Decker v. Sproul

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ROBERT K. DECKER,
Petitioner,
v.
DAN SPROUL,
Respondent.
Case No. 23-CV-45-NJR
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Petitioner Robert K. Decker is a federal inmate housed at FCI Marion, a Bureau of
Prisons facility located within the Southern District of Illinois. Decker filed a petition for
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his loss of 41 days of good
conduct time, as well as the incident report imposed on his prison record, due to a prison
disciplinary proceeding. (Docs. 1, 4). Decker sets forth two grounds for relief: (1) that he
was denied the opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, and
(2) that he was found guilty on insufficient evidence. (Docs. 1, 4). Respondent filed a
response to the petition (Doc. 11), to which Decker replied (Doc. 14). For the reasons set
forth below, the petition is denied. 1
B ACKGROUND
Decker is serving a 140-month sentence imposed by the Southern District of
Florida in 2017. (Doc. 11-1, at 7). His projected release date is August 2, 2027. 2 The
1 Because this Court denies Decker’s petition, Decker’s Motion for Status (Doc. 19) is denied as moot.
2 See www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited on Jan. 5, 2026).
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incident at issue in this action took place at United States Penitentiary Terre Haute on
February 3, 2021. (See Doc. 11-1, at 3; Doc. 11-1, at 160). An outgoing six-page letter written
by Decker to his wife was received for review by the prison’s Counter Terrorism Unit.
(Doc. 11-3, at 13). At the time, he had yet to secure approval to send letters to his wife at
her address. (Doc. 11-2, at 5; see Doc. 11-3, at 3).
The letter was reviewed by an intelligence analyst, who found that it included
what she believed to be instructions for selling drugs on the internet without being
detected. Id. She also reviewed a phone call between Decker and his wife. Id. In that phone
call, Decker’s wife stated that she is going to sell the house and “do something else with
the money.” Id. When Decker asked what she meant, reminding her that the call was
being recorded, she said “[w]hat you went to jail for!” Id. Because Decker had been
investigated for selling drugs online using similar mechanisms to those described in the
letter, and in connection with the phone call, the analyst determined that Decker had
“committed the prohibited act of use of mail for illegal purposes to further and aid his
wife in the commission of a crime.” Id. She wrote her findings in an incident report, thus
beginning the disciplinary process. (Doc. 11-2, at 3; see Doc. 11-3, at 13).
Decker was served with the incident report on February 10, 2021. 3 (Doc. 11-2; at 3;
Doc. 11-3, at 19). According to the investigatory official who served him, Decker
acknowledged the truth of the incident report but stated “[h]ow can a letter leave the
institution if the address is not on my approved mailing list.” (Doc. 11-3, at 19). In light
3 Technically, Decker was initially served on February 4, 2021. (Doc. 11-2, at 3; Doc. 11-3, at 21). However,
the incident report was thereafter suspended for review until February 10, 2021. (Doc. 11-2, at 3).
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of Decker’s admission and a review of relevant materials, the official determined that the
incident report was accurate and the charge against Decker was valid. Id.
The matter was then referred the Unit Discipline Committee (UDC). (Doc. 11-3,
at 19; Doc. 11-2, at 4). In a statement to the UDC, Decker argued that his wife was “not
even an approved contact” and that the contents of the letter are “all public information.”
(Doc. 11-3, at 13). The UDC decided to refer the matter to the Discipline Hearing Officer
(DHO) for determination “[d]ue to the seriousness of the charge.” Id. at 14.
Decker’s initial DHO hearing (which is not at issue before this Court) was held on
February 10, 2021. (Doc. 11-3, at 52–54). The DHO summarized Decker’s testimony at the
hearing as “[a]ll I was doing was showing her how to resell items from estate sales
online.” Id. at 52. The DHO found Decker had committed the charged infraction and
sanctioned him. Id. at 52–54. Decker appealed this decision to the regional office, claiming
(1) that he had requested a witness and a staff representative but was not provided either;
(2) that he had not had his reading glasses at the UDC and therefore could not see what
had been marked on the form; and (3) that he had not been given adequate time to
prepare a defense, as the DHO hearing had been held five minutes after the UDC hearing.
Id. at 10. The regional office determined that there had been a procedural error and
remanded the matter for rehearing before the DHO. Id.
