USA v. Goodman

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 25-CR-1039-CJW-MAR
Plaintiff,
vs. ORDER
AUSTIN ANDREW GOODMAN,
Defendant.
_________________________
I. INTRODUCTION
A Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) by the Honorable Mark A. Roberts,
United States Magistrate Judge, recommending the Court deny defendant’s motion to
dismiss and deny defendant’s motion to suppress, is before the Court. (Doc. 44). The
government and defendant both filed objections to the R&R. (Docs. 46 & 47). For the
following reasons, the government’s objection is overruled, defendant’s objections are
overruled, the R&R is adopted, defendant’s Motion to Suppress (Doc. 39) is denied,
and defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 35) is denied as to the facial challenge and held
in abeyance as to the as-applied challenge.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a party files a timely objection to a magistrate judge’s R&R, a “judge of the
court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3) (“The district judge must consider de
novo any objection to the magistrate judge’s recommendation.”); United States v.
Lothridge, 324 F.3d 599, 600 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that a district judge must
“undertake[ ] a de novo review of the disputed portions of a magistrate judge’s [R&R]”).
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“A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also
Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3) (“The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the
recommendation, receive further evidence, or resubmit the matter to the magistrate judge
with instructions.”). It is reversible error for a district court to fail to engage in a de
novo review of a magistrate judge’s R&R when such review is required. Lothridge, 324
F.3d at 600. Accordingly, the Court reviews the disputed portions of Judge Roberts’
R&R de novo.
Any portions of an R&R to which no objections have been made must be reviewed
under at least a “clearly erroneous” standard. See, e.g., Grinder v. Gammon, 73 F.3d
793, 795 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that when no objections are filed “[the district court
judge] would only have to review the findings of the magistrate judge for clear error”).
As the Supreme Court has explained, “a finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (cleaned up) (quoting United States v. U.S.
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). A district judge may, however, elect to review
an R&R under a more exacting standard even if no objections are filed. See Thomas v.
Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 154 (1985).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Procedural History
On September 9, 2025, a grand jury returned an indictment charging defendant
with possession of a firearm by a prohibited person in violation of Title 18, United States
Code, Sections 922(g)(4) and 924(a)(8). (Doc. 3). Specifically, the government alleged
that on or about March 3, 2025, defendant knowingly possessed a Sig Saur P365 knowing
that he had previously been committed to a mental institution. (Id.). On December 5,
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2025, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. (Doc. 35). On December 8,
2025, he filed a motion to suppress requesting suppression of various items including an
Apple iPhone, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, firearms, ammunition, a Lenovo
ThinkPad, and the contents of the iPhone and ThinkPad. (Docs. 39 & 39-2). The
government filed a resistance to both motions. (Docs. 41 (resistance to motion to dismiss)
& 42 (resistance to motion to suppress)).
On December 29, 2025, Judge Roberts held a hearing on the motions. (Doc. 43).
At the hearing, the government offered Exhibits 1, 1A, 2, 2A, 3, 3A, 4, and 4A. (Docs.
42-2 through 42-9). Defendant offered Exhibits A and B in support of his motion to
dismiss and Exhibits A, B, B-1, C, C-1, D, D-1, E, and E-1 in support of his motion to
suppress. (Docs. 36-1, 36-2, and 39-3 through 39-11).
The government called Dubuque Police Officer Nicholas Schlosser as a witness.
(Doc. 43). Officer Schlosser testified that he authored four search warrants related to an
investigation of defendant. (Doc. 45, at 11–12). Officer Schlosser became involved in
investigating defendant in October 2024 when Officer Schlosser learned that defendant
was suspected of “distributing paperwork and ongoing harass[ment]” and that there was
a “cease and desist letter for [defendant] that [the City Attorney] needed us to serve.”
