United States of America v. State of Hawaii

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE OF HAWAII; JOSHUA BOOTH
GREEN, Governor of the State of
Hawaii, in his official
capacity; ANNE E. LOPEZ, in her
official capacity as Attorney
General of the State of Hawaii,
Defendants.
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Civ. No. 25-00179 HG-WRP
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
(ECF No. 22)
On April 30, 2025, Plaintiff United States of America
(“Plaintiff United States”) filed a Complaint in the United
States District Court for the District of Hawaii. The Complaint
was filed against the following Defendants:
(1) the State of Hawaii;
(2) Governor of the State of Hawaii Joshua Booth Green, in
his official capacity; and
(3) Attorney General of the State of Hawaii Anne E. Lopez,
in her official capacity
(“State of Hawaii Defendants”).
The Complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief.
Plaintiff United States seeks to prevent the State of Hawaii
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Defendants from suing private fossil fuel entities in Hawaii
State Court.
On May 1, 2025, the day after Plaintiff United States filed
its Complaint here, the State of Hawaii filed a lawsuit against
various private fossil fuel entities in Hawaii State Court: State
of Hawaii, ex rel. Anne E. Lopez, Attorney General v. BP P.L.C.
et. al., 1CCV-25-0000717, Circuit Court of the First Circuit,
State of Hawaii.
In the case before this Court, the State of Hawaii
Defendants have filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
The State of Hawaii Defendants argue that Plaintiff United States
lacks standing to bring this lawsuit in Federal Court.
Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No.
22) is GRANTED.
The Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 30, 2025, Plaintiff United States filed the
Complaint before this Court. (ECF No. 1).
On May 1, 2025, the State of Hawaii filed a lawsuit against
various private fossil fuel entities in Hawaii State Court in
State of Hawaii, ex rel. Anne E. Lopez, Attorney General v. BP
P.L.C. et. al., 1CCV-25-0000717, Circuit Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii. (State Court Complaint, ECF No. 22-2).
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On July 25, 2025, the State of Hawaii Defendants filed a
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in the case before this
Court. (ECF No. 22).
On July 28, 2025, this Court issued a briefing schedule in
response to the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (ECF No.
23).
On August 22, 2025, Plaintiff United States filed a Motion
for Extension of Time to File Response. (ECF No. 25).
On the same date, the State of Hawaii Defendants filed an
Objection to the Motion for Extension of Time. (ECF No. 26).
On August 23, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff United
States’ Motion for Extension of Time. (ECF No. 27).
On September 24, 2025, Plaintiff United States filed its
Opposition to the State of Hawaii Defendants’ Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings. (ECF No. 29).
On October 22, 2025, the State of Hawaii Defendants filed
their Reply. (ECF No. 30).
On November 6, 2025, the Court issued a Minute Order
requesting briefing as to the impact the federal government
shutdown had on the proceedings in the case. (ECF No. 31).
On November 21, 2025, Plaintiff United States filed its
Response. (ECF No. 33).
Also on November 21, 2025, the State of Hawaii Defendants
filed their Response. (ECF No. 34).
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On November 24, 2025, the Court set a hearing on the Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings for January 27, 2026. (ECF No.
35).
On January 22, 2026, the Court issued a Minute Order stating
that it would be requiring additional briefing from both Parties
and vacating the hearing set for January 27, 2026. (ECF No. 37).
On January 26, 2026, the State of Hawaii Defendants filed a
Notice of Supplemental Authorities. (ECF No. 38).
On February 11, 2026, the Court issued a Minute Order
requiring briefing on five separate issues. (ECF No. 39).
On February 25, 2026, Plaintiff United States filed its
Supplemental Brief. (ECF No. 40).
On March 12, 2026, the State of Hawaii Defendants filed
their Supplemental Brief. (ECF No. 42).
The Court elects to decide the matter without a hearing
pursuant to District of Hawaii Local Rule 7.1(c).
BACKGROUND
The Complaint before the Court alleges that on April 28,
2025, the State of Hawaii announced its intention to file a
lawsuit against private fossil fuel entities. (Complaint at ¶¶
4, 14, ECF No. 1).