On May 25, 2021, Decker was advised of his rights at the upcoming rehearing, id.
at 22, and given the opportunity to request in writing a staff representative and any
witnesses he wished to call, id. at 23. He requested to call his case manager, Ms. Eisele, to
testify that his wife’s address was not on the approved contact list. Id. He did not request
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any other witnesses. Id.
The DHO rehearing took place on August 11, 2021. Id. at 3. Decker called Ms. Eisele
as a witness, and the DHO report does not indicate that he requested any other witnesses
who were not made available. Decker was again found to have committed the charged
violation. Id. at 3–5. To reach that conclusion, the DHO considered the incident report,
Decker’s disciplinary history, the letter, the phone call, Decker’s prior statements
acknowledging he had written the letter, and his statement at the rehearing contending
that his wife’s address had not been approved and that there was no proof he had written
the letter. Id. at 4.
Decker appealed the DHO’s determination on rehearing to the regional office.
(Doc. 11-1, at 166). He complained that the intelligence analyst who had initially reported
him should not have been reading his letter, as it would never have been sent to an
unapproved address. Id. He contested the interpretations of his letter and phone call by
prison officials and provided alternative explanations for their contents. Id. Finally, he
argued that he could not have been guilty of the charged conduct—use of the mail for
illegal purposes—because the letter in question would never have been sent in the mail
to an unapproved address. Id.
The regional office affirmed the finding of the DHO. 4 Id. at 159. It interpreted
Decker’s appeal as challenging the merits of the DHO’s determination; in response, the
regional office affirmed that Decker had been provided due process during the
4 Though it noted that the DHO report contained an administrative error and ordered an amended copy.
(Doc. 11-1, at 159).
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disciplinary procedure and that the DHO had based its determination on sufficient
evidence. Id.
Decker then appealed the decision of the regional office to the central office. Id.
at 148. He raised the same issues as before—namely, challenges to the merits of the
DHO’s finding of guilt. Id. The central office, too, interpreted this appeal as “contend[ing]
[that he] did not commit the prohibited act” and treated it as a challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence relied upon by the DHO. Id. at 147. The central office then affirmed the
decisions of the regional office and the DHO, stating that the DHO’s determination had
been “reasonable and supported by the evidence” and that Decker’s “Due Process rights
[had been] upheld during the discipline process.” Id. Decker then filed this habeas
petition.
A PPLICABLE LAW
Federal inmates must be given due process before their good time credit can be
rescinded. Brooks–Bey v. Smith, 819 F.2d 178, 180 (7th Cir. 1987). Inmates can challenge the
loss of good conduct credit through a petition for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 842 (7th Cir. 2011). Though there is no express
exhaustion requirement in the statute, § 2241 petitions are subject to a common-law
exhaustion rule. Richmond v. Scibana, 387 F.3d 602, 604 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Vieth v.
Williams, No. 21-cv-170, 2021 WL 5177567, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 2021) (citing Gonzalez v.
O’Connell, 355 F.3d 1010, 1016 (7th Cir. 2004)) (noting the exceptions to the exhaustion
requirement).
In a disciplinary hearing, inmates retain certain due process rights such as: (1) a
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receipt of written notice of the charges in advance of the hearing; (2) an opportunity to be
heard before an impartial decision maker; (3) the right to call witnesses and present
evidence where the same will not be unduly hazardous to safety or correctional goals;
and (4) a written statement as to the evidence relied on and the reason for the decision.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-66 (1974); Henderson v. U.S. Parole Commission,
13 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1994); Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 939 (7th Cir. 2007). Along
with these safeguards, due process requires that the findings of the DHO be supported
by “some evidence from which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be
deduced.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985) (quoting United States ex rel.
ajtauer v. Comm’r of Immigr., 273 U.S. 103, 106 (1927)); see also Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d
934, 941 (7th Cir. 2007). The “some evidence” standard is a low bar, which the Seventh
Circuit has described as a “meager threshold.” Scruggs, 485 F.3d at 941 (“once the meager
threshold has been crossed our inquiry ends”). A habeas court can overturn the decision
“only if no reasonable adjudicator could have found [petitioner] guilty of the offense on
the basis of the evidence presented.” Henderson, 13 F.3d at 1077.
