GRANGER v. CITY OF ANDERSON TRANSIT SYSTEM

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
CYNTHIA GRANGER, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:23-cv-01548-JPH-TAB
)
CITY OF ANDERSON TRANSIT SYSTEM, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Cynthia Granger alleges that while she was working as a bus
driver for the City of Anderson Transit System ("CATS"), CATS discriminated
against 	her 	based 	on 	her 	sex 	and 	race, 	subjected 	her 	to 	a 	hostile 	work
environment, and retaliated against her. 	CATS has filed a motion for summary
judgment. 	Dkt. [40]. 	For the reasons below, that motion is GRANTED.
I.
Facts and Background
Because CATS has moved for summary judgment under Rule 56(a), the
Court views and recites the evidence "in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Zerante
v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
Ms. Granger, a Black woman, began working for CATS as a bus driver in
2011. 	Dkt. 49-1 at 269. 	Her direct supervisors were Jim Carpenter, a white
male, and Barbara Johnson, a white woman. 	Id. at 38–40. 	Ms. Granger is a
member to the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees
Case 1:23-cv-01548-JPH-TAB Document 59 Filed 11/17/25 Page 1 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
Union Local 1913 ("AFSCME"). 	Id. at 61. 	CATS has a Collective Bargaining
Agreement ("CBA") with AFSCME. 	Dkt. 49-6.
A. Ms. Granger's disciplinary history and grievances
Ms. Granger filed two union grievances in late 2018, stating that CATS
treated her differently based on her "color" and sex. 	Dkt. 49-12 at 1–2. 	And in
May 2019, Ms. Granger emailed the president of her union local to report that
Mr. Williams yelled at her and acted in a hostile, harassing, and intimidating
manner towards her. 	Dkt. 49-13.
In March 2021, Ms. Granger left her assigned bus unattended for more
than five minutes without the flashers on, and without notifying the terminal or
dispatcher of her absence. 	Dkt. 49-7. 	CATS gave Ms. Granger a "2nd Offense,"
which 	resulted 	in 	a 	written 	warning, 	under 	the 	union 	CBA's 	progressive
disciplinary policy governing "minor infractions" of the CBA and work rules.
Dkts. 49-1 at 67; 49-6 at 29–31; 49-7. It is unclear why Ms. Granger received a
"2nd Offense," and not "1st Offense" under the policy, as she did not have a prior
offense in her record. 	Dkts. 49-1 at 67; 49-8.
Ms. Granger thereafter submitted a grievance to reduce the discipline to a
"1st Offense" under the progressive disciplinary policy. 	Dkt. 49-1 at 57. 	Under
that policy, CATS "will not take into consideration a prior disciplinary action
occurring 	more 	than 	one 	(1) 	year 	from 	the 	date 	of 	the 	offense 	for 	which
disciplinary action is contemplated," dkt. 49-6 at 30, and Ms. Granger argued
that she had not been disciplined in the prior year, dkt. 49-1 at 57. 	The union
board responsible for assessing her grievance rejected her grievance. Dkt. 49-8.
Case 1:23-cv-01548-JPH-TAB Document 59 Filed 11/17/25 Page 2 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
On April 8th, 2021, Ms. Granger was disciplined for failing to report to
work for mandatory overtime, resulting in a one-day suspension. 	Dkt. 49-1 at
90–92. 	Later that month, Ms. Granger was disciplined for insubordination for
not listening to her supervisor Barabara Johnson's instructions to stay after her
shift for a meeting. 	Dkt. 41-8 at 1. 	This discipline resulted in a three-day
suspension. 	Dkt. 49-1 at 126.
Also 	in 	spring 	2021, 	another 	bus 	driver—Tim 	Stanley—had 	a
disagreement with Ms. Granger about seniority and bus route bidding at a union
meeting. 	Dkt. 49-1 at 229–31. 	After Mr. Stanley said to Ms. Granger, "I called
you a witch, you bitch," she reported this incident to Leo Williams, CATS's
Director of Operations, but he took no action in response. 	Dkt. 49-2 (Granger
Aff. at 1 ¶ 8).
In August 2021, a passenger left a complaint with Mr. Williams about
another bus driver. 	Dkt. 49-1 at 225. 	Mr. Williams tried to call the passenger
back, but she did not answer. 	Id. at 227. 	Her voicemail, however, recorded a
discussion between Mr. Williams and Merle Jones, CATS's General Manager. Id.
at 44, 228. 	Mr. Jones remarked that he thought he heard the message refer to
"Cynthia," and Mr. Williams responded, "No, I don't think it's that Cynthia." 	Id.
at 228. Mr. Jones then said, "Yeah, it is, the witch. I'd just hang up on the bitch."
Id. 	The passenger sent a recording of this conversation to Ms. Granger. 	Id. at
224. Ms. Granger reported Mr. Jones's statement to Jake Brown, CATS's Human
Resources Representative, but Mr. Brown took no action in response. 	Dkt. 49-
2 (Granger Aff. at 2 ¶ 10).