On April 30, 2025, prior to any lawsuit being filed by the
State of Hawaii, Plaintiff United States filed a Complaint in
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this Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent
the State of Hawaii from suing private fossil fuel entities.
(Complaint, ECF No. 1).
In its Complaint, Plaintiff United States acknowledged that
the “specific theories on which [the State of] Hawaii would sue
[the private fossil fuel entities] are known only to [the State
of] Hawaii.” (Id. at ¶ 14).
Plaintiff United States’ Complaint requests that this Court
grant it equitable relief in order to:
(1) prevent the State of Hawaii from proceeding with a
lawsuit against private entities in Hawaii State
Court,
(2) declare that any of the claims brought by the
State of Hawaii against the private entities are
unconstitutional, and
(3) award the United States its costs and
disbursements for filing the action.
(Id. at p. 31).
On May 1, 2025, the day after Plaintiff United States filed
its Complaint in this Court, the State of Hawaii did file a
lawsuit in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii, against various private fossil fuel entities.1
See State of Hawaii, ex rel. Anne E. Lopez, Attorney	1
General v. BP P.L.C.; BP America Inc.; BP Products North America
Inc.; Chevron Corp.; Chevron USA Inc.; Exxon Mobil Corp.;
ExxonMobil Oil Corporation; Shell P.L.C.; Shell USA, Inc.;
Equilon Enterprises LLC d/b/a Shell Oil Products US; Shell
Trading (US) Company; Sunoco LP; Aloha Petroleum, Ltd.; Aloha
Petroleum LLC; ConocoPhillips; ConocoPhillips Company; Phillips
66; Phillips 66 Company; Woodside Energy Hawaii Inc. f/k/a BHP
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On July 25, 2025, the State of Hawaii Defendants filed a
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, seeking judgment in their
favor in the case before this Court.
The State of Hawaii Defendants argue that Plaintiff United
States lacks standing to bring the suit in this Court.
Defendants assert the Complaint contains no concrete injury-in-
fact. Defendants also argue that any of the alleged harm to the
United States is not caused by conduct of the Defendants.
The State of Hawaii Defendants alternatively request that
the Court abstain from adjudicating the case pursuant to the
abstention doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) permits a party to
move for judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are
closed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A motion brought pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) is subject to the same standard of review
that would be employed had the motion been brought prior to the
defendant’s answer pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). Dworkin v.
Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989);
see Ryan v. Salisbury, 382 F.Supp.3d 1031, 1046-47 (D. Haw.
Hawaii Inc.; American Petroleum Institute; and DOES 1-100,
Inclusive, 1CCV-25-0000717, Circuit Court of the First Circuit,
State of Hawaii; State Court Complaint attached as Ex. A to
Def.’s Motion, ECF No. 22-2.
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2019).
A motion for judgment on the pleadings that challenges
standing pursuant to Article III of the United States
Constitution implicates subject-matter jurisdiction under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(1). See Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067
(9th Cir. 2011); Stoutt v. Travis Credit Union, 512 F.Supp.3d
1048, 1050 (E.D. Cal. 2021).
Challenges to Article III standing are properly subject to
the Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) standard because standing pertains
to the federal courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction even when
raised as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Chandler v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Inc. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir.
2010); see Nakajima v. Munakata, Civ. No. 20-00052 JMS-RT, 2021
WL 4944343, *1 (D. Haw. Oct. 22, 2021).
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), a court must dismiss
claims over which it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, including
claims for which a plaintiff lacks Article III standing.
Chandler, 598 F.3d at 1121-22.
A plaintiff has the burden of proving that subject-matter
jurisdiction exists. Thornhill Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Gen. Tel. &
Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). The Court must
dismiss any claims for which it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); Leeson v.
Transamerica Disability Income Plan, 671 F.3d 969, 975 (9th Cir.
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2012).
A challenge to the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction may
be “facial or factual.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d
1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). The State of Hawaii Defendants raise
a facial attack in their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
In a facial attack, the party challenging jurisdiction argues
that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient
“on their face” to invoke federal jurisdiction. Id. A facial
challenge therefore mirrors a traditional motion to dismiss
analysis. The Court must take all allegations contained in the
pleading “to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in [its]
favor.” Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004).