DISCUSSION
Decker argues first that his procedural due process rights were violated when he
was denied the opportunity to call his wife as a witness or present a copy of the letter at
the rehearing before the DHO. (Doc. 4, at 4). Respondent asserts that this argument
cannot be considered, however, because Decker failed to exhaust his administrative
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remedies as to this ground for relief. 5 (Doc. 11, at 6–8).
To begin exhausting his administrative remedies, an inmate who wishes to
challenge a decision of the DHO must first submit an appeal to the appropriate Regional
Director. 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.14(d)(2), 542.15(a). If the inmate is not satisfied by the regional
office’s response, he may appeal again to the central office for a decision by the General
Counsel. Id. § 542.15(a). At each level, the inmate’s appeal must “state specifically the
reason for appeal,” and may not “raise . . . issues not raised in the lower level filings.” Id.
§ 542.15(b)(1)–(2). The central office’s determination exhausts the administrative remedy
process. Id. § 542.15(a).
Decker did not raise at either level of administrative appeal the procedural due
process issues asserted in his first ground for relief. (Doc. 11-3, at 6 (Decker’s regional
office appeal); Doc. 11-1, at 148 (Decker’s central office appeal); see also Doc. 11-1, at 147
(decision of the central office, summarizing Decker’s appeal as “contend[ing] [he] did not
commit the prohibited act”). He did not mention any concerns about his wife’s testimony
or presenting a copy of the letter at the rehearing; instead, he argues only that the DHO
was wrong to find him guilty. But Decker insists he exhausted his remedies. (Doc. 14,
at5). He appears to base this contention on language in the decisions of the regional and
central offices stating that his due process rights had been upheld. (Doc. 11-1, at 147 (“Our
review of the disciplinary proceedings indicates . . . . [y]our Due Process rights were
upheld during the discipline process.”); Doc. 11-1, at 158 (“A review of the disciplinary
5 Respondents concede that Decker exhausted his administrative remedies as to his second ground for
relief (sufficiency of the evidence). (Doc. 11, at 7).
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action indicated that you were provided due process . . . .”). The regional and central
offices reached this conclusion without having before them any indication of objections
to the process Decker had received other than to the sufficiency of the evidence against
him.
The question, then, is whether Decker can satisfy the exhaustion requirement for
this ground for relief—raised for the first time in his habeas petition—solely by pointing
to administrative determinations that his procedural due process rights had been upheld
in the context of a different issue. The undersigned finds that he cannot. The exhaustion
requirement “serves the twin purposes of protecting administrative agency authority and
promoting judicial efficiency.” 6 McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992). 7 These
purposes would be ill-served if one could thwart the requirement merely by omitting
certain objections during the administrative appeal process—especially where that
process requires the inmate to “state specifically the reason for [his] appeal” and forbids
him from “rais[ing] in an [a]ppeal issues not raised in the lower level filings.” 28 C.F.R.
§ 542.15(b)(1)–(2). A final administrative rejection of the claims an inmate raises should
6 The first of these purposes “acknowledges the commonsense notion of dispute resolution that an agency
ought to have an opportunity to correct its own mistakes with respect to the programs it administers before
it is haled into federal court.” McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992). Exhaustion promotes the
second purpose, judicial efficiency, in at least two ways: (1) “a judicial controversy may well be mooted, or
at least piecemeal appeals may be avoided,” when an agency gets the chance to correct its own errors; and
(2) “even where a controversy survives administrative review, exhaustion of the administrative procedure
may produce a useful record for subsequent judicial consideration” by giving the agency an opportunity to
compile a record sufficient for judicial review. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
7 “McCarthy has been superseded by statute to the extent it held that federal prisoners seeking monetary
damages in a Bivens action are not required under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to exhaust administrative remedies
provided by the Bureau of Prisons. However, McCarthy’s principle that when exhaustion is not statutorily
mandated, ‘sound judicial discretion governs’ remains good law, as does its further admonitions on how
that discretion should be utilized.” Gonzalez, 355 F.3d at 1016 n.5 (quoting McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 144) (first
citing Wendell v. Asher, 162 F.3d 887, 890 (5th Cir. 1998); and then citing Zephyr Aviation, L.L.C. v. Dailey, 247
F.3d 565, 570–73 (5th Cir. 2001)) (cleaned up).
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not be considered a final disposition of the claims he hasn’t raised at all.
