ABP Pearl Highlands LLC v. Tigo Energy, Inc.

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FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
ABP PEARL HIGHLANDS LLC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
TIGO ENERGY,
Defendant.
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CIVIL NO. 25-00154 JAO-WRP
FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT
PLAINTIFF ABP PEARL
HIGHLANDS LLC’S MOTION FOR
AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’
FEES AND NON-TAXABLE COSTS
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT PLAINTIFF ABP PEARL
HIGHLANDS LLC’S MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES
AND NON-TAXABLE COSTS
Before the Court is Plaintiff ABP Pearl Highlands LLC’s (Plaintiff)
Motion for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Non-Taxable Costs, ECF No. 20. No
opposition was filed by Defendant Tigo Energy (Defendant). On November 14,
2025, Plaintiff filed a Reply, ECF No. 26. The Court finds this Motion suitable for
disposition without a hearing pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(c). After careful
consideration of the record in this action and the relevant legal authority, the Court
finds and recommends that Plaintiff’s Motion be GRANTED.1
1 Within fourteen days after a party is served with the Findings and
Recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1), a party may file written
objections in the United States District Court. A party must file any objections
within the fourteen-day period to preserve appellate review of the Findings and
Recommendation.
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BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is the fee simple owner of Pearl Highlands. See Complaint,
ECF No. 1 at ¶ 12. Plaintiff currently leases the solar photovoltaic energy system
(System) at Pearl Highlands from its owner, First Hawaiian Leasing, Inc. (FHL).
See id. at ¶¶ 12-13. The claims in this lawsuit arise out of allegedly defective and
dangerous rapid shutdown devices (RSDs) designed, manufactured, marketed, and
distributed by Defendant, and installed in the photovoltaic System at Pearl
Highlands. See id. at ¶ 11.
On October 28, 2021, Plaintiff and FHL executed a lease, whereby
FHL agreed to lease the System to Plaintiff upon completion. See id. at ¶ 17.
Under the terms of the lease, FHL also assigned to Plaintiff all rights to any
manufacturer or vendor warranties on the System. See id. The lease further
required that all claims or actions under any such warranties shall be made by
Plaintiff. See id. 	Two of Defendant’s RSDs that were installed in the System
melted, overheated, combusted and/or ignited, causing a critical failure in the
System (Failure). See id. at ¶ 31. The Failure resulted in a total shutdown of the
System, and thermal and/or fire damage to the System. See id. at ¶ 31. As a direct
result of the Failure, Plaintiff was forced to shut down a portion of the System to
prevent further fires and mitigate the danger of death, personal injury, and/or
property damage created by the RSDs. See id. at ¶ 34.
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On April 11, 2025, Plaintiff filed the Complaint against Defendant,
asserting claims for: (1) negligence due to product defect (Count I); (2) negligence
due to failure to warn (Count II); (3) strict product liability (Count III); (4) breach
of the implied warranty of merchantability (Count IV); (5) breach of the implied
warranty of fitness for particular purpose (Count V); and (6) breach of express
warranty (Count VI).
After Defendant failed to respond to the Complaint, default was
entered against it on May 7, 2025. See Entry of Default, ECF No. 13. On August
29, 2025, this Court issued a Findings and Recommendation which recommended
“entering default judgment against Defendant as to all claims in the Complaint.”
See Findings and Recommendation, ECF No. 18 at 16. On September 19, 2025,
the District Court adopted this Court’s Findings and Recommendation. See Order
Adopting Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations. This motion for
fees and costs followed.
DISCUSSION
I. 	Entitlement to Attorneys’ Fees
Plaintiff argues that, as the prevailing party in this case, it is entitled to
attorneys’ fees pursuant to HRS Section 607-14 which governs the award of fees
for actions in the nature of assumpsit. HRS Section 607-14 provides: “[I]n all the
courts, in all actions in the nature of assumpsit . . . there shall be taxed as attorneys’
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fees, to be paid by the losing party and to be included in the sum for which
execution may issue, a fee that the court determines to be reasonable.” Haw. Rev.
Stat. § 607-14. Attorneys’ fees awarded pursuant to Section 607-14 “shall not
exceed twenty-five per cent of the judgment.” Id.
“In order to award reasonable attorneys’ fees under [HRS Section
607-14], the court must determine whether: (1) the action is in the nature of
assumpsit . . .; (2) the moving party is the prevailing party; (3) the fees requested
are reasonable; and (4) the fees do not exceed twenty-five percent of the
judgment.” Sheehan v. Centex Homes, 853 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1038 (D. Haw.