ANALYSIS
The United States of America (“Plaintiff United States”) has
filed a Complaint against the State of Hawaii, its Governor, and
its Attorney General (“State of Hawaii Defendants”).
Plaintiff United States’ Complaint seeks to prevent the
State of Hawaii Defendants from suing private entities in Hawaii
State Court.
The State of Hawaii Defendants argue that Plaintiff United
States lacks standing to request a federal court to issue an
order that would enjoin a State from suing private entities in
its own courts.
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I. ARTICLE III OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION LIMITS THE
FEDERAL COURT’S JURISDICTION
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the
jurisdiction of the federal courts to “Cases” and
“Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see Murthy v.
Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 56 (2024). The “case or controversy”
requirement is fundamental to the judiciary’s role in our system
of government. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997).
Article III standing serves to prevent the judicial process from
being used to usurp the powers of the political branches.
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013).
The federal court’s “role is neither to issue advisory
opinions nor to declare rights in hypothetical cases, but to
adjudicate live cases or controversies consistent with the powers
granted to the judiciary.” Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights
Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The party
seeking to invoke the federal court’s jurisdiction bears the
burden of demonstrating standing pursuant to Article III of the
Constitution. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016)
(“Spokeo I”) (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231
(1990)).
II. A CHALLENGE TO ARTICLE III STANDING IS A CHALLENGE TO THE
FEDERAL COURT’S SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION
The State of Hawaii Defendants have filed a Motion for
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Judgment on the Pleadings. The Defendants’ Motion argues that
there is no live case or controversy before the Court.
Defendants characterize Plaintiff United States’ allegations of
future harm, based on the State of Hawaii’s intention to file a
lawsuit against private entities, as abstract, conjectural, and
hypothetical. Defendants assert that Plaintiff lacks Article III
standing to bring the lawsuit before this Court.
The State of Hawaii Defendants’ Motion challenging standing
is analyzed under the 12(b)(1) standard for a motion to dismiss
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Maya v. Centex Corp.,
658 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011); 5C Charles Alan Wright &
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1367 (4th ed.
2008).
Defendants’ Motion presents a facial attack to Article III
standing. In analyzing a facial challenge to standing, the Court
must accept as true all material allegations of the Complaint.
Maya, 658 F.3d at 1068. The Court may also consider any
documents either attached to or incorporated in the Complaint.
See Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139-40,
1141 n.5 (9th Cir. 2003). It is within the trial court’s power
to require the plaintiff to supply, by amendment to the complaint
or by affidavits, further particularized allegations of fact to
support a plaintiff’s basis for standing. Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 501-02 (1975).
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The plaintiff must “clearly” allege facts demonstrating each
element of Article III standing. Spokeo I, 578 U.S. at 338.
Conclusory and vague allegations are insufficient to plead
standing. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888
(1990) (“Lujan I”) (disregarding conclusory allegations of
standing in supporting affidavit); Carrico v. City & Cnty. of San
Fran., 656 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding conclusory
allegations are insufficient to establish standing).
III. ARTICLE III STANDING REQUIRES INJURY-IN-FACT
The existence of standing turns on the facts as they existed
at the time the plaintiff filed the complaint. Skaff v. Meridien
N. Am. Beverly Hills, LLC, 506 F.3d 832, 838 (9th Cir. 2007).
In order to establish standing, the plaintiff must show that
it has suffered, or will suffer an injury-in-fact:
(1) that is concrete, particularized, and actual
or imminent;
(2) that was likely caused by the defendant; and
(3) that would likely be redressed by judicial
relief.
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (“Lujan
II”).
A. Standing: Injury-In-Fact
1. Concrete, Particularized Injury
An injury is concrete when it has a close relationship to
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a harm that is traditionally recognized as providing a basis for
suit. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 424 (2021)
(citing Spokeo I, 578 U.S. at 341). Certain harms readily
qualify as injuries under Article III. Id. at 425. “The most
obvious are traditional tangible harms, such as physical harms
and monetary harms.” Id. If a defendant is alleged to have
caused a particularized physical or monetary injury to the
plaintiff, the plaintiff has suffered a concrete injury-in-fact
under Article III. Id.
