Exum v. Doe et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JERRY EXUM JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN DOE,
C/O MOTELLO,
C/O DULANEY,
DR. COLE,
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCE,
NURSE NEWELL,
NURSE KANTY,
NURSE BAKER, and
NURSE SHERMAN,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-cv-01340-MAB
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Jerry Exum, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections who is
currently incarcerated at Lawrence Correctional Center, brings this civil action pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights. The Complaint is now before
the Court for preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.1 Under Section 1915A,
any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or requests money damages from a defendant who by law
1 The Court has jurisdiction to screen the Complaint in light of Plaintiff’s consent to the full jurisdiction of
a magistrate judge and the Illinois Department of Corrections’ and Wexford’s limited consent to the
exercise of magistrate judge jurisdiction as set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding between the
Illinois Department of Corrections, Wexford, and this Court.
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is immune from such relief must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
THE COMPLAINT
Plaintiff alleges the following: On March 20, 2025, Plaintiff was transported from
Lawrence Correctional Center (Lawrence) to Freeport, Illinois, for a court appearance.
(Doc. 1, p. 7). Prior to his departure, Correctional Officers Motello and Dulaney
handcuffed Plaintiff, wrapped a chain around his body and left arm, and secured the
handcuffs and chain with a “black box” handcuff cover. (Id.). The handcuffs and the chain
made it almost impossible to move, and the handcuffs were very tight, causing Plaintiff’s
hands to become numb. (Id.). Dulaney then placed leg shackles on Plaintiff, which were
also tight and uncomfortable. (Id.). Plaintiff was escorted to the transport van, seated in
the back row, and not properly secured. (Id.). The drive from Lawrence to the courthouse
in Freeport, Illinois, was six hours. (Id. at p. 8). During the long ride, Plaintiff’s wrists and
legs hurt. (Id. at p. 10).
Once they arrived in Freeport and were a few blocks from the courthouse, another
driver ran a stop sign and drove into the transport van. (Doc. 1, p. 8). Plaintiff was
propelled from his seat, he hit the steel and plastic partition that separated him from the
correctional officers, and he fell on the floor of the van. (Id.). Excruciating pain shot down
his neck and into his back. (Id.). Plaintiff was dizzy and confused, his head was throbbing,
his ears were ringing, and his body was sore. (Id). Plaintiff crawled back onto his seat and
sat back down. (Id.). Dulaney and Motello asked Plaintiff if he was “alright.” Plaintiff
informed them that he had slammed his head on the partition and now his neck and back
“hurt like crazy.” (Id.).
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Dulaney spoke with 	Motello 	and called 	someone at Lawrence for further
instructions. (Doc. 1, p. 9). John Doe, the driver of the other vehicle and an employee of
animal control in Freeport, approached the van asking if everyone was “alright” and
saying, “it was his fault.” (Id. at p. 8-9). The police arrived, and the accident was
documented. (Id. at p. 9). Plaintiff asked the correctional officers if they thought he needed
to go to the hospital. Motello again called Lawrence. (Id.). Plaintiff overheard Motello tell
someone at Lawrence that the courthouse was only a few blocks away from their location.
Motello asked Plaintiff whether he wanted to go to the courthouse or return to Lawrence.
(Id.). Even though Plaintiff was in pain, Plaintiff chose to go to the courthouse. (Id.). Before
Motello hung up the phone call with the individual at Lawrence, Plaintiff heard her say
that Plaintiff would need to see a doctor when he returned. (Id. at p. 10). Motello again
asked Plaintiff if he was “okay,” and Plaintiff told her that his body was throbbing and
his neck and back were sore, but he was “still alive.” (Id.). Following the court
appearance, they drove back to Lawrence. (Id.).
When Plaintiff returned to Lawrence, he was taken to the health care unit. (Doc. 1,
p. 10). In the health care unit, Dulaney told Sergeant Riggs that Plaintiff had been in a car
accident. (Id.). Riggs responded, “Dr. Cole knows and wants to see him.” (Id.). But Dr.
Cole refused to see Plaintiff because she was too busy doing paperwork on new transfers.
(Id.).
Nurse Newell examined Plaintiff’s back and neck. (Doc. 1, p. 10). Newell saw
swelling and asked Plaintiff to rate his pain. (Id.). Plaintiff rated his pain at an eight but
also stated that his head “felt like a 10.” (Id.). Plaintiff asked if he was going to be taken
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to the hospital because Newell was “not qualified as a doctor.” (Id. at p. 11). Newell
responded, “no,” and told Plaintiff that the decision to send him to a hospital is up to Dr.
