Hoosier v. City of Honolulu

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAI‘I
KALEB ALEXANDER HOOSIER,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU,
Defendant.
Case No. 25-cv-00312-DKW-KJM
ORDER GRANTING IN PART
DEFENDANT CITY AND
COUNTY OF HONOLULU’S
MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Kaleb Hoosier, proceeding without counsel, brings claims against
Defendant City & County of Honolulu, alleging that a City ordinance
“criminaliz[ing] sitting or lying on public sidewalks in designated areas[]” violates
federal constitutional and statutory law. 	The City moves to dismiss these claims,
arguing, among other things, that they fail to satisfy basic federal pleading standards.
Upon review of the parties’ briefing on the motion and the record generally, the
Court agrees that the Complaint fails to provide sufficient clarity as to Hoosier’s
claims and, therefore, dismissal is warranted. 	However, in part because of this lack
of clarity and Hoosier’s pro se status, leave to amend the Complaint is warranted in
order for Hoosier to attempt to correct and/or clarify the deficiencies highlighted
below.
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BACKGROUND
Hoosier’s four-page Complaint alleges as follows: Hoosier is an “unhoused
resident of Honolulu…reliant on public spaces for survival” and without “access to
adequate shelter. 	Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 9, 12. 	Between May and July 2025, Hoosier
was “cited” 10 times under Section 13-15A.2—an alleged City ordinance that
“prohibits sitting or lying on public sidewalks in designated areas, with penalties up
to $1,000 or 30 days in jail…” (referred to herein as the “Ordinance”). 	Id. at ¶¶ 11,
13. 	Perhaps up to “four” of these 10 “citations” were “dismissed for lack of
evidence….” 	Id. at ¶ 14.1
The following claims are asserted in the Complaint. 	First, violations of the
Eighth Amendment because the Ordinance’s penalties are “grossly
disproportionate” (Claim One). 	Id. at ¶¶ 23, 32.2 	Second, a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause because the Ordinance’s penalties
“shock the conscience” (Claim Two). 	Id. at ¶ 26. 	Third, a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause because the Ordinance
“disproportionately targets homeless individuals as a class” (Claim Three). 	Id. at
¶ 28. 	Fourth, a violation of Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Services of the City of New
York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), due to the City’s “failure to train” its police officers
1 Hoosier simultaneously alleges that only “three” of the 10 citations were dismissed for lack of
evidence. 	Dkt. No. 1 at 1.
2 Although Hoosier brings this as two separate claims, in light of the bases and alleged
constitutional support for the same, the Court treats the two claims as one herein.
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(Claim Four). 	Id. at ¶ 31. 	All of these claims are brought solely against the City.
The Complaint further asserts that the Ordinance is challenged “on its face and as
applied[]” and seeks declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. 	Id. at 4.
The City moves for dismissal of the Complaint, pursuant to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 8 and 12(b)(6). 	Dkt. No. 28. 	First, the City argues that the
Complaint fails to meet federal pleading standards. 	Second, the City argues that
Claim Four should be dismissed because it fails to state a claim under Monell for
failure to train. 	In opposition to the motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 29, Hoosier argues
that the Complaint satisfies both federal pleading standards and Monell. 	With the
filing of the City’s reply, Dkt. No. 32, this Order now follows.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes the Court to dismiss a complaint that fails “to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” 	Rule 12(b)(6) is read in conjunction with
Rule 8(a), which requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” 	Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). 	Pursuant to Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
“[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 	556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
In addition, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained
in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” 	Id. 	Accordingly,
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“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 	Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Rather, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” 	Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 	Factual
allegations that only permit the court to infer “the mere possibility of misconduct”
do not show that the pleader is entitled to relief as required by Rule 8(a)(2). 	Id. at
679.
When a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, leave to amend should be
given when “justice so requires.” 	Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). 	Justice does not require
leave to amend when (1) it would prejudice an opposing party, (2) it is sought in bad
faith, (3) it would unduly delay the litigation, (4) it would be futile, or (5) there has
been repeated failure to cure a deficiency. 	Abagninin v. AMVAC Chem. Corp., 545
F.3d 733, 742 (9th Cir. 2008); AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist West, Inc., 465
F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006).
DISCUSSION
Because all of Hoosier’s claims are brought against the City, the Court begins
by setting forth the legal framework for suing a municipality, such as the City, under
Section 1983.
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In Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658
(1978), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a municipality could be “sued directly
under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, the
action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy
statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by
that body’s officers” or is “visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though
such a custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official
decisionmaking channels.” 	Id. at 690-691. 	In addition, the Supreme Court has
held that a municipality can be liable under Section 1983 for a “failure to train”
when “the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons
with whom the police come into contact.” 	City of Canton v, Harris, 489 U.S. 378,
388 (1989). 	A municipality cannot be held liable under Section 1983 “solely
because it employs a tortfeasor–or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held
liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” 	Monell, 436 U.S. at 691
(emphasis in original).
As a result, a plaintiff can allege municipal liability under Section 1983 in one
of three ways. 	First, a municipality can be liable when it or a person with final
policymaking authority within the municipality expressly enacts or authorizes a
policy respecting a challenged action. 	Id. at 690; Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,
475 U.S. 469, 481-483 (1986) (“The official must also be responsible for
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establishing final government policy respecting such activity before the
municipality can be held liable.”). 	In this regard, a municipality can also be liable
when a final policymaker “ratifie[s]” a subordinate’s conduct and the basis for it.
Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, 710 F.3d 1049, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2013). 	Second, a
municipality can be liable for a custom that, although not expressly enacted, is “so
permanent and well settled” it operates with the force of law. 	Monell, 436 U.S. at
691 (quotation omitted). 	Third, a municipality can be liable for a failure to train its
employees when such failure amounts to deliberate indifference towards the rights
of its inhabitants. 	City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388. 	In addition, a plaintiff must
allege that a policy, custom, or failure to train actually caused a municipality’s
employee(s) to commit the constitutional deprivation. 	Id. at 391; Monell, 436 U.S.
at 694.
Here, Claims One, Two, and Three all allege that a City Ordinance is
unconstitutional, and, thus, implicates Monell. 	Id. at 690-691.3 	The remaining
question, for purposes of these claims, is whether the Ordinance may be
unconstitutional. 	Based upon the allegations of the Complaint, the Court agrees
3 While neither party frames Claims One through Three in the context of Monell, because the City
is the sole Defendant and Monell is the sole means with which to sue such an entity under Section
1983, as Hoosier does here, all of Hoosier’s claims, i.e., not just Claim Four, are properly
considered under Monell. 	See Ulrich v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984 (9th Cir.
2002) (explaining that “only” under Monell and its progeny may a municipality be found liable for
a constitutional violation under Section 1983).
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with the City that the same fails to meet federal pleading standards. 	Specifically,
Hoosier’s challenges to the Ordinance are unclear in various respects.
First, Hoosier alleges that the Ordinance’s penalties—a $1,000 fine or 30 days
in jail—are both excessive and cruel. 	He also alleges that the Ordinance is
challenged on its face and as applied. 	One problem with this, however, is that
Hoosier never alleges that he has, in fact, received any such fine or jail-time due to
the Ordinance. 	See Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 635 (9th Cir. 1998)
(explaining that an “as-applied challenge contends that the law is unconstitutional as
applied to the litigant’s particular … activity, even though the law may be capable of
valid application to others.”). 	Another problem is that the allegations of the
Complaint, even though liberally construed, cannot be stretched to infer that the
Ordinance’s penalties violate the Eighth Amendment in all circumstances, as
required for a valid facial challenge. 	See Ariz. Attorneys for Crim. Justice v. Mayes,
127 F.4th 105, 107 (9th Cir. 2025) (“In general, a facial challenge can succeed only
when all a statute’s applications would be unconstitutional.”). 	Rather, the
Complaint appears to allege something different: that the Ordinance is
unconstitutional as applied to the “homeless”, the “unhoused”, or to Hoosier alone.
A similar problem exists with the apparent facial challenge on Fourteenth
Amendment grounds in both Claims Two and Three.
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Second, many (if not all) of these claims rely upon conclusory assertions of
misconduct. 	For example, Hoosier alleges that the Ordinance “targets” the
homeless, represents “systematic discrimination”, and “shock[s] the conscience”.
These assertions are entirely conclusory, unsupported by any factual allegations,
and thus need not be accepted. 	See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
The same is true of Claim Four, which asserts a “failure to train” the City’s
police officers. 	The Complaint does not allege even one example of the training the
City provides (or does not provide) its officers. 	Instead, the Complaint merely
alleges that up to four of the ten alleged citations Hoosier has received under the
Ordinance were dismissed for “lack of evidence”. 	Even if true, however, without
anything more, whether a citation was dismissed has no plausible relationship to the
training (or lack thereof) provided to the City’s police officers. 	Moreover, it has
even less to do with whether the same amounts to deliberate indifference towards
Hoosier’s rights. 	See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388. 	It is unclear whether
Hoosier is bringing a “failure to train” claim or whether Claim Four is simply Claims
One through Three in disguise. 	For now, Claim Four, like the other claims, fails.
As mentioned, however, Hoosier is proceeding without counsel and this
Order represents the first occasion for the Court to apprise him of deficiencies with
the Complaint. 	Further, upon review, it is not impossible for amendment to correct
the same. 	Therefore, the Court finds leave to amend warranted under the
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circumstances here, should Hoosier choose to do so. 	If amending the Complaint,
Hoosier must state for each claim whether he is challenging the Ordinance facially
or as-applied. 	If the challenge is facial, as discussed, Hoosier must allege facts
from which a plausible inference can be drawn that the Ordinance is unconstitutional
in all circumstances. 	If the challenge is as-applied, as also discussed, Hoosier must
allege facts from which a plausible inference can be drawn that the Ordinance was
unconstitutionally applied as to his specific activity. 	In addition, in so alleging,
Hoosier may not rely upon conclusory assertions to satisfy the pleadings standard.
Instead, any claim must be premised upon alleged facts.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 28, is
GRANTED IN PART to the extent that the Complaint is DISMISSED for failure to
state a claim. 	Hoosier may have until February 3, 2026 to amend the
Complaint to the extent set forth herein. 	Should Hoosier not file a timely
amended complaint, this case will be dismissed with prejudice and without
further notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 14, 2026 at Honolulu, Hawai‘i.
___________________________
Derrick K. Watson
Chief United States District Judge
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