp
3 The magistrate judge’s report and recommendation in
Swanson, 2019 WL 7633157, was adopted by the district judge.
2020 WL 423384 (Jan. 24, 2020). The Ninth Circuit affirmed. 845
F. App’x 690 (9th Cir. 2021).
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Lejeune water contamination crisis in discussing the Johnson
factors.
A. 	Factor One - Situs of Tort
The first factor examines where the tortious act
occurred. See Johnson, 704 F.2d at 1436. There is no dispute
that the Navy’s negligent act took place at Red Hill. While the
Service Member Plaintiffs suffered their injuries in their
respective homes, see, e.g., Second Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 100-
23, “[t]he appropriate consideration is the situs of the
negligence.” See Costo, 248 F.3d at 868 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs cite no authority to
support their assertion that the focus of the first factor
should be where they suffered their injuries. See generally Mem.
in Opp. Accordingly, the first factor weighs in favor of
applying the Feres doctrine to bar the Service Member
Plaintiffs’ claims against the United States.
B. 	Factor Two - Duty Status
Pursuant to the second factor, this Court must
scrutinize the Service Member Plaintiffs’ duty status when the
tortious act occurred. See Johnson, 704 F.2d at 1437-38. There
is no dispute that the Service Member Plaintiffs were active-
duty service members at the time of the November 2021 fuel
release.
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Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish the second factor by
pointing to cases where service members performed activities
that could have been performed by civilians in similar
positions. See Mem. in Opp. at 4-5 (citing Dreier v. United
States, 106 F.3d 844, 853 (9th Cir. 1996); Schoenfeld v. Quamme,
492 F.3d 1016, 1023-25 (9th Cir. 2007)). Plaintiffs remark that
the decedent in Dreier was an active-duty service member but was
found to have been performing “activities on the base [that]
were ‘indistinguishable from that of a civilian participating in
the same leisure activities.’” [Id. at 4 (quoting Dreier, 106
F.3d at 853).] Plaintiffs state that the activity at issue in
Dreier was hiking and also state that “civilians had access to
the same hiking area.” [Id. at 4-5 (citing Dreier, 106 F.3d at
853).]
The Ninth Circuit in Johnson, when
discussing the second factor, stated that, “duty
status is relevant only insofar as it bears on
the relationship between the activity leading to
the injury and [the service member’s] military
service.” 704 F.2d at 1438. Accordingly, “[t]he
important question is whether the service member
on active duty status was engaging in an activity
that is related in some relevant way to his
military duties.” Id. In the absence of such a
relationship, active-duty status would not be
relevant in assessing the second Johnson factor.
See id.
Whaley Order, 2026 WL 1236183, at *5 (alterations in Whaley).
Plaintiffs ask this Court, as the plaintiffs did in
Whaley, to confine its attention to the personal activities that
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the Service Member Plaintiffs engaged in during and following
the November 2021 fuel release. See Mem. in Opp. at 5; Whaley
Order, 2026 WL 1236183, at *5. The activity, however, that led
to the Service Member Plaintiffs’ injuries was their quartering
in military housing. This activity parallels the activity at
issue in Feres. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 136-37, 146 (barring a
negligence claim alleging that the United States knew or should
have known of unsafe living conditions in the barracks of a
service member who perished from a fire in the barracks); see
also Perez, 2010 WL 11505507, at *4 (“The negligence alleged in
Feres — the government’s failure to maintain safe premises for
soldiers living on a military base — is very similar to, and
. . . legally indistinguishable from, the negligence alleged
here — the government’s failure to maintain a clean drinking
water supply at a military base and failure to warn soldiers and
their dependents about dangerous chemicals in the water.”).
Consequently, Plaintiffs’ reliance on cases such as
Dreier is unavailing. In Dreier, the decedent’s “drinking beer
and swimming during his leisure time in an area to which the
public has access,” i.e., the activity that led directly to his
death, did not bear any relevant relationship to his military
duty as a soldier in the United States Army. See 106 F.3d at
845, 853. In contrast, the Service Member Plaintiffs were
active-duty service members occupying military housing provided
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to them as a direct consequence of their active-duty status. The
activities leading to their injuries, i.e., utilizing military
housing and water utilities, are inextricably linked to their
active-duty military service. See Whaley Order, 2026 WL 1236183,
at *5. Accordingly, the second factor weighs in favor of
applying the Feres bar.