Cole. (Id.). When it appeared that Plaintiff was going to be sent back to his cell without
seeing a doctor, he asked if he could have something for his pain. (Id.). Nurse Kanty gave
Plaintiff a Toradol injection and administered insulin because Plaintiff is diabetic. (Id.).
Newell then gave Plaintiff a bag of ice and six Motrin pills. (Id.). Plaintiff again asked
about his head injury and if Dr. Cole would see him. (Id.). Nurse Newell told Plaintiff that
Dr. Cole would most likely see him the following day. (Id. at p. 12).
That evening, Plaintiff was unable to eat dinner. (Doc. 1, p. 12). He vomited in the
night and again at breakfast the following day. (Id.). Plaintiff “was in so much pain” that
he “just wanted to die.” (Id.). On March 21, 2025, Plaintiff stopped Nurse Baker and told
her about his pain caused by the car crash. (Id.). Baker stated that she did not know about
the car accident and that if she remembered, she would bring him pain medication. (Id.).
Baker did not return. (Id.). Plaintiff then stopped Nurse Sherman, and Sherman gave
Plaintiff the same response – that she did not know about the car accident and that if she
remembered she would bring him pain medication. (Id. at p. 12-13). Sherman also did not
return. (Id. at p. 13).
On March 22, 2025, Plaintiff’s neck was stiff, and he could not rotate it “too far.”
(Doc. 1, p. 13). His back was swollen and in pain, and his wrists were sore and spasming.
(Id.). Plaintiff had vomited again the previous night. (Id.). Plaintiff spoke to Nurse Newell
and asked about seeing Dr. Cole. (Id.). Newell informed Plaintiff that Dr. Cole was still
busy doing paperwork for the new transfers. Newell stated she would bring Plaintiff
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medication for his pain if she remembered, but she did not return to his cell. (Id.).
On March 23, 2025, Plaintiff was given ibuprofen and aspirin by Nurse Eckert, and
the pain medicine helped “a lot” for a “short while.” (Doc. 1, p.14). Plaintiff did not see
Dr. Cole until March 26, 2025. (Id.). Dr. Cole examined Plaintiff’s neck and back, and she
told Plaintiff that he would be sore for a couple of months. (Id.). She then asked about
Plaintiff’s hand injury and whether Plaintiff was vomiting. (Id. at p. 14-15). Plaintiff told
her that he had thrown up three times after the crash. (Id.). Dr. Cole stated that he
probably had a concussion and that if after a few days he still was having headaches and
dizzy spells then she would send him to the hospital for a scan. (Id.).
Days later, Plaintiff was still having major headaches, and his balance was “off at
times.” (Doc. 1, p. 15). Plaintiff wrote to Dr. Cole seeking medical treatment, but he
received no response. (Id.). Certain nurses became vindictive towards Plaintiff and would
dismiss him when he sought care. (Id.).
PRELIMINARY D ISMISSALS
Plaintiff sues the driver of the other vehicle, who worked for animal control in
Freeport, Illinois, and is identified as John Doe. (Doc. 1, p. 16). Following the accident,
Plaintiff alleges that John Doe stayed at the scene, he inquired into the well-being of
Plaintiff, Dulaney, and Motello, and he admitted the accident was “his fault.” While these
allegations may support a claim of negligence against John Doe, negligence is not enough
to bring a claim under Section 1983. Plaintiff must demonstrate something more than
negligence, or even gross negligence, to support a Section 1983 claim. See James v. Hale,
959 F. 3d 307, 318 (7th Cir. 2020); Chapman v. Keltner, 241 F. 3d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 2001).
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Accordingly, any constitutional claim intended against John Doe is dismissed.
Plaintiff has also failed to state a claim against Wexford Health Source (Wexford).
As a corporation, Wexford can only be liable for a policy or practice that caused the
alleged violation of a constitutional right. Shields v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 789 (7th
Cir. 2014). Plaintiff has made no such claim. In fact, Wexford is not even mentioned in his
statement of claim, and merely naming Wexford as a defendant in the case caption is not
sufficient to state a claim. See Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998). Therefore,
Wexford is dismissed as a defendant without prejudice.
D ISCUSSION
Based on Plaintiff’s allegations and his articulation of his claims, the Court
designates the following counts:
Count 1: 	Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim
against Motello and Dulaney for failing to properly secure
Plaintiff in the transport van on March 20, 2025.