2011). The Court addresses these factors below.
A. Nature of Assumpsit
“It is well settled under Hawai’i law that ‘an action in the nature of
assumpsit includes ‘all possible contract claims.’” Kona Enterprises, Inc. v. Est. of
Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 844 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Leslie v. Est. of Tavares, 93
Haw. 1, 5, 994 P.2d 1047, 1051 (2000)). “Assumpsit is a common law form of
action which allows for the recovery of damages for the non-performance of a
contract, either express or implied, written or verbal, as well as quasi contractual
obligations.” Id. (quoting Leslie, 93 Haw. at 5, 994 P.2d at 1051). “The focus of
this analysis is thus on the ‘substance’ of the action, ‘rather than [on] the formal
language employed or the form of the pleadings.’” Id. (citing Schulz v. Honsador,
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Inc., 67 Haw. 433, 436, 690 P.2d 279, 282 (1984), overruled on other grounds by
Blair v. Ing, 96 Haw. 327, 31 P.3d 184 (2001)). “Hence, the mere use of tort
language in a complaint does not control the characterization of the action as either
in assumpsit or in tort.” Id. “Instead, ‘[t]he character of the action should be
determined from the facts and issues raised in the complaint, the nature of the
entire grievance, and the relief sought.’” Id. (citing Leslie, 93 Haw. at 6, 994 P.2d
at 1052).
Further, for an action to be in the nature of assumpsit, the plaintiff’s
“primary objective must be to obtain monetary relief for breach of contract.”
Kahala Royal Corp. v. Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel, 113 Haw. 251, 280, 151
P.3d 732, 761 (2007). Additionally, the Ninth Circuit “requires an evaluation of
the nature of each claim when determining whether an action is in the nature of
assumpsit.” BlueEarth Biofuels, LLC v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., No. CIV. 09-00181
LEK-KS, 2015 WL 881577, at *7 (D. Haw. Feb. 27, 2015). In a suit with mixed
claims, the existence of contract claims may result in a finding that the action is in
the nature of assumpsit unless those “contract claims are merely decorative . . . and
not germane to the genuine dispute being litigated.” Kona Enterprises, Inc., 229
F.3d at 884. “[W]hen there is doubt as to the nature of the suit, the presumption is
that it sounds in assumpsit and not in tort.” Healy-Tibbitts Const. Co. v. Hawaiian
Indep. Refinery, Inc., 673 F.2d 284, 286 (9th Cir. 1982). The party opposing the
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request for fees under HRS Section 607-14 has the burden of showing that “all
claims” alleged are not in the nature of assumpsit. Kona Enterprises, Inc., 229
F.3d at 885.
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Defendant did not file
any opposition to this Motion and therefore waives any argument in opposition to
the issues raised in the Motion. See Trigueros v. Adams, 685 F.3d 983, 988 (9th
Cir. 2011); Gribben v. United Parcel Serv., 528 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2008).
The following claims are in the nature of assumpsit: Breach of the
Implied Warranty of Merchantability (Count IV); Breach of the Implied Warranty
of Fitness for a Particular Purpose (Count V); and Breach of Express Warranty
(Count VI). See Schulz, 690 P.2d at 282. Although Plaintiff’s other claims against
Defendant are not in the nature of assumpsit, the Court finds that the substance of
the entire grievance between these parties is the alleged breach of warranties. See
Kona Enterprises, Inc., 229 F.3d at 884. Plaintiff’s primary objective in bringing
its claims against Defendant was to obtain monetary compensation for
consequential damages resulting from the defect in Defendant’s product, in
violation of numerous warranties. See Complaint, ECF No. 1 at 17-18; Motion for
Default Judgment, ECF No. 15 at 2; Memorandum in Support of Default
Judgment, ECF No. 15-1 at 13; see also Kahala Royal Corp., 113 Haw. at 280, 151
P.3d at 761; Helfand v. Gerson, 105 F.3d 530, 537 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[A] plaintiff’s
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prayer for attorney fees is a significant indication that the action is in assumpsit.”).
Further, Plaintiff’s claims that sound in tort necessarily required
resolution of the breach of warranty claims. For example, Plaintiff’s negligence
and product liability claims concerned whether the RSDs had a defect in violation
of the express and implied warranties. See Complaint, ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 45, 48, 54.
The Court therefore finds that the assumpsit claims in this case were not merely
“decorative” in nature, but were “germane” to the genuine dispute litigated
between Plaintiff and Defendant. See Kona Enterprises, Inc., 229 F.3d at 884.