Here, where Decker did not raise the issues of access to the letter or his wife’s
testimony in any of his appeals, he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to his
first ground for relief. 8 Though the exhaustion requirement in § 2241 cases is not
absolute, e.g. Vieth, 2021 WL 5177567, at *3, Decker fails to argue that any recognized
exception is applicable here. The first ground for Decker’s petition, therefore, is denied
for failure to exhaust. 9
In Decker’s second ground for relief, he argues his due process rights were
violated when he was found to have committed the alleged violation on insufficient
evidence. (Doc. 4, at 5). Due process, in a prison disciplinary hearing, only requires “that
there be some evidence to support the findings made in the disciplinary hearing.” Hill,
472 U.S. at 457. The relevant question under this standard is “whether there is any
evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary
board.” Id. at 456-57. The Court cannot “assess the comparative weight of the evidence
8 The record supports the conclusion that these issues were not considered (or, therefore, exhausted) by
the regional and central offices. The record includes a copy of the form Decker was required to fill out, sign,
and return to the DHO before his rehearing. (Doc. 11-3, at 23 (“Notice of Discipline Hearing Before the
DHO”)). On the form, Decker noted that he wished to call witnesses and provided a list of those he planned
to call. Id. Decker only wrote that he wished to call Ms. Eisele to testify—not his wife or anyone else. Id. Ms.
Eisele attended the rehearing and testified as requested. Id. at 3. And, again, Decker’s administrative
appeals from the rehearing do not mention any allegation (1) that he had been prevented from calling his
wife to testify, or (2) that he asked for, did not receive, or was not permitted to present a copy of the letter
at issue. (Doc. 11-3, at 6; Doc. 11-1, at 148). Thus, even to the extent that the regional and central offices
considered the question of procedural due process, the record before them would not have disclosed the
existence of the objections animating Decker’s first ground for relief in this petition.
9 In his reply to Respondent’s brief, Decker for the first time asserts another alleged procedural violation:
that the initial UDC hearing was conducted by only one person instead of two. (Doc. 14, at 3–4). Even
assuming that the issue is properly before this Court, it too is absent from Decker’s administrative appeals.
(Doc. 11-3, at 6; Doc. 11-1, at 148). This ostensible ground for relief is therefore similarly denied for failure
to exhaust.
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underlying the disciplinary board’s decision.” Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652
(7th Cir. 2000). The “some evidence” standard is satisfied as long as “the record is not so
devoid of evidence that the findings of the disciplinary board were without support or
otherwise arbitrary.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 457.
Decker asserts that the DHO did not have sufficient evidence to find him guilty of
violating Code 196, which prohibits “[u]se of the mail for an illegal purpose.” 28 C.F.R.
§ 541.3, tbl. 1. But much of Decker’s argumentation (both during his administrative
appeals and before this Court) focuses on the fact that he was not permitted to send mail
to his wife at the time in question. (Doc. 11-3, at 6; Doc. 11-1, at 148; Doc. 1, ¶ 2; Doc. 4,
at 5). Decker appears to argue that, because the prison would never have allowed the
letter to be sent, it was not physically possible for him to “use” the mail; consequently, he
could not have violated Code 196. This argument is not truly a challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence against him. It is instead a claim that the alleged conduct, even if
sufficiently evidenced, does not fit the legal definition of the prohibited act.
As a matter of law, Decker is wrong. The regulation defining Code 196 as a
prohibited act also explicitly states that “[a]iding, attempting, or making plans to commit
any of the prohibited acts is treated the same as committing the act itself.” 28 C.F.R.
§ 541.3(a) (emphasis added). Thus, Decker need not have succeeded in using the mail
system for an illegal purpose to have committed a violation—he need only have attempted
to do so. That it was factually impossible for him to succeed does not mean Decker cannot
be held liable for the attempt. See, e.g., United States v. Cote, 504 F..3d 682, 687
(7th Cir. 2007). Consequently, Decker has no basis on which to challenge the legal
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sufficiency of the DHO’s determination.
Returning to the question of the sufficiency of the evidence, Decker’s claim fails
because there was “some evidence” to support the finding of guilt. At the rehearing, the
DHO relied on the report of the officer who reviewed Decker’s phone call and letter;
Decker’s 	disciplinary 	history; 	the 	phone 	call 	log 	and 	the 	written 	letter, 	which
corroborated the reporting officer’s report; Decker’s prior statements to the investigating
lieutenant, the UDC, and the DHO at the initial hearing; and Decker’s rehearing
testimony. (Doc. 11-3, at 4–5).
