Eads v. City of Collinsville et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PATRICIA EADS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF COLLINSVILLE &
VILLAGE OF MARYVILLE,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-CV-01555-SPM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
McGLYNN, District Judge:
Before the Court are two Motions to Dismiss: one filed by the Defendant City
of Collinsville and one filed by the Defendant Village of Maryville. (Docs. 13, 14).
Having been fully informed of the issues presented, both Motions to Dismiss are
DENIED.
RELEVANT FACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND
This action arises from Plaintiff Patricia Eads’s challenge of four municipal
ordinances which restricted the possession of certain weapons and related devices.
On July 1, 2025, Plaintiff filed her Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the
Third Judicial Circuit in Madison County, Illinois. (Doc. 1, Ex. A). The Complaint
alleged that ordinances enacted by Defendant City of Collinsville, §§ 9.28.010(c) and
(e), and Defendant Village of Maryville, §§ 137.01(A)(5) and (A)(7),1 violated her
1 Plaintiff’s Complaint incorrectly listed these sections as 137.01(a)(5) and (a)(7) (see Doc. 1, Ex. 1 ¶¶
25, 28, 30, 36), but no such sections exist, (see Doc. 14, Ex. 2).
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Second Amendment rights as incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 	(Id.). 	Specifically, 	she 	alleges 	that 	section 	9.28.010(c) 	unlawfully
prohibits 	the 	carriage 	or 	possession 	of 	pepper 	spray; 	that 	section 	9.28.010(e)
unlawfully prohibits the carriage or possession of a firearm at any location which sells
intoxicating 	beverages 	and 	at 	certain 	public 	events; 	that 	section 	137.01(A)(5)
unlawfully prohibits the concealed carry or possession in a vehicle of a stun gun; and
that section 137.01(A)(7) prohibits the possession of a silencer. (Id., Ex. A. ¶ 5, 18, 24,
30).
On August 8, 2025, Defendants timely removed the action pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1443. (Doc. 1 ¶ 4). After filing their Notice, Defendants repealed
the ordinances at issue. (Doc. 13, p. 6 (citing id., Ex. C); Doc. 14, p. 6 (citing id., Ex.
C)). Defendants then moved to dismiss the Complaint, contending that Plaintiff
lacked standing and that the repeal of the ordinances rendered the matter moot.2
(Docs. 	13, 	14). 	Plaintiff 	responded 	that 	she 	retained 	standing, 	and 	that 	the
controversy remained live. (Doc. 16). In the alternative, she argued that if the Court
found federal jurisdiction to be lacking, only remand, not dismissal, would be
appropriate since a lack of jurisdiction would make the removal improper. (Id.).
2 Defendants advance their standing and mootness arguments under both Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule
12(b)(6). (Doc. 13 pp. 3–6; Doc. 14 pp. 4–6). However, because questions of standing and mootness
implicate a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction under Article III, see Chicago Joe’s Tea Room,
LLC v. Vill. of Broadview, 894 F.3d 807, 813–14 (7th Cir. 2018), such arguments are properly analyzed
under Rule 12(b)(1), see Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chicago Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811,
820 (7th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, the Court will proceed with Defendants’ arguments solely under Rule
12(b)(1).
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LEGAL S TANDARD
A defendant utilizes a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) motion to
dismiss to raise the defense that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Bazile
v. Fin. Sys. of Green Bay, Inc., 983 F.3d 274, 279 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing F ED. R. C IV.
P. 12(b)(1)). This defense can take the form of a facial or a factual attack on the
plaintiff's allegations. See Apex Dig., Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 443–
44 (7th Cir. 2009). A facial attack tests whether the allegations, taken as true, support
an inference that the elements of standing exist. See id. In this way, a facial attack
does not challenge the alleged facts themselves. Bazile, 983 F.3d at 279. But a factual
attack 	does, 	testing 	the 	existence 	of 	jurisdictional 	facts 	underlying 	the
allegations. See id.
Accordingly, if a defendant challenges the facial sufficiency of the allegations
regarding subject matter jurisdiction, the Court must accept as true all well-pled
factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Apex
Digital, 572 F.3d at 443–44. But where a complaint is “facially sufficient but external
facts call the court's jurisdiction into question, [the Court] ‘may properly look beyond
the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been
submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction
exists.’” Taylor v. McCament, 875 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Apex Digital,
572 F.3d at 444).
DISCUSSION
Federal 	courts 	are 	courts 	of 	limited 	jurisdiction. 	Exxon 	Mobil 	Corp. 	v.