Additionally, even if there is doubt as to whether the action sounds in assumpsit or
in tort, there is a presumption that the case sounds in assumpsit. See Healy-
Tibbitts Const. Co. , 673 F.2d at 286. Accordingly, and absent any argument from
Defendant, the Court FINDS that this action is in the nature of assumpsit for
purposes of HRS Section 607-14.
B. Apportionment
“A court awarding attorneys’ fees pursuant to § 607-14 must
apportion the fees claimed between assumpsit and non-assumpsit claims, if
practicable.” Au v. Republic State Mortg. Co., No. CIV.11-00251 JMS, 2014 WL
770291, at *3 (D. Haw. Feb. 14, 2014) (citing Blair, 6 Haw. at 332, 31 P.3d at
189). “However, if apportionment would be impracticable because the various
claims are inextricably linked to the breach of contract, then the Court may decline
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to apportion attorneys’ fees between the claims.” Bruser v. Bank of Haw., No. CV
14-00387 LEK-RLP, 2017 WL 1534189, at *5 (D. Haw. Apr. 27, 2017); Blair, 96
Haw. at 333, 31 P.3d at 190 (“Because the negligence claim in this case was
derived from the alleged implied contract and was inextricably linked to the
implied contract claim by virtue of the malpractice suit, we hold that it is
impracticable, if not impossible, to apportion the fees between the assumpsit and
the non-assumpsit claims.”).
Judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff on all claims, including the
breach of warranty claims. As noted above, the non-assumpsit claims required
resolution of the breach of warranty claims because all claims analyze whether the
RSDs had a defect that caused danger and a shutdown of the System. Absent any
argument from Defendant, the Court FINDS that apportioning the remainder of the
claims is impracticable because they are inextricably linked to the breach of
warranty claims. See Bruser, 2017 WL 1534189, at *5; Blair, 96 Haw. at 333, 31
P.3d at 190.
C. Prevailing Party
“Section 607-14 states that reasonable attorneys’ fee[s] shall be taxed
in favor of the prevailing party against the losing party.” Au v. Funding Grp., Inc.,
933 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1270 (D. Haw. 2013). “In determining which party is the
prevailing party in complex litigation, Hawaiian courts focus on which party
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prevailed on the ‘disputed main issue.’” In re Hoopai, 581 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th
Cir. 2009) (citing Food Pantry, Ltd. v. Waikiki Bus. Plaza, Inc., 58 Haw. 606, 620,
575 P.2d 869, 879 (1978)). “The ‘disputed main issue,’ in turn, is identified by
looking to the ‘principal issues raised by the pleadings and proof in a particular
case.’” Id. (citing Fought & Co. v. Steel Eng’g & Erection, Inc., 87 Haw. 37, 53,
951 P.2d 487, 502-503 (1998)). “Thus, the ‘prevailing party’ is the party that
succeeds on the issue or issues that are (1) the ‘principal’ issues raised in the
litigation and (2) disputed by the parties.’” Id.
The Court FINDS that Plaintiff is the prevailing party because default
judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff on all claims. See Au, 933 F. Supp. 2d
at 1270 (citing MFD Partners v. Murphy, 9 Haw. App. 509, 514, 850 P.2d 713, 716
(1992) (stating that Hawaii courts have noted that “a party in whose favor
judgment is rendered by the district court is the prevailing party in that court.”)).
II. 	Attorneys’ Fees
A. Plaintiff’s Request for Attorneys’ Fees
Plaintiff requests attorneys’ fees in the amount of $27,261.50 for work
performed by counsel in litigating this matter beginning on November 8, 2024.
See Declaration of Harvey J. Lung, ECF No. 20-2 at 6, Ex. A to Motion, ECF No.
20-3 at 1.
Timekeeper 	Hours 	Hourly Rate 	Total Requested
Harvey J. Lung 	5.9 	$505.00 	$2,979.50
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David A. Imanaka 	9.5 	$240.00 	$2,280.00
Ivana P. Tran 	106.8 	$190.00 	$20,292.00
Amy S. Groves 	7.3 	$150.00 	$1,095.00
Chad A. Wago 	4.1 	$150.00 	$615.00
Total 	$27,261.502
See Declaration of Harvey J. Lung, ECF No. 20-2 at 6.
