USA v. York et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
WESTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff, 	No. CR24-4080-LTS-KEM
vs.
ORDER ON REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATION	WILLIE JAMES YORK and CORI
MICHELLE BENSON,
Defendants.
This case is before me on a Report and Recommendation (R&R) in which the
Honorable Kelly K.E. Mahoney, Chief United States Magistrate Judge, recommends that
I deny the motions to suppress evidence filed by defendants Willie James York (Doc. 84)
and Cori Michelle Benson (Doc. 77), along with Benson’s motion (Doc. 76) to file an
untimely motion to suppress. 	Doc. 94. 	York, the Government and Benson have filed
objections. 	Docs. 95, 97, 98. 	The Government has filed responses (Docs. 96, 99) to
both defendants’ objections.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Shortly before midnight on October 1, 2024, Benson was driving southbound on
the interstate with York as a passenger. 	Doc. 94 at 2. 	Woodbury County Sheriff’s
Deputy Troy Tadlock stopped Benson, claiming her taillight was out. 	Id. at 2-3.
Woodbury County Sheriff’s Deputy Devon Groenhagen later arrived on the scene to
assist Tadlock. 	Id.
Based on evidence found during the stop, a Grand Jury returned an indictment
(Doc. 3) charging York and Benson with conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance1
1 In violation of 21 U.S.C §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 846 and 851.
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and possession with intent to distribute and aiding and abetting the possession with intent
to distribute a controlled substance.2 York was also charged with possession of a firearm
during and in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime3 and possession of a firearm by a
prohibited person.4 Id. 	York and Benson seek to exclude evidence gathered from the
stop. The Government resists.
Judge Mahoney held an evidentiary hearing on September 15, 2025. 	Doc. 94 at
1. 	The Government called Groenhagen and Tadlock as witnesses. 	Id. at 1-3. 	Judge
Mahoney admitted the following exhibits: (1) Tadlock’s dash camera video (Doc. 88-2,
Ex. 1); (2) Tadlock’s body camera video (Doc. 88-3, Ex. 2); a video screenshot showing
the back of Benson’s car (Doc. 88-4, Ex. 3); a second video screenshot showing the back
of Benson’s car (Doc. 88-5, Ex. 4); a photograph taken by an investigator (Doc. 88-6,
Ex. 5) and the warning to repair taillight Tadlock issued to Benson following the traffic
stop (Doc. 88-7, Ex. 6). Doc. 94 at 1-2. Judge Mahoney issued the R&R on September
24, 2025. 	Id. at 11.
II. 	THE R&R
A. 	Findings of Fact
Judge Mahoney made findings of fact. As discussed below, York, Benson and the
Government have each asserted various objections to those findings of fact. 	Based on
my de novo review of the record, including the transcript (Doc. 102) of the suppression
hearing, I agree with Judge Mahoney’s findings. 	As such, I adopt them without
modification and incorporate them here by reference.
2 In violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(a), 851 and 18 U.S.C. § 2.
3 In violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).
4 In violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 922(g)(3) and 924(a)(8).
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B. 	Recommendations
Judge Mahoney denied Benson’s motion for leave to file an untimely suppression
motion. Doc. 94 at 2. Further, she recommends denying both motions to suppress based
on her finding that Tadlock had reasonable suspicion that at least one of Benson’s
taillights had an inoperable bulb. 	Id. at 9-10.
III. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district judge must review a magistrate judge’s R&R under the following
standards:
Within fourteen days after being served with a copy, any party may serve
and file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations
as provided by rules of court. 	A judge of the court shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings
or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may
accept, 	reject, 	or 	modify, 	in 	whole 	or 	in 	part, 	the 	findings 	or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge. 	The judge may also
receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b). 	Thus, when a party objects to
any portion of an R&R, the district judge must undertake a de novo review of that portion.
Any portions of an R&R to which no objections have been made must be reviewed
under at least a “clearly erroneous” standard. 	See, e.g., Grinder v. Gammon, 73 F.3d
793, 795 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that when no objections are filed “[the district court
judge] would only have to review the findings of the magistrate judge for clear error”).
