Durrwachter v. Commissioner of Social Security

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
EASTERN DIVISION
SARA E. D.,
Plaintiff, 	No. C25-2025-LTS-KEM
vs.
ORDER ON REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION	FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant.
I. 	INTRODUCTION
This case is before me on a Report and Recommendation (R&R) by Chief United
States Magistrate Judge Kelly K.E. Mahoney. 	Doc. 18. 	Judge Mahoney recommends
that I reverse and remand the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the
Commissioner) denying the application by plaintiff Sara E. D. (the Claimant) for
disability insurance (DI) benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
401-434. Neither party has objected to the R&R and the deadline for such objections has
expired.
II. 	APPLICABLE STANDARDS
A. 	Judicial Review of the Commissioner’s Decision
The Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed “if it is supported by substantial
evidence on the record as a whole.” 	Pelkey v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 577 (8th Cir.
2006); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as
to 	any 	fact, 	if 	supported 	by 	substantial 	evidence, 	shall 	be 	conclusive . . . .”).
“Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but enough that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 	Lewis v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 642,
Case 6:25-cv-02025-LTS-KEM Document 19 Filed 10/16/26 Page 1 of 5

2
645 (8th Cir. 2003). 	The Eighth Circuit explains the standard as “something less than
the weight of the evidence and [that] allows for the possibility of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions, thus it embodies a zone of choice within which the [Commissioner] may
decide to grant or deny benefits without being subject to reversal on appeal.” Culbertson
v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 934, 939 (8th Cir. 1994).
To determine whether the Commissioner’s decision meets this standard, the court
considers “all of the evidence that was before the ALJ, but it [does] not re-weigh the
evidence.” Vester v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 886, 889 (8th Cir. 2005). The court considers
both evidence which supports the Commissioner’s decision and evidence that detracts
from it. Kluesner v. Astrue, 607 F.3d 533, 536 (8th Cir. 2010). The court “must search
the record for evidence contradicting the [Commissioner’s] decision and give that
evidence appropriate weight when determining whether the overall evidence in support
is substantial.” Baldwin v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 549, 555 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Cline v.
Sullivan, 939 F.2d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 1991)).
To evaluate the evidence in an appeal of a denial of benefits, the court must apply
a balancing test to assess any contradictory evidence. 	Sobania v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 879 F.2d 441, 444 (8th Cir. 1989). 	The court, however, does not
“reweigh the evidence presented to the ALJ,” Baldwin, 349 F.3d at 555 (citing Bates v.
Chater, 54 F.3d 529, 532 (8th Cir. 1995)), or “review the factual record de novo.” Roe
v. Chater, 92 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Naber v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 186, 188
(8th Cir. 1994)). 	Instead, if, after reviewing the evidence, the court “find[s] it possible
to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents
the Commissioner’s findings, [the court] must affirm the [Commissioner’s] denial of
benefits.” 	Kluesner, 607 F.3d at 536 (quoting Finch v. Astrue, 547 F.3d 933, 935 (8th
Cir. 2008)). This is true even if the court “might have weighed the evidence differently.”
Culbertson, 30 F.3d at 939 (quoting Browning v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 817, 822 (8th Cir.
1992)). 	The court may not reverse the Commissioner’s decision “merely because
substantial evidence would have supported an opposite decision.” Baker v. Heckler, 730
Case 6:25-cv-02025-LTS-KEM Document 19 Filed 10/16/26 Page 2 of 5

3
F.2d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir. 1984); see also Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir.
2005) (“[A]n administrative decision is not subject to reversal simply because some
evidence may support the opposite conclusion.”).
B. 	Review of Report and Recommendation
A district judge reviews a magistrate judge’s R&R under the following standards:
Within fourteen days after being served with a copy, any party may serve
and file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations
as provided by rules of court. 	A judge of the court shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings
or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may
accept, 	reject, 	or 	modify, 	in 	whole 	or 	in 	part, 	the 	findings 	or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge. 	The judge may also
receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 	Thus, when a party objects to
any portion of an R&R, the district judge must undertake a de novo review of that portion.
Any portions of an R&R to which no objections have been made must be reviewed
under at least a “clearly erroneous” standard. 	See, e.g., Grinder v. Gammon, 73 F.3d
793, 795 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that when no objections are filed “[the district court
judge] would only have to review the findings of the magistrate judge for clear error”).
As the Supreme Court has explained, “[a] finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” 	Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.,
333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). However, a district judge may elect to review an R&R under
a more-exacting standard even if no objections are filed:
Any party that desires plenary consideration by the Article III judge of any
issue need only ask. Moreover, while the statute does not require the judge
to review an issue de novo if no objections are filed, it does not preclude
Case 6:25-cv-02025-LTS-KEM Document 19 Filed 10/16/26 Page 3 of 5

4
further review by the district judge, sua sponte or at the request of a party,
under a de novo or any other standard.
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Because the parties did not object to the R&R, I have reviewed it for clear error.
Judge Mahoney applied the appropriate legal standards in concluding substantial evidence
(1) supported the ALJ’s determination that the Claimant’s migraines did not equal a listing
or require additional limitations in the residual functional capacity but (2) did not support
the limitation that the Claimant could stand and walk for four hours in an eight-hour
workday for the entirety of the relevant time period. 	She also applied the appropriate
legal standards in concluding the ALJ had not failed to fully and fairly develop the record
with medical-opinion evidence related to the Claimant’s mental functioning.
Based on my review of the record, I find no error – clear or otherwise – in Judge
Mahoney’s recommendation that the case be remanded for an award of benefits as of
March 31, 2022, based on the onset of the Claimant’s knee pain and treatment records
reflecting related limitations as well as the history of this case. 	See Doc. 18 at 23-27.
As such, I adopt the R&R in its entirety.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein:
1. 	I accept the R&R (Doc. 18) without modification. 	See 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1).
2. 	Pursuant to Judge Mahoney’s recommendation:
a. 	The 	Commissioner’s 	determination 	that 	the 	Claimant 	was 	not
disabled is reversed and remanded for an award of benefits as of March
31, 2022.
Case 6:25-cv-02025-LTS-KEM Document 19 Filed 10/16/26 Page 4 of 5

5
b. 	Judgment shall enter in favor of the Claimant and against the
Commissioner.
c. 	If the Claimant wishes to request an award of attorney’s fees and
costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, an
application may be filed up until 30 days after the judgment becomes “not
appealable,” i.e., 30 days after the 60-day time for appeal has ended. 	See
Shalala 	v. 	Schaefer, 	509 	U.S. 	292, 	296 	(1993); 	28 	U.S.C. 	§§
2412(d)(1)(B), (d)(2)(G).
IT IS SO ORDERED this 16th day of October, 2026.
__________________________
Leonard T. Strand
United States District Judge
Case 6:25-cv-02025-LTS-KEM Document 19 Filed 10/16/26 Page 5 of 5