Allapatthah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005). Article III of the United States
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Constitution confers on federal courts jurisdiction over “cases” and “controversies.”
U.S. CONST . art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Article III jurisdiction requires that the parties
maintain a personal stake in the litigation through all stages of the proceedings.
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (citations and quotations omitted). This
“personal stake” in the suit must exist “not only at the outset of litigation, but
throughout its course.” Gracia v. SigmaTron Int’l, Inc., 986 F.3d 1058, 1063 (7th Cir.
2021) (quoting Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 701 (2011)).
The closely related doctrines of standing and mootness derive from Article III's
limitation of judicial power. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 335 (2006).
The standing doctrine addresses whether, at the inception of the litigation, the
plaintiff had suffered a concrete injury that could be redressed by action of the court.
See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). Mootness addresses
whether the plaintiff continues to have such a stake throughout the course of the
litigation. Milwaukee Police Ass’n v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm’rs, 708 F.3d 921, 929
(7th Cir. 2013). In clarifying how standing and mootness interact, the Supreme Court
characterized mootness as “the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite
personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing)
must continue throughout its existence (mootness).” Arizonans for Official English v.
Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 n.22 (1997). Accordingly, the absence of standing at the
commencement of suit or the loss of a live controversy through mootness deprives
federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction. See Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk,
569 U.S. 66, 71 (2013).
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Defendants moved to dismiss, contending that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. (Doc. 13, pp. 5–6; Doc. 14, pp. 5–6). They argue
that Plaintiff both lacks standing, and that her claims are now moot. (Doc. 13, pp. 3–
6; Doc. 14, pp. 4–6). Each argument will be addressed in turn.
I. 	Standing
Beginning 	with 	standing,3 	Defendants 	contend 	Plaintiff 	lacks 	standing
because she was neither prosecuted under the ordinances nor threatened with
prosecution and thus suffered no injury in fact.4 (Doc. 13 pp. 4–5; Doc. 14 p. 5). The
Court disagrees.
To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate an injury in fact
that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent, that is fairly traceable to the
defendant’s conduct, and that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. An injury in fact only exists when a plaintiff shows that
they have sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as
the result of the challenged official conduct, and the injury or threat of injury must
be both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical. City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983). When a plaintiff seeks prospective relief from a harm
not yet incurred, they must establish that they are immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury. Bell v. Keating, 697 F.3d 445, 451 (7th Cir. 2012). A
3 The Court may address standing and mootness in any order it chooses. Acheson Hotels, LLC v.
Laufer, 601 U.S. 1, 4 (2023). In this case, it chooses to proceed with standing.
4 Defendants’ do not challenge the facts as alleged, but rather the Plaintiff’s legal conclusion that those
facts establish an injury in fact. (See Docs. 13, 14). Accordingly, their motion constitutes a facial attack
under Rule 12(b)(1), which requires the Court to accept all well-pled factual allegations as true and
draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor. Apex Digital, 572 F.3d at 443–44.
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plaintiff who wishes to engage in conduct arguably protected by the Constitution but
criminalized by statute sufficiently demonstrates an immediate risk of injury. Id.
Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint challenges four separate municipal ordinances—
the City of Collinsville’s ordinances 9.28.010(c) and (e), and the Village of Maryville’s
ordinances 137.01(A)(5) and (A)(7)—as violative of her rights under the Second
Amendment as incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc.
1, Ex. A). These ordinances prohibit the possession of pepper spray, firearms in
certain locations, stun guns, and silencers. The Second Amendment extends to all
instruments that constitute “bearable arms.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
570, 582 (2008). While not unlimited, the right secured by the Second Amendment
includes those weapons in common use that are typically possessed by law-abiding
citizens for lawful purposes. Id. at 624–26. Courts have recognized that pepper spray,
firearms, stun guns, and silencers are at least arguably protected by the Constitution.
See, e.g., Avitabile v. Beach, 368 F. Supp. 3d 404, 409 (N.D.N.Y. 2019); Moore v.
Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 934 (7th Cir. 2012); Caetano v. Massachusetts, 577 U.S. 411,
412 (2016); Bevis v. City of Naperville, 85 F.4th 1175, 1228 (7th Cir. 2023) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Barnett v. Raoul, 756 F. Supp. 3d 564 (S.D. Ill. 2024), judgment
entered, No. 23-CV-00141-SPM, 2024 WL 5707234 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2024).