As the Supreme Court has explained, “[a] finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” 	Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.,
333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). However, a district judge may elect to review an R&R under
a more-exacting standard even if no objections are filed:
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Any party that desires plenary consideration by the Article III judge of any
issue need only ask. Moreover, while the statute does not require the judge
to review an issue de novo if no objections are filed, it does not preclude
further review by the district judge, sua sponte or at the request of a party,
under a de novo or any other standard.
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Objections to the R&R
1. 	York’s Objections
York objects to Judge Mahoney’s conclusion that the stop was lawful. 	First, he
questions whether she properly relied on law enforcement testimony stating that there
were issues with the taillights because, he claims, “the lights appear to be working in the
video.” Doc. 95 at 2. Specifically, he objects to the following passage from the R&R:
About four minutes into the traffic stop, Deputy Tadlock asked Benson to
exit the vehicle so he could show her the broken light, and he requested she
turn off her blinker. 	Ex. 2, 3:55-4:20. 	Benson appeared to turn off the
blinker and brake lights and turn on her emergency flashers. 	Id.
Doc. 95 at 2 (emphasis added by York). 	York states: “Brake lights are activated by
depressing the brake pedal. 	Benson was not in the vehicle; the brake lights would
necessarily be off when the photo was taken.” Id. The substance of York’s objection is
unclear. 	However, Exhibit 1 confirms Judge Mahoney’s description. 	Before Benson
stepped out of the car, her right blinker and brake lights were on; after she stepped out
her brake lights were off and her emergency flashers were on. Ex. 1, 4:10-4:40. Because
Judge Mahoney accurately described the events, this objection is overruled.
Next, York questions whether Exhibit 5, a photograph taken at the scene,
accurately depicts the vehicle’s taillights. Doc. 95 at 3-4. York argues that external light
sources could have reflected off the taillights, rendering the photograph inaccurate. 	Id.
Because he claims the photograph could be inaccurate, he requests I disregard Judge
Mahoney’s determination that the passenger’s side taillight was out “[t]o the extent this
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finding relies on” the photograph to support Tadlock’s testimony. 	Id. 	However, Judge
Mahoney did not rely only on the photograph to determine the taillight was out. 	Doc.
94 at 9. Instead, she reached this conclusion based on a combination of officer testimony
and video evidence. 	Id. 	I will consider this objection below.
2. 	Benson’s Objections
Benson objects to the following conclusions in the R&R: (1) good cause did not
exist to excuse her untimely motion to suppress and (2) reasonable suspicion or probable
cause supported the traffic stop. 	Doc. 98 at 2-3. 	Regarding the stop, Benson claims it
was improper on two bases. 	Id. 	First, she argues that Tadlock’s testimony was not
credible. 	Id. 	Second, she argues the evidence did not support Tadlock’s claim that he
saw that the taillight was out before stopping Benson. 	Id.
3. 	Government’s Objections
The Government agrees with Judge Mahoney that Benson did not demonstrate good cause
to file an untimely motion to suppress and that the stop was lawful because at least one
taillight was not fully functioning. Doc. 97 at 2. However, the Government asserts that
neither of Benson’s rear taillights were fully functioning. 	Id. at 1. 	Therefore, the
Government objects to Judge Mahoney’s findings omitting “that at least a portion of the
rear taillight on the driver’s side was out or not fully functioning properly” and to her
legal 	conclusions omitting 	that the 	stop was 	lawful 	because 	both 	lights 	were 	not
functioning properly. Id. at 1-2.
B. 	Analysis
1. 	Untimely Motion
Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs pretrial motions,
which include motions to suppress. 	Rule 12(c)(3) states, “If a party does not meet the
deadline for making a [pretrial] motion, the motion is untimely.” 	Under Rule 12(c)(3),
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courts cannot consider untimely pretrial motions without “a showing of ‘good cause,’
which requires a showing of cause and prejudice.” 	United States v. Fry, 792 F.3d 884,
888 (8th Cir. 2015); see also United States v. Fogg, 922 F.3d 389, 391 (8th Cir. 2019).
