Meafou v. State of Hawaii et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
ISSACHAR TIMOTHY MEAFOU,
#A6005734,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE OF HAWAII, et al.,
Defendants.
CIVIL NO. 25-00460 DKW-WRP
ORDER DISMISSING SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND
ACTION
Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Issachar Meafou’s Second Amended
Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint (SAC) brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
ECF No. 19. In the SAC, Meafou alleges that nine prison officials violated his
rights by using excessive force (Count I), threatening his safety (Count II), and
denying him adequate medical care (Count III) during his pretrial detention at the
Oahu Community Correctional Center (OCCC).1 Id. at PageID.96–101. After
conducting the screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court DISMISSES
the SAC. Because the SAC suffers from the same flaws that the Court identified
1 Meafou names as defendants: (1) Adult Corrections Officer (ACO) Jeff Tai; (2) ACO Kainoa
Mallot; (3) Sergeant (Sgt.) Levi Kaakau; (4) ACO John Doe; (5) ACO Villanueva; (6) ACO
Darryl Pili; (7) ACO Larry Domingo; (8) Deputy Warden Lance Rabacal; and (9) Nurse
Matthew Huber. ECF No. 19 at PageID.89–93. Meafou names all the prison officials in their
individual capacities only. Id.
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and instructed Meafou to correct in dismissing his two earlier pleadings, the Court
finds that granting further leave to amend would be futile and is not warranted.
This dismissal is, therefore, with prejudice.
I. 	BACKGROUND
While Meafou was a pretrial detainee at OCCC, Sgt. Kaakau moved a
“known violent [security threat group] . . . member” into his cell. ECF No. 19 at
PageID.96. At some point, ACO Villanueva allowed “inmate[] communication”
that resulted in a “planned attack.” Id.
On May 22, 2025, Meafou was stabbed. Id. According to Meafou, Sgt.
Kaakau, ACO Tai, ACO Mallot, and ACO Doe “observed” the attack, but they did
not intervene. Id. During the incident, Meafou sustained stab wounds to his face,
head, and hands. Id. He also lost consciousness and experienced head trauma,
headaches, neck pain, and permanent damage to a finger. Id.
ACO Tai responded, forced Meafou to the ground, and handcuffed him. Id.
at PageID.98. According to Meafou, the handcuffs were “excessively tight.” Id.
ACO Tai proceeded to shove and pull Meafou. Id. At some point, Meafou
reported being in pain, but ACO Tai ignored him. Id. While this was happening,
ACO Pili, ACO Domingo, and Deputy Warden Rabacal were present, but they did
not intervene. Id. During this encounter, Meafou sustained injuries to his wrist,
and he aggravated a shoulder injury. Id.
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It appears that Meafou was taken to OCCC’s medical unit, where he was
seen by Nurse Huber. Id. at PageID.100. According to Meafou, Nurse Huber
“failed to properly examine or treat” him, and ACO Tai “interfered with [his]
medical treatment.” Id. Meafou was sent to the hospital on May 24, 2025, two
days after the incident. Id.
Meafou commenced this lawsuit by signing his original Complaint that the
Court received on October 27, 2025. Id. The Court dismissed the original
Complaint on December 23, 2025, ECF No. 7. In doing so, the Court provided the
applicable legal standards for Meafou’s claims as guidance for any amended
pleading. Id. at PageID.34–42.
The Court received the First Amended Complaint (FAC) on January 20,
2026, ECF No. 11, and Meafou filed a letter clarifying his claims on February 17,
2026, ECF No. 13. The Court dismissed the FAC on March 3, 2026. ECF No. 15.
The Court explained that Meafou failed to allege sufficient facts to state an
excessive force claim against ACO Tai and also failed to state a claim against the
other officers in the area based on an alleged failure to intervene. Id. at
PageID.76–79. The Court also concluded that Meafou failed to state a threat-to-
safety claim against Sgt. Kaakau and ACO Villanueva. Id. at PageID.79–81.
Finally, the Court dismissed Meafou’s medical care claims against Nurse Huber
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and ACO Tai. Id. at PageID.81–83. The Court nonetheless gave Meafou another
opportunity to cure the deficiencies in his claims. Id. at PageID.84.