(Id., at 12–13). Officer Schlosser explained that defendant “had worked for [his former
employer] C.M. for some time. At one point, [defendant] was terminated. C.M.
reported that [defendant] then began harassing him.” (Id., at 20). “[O]n one occasion
[defendant] drove by yelling ‘fuck you’ at some of the employees working outside of one
of C.M’s buildings. And traffic cameras did show some employees working outside,
[defendant] driving by, slowing down.” (Id., at 20–21). In addition, “several of his
properties that [C.M.] owns, along with a property that his wife owns, where [defendant]
is -- has been served no-trespass orders on, had these documents that he had spread
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throughout the city and was giving to City councilmembers, were actually inside C.M.’s
properties.” (Id., at 21). Further,
C.M. wasn’t sure if he -- the buildings were locked, so he wasn’t sure --
he didn’t believe [defendant] may have entered them but may have slid them
under the doors. But also on [October] 28th when he arrived at work that
morning -- I believe around 9:00 a.m., C.M. did -- he found on his printer
several more of these documents that have been put all over all his
properties on his printer. C.M. then reached out to his IT person and was
able to find that on two occasions, just prior to all this being done, a laptop
computer and an iPhone had logged into the network, the Internet network,
and printed off those documents on C.M.’s printer. [Law enforcement]
then was able to go through City of Dubuque traffic cameras and found, I
believe it was, a black Jeep or a vehicle like that that ultimately was able to
read the plate that was registered to [defendant] in the area and/or right
outside the building of C.M.’s, which would be around the same time that
the server was logged into and those documents were being printed off on
Mr. -- on C.M.’s printers, which would have been being done by
[defendant].
(Id., at 21–22).
After learning this information, Officer Schlosser authored the first search warrant
application, which was for defendant’s cell phone. (Id., at 13; Doc. 39-4; Doc. 42-2).
Officer Schlosser also authored a second search warrant for “[a]ny electronic devices that
can communicate via cell service or internet and or Wi-Fi.” (Docs. 39-6 & 42-4). The
second warrant was for searching defendant’s residence for the electronic devices. (Id.).
While officers were searching defendant’s residence for electronic devices, they saw
firearms and evidence of drug use in plain view. (Doc. 45, at 14). Officer Schlosser
then authored a third search warrant to search defendant’s residence for marijuana,
controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, firearms, ammunition, and receipts for the
purchase of firearms or ammunition. (Docs. 39-8 & 42-6). Last, Officer Schlosser
authored a fourth search warrant to search two devices law enforcement seized—a Lenovo
ThinkPad and a silver Apple iPhone—for which the “[d]ates of interest are from
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09/09/2024 to 10/31/2024.” (Docs. 39-10 & 42-8). In addition to the Lenovo ThinkPad
and silver Apple iPhone, law enforcement seized marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and
firearms from defendant’s residence. (Doc. 45, at 14–15).
Officer Schlosser also described a later incident involving defendant at the
Dubuque Federal Building (“the Dubuque building”) in March 2025:
while live streaming . . . [defendant] entered the Dubuque building, along
with his two dogs. He was dressed in a suit, draped in an American flag,
with a marijuana cigarette in his ear. He also had a firearm on his hip. He
entered the Dubuque building, entered the elevator, went up to the -- I’m
trying to think if – it’s either the third or fourth floor --whichever floor the
City Council hosts their meetings, entered the floor. At which point, that’s
when he was stopped by officers before he was able to enter the chambers
of the City Council where actual meetings were in session.
(Id., at 16–17). Law enforcement also seized a firearm from defendant that day. (Id.,
at 17).
Officer Schlosser also testified that he was aware that defendant had previously
been mentally committed. (Id., at 17).
On January 9, 2026, Judge Roberts filed his R&R, recommending that the Court
deny defendant’s motion to dismiss as to defendant’s facial challenge and hold in
abeyance defendant’s as-applied challenge, and to deny defendant’s motion to suppress.
(Doc. 44). The government and defendant both filed timely objections. (Docs. 46 &
47). The government objects to the section of the R&R pertaining to the motion to
suppress only, stating that it “seeks only a small clarification to the recommendation to
deny the motion to suppress.” (Doc. 46-1, at 1–2). For that reason, the government did
“not address the recommendation regarding the motion to dismiss.” (Id., at 2 n.1).