The letter and the phone call are reasonably read to refer to criminal activity—
specifically, it is natural to read them as giving his wife instruction on how to sell
contraband on the internet. Decker instructed his wife to use virtual private networks
and data encryption programs to browse the web privately (Doc. 11-3, at 13 (officer report
describing the letter); Doc. 14, at 7–13 (copy of the letter)), and told her to “[b]uy some
things online to sell too like I used to do, O.K.? Buy small [at] first until you know it’s
good, O.K. Look for other sites to sell on too O.K. That way you can expand your
customer’s [sic].” (Doc. 14, at 12). This evidence, from which the DHO inferred an
intention to further the commission of crimes similar to those for which Decker had been
originally convicted, is more than sufficient to meet the “meager threshold” required in
this context. Scruggs, 485 F.3d at 941.
Decker’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. He makes two principal
contentions: first, he claims there was no proof he had written the letter in question
(Doc. 1, ¶ 3); and second, he argues there is no evidence that he was attempting to engage
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in criminal activity, because he never explicitly referred to illegal matters in the phone
call or letter. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 4–5; Doc. 4, at 5; Doc. 14, at 2, 5). These arguments are ultimately
futile because this Court’s only role is to determine whether some evidence supports the
conclusion by the DHO—not to rehash individual substantive arguments from the
disciplinary rehearing. Even if the Court could consider Decker’s arguments, however,
they are without merit.
First, the DHO based its finding at rehearing that Decker had written the letter on
his admission at the initial hearing that he had done so. (Doc. 11-3, at 4–5). An admission
by Decker himself easily clears the “meager threshold” required to support the finding
that Decker had written the letter. Scruggs, 485 F.3d at 941.
Second, Decker argues that there is no evidence of criminal activity because each
of the statements in the letter and the phone call have innocuous explanations. (Doc. 1,
¶¶ 4–5 (“It does not state anywhere in the letter the following as alleged, Drugs,
Darkweb, Bitcoins, or anything that was illegal. . . . [the reporting officer] inferred that
what I was allegedly attempting to do was instruct my wife in illegal activities, but all in
all I was explaining to my wife on how to be safe on the internet in totality.”); Doc. 14,
at 2, 5 (explaining that the allegedly inculpatory portions of the phone call and letter
referred to legal activities rather than illegal activities, as inferred by the DHO)).
This argument is similarly futile, because the question before this Court is not
whether the DHO’s reading of Decker’s letter is the only plausible reading, or even the
most plausible. The Court finds that it was reasonable for the DHO to infer, based on the
phone call where Decker’s wife referred to “what [he] went to jail for,” (Doc. 11-3, at 4),
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that the phone call and subsequent letter were referring to illegal activity.
Ultimately, the DHO’s conclusion that the letter was an attempt to use the mail
system for an illegal purpose was clearly based on some evidence. The DHO read the
letter and, in the context of the previous phone call with his wife, concluded that the letter
was explaining to his wife how to use virtual private network and data encryption
services to conduct illegal activities online without getting caught. That there may be
alternative explanations for Decker’s words is irrelevant when the only question is
whether the DHO based its conclusion on “some evidence.” Because this Court cannot
say that “no reasonable adjudicator could have found [Decker] guilty of the offense on
the basis of the evidence presented,” Henderson, 13 F.3d at 1077, Decker’s petition must
be denied.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
filed by Petitioner Robert K. Decker (Doc. 1) is DENIED. Decker’s Motion for Status
(Doc. 19) is DENIED as moot.
If Decker wishes to appeal this Order, he must file a notice of appeal with this
Court within 60 days of the entry of judgment. F ED. R. A PP . P. 4(a)(1)(B). If Decker chooses
to appeal, he will be liable for the $605.00 appellate filing fee irrespective of the outcome
of the appeal. See F ED. R. A PP . P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d
724, 725-26 (7th Cir. 2008). If Decker files a motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis, he
must include in his motion a description of the issues he intends to present on appeal.
See F ED. R. A PP . P. 24(a)(1)(C).
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It is not necessary for Decker to obtain a certificate of appealability from this
disposition of his § 2241 petition. Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 638 (7th Cir. 2000).
This entire action is DISMISSED with prejudice, and the Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 	January 6, 2026
____________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge
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