In her R&R, Judge Mahoney discussed two cases analyzing good cause: United States v.
Trobee, 551 F.3d 835 (8th Cir. 2009) and United States v. Trancheff, 633 F.3d 696 (8th
Cir. 2011). Doc. 94 at 7-8.
In Trobee, the court considered whether the district court abused its discretion in
“refusing to consider [the defendant’s] motion to suppress,” which the defendant filed
three months after the deadline. 	551 F.3d at 837-38. 	Although the defendant had not
sought to extend the deadline before it passed, he claimed that good cause for the delay
existed. Id. at 838. He argued good cause supported his delay because at the time of the
deadline, he had been negotiating a plea and did not want to file a motion to suppress out
of concern it would limit “leverage for his plea options.” Id. Further, he argued a late-
filed motion to suppress did not prejudice the Government. Id. The court remarked that
courts 	are 	not required 	to 	grant extensions 	to 	motions deadlines 	because 	of plea
negotiations, “particularly where a party allows a deadline to pass and then seeks
retroactively to have it extended.” 	Id. 	Further, the court stated, “The absence of
prejudice or delay in the trial may be relevant to whether the district court is willing to
grant relief, but those factors themselves do not require a finding of ‘good cause.’” 	Id.
In 	Trancheff, 	the 	court 	determined 	that 	a 	defendant’s 	“desire 	to 	suppress
incriminating 	evidence” 	alone 	does 	not 	establish 	good 	cause. 	633 	F.3d 	at 	698.
Additionally, the court held that a delay caused by the defendant absconding did not
establish good cause for a delayed motion. 	Id.
Here, Benson admits her motion was untimely. 	Doc. 76 at 1. 	Not only was it
untimely, but she filed it nearly eight months after the deadline for pretrial motions
expired on December 19, 2024. 	Doc. 16 at 3; Doc. 80 at 3 n.3. 	In her motion (Doc.
76) for leave to file an untimely motion to suppress, Benson failed to address the “good
cause” standard. Instead, she merely stated that she had been negotiating for a plea deal
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at various points, alluded to the fact that she had absconded from pretrial release5 and
announced that she now wanted to “pursue her right to challenge the Government’s
evidence against her through a suppression motion.” Id. During the suppression hearing,
Benson did not attempt to establish good cause for her delay. Doc. 102 at 46-47. Instead,
she merely argued that the Government was not prejudiced because York had a hearing
on the same issues and the trial date had already been continued. 	Id. at 47. 	In her
objection (Doc. 98) to the R&R, Benson still fails to identify any grounds to find that
good cause supported her delay. Id. at 1-2. Instead, she attempts to distinguish her case
from Trobee and does not address Trancheff. Id.
Benson claims Trobee is inapplicable because “the defendant’s motion in Trobee
did not make an argument as to good cause and also the court had submitted a scheduling
order specific to filing a motion to suppress.” 	Doc. 98 at 1. 	Benson is correct that the
defendant in Trobee did not argue why good cause existed when filing his untimely motion
to suppress in the district court. 	Trobee, 551 F.3d 837. 	However, on appeal, Trobee
argued “that his tardiness should be excused for good cause.” 	Id. 	Because of this
argument, the court analyzed when a defendant shows good cause for an untimely motion.
Id. at 837-38. 	As for Benson’s suggestion that this court’s trial management order did
not establish a deadline for filing a motion to suppress, she is wrong. 	Her trial
management order (Doc. 16) set a deadline for “[a]ll motions not directly related to trial
issues, including discovery motions, motions to suppress, motions to dismiss and motions
for severance.” 	Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 	Clearly there was a specific deadline for
Benson to file a motion to suppress and she missed that deadline by almost eight months.
Benson then quotes a passage from Trobee stating that “the absence of prejudice
or delay in the trial may be relevant to whether the district court is willing to grant relief,
but those factors themselves do not require a finding of ‘good cause.’” 	Doc. 98 at 1-2.