Defendant objected to the recommendations on both the motion to dismiss and the motion
to suppress. (Doc. 47, at 1).
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Given that Judge Roberts began his analysis with the motion to dismiss and that
the issue could be dispositive, the Court begins there as well.
B. Motion to Dismiss
As stated, the government does not object to Judge Roberts’ conclusions on the
motion to dismiss. (Doc. 46-1, at 2 n.1). Defendant objects; his entire objection on this
issue is as follows: “Mr. Goodman objects to Magistrate Judge Roberts’s denial of the
facial challenge to 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(4).” (Doc. 47, at 1).
When it comes to an R&R, Local Rule 72A requires that the objecting party must
specify the parts of the R&R to which objections are made, as well providing the portions
of the record forming the basis for the objections. LR 72A; accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.
Further, objections must be specific to trigger de novo review. See Thompson v. Nix,
897 F.2d 356, 357–58 (8th Cir. 1990) (“We also remind parties that objections must be
. . . specific to trigger de novo review by the District Court of any portion of the
magistrate’s [R&R].”); see also Dormani v. Target Corp., 970 F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir.
2020) (“To be reviewable, an issue must be presented in the brief with some specificity.
That means the [objecting party] must offer more than a cursory and summary statement
of the asserted error.”).
Here, the Court finds that defendant has waived de novo review on the facial
challenge in the motion to dismiss given his failure to present his objection with sufficient
specificity. He objected generally to Judge Roberts’ final conclusion, but he did not
specify why Judge Roberts was incorrect in reaching that conclusion. He did not object
to Judge Roberts’ recommendation as to the as-applied challenge. Likewise, the
government explicitly stated that it is not challenging the recommendation on the motion
to dismiss on either challenge and thus agrees to clear error review on this issue. Thus,
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the Court will review Judge Roberts’ recommendation on the motion to dismiss for clear
error.1
Judge Roberts concluded that “[t]he facial challenge [to Section 922(g)(4)] before
me is identical to the one presented to the Court in United States v. Clark, No. 24-cr-
2056 (N.D. Iowa April 8, 2025.)” (Doc. 44, at 13). Likewise, Judge Roberts found
that “[i]n Clark, the defendant asserted the same challenges as [d]efendant herein.” (Id.).
Judge Roberts then concluded, “I see no reason to reach a different conclusion than the
Court in Clark” and recommended denying defendant’s facial challenge. (Doc. 44, at
16).
The Court concluded in Clark that Section 922(g)(4) is facially constitutional
because “this Nation’s historical tradition of disarming individuals who are both mentally
ill and dangerous is sufficiently analogous to modern regulations[.]” Clark, No. 6:24-
cr-2056, at *5. Other courts have relied on similar reasoning as in Clark to deny facial
challenges to the constitutionality of Section 922(g)(4). See United States v. Franzky,
4:23-cr-40022, 2024 WL 4494988, at *4 (D.S.D. Oct. 15, 2024) (“The long history of
the prohibition of firearms possession by those who have been determined to be mentally
ill supports the constitutionality of such a provision.”); United States v. Walker, 747 F.
Supp. 3d 1195, 1202 (D. Minn. 2024) (“The numerous examples in [United States v.
Veasley, 98 F.4th 906 (8th Cir. 2024)] of restrictions placed upon persons deemed
mentally ill during the Colonial period further supports the Court’s conclusion that the
prohibition on firearm possession in § 922(g)(4) is constitutional.”); United States v.
Gould, 672 F. Supp. 3d 167, 182–84 (S.D. W. Va. 2023) (“Thus, the societal problem
§ 922(g)(4) seeks to address is firearm violence by individuals who have been determined
to be a danger to themselves or others . . . . Accordingly, because there is a historical
1 To be sure, having reviewed the merits of the argument, the Court’s ruling affirming the R&R
would remain the same even if the Court reviewed it de novo.