Various intangible harms have also been determined to be
concrete for purposes of Article III standing. See Spokeo I, 578
U.S. at 340-41. Those harms include reputational harms, harms
traceable to the disclosure of private information, and harms
such as violations of an individual’s right to free speech or
free exercise. TransUnion LLC, 594 U.S. at 425.
The United States Supreme Court has recently clarified that
Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the
context of an alleged violation of a federal law or statute.
Spokeo I, 578 U.S. at 340. A plaintiff does not automatically
satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a plaintiff
alleges that a statute grants the plaintiff a right and
authorizes the plaintiff to vindicate that right. Robins v.
Spokeo, Inc. (“Spokeo II”), 867 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2017);
Dutta v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 895 F.3d 1166, 1173-74
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(9th Cir. 2018) (explaining that “the plausible pleading of a
flat out violation of a statutory provision will not necessarily”
constitute an injury-in-fact as required for Article III
standing).
An injury-in-fact must be particularized in order to
establish Article III standing. An injury is particularized if
it affects the plaintiff in a “personal and individual way.”
Spokeo I, 587 U.S. at 339.
2. Actual Or Imminent Injury
An injury is actual or imminent where there is a credible
threat that a harm will materialize. Nat. Res. Def. Council v.
U.S. EPA, 735 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 2013). A plaintiff seeking
injunctive relief must demonstrate a likelihood of substantial
and immediate irreparable injury in order to establish standing.
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983). An injury
is generally not imminent if it is contingent on a series of
future events. FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U.S.
367, 381 (2024). Imminence requires the injury to be “certainly
impending” and allegations of theoretical future injury are not
sufficient to establish standing. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409.
B. Standing: The Complaint Does Not Allege A Concrete
Injury-In-Fact
The Complaint does not claim Plaintiff United States
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suffered an injury-in-fact in the past. Rather, the Complaint
requests declaratory and injunctive relief against the State of
Hawaii Defendants for an abstract, theoretical future harm.
On April 28, 2025, the State of Hawaii announced an
intention to file a lawsuit against private fossil fuel entities.
(Complaint at ¶ 14, ECF No. 1). Two days after the announcement,
on April 30, 2025, the United States filed the Complaint here
alleging that the United States may be injured if the State of
Hawaii files the lawsuit against private fossil fuel entities and
prevails.
An injury-in-fact must be concrete, meaning that it must be
real and not abstract. All. for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U.S.
at 381. The United States has not alleged a concrete injury-in-
fact. The State of Hawaii Defendants’ April 28, 2025
announcement that they intended to sue private fossil fuel
entities in state court does not amount to concrete harm to the
United States.
1. Conclusory Allegations Are Insufficient To Confer
A Party With Article III Standing
The United States argues that “notice pleading” applies and
that it may rely on conclusory allegations to establish standing.
(See Pl.’s Supplemental Brief at p. 7, asserting “the Complaint
clearly passes the low bar for notice pleading,” ECF No. 40).
The threshold question of whether plaintiff has standing is
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distinct from the merits of the claim. As a result, the
plausibility standard for pleading set forth in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) does not apply to a standing
analysis. Maya, 658 F.3d at 1068 (explaining that Twombly and
Iqbal are ill-suited to application in the constitutional
standing context).
At the pleading stage, the plaintiff must clearly allege
facts demonstrating each element of standing. Spokeo I, 578 U.S.
at 338.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has clarified that a
plaintiff cannot rely on legal conclusions or threadbare
allegations to establish standing. Maya, 658 F.3d at 1068
(citing Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 954-
55 & n.9 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) and United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669,
689-90 (1973)).
The Complaint’s allegations here assert a legal conclusion
that the United States’ “sovereignty” will be injured if the
State of Hawaii sues third parties in state court. The Complaint
hypothesizes that any state law tort claim would be preempted by
federal law. The Complaint also contains conclusory allegations
that the State of Hawaii’s announcement of an intention to file a
lawsuit against third parties may affect United States commerce
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or its energy policy.
