Schuttpelz v. USA et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MICHAEL L. SCHUTTPELZ,
#41686-039,
Plaintiff,
vs.
USA, MS. CURRY, STEPHEN ARDREY,
T. HUCKELBERRY, DANIEL SPROUL,
MR. WALLACE, MS. TAPELEY,
DR. OWINGS, MS. DEITRICK,
MS. DUNNING, C. BROOKS, JENNIE
McGLYNN EMMONS, BRYAN TAUBE,
NESTLEROAD, STEVE BENNER,
KARL HAWS, JOHN N. O’BRIEN, II,
CHRISTOPHER S. PENNISI,
G. THOMAS WINTERHALTER,
KEVIN MALCAHY,
and STEPHEN J. MURPHY,
Defendants.
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Case No. 25-cv-01847-JPG
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
GILBERT, District Judge:
Plaintiff Michael Schuttpelz, a federal inmate at Loretto Federal Correctional Institution
(FCI-Loretto), brings this action for money damages against the United States and 20 individuals
under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed’l Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
He complains of miscellaneous violations of his federal rights that resulted in his incarceration at
and transfer from the United States Penitentiary in Marion, Illinois (USP-Marion).1
1 In September 2025, Plaintiff filed 3 civil suits in this District to address claims arising out of his
confinement at USP-Marion in 2022. The Court refers to this case as “Schuttpelz 3.” See also Schuttpelz v.
United States, No. 25-cv-01815-JPG (S.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2025) (“Schuttpelz 1”) (Federal Torts Act Claim
(FTCA) for property lost during prison transfer); Schuttpelz v. United States, No. 25-cv-01846-JPG (S.D.
Ill. Sept. 30, 2025) (“Schuttpelz 2”) (FTCA claim against United States for same events that give rise to
this action).
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The Complaint (Doc. 1) is subject to review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires
screening and dismissal of any portion that is legally frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim
for relief, or seeks money damages from an immune defendant. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(a)-(b). At this
juncture, the factual allegations are liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv.,
577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
The Complaint
Plaintiff sets forth the same allegations in two complaints he filed on September 30, 2025,
i.e., Schuttpelz 2 (Doc. 1, pp. 5-19) and Schuttpelz 3 (Doc. 1, pp. 11-25). According to both,
Plaintiff was wrongfully disciplined and transferred from the United States Penitentiary in Marion,
Illinois (USP-Marion) to another federal facility on October 26, 2022. He faults 20 or more federal
officials for their roles in transferring him without a binding separation order. Plaintiff claims they
worked together, contributed to, or conspired to violate statutes, regulations, laws, and rules in an
abuse of process that resulted in the “false imprisonment of [his] physical being.” Id.
According to Plaintiff, Defendant Curry was the “originating compulsion . . . that instigated
the 	retaliative 	conspiracy, 	to, 	have, 	Plaintiff 	Michael 	Schuttpelz 	submitted 	to 	‘false
imprisonment’” at USP-Marion. On August 7, 2022, this defendant conducted a cell shakedown.
Plaintiff became outraged because the shakedown reminded him of an earlier cell search that
resulted in the confiscation, loss, or destruction of his billiard chalk cubes. Id.
He discussed the shakedown with another inmate at a Sex Offender Treatment Program
(Residential) (SOTP-R) processing session on August 9, 2022. Inmate Stephen Ardrey listened in
on the session while the two inmates talked, in violation of SOTP-R confidentiality rules.
Defendant Huckelberry questioned Plaintiff about the conversation on August 10, 2022. The
officer concluded that Plaintiff was being untruthful about his role in the matter and issued him a
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disciplinary ticket for a “203 infraction.” Plaintiff was placed in USP-Marion’s Special Housing
Unit (SHU) the same day. Id.
On August 17, 2022, a female officer conducted a telephonic disciplinary hearing before
finding Plaintiff guilty and punishing him with a $15 fine, 21 days of segregation, 27 days of lost
good time credit, and 60 days of lost commissary, email, and visitation privileges. Because he
transferred to the SHU on August 10, 2022, Plaintiff claims that he should have been released after
21 days on August 31, 2022. He remained in the SHU until he transferred to another federal facility
on October 26, 2022. Plaintiff claims that he was subjected to false imprisonment from
September 1, 2022 until October 26, 2022. Id.
Defendant Brooks had authority to release him from the SHU but refused to do so.
Defendants Owings, Dunning, and Deitrick also failed to release him from the SHU after
August 31, 2022. When Defendant Owings learned where the plaintiff would be transferred, she
“gloatingly” informed him that he would not like it there. Warden Sproul had authority to stop the
transfer but did not. On October 25, 2022, USP-Marion officials packed the plaintiff’s belongings
and left some behind.2 As he exited the facility on October 26, 2022, Defendant Owings said, “Do
not ever come back here.” No separation order was legally issued before his transfer. Id.
While at USP-Marion, Plaintiff repeatedly requested a BP-8 Form. He asked Defendants
Brooks, Wallace, and Tapeley for this form to appeal the disciplinary decision, his continued
placement in the SHU, and other unspecified issues. Defendants failed to provide the form or
address any of these concerns. Id.