The Court received the SAC on April 17, 2026. ECF No. 19. In the SAC,
Meafou again alleges that Defendants violated his rights by threatening his safety
(Count I), using excessive force (Count II), and denying him adequate medical care
(Count III). Id. at PageID.96–101. Meafou seeks unspecified damages. Id. at
PageID.62.
II. 	STATUTORY SCREENING
The Court is required to screen all prisoner pleadings against government
officials pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). See Byrd v. Phx. Police Dep’t, 885
F.3d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 2018). Claims or complaints that are frivolous, malicious,
fail to state a claim for relief, or seek damages from defendants who are immune
from suit must be dismissed. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir.
2000) (en banc); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010).
Screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) involves the same standard of review
as that used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Rosati v.
Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). Under this standard, a
complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A claim is “plausible” when the
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facts alleged support a reasonable inference that the plaintiff is entitled to relief
from a specific defendant for specific misconduct. See id.
In conducting this screening, the Court liberally construes pro se litigants’
pleadings and resolves all doubts in their favor. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338,
342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). The Court must grant leave to amend if it
appears the plaintiff can correct the defects in the complaint. See Lopez, 203 F.3d
at 1130. When a claim cannot be saved by amendment, dismissal with prejudice is
appropriate. See Sylvia Landfield Tr. v. City of Los Angeles, 729 F.3d 1189, 1196
(9th Cir. 2013).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Legal Framework for Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
“Section 1983 provides a cause of action against ‘[e]very person who, under
color of’ law deprives another of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution.’” Cornel v. Hawaii, 37 F.4th 527, 531 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 1983) (alteration in original). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a
plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States was violated; and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a
person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988);
Park v. City & County of Honolulu, 952 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2020).
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B. 	Threat to Safety
Meafou alleges in Count I that Sgt. Kaakau, ACO Villanueva, ACO Tai,
ACO Mallot, and ACO Doe threatened his safety. ECF No. 19 at PageID.96–97.
To establish a threat-to-safety claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, the
plaintiff must show that:
(1) [t]he defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the
conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (2) [t]hose
conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious
harm; (3) [t]he defendant did not take reasonable available measures
to abate that risk, even though a reasonable officer in the
circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk
involved—making the consequences of the defendant's conduct
obvious; and (4) [b]y not taking such measures, the defendant caused
the plaintiff’s injuries.
Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(formatting and footnoted omitted).
“With respect to the third element, the defendant's conduct must be
objectively unreasonable, a test that will necessarily turn on the facts and
circumstances of each particular case.” Id. (internal quotation marks, brackets, and
citations omitted). A pretrial detainee who asserts a threat-to-safety claim must
“prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to
reckless disregard.” Id.
Meafou alleges that Kaakau decided to house him with a “known violent
STG member.” ECF No. 19 at PageID.96. Again, however, Meafou has not
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alleged facts showing that ACO Kaakau’s housing decision placed him at
substantial risk of harm and that a reasonable officer would have appreciated the
risk. Like Meafou’s earlier pleadings, nothing in the SAC suggests that the other
inmate was an inherent threat to Meafou. Although Meafou describes the other
inmate as “violent,” he does not allege that the other inmate had a history of
attacking his cellmates, and, even if he did, Meafou alleges no facts suggesting that
a reasonable officer would have appreciated that the other inmate might also attack
Meafou.
To the extent Meafou alleges that ACO Villanueva “allowed inmate[]
communication that created a planned attack,” id. at PageID.96, again, Meafou
fails to allege facts demonstrating a substantial risk of harm that a reasonable
officer would have appreciated. Meafou does not say who was allowed to
communicate or how a reasonable officer would have recognized that such
communication would result in an attack on Meafou.
Finally, regarding Meafou’s claim that Sgt. Kaakau, ACO Tai, ACO Mallot
and ACO Doe threatened his safety by observing the attack and failing to respond,
id., he fails to say how any of these officers acted with anything close to reckless
disregard. Indeed, later in the SAC, Meafou acknowledges that ACO Tai
responded to the attack, albeit using allegedly excessive force. Id. at PageID.98.