The Complaint does not describe any concrete injury. See
Lujan I, 497 U.S. at 888. As the State of Hawaii Defendants
point out, the “United States does not identify any lessee that
would avoid entering any oil or gas lease, any foreign nation
that would alter its relations with the United States, or any EPA
regulation that would be undermined if the State [of Hawaii]
prevails.” (Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Memo. at p. 15,
ECF No. 22-1).
The United States’ injury-in-fact allegations are merely
legal conclusions that are not entitled to a presumption of truth
at the pleading stage. Daniel v. Nat’l Park Serv., 891 F.3d 762,
765 (9th Cir. 2018). Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations are
insufficient to confer the United States with standing. Lujan I,
497 U.S. at 888 (holding that neither conclusory allegations nor
conclusory affirmations are sufficient to confer a party with
standing).
2. The United States’ Theory Of Harm Is Speculative
The Complaint’s theory of harm is premised on a yet-to-be-
filed lawsuit by the State of Hawaii against private entities.
The Complaint does not challenge a law or regulation that was
passed by the State of Hawaii legislature. Instead, the
Complaint’s theory of harm hinges on Plaintiff’s attempt to
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predict the State of Hawaii’s litigation theories and tactics in
state court.
The United States’ alleged injury depends on multiple layers
of unpredictable future events. The Complaint’s theory of harm
requires: (1) predicting the nature of the claims brought by the
State of Hawaii against unknown private fossil fuel entities; (2)
predicting that the State of Hawaii will find success in
litigation against the private entities; (3) guessing that such a
result would cause the fossil fuel entities to react in a
particular manner, and (4) hypothesizing that the reaction would
ultimately negatively impact the United States’ interests,
including harm to its commerce and future energy policy.
The allegations of such an unpredictable chain of events are
“no more than conjecture” at this time. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 108;
Lake v. Fontes, 83 F.4th 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 2023) (explaining
that conjectural allegations of potential future injuries are
insufficient to establish a real and imminent threat of harm).
The United States relies on Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000).
Stevens does not provide support for the United States’ theory
for standing. In Stevens, the United States Supreme Court ruled
that a private individual could bring a qui tam action pursuant
to the False Claims Act on behalf of the United States where he
alleged a concrete, tangible harm to the United States. Id. at
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787-88. The plaintiff there alleged that the Vermont Agency of
Natural Resources submitted false claims to the United States
Environmental Protection Agency in connection with various
federal grant programs. Id. at 770. The allegation was that the
Vermont Agency had overstated the amount of time spent by its
employees on the federally funded projects and caused the United
States to overpay for the projects. Id.
The United States Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff had
standing to bring a qui tam action on behalf of the United States
because he alleged an injury-in-fact. Id. The plaintiff in
Stevens provided sufficient allegations to assert a False Claims
Act violation. The plaintiff established concrete injuries to
the United States based on clear allegations that the State
program defrauded the United States Environmental Protection
Agency which caused monetary harm to the United States. Id. at
771-72.
Stevens does not provide support for the United States’
theory in this case. There is no False Claims Act violation
alleged here. Unlike in Stevens, there is no past monetary
injury to the United States to provide a concrete injury-in-fact.
The Complaint in this case relies on hypothetical
allegations that the United States may be injured in the future.
The Complaint’s attempt to predict the outcome of a yet-to-be-
filed lawsuit and how it could possibly injure the federal
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government in the future is not a concrete injury-in-fact. See
Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Cnty. of Delaware, Pa., 968 F.3d 264, 270
(3d. Cir. 2020) (finding that plaintiff lacked standing even if
plaintiff could show that a lawsuit was certainly impending,
because it failed to establish that such a lawsuit would cause a
concrete injury to its constitutional rights); see also Bates v.
Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 445 (2005).
IV. ARTICLE III STANDING REQUIRES THE INJURY-IN-FACT BE
CAUSED BY DEFENDANT’S CONDUCT
The Complaint alleges that the potential Hawaii State Court
lawsuit will cause the United States injury in the future.
A. Causation
A plaintiff must establish that the injury-in-fact was
caused or will likely be caused by the defendant’s conduct.
Lujan II, 504 U.S. at 561-62. Causation is not traceable to the
defendant when an injury is contingent upon the decisions of
multiple third party or independent actors in the casual chain.
Missouri ex rel. Koster v. Harris, 847 F.3d 646, 654 (9th Cir.