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basis for disarming individuals that have been determined to be dangerous to themselves
and/or the public at large, § 922(g)(4) is constitutional on its face.”); see also In re N.S.,
13 N.W.3d 811, 831 (Iowa 2024) (stating in analyzing a challenge to Iowa Code section
724.31 “federal courts reviewing Second Amendment challenges to section 922(g)(4)’s
prohibition on firearm possession after a mental health commitment have recognized a
‘compelling’ government interest in ‘preventing crime and preventing suicide’”).
There is nothing to suggest this case requires a different conclusion than in Clark.
Thus, the Court adopts Judge Roberts’ recommendation to deny defendant’s motion to
dismiss as to the facial challenge.
Regarding defendant’s as-applied challenge, Judge Roberts recommended holding
it in abeyance until trial, again citing Clark. (Doc. 44, at 17). In Clark, the Court held
the defendant’s as-applied challenge in abeyance until trial as it found that “there are
factual issues related to the elements of the offense that must be resolved by the fact-
finder. Because those issues may not be resolved before trial, the Court cannot yet rule
on defendant’s as-applied challenge.” Clark, No. 6:24-cr-2056, at *6. The Court has
taken a similar approach to as-applied challenges to Section 922(g)(3). See United States
v. Dufauchard, No. 6:20-cr-2014, at *6 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 23, 2025); United States v.
Thurn, No. 2:24-cr-1025, at *9 (N.D. Iowa Nov. 20, 2024). The Court is not left with
a firm conviction that Judge Roberts committed a mistake in recommending the same
approach here.2
Thus, the Court finds that Judge Roberts did not clearly err in recommending that
the Court deny defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment as to the facial challenge and
holding in abeyance as to the as-applied challenge. Defendant’s objection on this issue
is overruled.
2 Again, the Court’s ruling would remain the same even under a de novo review.
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C. Motion to Suppress
Next, the Court addresses defendant’s motion to suppress. At the hearing on the
motions, the government stated that it was not seeking to admit evidence seized from
either the Lenovo ThinkPad or Apple iPhone, in other words, evidence obtained from
the first, second, or fourth warrants. (Doc. 45, at 4). Defendant agreed and added “that
what’s seeking to be suppressed is related to October and November events and not March
3rd.” (Id., at 5–6). Thus, in the R&R, Judge Roberts found that the parties’ agreement
regarding the scope of defendant’s motion to suppress had “largely moot[ed] any
arguments about all the warrants except the warrant to search for controlled substances,
firearms, and ammunition, i.e., the third warrant.” (Doc. 44, at 17). More concretely,
Judge Roberts found that any analysis of the fourth warrant was unnecessary as “law
enforcement was unable to access the devices and the [g]overnment does not intend to
offer evidence of their contents at trial.” (Doc. 44, at 31). Thus, the Court focuses its
analysis on the third warrant and whether it was supported by probable cause.
The Fourth Amendment ensures that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also
United States v. Green, 954 F.3d 1119, 1122 (8th Cir. 2020) (“Under the Fourth
Amendment, search warrants must be supported by probable cause.”). “Probable cause
exists, if under the totality of the circumstances, a showing of facts can be made sufficient
to create a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be
searched.” United States v. Johnson, 848 F.3d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 2017) (internal
quotation marks removed) (citing United States v. Wallace, 550 F.3d 729, 732 (8th Cir.
2008) (per curium)); accord United States v. Hudspeth, 525 F.3d 667, 674 (8th Cir.
2008) (“If an affidavit in support of a search warrant sets forth sufficient facts to lead a
prudent person to believe that there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
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crime will be found in a particular place, probable cause to issue the warrant has been
established.”).
Also, to be supported by probable cause a warrant must contain “evidence of a
nexus between the contraband and the place to be searched[.]” United States v. Tellez,
217 F.3d 547, 550 (8th Cir. 2000). In looking for a nexus, courts consider “the nature
of the crime and the reasonable, logical likelihood of finding useful evidence.” United
States v. Etheridge, 165 F.3d 655, 657 (8th Cir. 1999). Conclusory statements are
insufficient to demonstrate that probable cause exists. United States v. Moore, No. 25-
cr-1036-CJW, 2025 WL 3014225, at *4 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 28, 2025) (citing United States
v. Summage, 481 F.3d 1075, 1077–78 (8th Cir. 2007)).