Count 2: 	Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Motello and
Dulaney for securing Plaintiff’s handcuffs and leg shackles
too tight during the transport to Freeport, Illinois, on March
20, 2025.
Count 3: 	Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against
Newell, Kanty, Baker, Sherman, and Dr. Cole for failing to
provide adequate medical care for his injuries resulting from
the car accident that occurred on March 20, 2025.
The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders,
unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is
mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered
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dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly 2 pleading
standard.
Count 1
Plaintiff claims that Correctional Officers Motello and Dulaney did not properly
secure him in the van resulting in him slamming into the dividing partition and causing
injury when the car accident occurred on March 20, 2025. (Doc. 1, p. 7-8).
The Court assumes that failing to “properly secure” means that Plaintiff was not
provided a seatbelt. Failing to provide a seatbelt, however, standing alone, does not
violate the Constitution. Accordingly, Count 1 is dismissed as to Motello and Dulaney.
See Proffitt v. Ridgway, 279 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 2002) (concluding that failure to seatbelt
an arrestee in the back seat of a squad car, which wrecked causing the arrestee’s death,
was at most negligence); Dale v. Agresta, 771 F. App’x 659, 661 (7th Cir. 2019) (noting that
neither the Seventh Circuit or the Supreme Court has ruled that “transporting an inmate
without a seatbelt creates an intolerable risk of harm”); O’Quinn v. Williams, No. 23 C
50276, 2025 WL 2418410, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2025) (“the Constitution does not
guarantee seatbelts during transport”).
Count 2
Plaintiff explains that after Motello and Dulaney handcuffed him, he was “stuck
in that same position and its very tight it cuts off your blood circulation leaving your
hand numb.” (Doc. 1, p. 7). He also states that the leg shackles were “very tight and very
uncomfortable,” causing his legs “to go numb and fall asleep.” (Id.).
2 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
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Even if the handcuffs and leg shackles were applied too tightly, these facts do not
rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment claim. “The ‘core requirement’ of an excessive
force claim under the Eighth Amendment is that the defendant ‘used force not in a good-
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, but maliciously and sadistically to cause
harm.’” Gates v. Doctors, No. 24-CV-704-JVB-JEM, 2024 WL 5186647, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Dec.
19, 2024) (quoting Hendrickson v. Cooper, 589 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 2009)). Plaintiff does
not make any allegation that the officers purposely placed the handcuffs and leg shackles
on him to cause him pain or that they ignored his complaints pain. Accordingly, Count 2
is dismissed. See Tibbs v. City of Chi., 469 F. 3d 661, 666 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding no excessive
force 	under 	the 	Fourth 	Amendment 	reasonableness 	standard 	where 	the 	plaintiff
complained once to an officer, gave no indication of the degree of his pain, and
experienced minimal injury).
Count 3
To plead an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must
allege: (1) that he suffered from an objectively serious medical condition (objective
standard); and (2) that the individual defendant was deliberately indifferent to that
condition (subjective standard). Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 2010); Arnett
v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Johnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d 579, 584 (7th
Cir. 2006)). A medical condition is objectively serious if “‘a physician has diagnosed it as
requiring treatment, or the need for treatment would be obvious to a layperson.’” Lockett
v. Bonson, 937 F.3d 1016, 1023 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th
Cir. 2014)). To satisfy the subjective component, a prisoner must demonstrate that an
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official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health. Greeno v. Daley, 414
F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). Neither medical malpractice, nor mere disagreement with a
doctor’s medical judgment will amount to deliberate indifference. Id.
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Nurses Kanty, Baker, and Sherman. As
to Nurse Kanty, Plaintiff states that she treated him when he arrived at the health care
unit following the car accident. Nurse Kanty spoke with Dr. Cole about Plaintiff’s current
condition and then administered Toradol, gave Plaintiff an ice pack, and 6 Motrin pills.
(Doc. 1, p. 11). Plaintiff was then told by another nurse, Nurse Newell, that he most likely
would be seen by Dr. Cole the following day. Nurse Kanty’s conduct, as described, does
not plausibly amount to deliberate indifference. She consulted with the medical doctor
and administered medication for Plaintiff’s pain. There is no indication that she was
aware that Plaintiff continued to feel unwell after March 20, 2025, and that Plaintiff was
denied subsequent care. Count 3 is dismissed as to Nurse Kanty.