This passage clearly states that lack of prejudice or delay alone does not require the court
5 Benson absconded for nearly three months. Doc. 94 at 6.
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to find good cause. Confusingly, Benson then argues that her untimely motion has neither
prejudiced the Government nor delayed trial but does not otherwise argue that good cause
exists.6 Id. at 2.
Comparing Benson’s situation to Trobee and Trancheff further shows the lack of
good cause for her untimely motion. Like the defendant in Trobee, Benson delayed filing
a motion to suppress because of plea negotiations and failed to file a motion to extend the
motion deadline before it expired. 	While the defendant in Trobee filed his motion three
months after the deadline, Benson filed her motion nearly eight months late. In Trancheff,
the court found that the defendant’s “desire to suppress incriminating evidence” alone
did not establish good cause and that a delay caused by the defendant’s absconding from
pretrial release likewise did not constitute good cause. 	The same is true here. 	Because
Benson failed to demonstrate good cause, her objection is overruled and her motion to
suppress is denied as untimely.
2. 	Traffic Stop
Judge Mahoney correctly identified the applicable legal standards for the traffic
stop. Doc. 94 at 8-10. Unless there was reasonable suspicion or probable cause that at
least a portion of Benson’s taillights were out, the stop was unlawful. York and Benson
claim there was not reasonable suspicion that a bulb was out. 	They argue (1) Tadlock
was not a credible witness and (2) the photographic and video evidence did not sufficiently
corroborate Tadlock’s testimony.
a. 	Credibility Determination
Benson challenges Judge Mahoney’s determination that Tadlock testified credibly.
Doc. 98 at 2. Specifically, he contends Tadlock’s testimony was not credible because of
6 The Government claims Benson has both prejudiced the Government and delayed trial. 	Doc.
99 at 3-4.
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impeachment during the hearing. 	Id. 	Tadlock first testified that he observed Benson’s
taillights were out while parked on the interstate median. 	Doc. 102 at 23. 	On cross-
examination, however, he was confronted with his police report, in which he had written
that he noticed the taillights after he began following Benson. 	Id. at 32-33.
As noted above, I have read the transcript (Doc. 102) of the suppression hearing
in its entirety. 	See United States v. Azure, 539 F.3d 904, 910 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[D]e
novo review requires that the district court either listen to the tape of the hearing or read
the hearing transcript.”). 	Upon review, I agree with Judge Mahoney that Tadlock
testified credibly. 	Like Judge Mahoney, I credit his testimony that “he could see a bulb
out while following” Benson. 	Doc. 94 at 9. 	I reach this conclusion for two reasons.
First, Tadlock and Groenhagen provided coherent and consistent narratives. 	Doc. 102
at 6-11, 22. 	Second, Tadlock’s actions after stopping Benson were consistent with him
having stopped her for a broken taillight. 	He explained he had stopped her because of
the taillight, offered to show her the taillight and even wrote her a warning citation for
the taillight. 	Doc. 102 at 27, 37; Doc. 88-7. 	This overall consistency outweighs any
discrepancy between Tadlock’s testimony and his report as to when he first noticed the
broken taillight. Benson’s objections based on Tadlock’s credibility are overruled.
b. 	Lack of Corroborating Evidence
Tadlock testified that he saw the taillights out. 	Doc. 102 at 41. 	Both York and
Benson argue that the video and photo evidence does not sufficiently corroborate his
testimony. However, when I view Tadlock’s dash and body camera footage, I agree with
Judge Mahoney that “[a]t the very least, . . . the video evidence supports that a portion
of the passenger’s side taillight was out.”7 Doc. 94 at 9; Ex. 1, 3:40; Ex. 2, 4:30.
7 Because the Government’s objection leads to the same outcome, I find it unnecessary to
consider. Therefore, the objection is overruled.
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A court may find probable cause based solely on officer testimony without
extrinsic proof. 	See United States v. Mendoza, 677 F.3d 822, 827-28 (8th Cir. 2012);
see also United States v. Herbst, No. 17-CR-4059, 2018 WL 445532, at *11 (N.D. Iowa
Jan. 16, 2018) (“There is no requirement of extrinsic proof that a traffic violation
occurred, rather, one officer's credible testimony may be sufficient to establish probable
cause.”). However, officer testimony cannot be accepted if it is controverted by extrinsic
evidence. See Mendoza, 677 F.3d at 827. York and Benson have not presented any such
evidence.