At the same time, “probable cause is about fair probabilities, not near certainties.”
United States v. James, 3 F.4th 1102, 1105 (8th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). “[A] judge
may draw reasonable inferences from the totality of the circumstances in determining
whether probable cause exists to issue a warrant . . . [and] law enforcement officers may
make reasonable inferences in preparing affidavits in support of a warrant[.]” United
States v. Thompson, 210 F.3d 855, 860 (8th Cir. 2000). In addition to allowing for
inferences, “[a]s a reviewing court, we pay ‘great deference’ to the probable cause
determinations of the issuing judge or magistrate, and limit our inquiry to discerning
whether the issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause
existed.” United States v. Butler, 594 F.3d 955, 962 (8th Cir. 2010). Defendant bears
the burden of proving the warrant was issued without probable cause. See Carter v.
United States, 729 F.2d 935, 940 (8th Cir. 1984) (“As a general rule, the burden of proof
is on the defendant who seeks to suppress evidence[.]”).
Judge Roberts recited the entire affiant’s attachment in the third warrant in his
R&R. (Doc. 44, at 5–8). The Court does not do so here, but summarizes that the
attachment alleged that C.M. had been dealing with ongoing harassment from defendant;
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defendant had created and distributed a letter harassing C.M.; defendant was trespassed
from—meaning warned not to enter—C.M.’s properties; after defendant was trespassed,
C.M. discovered the harassing letters inside his properties; the doors to the properties
were locked, so defendant most likely slid the letters under the doors; around fifty copies
of the letter were found on the printer at one of C.M.’s properties; it was likely that
defendant accessed C.M.’s wi-fi in order to print; defendant was seen driving by C.M.’s
properties and caught on traffic camera doing the same; defendant made threatening
statements in text messages and Facebook posts about C.M.; the IT person for C.M.
found a new laptop and iPhone connected to the wi-fi at C.M.’s properties after defendant
was trespassed and on the day the letters were found at C.M.’s properties. (Doc. 39-8,
at 3–4; Doc. 42-6, at 3–4).
After detailing the information within the four corners of the third warrant
application, Judge Roberts found that it contained probable cause that evidence of a crime
would be found at the place to be searched. (Doc. 44, at 30). He found the third warrant
supported by probable cause because the first warrant (for the cell phone) and the second
warrant (for electronic devices capable of connecting to wi-fi at defendant’s residence)
were also both supported by probable cause and were the reasons for eventually needing
a third warrant because police discovered the objects in the third warrant while executing
the previous warrant. (Id., at 31). In analyzing the first warrant, Judge Roberts found
“[a] decade (or more) ago, the failure to spell out the evidentiary value of placing the cell
phone at a particular location might have been a more glaring omission. In October 2024,
the absence of such an explanation is less troubling.” (Id., at 27). Regarding the second
warrant, Judge Roberts explained that “[t]he laptop was . . . mentioned in the affidavit
as having connected to C.M.’s network at the time [d]efendant was near C.M.s place of
business. Moreover, other electronic devices could have been used to make posts or texts
relevant to the harassment investigation.” (Id., at 29).
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Defendant objects to Judge Roberts’ recommendation, arguing “[t]he affidavit
failed to establish probable cause that evidence of a crime would be present on
[defendant’s] cell phone.” (Doc. 47, at 2). In support of this argument, defendant argues
that “the majority of [defendant’s] conduct offered as support for the criminal behavior
are communications to third parties and not C.M. directly,” which is required for
harassment. (Id.). In addition, defendant claims that “[t]here is no information in the
affidavit that [defendant] engaged in criminal trespassing.” (Id., at 3). Last, defendant
objects to Judge Roberts making “the inferential leap that the electronic devices would
be stored in [defendant’s] residence” given that defendant is seen in his vehicle and
outside of C.M.’s business. (Id.). For that reason, defendant claims, “[t]he logical place
for such items to be searched for would be [defendant’s] vehicle.” (Id., at 4).