2017).
Causation cannot be too speculative or attenuated. Clapper,
568 U.S. at 413-14. The United States Supreme Court has
explained that it is difficult for a plaintiff to establish
standing when the complaint challenges regulation of third
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parties, rather than the regulation of the plaintiff itself. Id.
The plaintiff must demonstrate that the government regulation of
a third party will ultimately result in injury to the plaintiff.
All. for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U.S. at 383.
The causation requirement is central to the Article III
standing analysis because without it the courts would be
“virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of
government action.” Id. at 383-84.
B. Plaintiff’s Theory Of Causation Is Premised On
Unpredictable Actions By Independent, Third Parties
The Complaint here does not establish causation. The United
States merely relies on a highly attenuated chain of
possibilities in its attempt to assert an injury-in-fact.
Clapper, 568 U.S. at 410.
There is no basis in the Complaint to find that a potential
lawsuit by the State of Hawaii against fossil fuel entities would
predictably result in harm to the United States. See Kumar v.
Koester, 131 F.4th 746, 751, 753 (9th Cir. 2025). There is no
predictable causal link of injury directly to the United States.
Potential litigation between the State of Hawaii and private
fossil fuel entities would not require the United States to do
anything or to refrain from doing anything. See Ohio Forestry
Assn., Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998).
The Complaint contains no timeline as to when the injury may
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manifest. It is unclear which federal government agencies may be
potentially affected. Courts cannot presume to predict how
government officials might exercise their discretion in the
future. G.B. v. U.S. EPA, __ F.4th __, 2026 WL 959839, *9 (9th
Cir. Apr. 9, 2026) (citing ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605,
614-15 (1989)).
The Complaint’s theory of causation is based on a highly
attenuated chain of possibilities that is dependent on decisions
of third parties and independent actors. California v. Texas,
593 U.S. 659, 680 (2021); see Dept. of Commerce v. New York, 588
U.S. 752, 768 (2019).
The United States also asserts vague theories that the State
Court lawsuit may ultimately hurt consumers. The United States’
allegations based on potential harm to its citizens are similarly
too abstract and conjectural to confer the United States with
standing. See Table Bluff Reservation (Wiyot Tribe) v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 256 F.3d 879, 885 (9th Cir. 2001).
V. ARTICLE III STANDING REQUIRES THAT THE INJURY BE
REDRESSABLE BY THE COURT
Article III standing requires the plaintiff to establish
that it is likely, as opposed to speculative, that a favorable
decision by the court will be able to redress the injury-in-fact
alleged in the complaint. Lujan II, 504 U.S. at 561.
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A. Plaintiff Has Not Established That The Federal Court
Has The Ability To Grant The Relief Requested
A plaintiff must establish standing to seek each form of
relief requested in a complaint. Town of Chester v. Laroe Ests.,
Inc., 581 U.S. 433, 434 (2017). The Complaint here requests two
extraordinary remedies.
First, Plaintiff requests declaratory relief. Plaintiff
requests that the Court declare that the State of Hawaii
Defendants’ potential state lawsuit violates the United States
Constitution. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly
held that declaratory relief of that nature is not redressable
absent further court action. See Juliana v. United States, 947
F.3d 1159, 1170 (9th Cir. 2020). A declaratory judgment may be
persuasive to those whose rights are declared, but unlike an
injunction, declaratory relief is not ultimately coercive and
does not support a finding of redressability as required for
standing. G.B., __ F.4th __, 2026 WL 959839, at *13, n.13
(citing Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 471 (1974)).
Second, Plaintiff requests injunctive relief. The United
States requests that the federal court enjoin the Hawaii State
Court system from allowing a yet-to-be-filed suit against third
parties to proceed. The United States has not cited a single
case where a federal court has granted injunctive relief to halt
a state court lawsuit against a third party because a potential
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jury verdict on state law tort claims could hypothetically cause
the United States injury.
The State of Hawaii Defendants cite to United States v.
Michigan,___ F.Supp.3d ___, 2026 WL 194031, *12 (W.D. Mich. Jan.
24, 2026). In Michigan, the federal district court ruled that
the United States did not have standing to attempt to prevent the
State from suing private fossil fuel entities in its own state
court system. Id.