C. 	Factor Three - Benefits to Service Members
The third Johnson factor requires the examination of
the benefits accruing to the Service Member Plaintiffs because
of their military status. See Johnson, 704 F.2d at 1438-39. When
considering the third Johnson factor, two distinct benefits can
be examined: first, an entitlement to compensation on account of
the resulting injury, and second, “the benefit of being
permitted to participate in the activity that led to the
injury.” See Schoenfeld, 492 F.3d at 1024 (citation omitted).
The Service Member Plaintiffs do not dispute that the
first type of benefit weighs in favor of applying the Feres
doctrine to bar their claims. See Mem. in Opp. at 5-6.
Accordingly, the Service Member Plaintiffs’ entitlement to
compensation as a result of their injury weighs in favor of
applying the Feres bar.
Plaintiffs argue that “[p]ersonal use of tap water,
for cooking, cleaning and bathing is not a benefit incident to
the service members’ service.” [Mem. in Opp. at 5.] They further
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contend that “[t]here is negligible benefit to the exposures to
contaminated water in [the Service Member Plaintiffs’] homes
which accrues as a by-product of the service members status as a
member of the military.” [Id. at 6.]
Plaintiffs miss the mark. As this Court discussed in
Whaley, the relevant inquiry is whether the housing and
utilities provided to the Service Member Plaintiffs were
provided to them as benefits of their military service. See
Whaley Order, 2026 WL 1236183, at *6. Like the plaintiffs in
Whaley, the Service Member Plaintiffs’ housing was a benefit
derived from their positions as service members. See id. at *7;
Second Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 107, 110 (alleging that fuel
flowed from Red Hil into military housing where Plaintiffs drank
and bathed in contaminated water). Plaintiffs present no case
law supporting their assertion that the inquiry should instead
be whether the benefit was “negligible” or “minimal.” See Mem.
in Opp. at 5-6. Accordingly, the third Johnson factor also
weighs in favor of the application of the Feres doctrine to bar
the Service Member Plaintiffs’ claims.
D. 	Factor Four - Nature of Activities
Pursuant to the fourth Johnson factor, the
Court must analyze the nature of the [Service
Member] Plaintiffs’ activities at the time the
negligent act occurred. See Johnson, 704 F.2d at
1439-41. The Ninth Circuit has previously
stressed that the fourth factor [] “is the most
important in determining whether a plaintiff’s
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suit is Feres barred.” Schoenfeld, 492 F.3d at
1025 (citation omitted). “[T]he key inquiry is
‘whether or not the service member’s activities
at the time of injury are of the sort that could
harm the disciplinary system if litigated in a
civil action.’” Id. (quoting Johnson, 704 F.2d at
1439). Considerations that are relevant to this
key inquiry include whether the nature of the
activity at issue “involve the sort of close
military judgment calls that the Feres doctrine
was designed to insulate from judicial review” or
implicate “decision[s] requiring military
expertise or judgment.” See Johnson, 704 F.2d at
1440 (citation omitted).
Whaley Order, 2026 WL 1236183, at *7 (some alterations in
Whaley).