B. Reasonable Fees
HRS Section 607-14 requires that the Court determine the
reasonableness of the fees requested. See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 607-14. An award of
reasonable attorneys’ fees is generally based on the traditional “lodestar”
calculation set forth in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). See
Fischer v. SJB-P.D., Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000). A reasonable fee is
determined by multiplying (1) “the number of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation” by (2) “a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34.
i. 	Reasonable Hourly Rate
A reasonable hourly rate is determined by assessing the prevailing
market rate in the relevant community for similar work performed by attorneys of
comparable skill, experience, and reputation. See Roberts v. City of Honolulu, 938
F.3d 1020, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 2019). The relevant community is the forum in
which the district court sits. See Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973,
2 The table included in Plaintiff’s filing stated “27,261.60” as the total. Based on
the Court’s calculation, this is an error.
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979 (citing Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1997)). The Court may
also rely on its own knowledge and experience in determining a reasonable hourly
rate. See Ingram v. Oroudjian, 647 F.3d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding district
court did not abuse its discretion by relying on its own knowledge and experience
to determine reasonable hourly rate for attorney fees).
Mr. Harvey J. Lung, Esq. was admitted to practice law in Hawaii in
1981 and has been practicing law for approximately forty-four (44) years. See
Declaration of Harvey J. Lung, ECF No. 20-2 ¶ 4. He is a partner with Lung Rose
Voss & Wagnild (LRVW) and specializes in real estate and construction law. Id.
¶¶ 1, 4. He has a “Preeminent” ranking from Martindale-Hubble and is
“recognized among the Best Lawyers in Hawai’i for commercial litigation and
construction law, as published by Honolulu Magazine, Best Lawyers in America,
and Super Lawyers for construction litigation. Id. ¶ 4. He has extensive
experience litigating complex civil litigation matters and is lead counsel for this
case. Id. ¶¶ 3, 5. His regular hourly rate is $575. Id. ¶ 6. Based on the evidence
provided in support of Mr. Lung’s rate and the Court’s knowledge and experience
of the prevailing rates in the community, the Court FINDS that Mr. Lung’s rate of
$505 per hour is reasonable.
Mr. David A. Imanaka, Esq. was admitted to practice law in Hawaii in
2017 and has been practicing law for approximately eight (8) years. Id. ¶ 7. He
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practices complex commercial litigation, real estate litigation, and construction
litigation. Id. For this case, he “oversaw all aspects of LRVW’s efforts, including
reviewing and editing court submissions, supervising client communications, and
developing litigation strategy.” Id. “He also contributed to drafting the Complaint,
the Motion for Default Judgment, the present Motion, and other filings and briefs.”
Id. His usual hourly rate is $285. Id. Based on the evidence provided in support
of Mr. Imanaka’s rate and the Court’s knowledge and experience of the prevailing
rates in the community, the Court FINDS that Mr. Imanaka’s rate of $240 per hour
is reasonable.
Ms. Ivana P. Tran, Esq. was admitted to practice law in Hawaii in
2023 and has been an associate at LRVW for approximately three (3) years. Id. ¶
8. Ms. Tran also clerked for approximately two (2) years with the Honorable John
M. Tonaki in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. Id. For this
case, she “prepar[ed] initial drafts of the majority of the correspondence, legal
analyses, and court filings in this and the related Bankruptcy Matter, including . . .
the Complaint, the Motion for Default Judgment, [and] the present Motion.” Id.
Her usual hourly rate is $225. Id. Based on the evidence provided in support of
Ms. Tran’s rate and the Court’s knowledge and experience of the prevailing rates
in the community, the Court FINDS that Ms. Tran’s rate of $190 per hour is
reasonable.
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Ms. Amy Groves is a third-year law student who worked at LRVW as
a summer associate and law clerk. Id. ¶ 9. In this case, she “assisted with
discovery and drafting the initial disclosures.” Id. Based on the evidence provided
in support of Ms. Groves’ rate and the Court’s knowledge and experience of the
prevailing rates in the community, the Court FINDS that Ms. Groves’ rate of $150
per hour is reasonable.
Mr. Chad A. Wago is a paralegal at LRVW and has approximately
seven (7) years of experience as a paralegal in Hawaii. Id. ¶ 10. In this case, he
“assisted with discovery . . . by processing, reviewing, and preparing the
voluminous documents received from the client.” Id. Based on the evidence
provided in support of Mr. Wago’s rate and the Court’s knowledge and experience
of the prevailing rates in the community, the Court FINDS that Mr. Wago’s rate of
$150 per hour is reasonable.
ii. 	Hours Reasonably Expended
Plaintiff bears the burden of proving the fees requested are associated
with the relief requested and reasonably necessary to achieve the results obtained.
See Tirona v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 821 F. Supp. 632, 636 (D. Haw.