Federal courts sitting in equity generally do not interfere
with pending state court litigation. The firmly established
principle is that state and federal courts do “not interfere with
or try to restrain each other’s proceedings. That rule has
continued substantially unchanged to this time.” Donovan v. City
of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 412 (1964). Both the States and the
Federal Government are sovereign entities and basic concerns of
federalism counsel against interference by federal courts with
the operation of state courts. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S.
434, 441 (1977). There is a strong, longstanding policy against
federal intervention in state judicial processes. Moore v. Sims,
442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979).
The United States has not demonstrated that its alleged
injury-in-fact is redressable. Principles of equity, comity, and
federalism prevent a federal court from enjoining a state court
proceeding when the plaintiff’s sole allegations of harm are that
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the state court proceeding may cause speculative, abstract
injuries. See O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499 (1974).
B. The United States’ General Objection To The State Of
Hawaii’s Litigation Decisions Is Not Redressable By
This Court
The United States’ objection to the State of Hawaii’s
decision to sue third parties in Hawaii State Court is not
redressable by this Court. Under Plaintiff’s theory, the United
States would have standing to prevent any state court lawsuit
against a private entity so long as the United States alleges
that the litigation might interfere with the goals of the
Executive Branch. Such conclusory allegations are insufficient
to establish standing.
Article III standing requires a concrete injury that is
redressable by the Court in order to prevent a plaintiff from
bringing a case where it has only a “general legal, moral,
ideological, or policy objection to a particular government
action.” All. for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U.S. at 382 (citing
Valley Forge Christian College v. Am. United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 487 (1982)). The Court
cannot issue advisory opinions about speculative harm. Aetna
Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241
(1937) (explaining that federal courts may not issue opinions
advising what the law would be based upon hypothetical facts).
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The United States’ abstract, theoretical concerns do not
satisfy the concrete harm requirement for Article III standing.
Pierce v. Ducey, 965 F.3d 1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 2020). A
plaintiff’s interest in seeing that the law is obeyed is not
concrete. Id. (citing FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998)).
The United States has failed to meet its burden to establish
standing. Spokeo I, 578 U.S. at 338. The Court does not address
the State of Hawaii Defendants’ arguments related to Younger
abstention because the Court finds that the United States lacks
standing.
Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No.
22) is GRANTED.
VI. POST-FILING EVENTS DO NOT AFFECT THE COURT’S STANDING
ANALYSIS
As explained above, the existence of standing turns on the
facts as they existed at the time the plaintiff filed the
complaint. Skaff, 506 F.3d at 838. Post-filing events may
implicate the related doctrines of mootness or ripeness but
generally do not affect standing at the time the complaint was
filed. Clark v. City of Lakewood, 259 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir.
2001); see San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. U.S. Dept. of
the Interior, 905 F.Supp.2d 1158, 1169 (E.D. Cal. 2012).
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A. The United States Relies On Post-Filing Events In Its
Opposition To Defendants’ Motion For Judgment On The
Pleadings
On April 28, 2025, the State of Hawaii announced its
intention to file a lawsuit against private fossil fuel entities.
The Complaint before the Court here was filed on April 30, 2025.
(ECF No. 1). The following day, on May 1, 2025, the State of
Hawaii filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit,
State of Hawaii, against various private fossil fuel entities.
See State of Hawaii, ex rel. Anne E. Lopez, Attorney General v.
BP P.L.C., et al., 1CCV-25-0000717.
The State of Hawaii Defendants filed their Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings on July 25, 2025. (ECF No. 22).
Plaintiff’s Opposition was filed on September 24, 2025.
(ECF No. 29). The United States’ Opposition repeatedly refers to
the May 1, 2025 State Court Complaint. (See Pl.’s Opp. at pp. 5,
7-16, ECF No. 29).
Plaintiff’s reliance on the State Court Complaint is
misplaced. It is well-established that post-filing events that
did not exist at the time of the filing of the complaint must be
disregarded for purposes of analyzing standing. Clark, 259 F.3d
at 1006. An injury that has not yet happened cannot be part of
the legal harm alleged in the complaint. Id.; see 13A Charles
Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §
3531 (4th ed. 2008). A court must dismiss a complaint if the
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plaintiff lacked Article III standing at the time the complaint
was filed. Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir.