The Court finds, on de novo review, that the third warrant was supported by
probable cause.
First, defendant’s argument that most of the allegations of harassment were
indirect to third parties overlooks the evidence of direct harassment—the copies of a letter
left inside of C.M.’s business and on his business printer—which “regard[ed] a lawsuit
attacking [C.M.] and his business” and which caused C.M. to report to law enforcement.
(Doc. 39-8, at 3; Doc. 42-6, at 3). In fact, the warrant application specifically stated,
“[C.M.] is afraid because he knows [defendant] owns firearms, uses drugs and is not
mentally stable.” (Doc. 39-8, at 3; Doc. 42-6, at 3). Defendant’s argument also
overlooks the allegation of entry onto C.M.’s property after defendant was warned that
a further entry would constitute trespass—that the doors to the business were locked so
defendant would have had to slip the letter found on the floor under the door, thus
defendant had to have entered onto the property. (Doc. 39-8, at 3; Doc. 42-6, at 3).
Thus, the affidavit contained support for the criminal behavior directed at C.M.
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Second, there were sufficient allegations that evidence of a crime would be found
on the cell phone or laptop and that the cell phone or laptop would be in defendant’s
residence. As Judge Roberts put it, “it would take an inordinately obtuse reading to the
[warrant] application to avoid drawing the inference that [d]efendant was suspected of
using his iPhone” as part of his alleged trespass or harassment. (Doc. 44, at 25). The
Court finds the same.
We use cell phones constantly. We use them to set alarms, text, play music, watch
videos, map driving routes, track workouts, access the Internet, take pictures and videos,
play games, and stream movies, in addition to making and receiving phone calls. Because
we use cell phones constantly, they are with us constantly. It is reasonable to believe
that a person would likely have their cell phone with them, wherever they are, at any
given time. Also, the warrant application contained the specific allegation that a laptop
and iPhone connected to the wi-fi network at C.M.’s business around the time that
harassing letters were printed and left inside the business. That happened after defendant
had already been trespassed from all of C.M.’s businesses and had been seen driving by,
yelling “fuck you,” and in his vehicle in the area.
Also, contrary to defendant’s claim, the logical place for the cell phone and laptop
is inside of defendant’s residence, which is where the warrant requested permission to
search. As noted, a person’s cell phone is likely to be wherever the person is, including
in their own home. A person’s residence is also the place they would likely store their
belongings, but it is even more likely with electronics because electronics need to be
charged and their residence is the easiest place to do so. The Court concludes that this
information is sufficient to establish a reasonable probability that evidence of the crimes
of trespass and harassment would be found and that there is a sufficient nexus to
defendant’s residence for both.
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Thus, based on the totality of information in the four corners of the third warrant
application, the Court concludes, like Judge Roberts, that there was a fair probability that
evidence of a crime would be found at defendant’s address and the warrant was supported
by probable cause. The Court overrules defendant’s objection on this issue.
D. Additional Arguments and Government’s Objection
Because the Court has already found probable cause supported the third warrant,
the Court need not address the Leon good faith exception. See United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897 (1984). This issue is moot. Sorcan v. Rock Ridge Sch. Dist., 131 F.4th
646, 650 (8th Cir. 2025) (explaining that an issue is moot “when it is impossible for a
court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party”). The Court overrules
defendant’s objection on this issue as well. Likewise, the Court overrules the
government’s objection for the same reason.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the government’s objection (Doc. 46) is overruled.
Defendant’s objections (Doc. 47) are overruled. The Court adopts the R&R. (Doc. 44).
Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (Doc. 39) is denied, and the Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
35) is denied as to the facial challenge and held in abeyance as to the as-applied
challenge. Trial remains as scheduled.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 2nd day of February, 2026.
_______________________________
C.J. Williams, Chief Judge
United States District Court
Northern District of Iowa
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