1993). Time expended on work deemed “excessive, redundant, or otherwise
unnecessary” will not be compensated. See Gates v. Duekmejian, 987 F.2d 1392,
1397 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34). The Court will further
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strike or reduce block billed entries, incomplete entries that do not provide enough
information to evaluate the legal services provided, or other entries that do not
comply with the Local Rule 54.2(f)(3):
(3) Description of Services Rendered. The party seeking
an award of fees must describe adequately the services
rendered, so that the reasonableness of the requested fees
can be evaluated. In describing such services, counsel
should 	be 	sensitive 	to 	information 	protected 	by 	the
attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product
doctrine, but must nevertheless furnish an adequate non-
privileged description of the services in question. If the
time descriptions are incomplete, or if such descriptions
fail to describe adequately the services rendered, the court
may reduce the award accordingly. For example, time
entries 	for 	telephone 	conferences 	must 	include 	an
identification of all participants and the reason for the call;
entries for legal research must include an identification of
the specific issue researched and, if possible, should
identify the pleading or document for which the research
was 	necessary; 	entries 	describing 	the 	preparation 	of
pleadings 	and 	other 	documents 	must 	include 	an
identification of the pleading or other document prepared
and the activities associated with such preparation. Block
billing is not permitted, and block billed entries may be
partially or completely excluded by the court.
Local Rule 54.2(f)(3).
The Court reviewed Plaintiff’s time entries and FINDS that all time
entries comply with Local Rule 54.2, contain sufficient detail for the Court to
evaluate the legal services provided, and are reasonable. Based on the Court’s
analysis above, and as set forth in the table below, the Court FINDS that Plaintiff
has established it is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees in the amount
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of $28,546.06.
Timekeeper 	Hours 	Rate 	Fees Requested
Harvey J. Lung 	5.9 	$505.00 	$2,979.50
David A. Imanaka 	9.5 	$240.00 	$2,280.00
Ivana P. Tran 	106.8 	$190.00 	$20,292.00
Amy S. Groves 	7.3 	$150.00 	$1,095.00
Chad A. Wago 	4.1 	$150.00 	$615.00
Sub-Total 	$27,261.50
General Excise
Tax (4.712%)
$1284.56
Reasonable
Attorneys’ Fees
$28,546.06
III. 	Costs
The Court is authorized to award costs pursuant to Section 607-14 and
FRCP Rule 54(d)(1). See Ko Olina Dev., LLC v. Centex Homes, No. CV. 09-
00272 DAE-LEK, 2011 WL 1235548, at *14 (D. Haw. Mar. 29, 2011) (citing
Fought & Co., 87 Haw. at 52, 951 P.2d at 502) (“Although Haw. Rev. Stat. § 607-
14 does not expressly authorize an award of costs in addition to attorneys’ fees,
Hawaii courts award costs pursuant to § 607-14.”)).
Plaintiff requests reimbursement of costs in the amount of $825.49 for
FedEx, PACER, the filing fee, service of process, and copies. See Memorandum
in Support of Motion, ECF No. 20-1 at 27. Absent any opposition to Plaintiff’s
request and in finding that Plaintiff’s request for costs is reasonable, the Court
RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s request for costs in the amount of $825.49 be
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granted.
IV. 	Total Recommended Award
Based on the above, the Court recommends that Plaintiff be granted
its reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount below.
Timekeeper 	Hours 	Rate 	Fees Requested
Harvey J. Lung 	5.9 	$505.00 	$2,979.50
David A. Imanaka 	9.5 	$240.00 	$2,280.00
Ivana P. Tran 	106.8 	$190.00 	$20,292.00
Amy S. Groves 	7.3 	$150.00 	$1,095.00
Chad A. Wago 	4.1 	$150.00 	$615.00
Sub-Total 	$27,261.50
General Excise
Tax (4.712%)
$1,284.56
Costs 	$825.49
Recommended
Award of Fees
and Costs
$29,371.553
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the Court FINDS and RECOMMENDS that
Plaintiff’s Motion for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Non-Taxable Costs, ECF
No. 20, be GRANTED. The Court recommends that Plaintiff be granted its
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $29,371.55.
3 This amount does not exceed 25% of the judgment awarded to Plaintiff in this
action, as required by Section 607-14. See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 607-14; Clerk’s
Judgment, ECF No. 282.
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IT IS SO FOUND AND RECOMMENDED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, January 15, 2026.
ABP Pearl Highlands LLC v. Tigo Energy, Inc.; CIVIL NO. 25-00154 JAO-WRP;
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT PLAINTIFF ABP PEARL
HIGHLANDS LLC’S MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES
AND NON-TAXABLE COSTS.
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