2004).
B. Plaintiff Declined The Opportunity For Leave To Amend
The Complaint
On February 11, 2026, the Court ordered additional briefing
on the issues raised in the filings related to the Defendants’
Motion. (Minute Order dated Feb. 11, 2026, ECF No. 39). The
Court specifically inquired if the United States would seek leave
to amend the Complaint given that Plaintiff’s Opposition
repeatedly relied on the May 1, 2025 State Court Complaint.
(Id.)
Plaintiff was clearly aware of the contents of the May 1,
2025 State Court Complaint when it filed its Supplemental Brief
on February 25, 2026, and declined the opportunity for leave to
amend its Federal Court Complaint. (Pl. Supp. Brief at p. 6-10,
ECF No. 40).
A District Court generally affords a plaintiff leave to
amend when a defendant successfully challenges a plaintiff’s
standing at the pleading stage. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 501.
Here, Plaintiff has declined to the opportunity to amend its
Complaint. There is no basis to provide Plaintiff with another
opportunity for leave to amend. See G.B., __ F.4th __, 2026 WL
959839, at *14-*15.
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C. The May 1, 2025 State Court Complaint Does Not Alter
The Standing Analysis
The Court considers the United States’ reliance on the May
1, 2025 State Court Complaint for purposes of completeness and to
avoid additional litigation. Even if considered, the May 1, 2025
Hawaii State Court Complaint does not provide Plaintiff United
States with standing in this case.
First, the United States’ Complaint attempted to predict the
nature of the State of Hawaii’s lawsuit against private fossil
fuel entities. The United States predicted that the Defendants’
State Court Action would attempt to regulate greenhouse gases and
interstate pollution. The Hawaii State Court Complaint, however,
brings various Hawaii state law tort claims that center on
advertising injuries. Specifically, the State Court Complaint
alleges tortious and deceptive conduct against fossil fuel
entities in marketing their products.
The State of Hawaii’s Complaint relies on a decision from
the Hawaii Supreme Court in City & Cnty. of Honolulu v. Sunoco
LP, 537 P.3d 1173, 1193 (Haw. 2023), cert. denied, 145 S.Ct. 1111
(2025). In Sunoco LP, the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that a
lawsuit brought by the City and County of Honolulu against oil
and gas companies alleging various Hawaii state law tort claims
arising from the entities’ alleged deceptive marketing about the
dangers and environmental impact of using fossil fuel products
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“does not seek to regulate emissions or curb energy production.”
Id.
The allegations in the United States’ Complaint here did not
correctly predict the nature of the state law tort claims alleged
against the fossil fuel entities. The actual causes of action in
the Hawaii State Court Complaint do not provide any support for
this Court to find that the United States has standing in this
case.
Second, even considering the May 1, 2025 State Court
lawsuit, Plaintiff United States’ standing argument remains
speculative, attenuated, and based on conjecture. The fact the
lawsuit was actually filed does not alter the Court’s evaluation.
Plaintiff United States’ theory of harm is based on a series of
abstract harms and contingencies about hypothetical actions third
parties may take if the State of Hawaii is ultimately successful
in the state tort lawsuit. The long chain of contingencies is
too speculative and attenuated to establish Article III standing.
All. for Hippocratic Medicine, 602 U.S. at 383; Clapper, 568 U.S.
at 413. Plaintiff has failed to articulate a concrete injury-in-
fact caused by the State of Hawaii Defendants that is redressable
by this Court.
The Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
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CONCLUSION
Defendants State of Hawaii, Governor Green, and Attorney
General Lopez’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 22)
is GRANTED.
The Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The Clerk of Court is ORDERED to enter Judgment in favor of
the Defendants and to CLOSE THE CASE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 15, 2026, Honolulu, Hawaii.
United States of America v. State of Hawaii; Joshua Booth Green,
Governor of the State of Hawaii, in his official capacity; Anne
E. Lopez, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the
State of Hawaii, Civ. No. 25-00179 HG-WRP; ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS (ECF No. 22)
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