Plaintiffs contend that the Service Member Plaintiffs’
activities at the time that they were injured were entirely
“private/personal.” See Mem. in Opp. at 6. Plaintiffs’ argument,
however, does not address this Court’s conclusion in Whaley that
“residing in military housing” is the activity “which led to the
Whaley Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries.” See Whaley Order, 2026 WL
1236183, at *7 (citing Perez, 2010 WL 11505507, at *4 (“although
it is not exactly clear what precise activity or activities [the
plaintiff] was engaged in every single time he drank or used the
contaminated water at [Camp Lejeune], it is undeniable that he
drank and used the water while performing at least some military
activities”)). So too here. “When evaluating similar claims
involving contaminated water provided by the military, federal
courts,” including this Court, “have consistently rejected the
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argument that engaging in routine, personal activities at home
precludes the application of the Feres doctrine.” Whaley Order,
2026 WL 1236183, at *7 (citations omitted). This Court similarly
concludes that the Service Member Plaintiffs’ “overarching
activity of residing in military-provided housing and consuming
military-supplied water is fundamentally incidental to their
military service.” See id. at *9.4
E. 	Summary
Because all four Johnson, 704 F.2d 1431, factors weigh
in favor of the application of the Feres doctrine to bar the
Service Member Plaintiffs’ claims, this Court concludes, with
regret, that it is compelled to grant the Motion. This Court
again recognizes that dismissal of claims by service members in
this matter based on the Feres doctrine is an overly harsh and
unjust outcome. See Whaley Order, 2026 WL 1236183, at *9 (noting
that justices of the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have
called into doubt the validity of the Feres doctrine). This
4 Plaintiffs also point to activities such as bathing,
cooking, brushing teeth, washing pets, and drinking water, and
argue that such activities were not performed by the Service
Member Plaintiffs pursuant to a military mission or orders.
[Mem. in Opp. at 6-7.] This Court, however, has already rejected
the argument that “the Feres doctrine is inapplicable unless a
service member is acting under orders or on a specific military
mission.” Whaley Order, 2026 WL 1236183, at *8 (citations
omitted).
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Court, however, remains bound and compelled to follow Feres and
its Ninth Circuit progeny.
II. Dingle’s Claims
Plaintiffs do not address the United States’ argument
that the FTCA’s foreign country exception bars Dingle’s personal
injury claims. See generally Mem. in Opp. Nor do Plaintiffs
attempt to rebut the evidence submitted by the United States
showing that Dingle suffered his alleged emotional distress and
other impacts on his mental health while in South Korea. See,
e.g., Motion, Declaration of Eric A. Rey in Support of the
United States’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-Matter
Jurisdiction the Claims of Plaintiffs Elliston, Simic, Stephens,
Torres, Wilson, Woodson, and Dingle, Exh. C (excerpt of
Plaintiff Wayne Dingle’s Response to Defendant United States’
Third Set of Interrogatories to Remaining Williams Plaintiffs,
Dated July 16, 2025). This Court concludes that Dingle’s
personal injury claims are barred by the FTCA. See S.H. by Holt
v. United States, 853 F.3d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 2017)
(concluding that the foreign country exception bars the
plaintiff’s claims because the injury was suffered outside of
the United States); Domantay v. United States Dep’t of Veterans
Affs., Case No. 18-cv-03726-SK, 2018 WL 10501631, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 10, 2018) (concluding that the foreign country
exception bars the plaintiff’s claim because, “even if the
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allegedly wrongful act occurred in the United States,” the
injury occurred outside of the United States); see also Terry v.
Tabar, CIVIL NO. 24-00309 JAO-KJM, 2025 WL 1319177, at *7 (D.
Hawai`i Apr. 25, 2025) (concluding that, because the plaintiff
did not address the defendant’s argument that the district court
lacked jurisdiction over an FTCA action, the plaintiff
“concede[d] that dismissal is warranted on this basis.”
(citation omitted)).
This Court also concludes that the Feres doctrine bars
Dingle’s property-damage claims for the same reasons discussed
supra.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the United States’ Motion
to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction the Claims of
Plaintiffs Elliston, Simic, Stephens, Torres, Wilson, Woodson,
and Dingle, filed May 29, 2026, is GRANTED.
There being no remaining claims, the Clerk’s Office is
DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of the United States and to
close this case, pursuant to the instant Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, August 27, 2026.
JAMIE WILLIAMS ET AL. VS. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ET AL.;
CV 23-00028 LEK-KJM; ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION THE CLAIMS OF
PLAINTIFFS ELLISTON, SIMIC, STEPHENS, TORRES, WILSON, WOODSON,
AND DINGLE
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