Plaintiff claims that all other defendants played a role in his false imprisonment through
their alleged abuse of process in his underlying arrest, prosecution, and/or conviction for
2 Schuttpelz 1 focuses on Plaintiff’s claim for lost property arising from this prison transfer. See id.
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enticement of a minor. This includes FBOP officials Jenny McGlynn Emmons, Bryan Taube,
Steve Benner, Karl Haws, Christopher S. Pennisi, G. Thomas Winterhalter, and Special Agent
Nestleroad and Assistant United States Attorneys John O’Brien, II, Kevin Mulcahy, and Stephen
J. Murphy. Id.
Discussion
Based on these allegations, the Court finds it convenient to designate the following claims
in the pro se Complaint:
Count 1: 	Bivens claim against Defendants for issuing Plaintiff a disciplinary ticket
for a “203 infraction” on August 10, 2022, and punishing him with 21 days
in segregation, 27 days of lost good time credit, and 60 days of lost
privileges.
Count 2: 	Bivens claim against Defendants for Plaintiff’s prolonged placement in
USP-Marion’s SHU from September 1, 2022 until October 26, 2022, after
he completed his 21-day punishment on August 31, 2022.
Count 3: 	Bivens claim against Defendants for Plaintiff’s unlawful transfer to another
federal facility without a lawful separation order on October 26, 2022.
Count 4: 	Bivens 	claim 	against 	Defendants 	for 	their 	role 	in 	Plaintiff’s 	false
imprisonment in the Federal Bureau of Prisons for enticement of a minor.
Any claim that is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed herein is considered
dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly.3
Plaintiff brings his claims in this case pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,
403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971). In Bivens, the Supreme Court first recognized an implied damages
remedy against individual federal officers for violations of the Fourth Amendment prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392. In the decade that followed,
the Court extended the implied damages remedy only twice to cover a Fifth Amendment claim of
3 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”).
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gender discrimination in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) and an Eighth Amendment claim
of medical deliberate indifference in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). The Supreme Court
has since declined to extend the implied damages remedy into any new context or to include any
new defendants. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 133 (2017).
The Court more recently clarified that all further expansion of the implied damages remedy
is strongly disfavored. See Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482 (2022). Now, a district court presented
with any Bivens-type claim must determine whether it meaningfully differs from the three claims
previously recognized by the Supreme Court in Bivens, Davis, and Carlson. Egbert, 596 U.S. at
492. The district court must also consider whether “special factors” counsel hesitation in
expanding this remedy into a new context without congressional action. Id. This analysis hinges
on the question of whether Congress or the Court is in a better position to create a damages remedy.
Id. Generally, Congress is in the better position to do so. Id.
Counts 1 through 4 all present new contexts not previously recognized by the Supreme
Court. In Count 1, Plaintiff challenges his punishment resulting from an allegedly false disciplinary
ticket. In Count 2, he disputes his prolonged placement in the SHU. In Count 3, he takes issue with
a prison transfer. In Count 4, Plaintiff challenges the underlying basis of his custody and detention
within the FBOP. These claims are unlike the Fourth Amendment search and seizure claim in
Bivens, Fifth Amendment gender discrimination claim in Davis, or Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference to medical needs claim in Carlson.
Counts 	1 	through 	4 	also 	involve 	different 	groups 	of 	defendants 	not 	previously
contemplated in Bivens, Davis, or Carlson. This includes the United States, United States
Attorney, Assistant United States Attorneys, Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agents,
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miscellaneous prison staff, and an inmate. The Supreme Court has not authorized further expansion
of the Bivens-type remedy to cover these defendants.
Moreover, the FBOP’s administrative remedies process and/or habeas actions may be used
to address due process violations like the ones alleged by Plaintiff. See Goree v. Serio, 735 F.
App’x 894 (7th Cir. 2018) (claims premised on due process violations arising from administrative
and disciplinary proceedings not cognizable under Bivens and properly dismissed at screening).
And, to the extent Plaintiff presents a new claim, Congress is in a better position than the Court to
create any additional remedy.
Based on the foregoing discussion, Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4 against Defendants shall be
dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim,4 and this case will be closed.
Disposition
IT IS ORDERED that the Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This includes COUNTS 1, 2, 3, and 4 against
ALL DEFENDANTS. Because no other claims remain pending, the entire action is DISMISSED
with prejudice. Plaintiff is ADVISED that this dismissal counts as one of his three allotted
“strikes” under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Plaintiff’s obligation to pay the filing fee for this action was incurred at the time the action
was filed, thus the filing fee of $350.00 remains due and payable. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); Lucien
v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998). If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, his
notice of appeal must be filed with this Court within sixty days of the entry of judgment. FED. R.
4 Plaintiff’s claims may also be barred by the applicable statute of limitations or by his failure to exhaust
all available administrative remedies before filing his complaint as required under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act. Even if he timely filed suit after properly exhausting his administrative remedies in compliance
with the PLRA, however, Plaintiff’s underlying claims do not survive screening and are subject to dismissal
under 28 U.S.C. 1915A.
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APP . P. 4(a)(1)(A). A motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis should set forth the issues
Plaintiff plans to present on appeal. See FED. R. APP . P. 24(a)(1)(C). If Plaintiff does choose to
appeal, he will be liable for the $605.00 appellate filing fee irrespective of the outcome of the
appeal. See FED. R. APP . P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Moreover, if the appeal is found to be
nonmeritorious, Plaintiff may also incur a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A proper and timely
motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may toll the 60-day appeal deadline.
FED. R. APP . P. 4(a)(4). A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no more than twenty-eight (28) days
after the entry of the judgment, and this 28-day deadline cannot be extended.
The Clerk’s Office is DIRECTED to close this case and enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: December 01, 2025 	s/ J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
United States District Judge
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