Because Plaintiff alleges that she wishes to engage in conduct arguably
protected by the Second Amendment but criminalized by the challenged ordinances,
she has demonstrated an immediate risk of injury sufficient to establish injury in
fact. Accordingly, this Court holds that Plaintiff had standing at the time of filing.
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II. 	Mootness
Turning to mootness, Defendants argue that the repeal of the challenged
ordinances renders all of Plaintiff’s claims moot.5 (Doc. 13, pp. 5–6; Doc. 14, pp. 5–6).
Once again, this Court disagrees.
A case is moot, and federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction, when the
issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in
the outcome. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 297 (2000). Mootness precludes
review when a party with standing at the inception of the litigation loses it due to
intervening events. Parvati Corp. v. City of Oak Forest, 630 F.3d 512, 516 (7th Cir.
2010).
Where mootness is premised on voluntary cessation of the challenged activity,
a defendant must show that there is no reasonable expectation the activity will
resume following adjudication. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs.
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000). When cessation takes the form of repeal,
however, the burden shifts. In such cases, it is the plaintiff who must provide
“evidence indicating that the challenged law likely will be reenacted.” Fed’n of Advert.
Indus. Representatives, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 326 F.3d 924, 930 n.7 (7th Cir. 2003)
(citing Nat’l Black Police Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 346, 349 (D.C. Cir.
1997)). This is because “the repeal of a challenged statute is one of those events that
5 Defendants’ mootness argument rests on facts that arose after the filing of the Complaint, namely
the repeal of the challenged ordinance, to argue that no live controversy remains. (Doc. 13, pp. 5–6;
Doc. 14, pp. 5–6). Because the Court must consider this extrinsic fact in assessing jurisdiction,
Defendants’ argument, therefore, constitutes a factual attack under Rule 12(b)(1). Apex Digital, 572
F.3d at 444. As such, the court may properly look beyond the jurisdictional allegations of the Complaint
and consider whatever evidence has been submitted to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction
exists. Id.
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makes it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior . . . could not
reasonably be expected to recur,” and “the mere power to reenact a challenged law is
not a sufficient basis on which a court can conclude that a reasonable expectation of
recurrence exists.” Id. (citation modified).
Whether repeal renders a plaintiff’s claims moot depends on the type of relief
sought. If a plaintiff seeks only declaratory and injunctive relief, repeal of the
challenged law moots those claims. Markadonatos v. Village of Woodridge, 760 F.3d
545, 546 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 474 (1990);
Diffenderfer v. Cent. Baptist Church of Miami, Inc., 404 U.S. 412, 415 (1972) (per
curiam). If, however, a plaintiff pairs requests for declaratory and injunctive relief
with claims for damages, repeal does not deprive a federal court of jurisdiction. See
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S.
598, 608–09 (2001). Even if said damages are merely nominal,6 such a request is
sufficient by itself to sustain Article III jurisdiction. See Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski,
592 U.S. 279, 291 (2021).
Here, it is undisputed that the challenged ordinances have been repealed. (See
Docs. 13, 14, 16). Plaintiff has not alleged facts suggesting Defendants are likely to
reenact 	them 	or 	adopt 	substantially 	similar 	provisions. 	(See 	Doc. 	1, 	Ex. 	A).
Accordingly, 	Plaintiff’s 	claims 	for 	injunctive 	and 	declaratory 	relief 	are 	moot.
6 It is unclear whether Plaintiff’s request for damages—$20.00 per count, for a total value of $80.00—
is rightfully considered nominal or compensatory. Kyle v. Patterson, 196 F.3d 695, 697 (7th Cir. 1999)
($1.00 is the norm for nominal damages); Moore v. Liszewski, 838 F.3d 877, 878 (7th Cir. 2016)
(nominal damages rarely exceed $2.00); but see Quainoo v. City of Huntsville, 611 Fed. Appx. 953, 955
(11th Cir. 2015) (nominal damages can range from $1.00 to $100.00).
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However, because Plaintiff also seeks damages, (see id., ¶¶ 12, 14, 22, 28, 36), those
claims remain live and are not rendered moot by the Defendants’ repeal of the
challenged ordinances. See Six Star Holdings, LLC v. City of Milwaukee, 821 F.3d
795, 799 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of
Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 608–09 (2001)). Therefore, Defendants’ Motions
to Dismiss must both be denied.
C ONCLUSION
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	above, 	both 	Motions 	to 	Dismiss 	filed 	by 	the
Defendants City of Collinsville (Doc. 13) and Village of Maryville (Doc. 14) are
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: December 12, 2025
s/ Stephen P. McGlynn
STEPHEN P. McGLYNN
U.S. District Judge
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