Nothing suggests that ACO Tai’s response time was anything close to reckless, nor
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has Meafou alleged facts demonstrating that any of the other officers violated his
rights, given ACO Tai’s response. Meafou’s threat-to-safety claims in Count I are
DISMISSED.
C. 	Excessive Force
Meafou alleges in Count II that ACO Tai used excessive force while
responding to the attack, and that ACO Pili, ACO Domingo, Deputy Warden
Rabacal were “present during the incident [and] . . . failed to respond.” Id. at
PageID.98.
The Supreme Court has stated that “the appropriate standard for a pretrial
detainee’s excessive force claim is solely an objective one.” Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015). Under this standard, “a pretrial detainee
must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was
objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 396–97. Objective reasonableness turns on the
facts and circumstances of each case. Id. at 397. Relevant considerations include,
among other things, the relationship between the need for the use of force and the
amount of force used, the extent of the plaintiff’s injury, any effort by the officer to
temper or limit the amount of force, the severity of the security problem at issue,
the threat reasonably perceived by the officer, and whether the plaintiff was
actively resisting. Id.
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Here, Meafou alleges that ACO Tai forced him to the ground, put him in
“excessively tight handcuffs,” and shoved and pulled him. ECF No. 19 at
PageID.98. Again, this is not enough to state an excessive force claim.
To the extent Meafou alleges that ACO Tai forced him to the ground,
nothing suggests that ACO Tai used excessive force in doing so. Meafou does not
say how ACO Tai forced him to the ground, nor does Meafou allege that he
suffered any injuries because of how ACO Tai did so.
Regarding the handcuffs, although Meafou alleges that the handcuffs were
“excessively tight,” he still has not alleged that ACO Tai was or should have been
aware of this fact. For example, Meafou does not allege that he was in visible
pain, that he ever specifically complained to ACO Tai about the handcuffs, that he
had and that ACO Tai was aware of a medical issue that made Meafou more
susceptible to injury from handcuffs, or that he asked ACO Tai to loosen the
restraints. Cf. Shaw v. City of Redondo Beach, No. 05-0481, 2005 WL 6117549, at
*8 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005) (“In those tight handcuffing cases in which courts
have found excessive force, the arrestee was either in visible pain, complained of
pain, alerted the officer to pre-existing injuries, sustained more severe injuries, was
in handcuffs for a longer period of time, asked to have the handcuffs loosened or
released, and/or alleged other forms of abusive conduct in conjunction with the
tight handcuffing.”).
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To the extent Meafou alleges that ACO Tai shoved and pulled him, he again
does not describe where on his body he was shoved or pulled, how many times he
was shoved or pulled, the strength of any such shoves or pulls, any resulting injury,
or how he responded. Cf. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (“That is not
to say that every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of
action.”).
Finally, because Meafou fails to state a plausible excessive force claim
against ACO Tai, his claims against ACO Pili, ACO Domingo, and Deputy
Warden Rabacal grounded on their alleged failure to intervene also cannot
proceed. See Claiborne v. Blauser, 2013 WL 1384995, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 4,
2013) (“A defendant is liable for failing to intervene only where there has been an
underlying constitutional violation warranting intervention.”), report and
recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 1963515 (E.D. Cal. May 10, 2013). Meafou’s
excessive force claims in Count II are therefore DISMISSED.
D. 	Medical Care
Meafou alleges in Count III that Nurse Huber and ACO Tai denied him
adequate medical care immediately after the incident on May 22, 2025. ECF No.
19 at PageID.100–01.
Medical care claims brought by pretrial detainees also arise under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Gordon v. County of Orange, 888
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F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2018). “[C]laims for violations of the right to adequate
medical care brought by pretrial detainees against individual defendants . . . must
be evaluated under an objective deliberate indifference standard.” Id. at 1124–25.
A pretrial detainee asserting a failure-to-provide-adequate-medical-care
claim must show that: (1) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect
to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (2) those conditions put
the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (3) the defendant did not
take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable
official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk
involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and (4)
by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Id. at
1125.