Count 3 is also dismissed against Nurses Baker and Sherman. According to the
Complaint, Plaintiff had a single interaction with each nurse on March 21, 2025. (Doc. 1,
p. 12). Plaintiff informed the nurses that he was injured in a car accident and experiencing
pain. The nurses said they would bring him pain medication, if they remembered, but
neither one did. (Id. at p. 12-13). Plaintiff did not have any further interactions with the
nurses. As pled, the Court cannot plausibly infer that either Nurse Baker or Nurse
Sherman disregarded an excessive risk to his health or safety by failing to return with
pain medication one time. At most, these individuals acted with negligence, which is not
deliberate indifference. See Johnson v. Dominguez, 5 F. 4th 818, 825 (7th Cir. 2021)
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(“deliberate indifference does not equate to medical malpractice”); Owens v. Duncan, 788
F. App’x 371, 374 (7th Cir. 2019) (a single interaction with staff at sick call did not amount
to deliberate indifference); Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1374 (7th Cir. 1997) (“isolated
instances of neglect…cannot support a finding of deliberate indifference”).
Count 3 will proceed against Nurse Newell. Newell examined Plaintiff on March
20, 2025, when he returned to Lawrence after the car accident. (Doc. 1, p. 12). He spoke
again with Newell on March 22, 2025, and he told her that he still had not seen Dr. Cole
and that he continued to experience pain. (Id. at p. 13). Newell did not, however, take any
action to ensure that Plaintiff was provided adequate medical care for his injuries,
including assisting him in seeing a doctor or providing him pain medicine. The Court
will allow Plaintiff to proceed on Count 3 against Nurse Newell.
Count 3 will also proceed against Dr. Cole, Plaintiff’s treating physician, who has
delayed and/or denied Plaintiff care for his injuries as a result of the car accident on
March 20, 2025.
M OTION FOR RECRUITMENT OF COUNSEL
Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 3), which is
DENIED.3 Plaintiff discloses several unsuccessful efforts to contact attorneys via written
correspondence 	and 	has 	included 	the 	letters 	from 	seven 	law 	firm 	declining
representation. Accordingly, he appears to have made reasonable efforts to retain counsel
on his own. With respect to his ability to pursue this action pro se, Plaintiff indicates that
3 In evaluating Plaintiff’s Motion for Recruitment of Counsel, the Court applies the factors discussed in
Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007) and related authority.
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he has no legal knowledge, and his incarceration will make litigating this case difficult.
He also states that he has a learning disability and mental health problems. Nonetheless,
the Court finds that Plaintiff can proceed pro se, at least for now. Plaintiff’s pleadings
demonstrate an ability to construct coherent sentences and relay information to the Court.
Plaintiff has had some high school education, and he appears competent to attempt to
litigate this matter without representation at this time. Once discovery on the merits has
commenced, if Plaintiff has significant difficulty, he may refile his motion.
D ISPOSITION
For the reasons set forth above, the Complaint survives preliminary review
pursuant to Section 1915A. COUNTS 1 and 2 are DISMISSED without prejudice.
COUNT 3 shall proceed against Dr. Cole and Nurse Newell and is DISMISSED
without prejudice as to Kanty, Baker, and Sherman. Because there are no surviving
claims against John Doe, Motello, Dulaney, Wexford Health Source, Kanty, Baker, and
Sherman, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate them as parties on the docket.
The Clerk of Court SHALL prepare for Defendants Dr. Cole and Newell the
following: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a
Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED
to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to the
defendants’ place of employment. If a defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of
Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were
sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on the defendant,
and the Court will require the defendant pay the full costs of formal service, to the
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extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
If a defendant can no longer be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff,
the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the defendant’s current work address, or, if
not known, his last known address. This information shall be used only for sending the
forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the
address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be
maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendants are ORDERED to file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
Complaint in a timely manner and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(g). Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants only need to
respond to the issues stated in this Merit Review Order.
Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915
for leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs
or give security for the same, the applicant and (if applicable) his or her attorney were
deemed to have entered into a stipulation that any unpaid costs taxed against the
applicant shall be paid from any recovery secured in this action.
Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep
the Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the
Court will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing
and not later than 14 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to
comply with this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and
may result in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 41(b).
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In light of this Order, the Motion for Status is DEEMED moot. (Doc. 9).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 5, 2026
/s/ Mark A. Beatty
MARK A. BEATTY
United States Magistrate Judge
N OTICE TO PLAINTIFF
The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of
your lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been
achieved, the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint.
It will likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the defendants’
Answers, but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When all of the
defendants have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing
important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to
wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the
defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before
defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature.
Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at his time, unless otherwise directed
by the Court.
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