Benson challenges whether Tadlock would have been able to see a burnt-out
taillight while he followed Benson, stating the dash camera video shows “he would never
have been close enough to observe the lights.” Doc. 98 at 2. Benson further argues that
Tadlock would not have been able to tell whether the bulbs were burnt out because they
“were sandwiched in between the brake lights, turn signals, and other bulbs, and were
somewhat illuminated by other bulbs in the taillight assembly.” 	Id. This argument fails
to controvert Tadlock’s testimony for two reasons. First, it is unclear whether Tadlock’s
dash camera captured the entire time he followed Benson. 	Tadlock testified that he did
not engage his lights until after he and Benson exited the construction zone. Doc. 102 at
38. Tadlock explained that his dash camera begins recording when he engages his lights
and goes back 30 seconds. 	Id. at 28. Because of this, Tadlock may have been closer to
Benson while going through the construction zone, which might not have been included
in the dash camera video.
Second, Tadlock testified that his vision was more accurate than the video or
photographic evidence because of how the lights reflected. 	Id. at 29. Neither York nor
Benson attempted to challenge this claim. 	I find it plausible. 	In any event, the middle
right of the passenger’s side taillight appears dark in both Tadlock’s dash and body
camera footage while the surrounding lights are illuminated. 	Ex. 1, 3:40; Ex. 2, 4:30.
Benson has not controverted Tadlock’s testimony.
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York challenges the evidence depicting the lights after Tadlock stopped the car.
He posits that in Exhibit 5, a photograph taken at the scene, the passenger’s side taillight
might have appeared out because of how extrinsic light sources were hitting the car’s rear
lights. 	Doc. 95 at 4. 	In support, he argues that in the photograph, the passenger’s side
brake light beneath the passenger’s side taillight appears on, “even though no one is in
the vehicle to depress the brake pedal.” 	Id. 	York further claims that the passenger’s
side taillight appearing out “does not necessarily indicate a bulb failure—rather, it is
equally likely that it is an optical effect caused by the angle of the light sources.” 	Id.
York provides no support for his assertion or how he estimated it to be “equally likely.”
After reviewing the dash camera and the body camera videos, I agree with Judge
Mahoney that “the middle portion of the passenger’s side taillight appears dark” while
the lights around it are lit. 	Doc. 94 at 9; Ex. 1, 3:40; Ex. 2, 4:30. 	Even if York is
correct that unlit bulbs might appear lit because of reflections from external light sources,
this would not make a lit bulb appear unlit.8 York’s argument does not point to evidence
that controverts Tadlock’s testimony.
Like Judge Mahoney, I credit Tadlock’s testimony that he could see a bulb out
while following the BMW, which led him to pull Benson over. 	Doc. 94 at 9. 	As
discussed above, this justification for the stop is corroborated by how he acted after he
pulled her over, as well as by the dash and body camera video. 	Based on my de novo
review of the record, I find that at least a portion of the passenger’s side taillight was
out, which gave Tadlock reasonable suspicion to stop the car. 	Because the stop was
lawful, York and Benson’s objections are overruled.
8 Although York argues that it is unclear whether the car’s lights were turned on in the photo
(Doc. 95 at 4), the car’s lights were clearly on in the dash and body camera videos.
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V. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, I hereby accept the Report and Recommendation
(Doc. 94) without modification. As a result:
1. 	Defendant Willie James York’s objections (Doc. 95) are overruled and his
motion (Doc. 84) to suppress is denied.
2. 	Defendant Cori Michelle Benson’s objections (Doc. 98) are overruled and
her motion (Doc. 76) to file an untimely motion to suppress and her motion (Doc. 77) to
suppress are both denied.
3. 	The Government’s objections (Doc. 97) are overruled.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 10th day of November, 2025.
__________________________
Leonard T. Strand
United States District Judge
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