Regarding the third element, “the defendant’s conduct must be objectively
unreasonable, a test that will necessarily turn[ ] on the facts and circumstances of
each particular case.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in
original). The “mere lack of due care by a state official does not deprive an
individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment”; the
plaintiff must “prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent—
something akin to reckless disregard.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
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Meafou alleges that Nurse Huber “failed to properly examine or treat” him.
ECF No. 19 at PageID.100. This vague and conclusory allegation is insufficient to
state a claim. Although Meafou may think that Nurse Huber should have done
something differently, he still has not alleged facts showing that Nurse Huber acted
in a medically unacceptable manner under the circumstances. See Breaux v. Med.
Staff, 2024 WL 5706269, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2024).
Meafou also alleges that ACO Tai “interfered” with his treatment. ECF No.
19 at PageID.100. While interference with medical care can amount to deliberate
indifference, an inmate must also show that the interference resulted in further
injury. See Dampier v. King Cnty. Jail, 2022 WL 17655879, at *2 (W.D. Wash.
Nov. 17, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 17601166 (W.D.
Wash. Dec. 12, 2022). Like his earlier pleadings, Meafou again does not specify
how ACO Tai interfered with his medical care. In addition, Meafou does not
allege how ACO Tai’s actions resulted in further injury. Meafou’s medical care
claims are therefore DISMISSED.
IV. 	NO LEAVE TO AMEND
In general, “[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the
defect, . . . a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and
an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action.” Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr.,
66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Amina v. WMC Fin. Co., 329 F.
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Supp. 3d 1141 (D. Haw. 2018), aff’d, 812 F. App’x 509 (9th Cir. 2020). After a
district court has already granted a plaintiff leave to amend, however, its discretion
in deciding whether to grant further leave to amend is “particularly broad.”
Dreamstime.com, LLC v. Google LLC, 54 F.4th 1130, 1143 (9th Cir. 2022); see
also Snyder v. Allison, 2021 WL 3784256 (9th Cir. Aug. 26, 2021) (applying rule
to pro se prisoner).
Here, in dismissing both the original Complaint and FAC, the Court
identified numerous flaws in Meafou’s claims and provided him with a thorough
description of the relevant legal standards for his claims. Rather than correcting
the noted deficiencies in Meafou’s claims, however, the SAC includes even less
information than his previous two pleadings. Given Meafou’s inability to state a
plausible claim against any Defendant—despite guidance from the Court as to how
to do so—the Court finds that granting further leave to amend is not warranted.
See Martinez v. Villalon, 809 F. App’x 426, 427 (9th Cir. 2020) (“The district court
did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the claims in the [amended pleading]
without leave to amend because [the plaintiff] failed to cure the complaint’s
deficiencies despite the district court’s specific instructions about how to do so.”).
All of Meafou’s claims against Defendants are DISMISSED without leave to
amend.
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V. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)
Meafou is notified that this dismissal counts as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g). Under this “3-strikes” provision, a prisoner may not bring a civil action
or appeal a civil judgment in forma pauperis,
if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or
detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the
United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
VI. 	CONCLUSION
(1) The SAC, ECF No. 19, is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b).
(2) Because Meafou was unable to state a colorable claim for relief—despite
explicit guidance from the Court on how to do so—the Court finds that granting
further leave to amend is not warranted. The SAC is therefore DISMISSED
without leave to amend, and this dismissal constitutes a strike under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g).
(3) The Court CERTIFIES that an appeal from this Order would be frivolous
and, therefore, not taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d
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548, 550 (9th Cir.1977) (stating that indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP
on appeal only if appeal would not be frivolous).
(4) The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment and close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 29, 2026 at Honolulu, Hawaiʻi.
Issachar Timothy Meafou v. State of Hawaii, et al.; Civil No. 25-00460
DKW-WRP; ORDER DISMISSING SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
AND ACTION
_______________________________
Derrick K. Watson
Chief United States District Judge
/s/ Derrick K. Watson
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