Kitterman v. City of Belleville et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SHANE KITTERMAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF BELLEVILLE, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 3:19-cv-00051-GCS
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
SISON, Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Shane A. Kitterman, proceeding pro se, brought this action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against Defendants alleging Defendants violated and continue to violate his rights
under the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, as well as the Ex Post Facto clause and laws impairing contracts under the
United States and Illinois constitutions. On February 14, 2020, the Court dismissed with
prejudice Kitterman’s lawsuit. (Doc. 79). judgment reflecting the same was entered on
February 20, 2020. (Doc. 80). On May 26, 2023, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
issued its Mandate affirming the Court’s decision. (Doc. 133).
Now before the Court is Kitterman’s motion for substitution of judge to consider
Rule 60(b) motions, which the Court considers as a motion for recusal. (Doc. 140). Based
on the following, the Court denies the motion.
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Under Section 455(a), “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The standard set forth by this provision is objective and
“asks whether a reasonable person perceives a significant risk that the judge will resolve
the case on a basis other than the merits.” In re Hatcher, 150 F.3d 631, 637 (7th Cir.
1998) (quoting Hook 	v. 	McDade, 	89 	F.3d 	350, 	354 	(7th 	Cir. 	1996)). 	The 	decision
to recuse turns not on the judge's actual partiality but on the appearance of partiality. See
Hatcher, 150 F.3d at 637 (citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994)).
Under Section 455(b)(1), a judge must recuse himself “[w]here he has a personal
bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). Bias justifying recusal must arise from
an extrajudicial source. See O'Regan v. Arbitration Forums, Inc., 246 F.3d 975, 988 (7th Cir.
2001). “[N]either judicial rulings nor opinions formed by the judge as a result of current
or prior proceedings constitute a basis for recusal ‘unless they display a deep-seated
favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.’” United States v.
White, 582 F.3d 787, 807 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555).
Under Section 144, a judge must recuse himself “[w]henever a party . . . makes and
files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending
has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party.” 28
U.S.C. § 144. An affidavit is not timely unless filed as soon as the movant is aware of the
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facts establishing the basis for the judge's disqualification. See United States v. Sykes, 7 F.3d
1331, 1339 (7th Cir. 1993). An affidavit must allege facts that are “sufficiently definite and
particular to convince a reasonable person that bias exists; simple conclusions, opinions,
or rumors are insufficient.” O'Regan, 246 F.3d at 989 (internal quotations omitted). As
with § 455(b)(1), the bias must come from an extrajudicial source to justify recusal Id. at
988.
A judge has an obligation to hear cases before him where there is no legitimate
reason for recusal. See New York City Housing Development Corp. v. Hart, 796 F.2d 976, 980-
981 (7th Cir. 1986); Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 351 (10 th Cir. 1995). A recusal statute “must
not be so broadly construed that it becomes, in effect, presumptive, so that recusal is
mandated 	upon 	the 	merest 	unsubstantiated 	suggestion 	of 	personal 	bias 	or
prejudice.” Nichols, 71 F.3d at 351 (internal quotations omitted). The Court is also mindful
that the recusal statutes are not judge-shopping devices. See United States v. Walsh, 47
F.4th 491, 500 (7th Cir. 2022); Hook, 89 F.3d at 354.
Kitterman merely states: “3. Defendants assign blame to Judge Gilbert Sison for
violating the terms of a state court fully negotiated plea agreement. See Doc. 136, p. 1-7. .
. . 5. Plaintiff cannot receive fair consideration if Judge Gilbert Sison remains on the case.”
(Doc. 140, p. 3). Thus, the Court finds that Kitterman has asserted nothing outside of court
rulings that would cause any reasonable person to doubt the Court's impartiality or to
believe any actual bias exists. Nor has he pointed to any Court ruling that displays a deep-
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seated favoritism or antagonism such that the Court cannot be fair. And finally, he has
not submitted the affidavit required by § 144.
As such, the Court DENIES Kitterman’s motion for substitution of judge to
consider Rule 60(b) motions. (Doc. 140).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: October 27, 2025.
______________________________
GILBERT C. SISON
United States Magistrate Judge
Digitally signed by
Judge Sison
Date: 2025.10.27
14:01:42 -05'00'
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