Case 1:23-cv-01548-JPH-TAB Document 59 Filed 11/17/25 Page 3 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
On Ms. Granger's January 5, 2022, route, a passenger holding her child
fell out of her seat. 	Dkt. 49-1 at 147–48. 	Ms. Granger pulled over and verbally
reported the incident to dispatch. 	Id. at 148. 	She also told her supervisor that
she was preparing an "Accident Report Card." 	Id.; dkt. 49-10. 	Ms. Granger
submitted the accident report card on January 13th after she realized she had
not turned it in yet. 	Dkt. 49-1 at 148; dkt. 49-9. 	The same day, CATS received
a complaint from the passenger requesting that CATS pay her medical bills. Dkt.
41-10 at 2; dkt. 41-11. 	CATS suspended Ms. Granger for five days without pay
because she failed to complete the accident report in the required time and failed
"to immediately report any accident or injury involving any City employee,
equipment, or property." 	Dkt. 49-9. 	This was her "5th offense" under the
progressive disciplinary policy. 	Id.; dkts. 49-1 at 155; 49-6 at 30.
In December 2022, Ms. Granger called over the radio that she was going
to assist a passenger, but two white bus drivers mocked her over the radio and
interrupted her. 	Dkt. 49-1 at 160–61.
B. Ms. Granger's use of personal sick time for medical treatment
On August 12, 2022, Ms. Granger fell on the broken bottom step of a bus
and told her supervisor Jim Carpenter that she needed medical treatment for the
fall. 	Dkt. 49-2 (Granger Aff. at 1 ¶ 5). 	Mr. Carpenter told Ms. Granger to clock
out and use personal sick time to obtain medical treatment. 	Id. at ¶ 6.
C. Conduct of Ms. Granger's co-worker
Randy Wiggins, a white man, also worked as a bus driver for CATS. 	See
dkt. 49-1 at 132–33. In June 2021, while driving a bus out of the CATS garage,
Case 1:23-cv-01548-JPH-TAB Document 59 Filed 11/17/25 Page 4 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
Mr. Wiggins ran over a "No Parking" sign, damaging both the sign and the bus.
Id. at 133; see also dkt. 49-11 at 1–5 (pictures of the bus and sign). Ms. Granger
heard a CATS mechanic call Mr. Wiggins over the radio to tell him that he had
hit the sign and that bus parts were lying on the ground. Dkt. 49-1 at 134. Mr.
Wiggins responded to the mechanic that he "was going to report it," but did not
stop.1 Id.
Then, in July 2022, Mr. Wiggins drove a CATS "Nifty Lift" commercial van
through a parking lot and damaged the van by crashing it into a pole. 	Id. at
138–39; dkt. 49-11 at 6–7 (pictures of the van). Ms. Granger heard Mr. Wiggins
report the incident to a CATS supervisor over the radio.2 	Dkt. 49-1 at 138–39.
The CBA lists "Destruction of City property" as a dischargeable offense. Dkt. 49-
6 at 30.
C. Procedural history
In September 2022, Ms. Granger filed a Charge of Discrimination with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging race and gender
discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. 	Dkt. 41-1 at 1. 	In
May 2023, the EEOC issued a "right to sue" letter to Ms. Granger. Dkt. 41-2. In
August 2023, Ms. Granger brought this action, alleging that CATS discriminated
against her based on her sex and race, subjected her to a sex- and race-based
1 CATS argues that these statements are inadmissible hearsay. Dkt. 58 at 4–5.
However, these statements are admissible for their truth as an admission of CATS's
"employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship and while it existed." Fed.
R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D); see also Baines v. Walgreen Co., 863 F.3d 656, 662–63 (7th Cir.
2017) (holding statement from one of defendants' employees to another employee was
admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(D) as a statement of a party opponent's employee).
2 CATS does not contest the admissibility of this statement.
Case 1:23-cv-01548-JPH-TAB Document 59 Filed 11/17/25 Page 5 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
hostile work environment, and retaliated against her for engaging in a protected
activity. 	Dkt. 1. 	CATS has moved for summary judgment. 	Dkt. 40.
II.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law." 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 	The moving party must inform the
court "of the basis for its motion" and specify evidence demonstrating "the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact." 	Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party
must "go beyond the pleadings" and identify "specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial." 	Id. at 324.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence
"in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw[s] all reasonable
inferences in that party's favor." 	Zerante, 555 F.3d at 584 (citation omitted).
III.
Analysis
Ms. Granger brings three claims against CATS, alleging: (1) disparate
treatment based on race and sex, (2) hostile work environment based on race
and sex, and (3) retaliation. 	Dkt. 1 at 3–5.
A. Disparate treatment
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to "discriminate against any
individual . . . because of such individual's race [or] . . . sex." 	42 U.S.C. 2000e-
2(a)(1). 	"[T]he singular question that matters in a discrimination case" is
Case 1:23-cv-01548-JPH-TAB Document 59 Filed 11/17/25 Page 6 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
"whether the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the
plaintiff's race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed factor caused the
discharge or other adverse employment action." 	Johnson v. Advoc. Health &
Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 894 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Ortiz v. Werner Enters.,
Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 764–66 (7th Cir. 2016)). 	"Evidence must be considered as a
whole, rather than asking whether any particular piece of evidence proves the
case by itself. . . . Relevant evidence must be considered and irrelevant evidence
disregarded." 	Id.
A plaintiff may organize and present evidence using the burden-shifting
approach articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973). 	See Johnson, 892 F.3d at 894–95. 	But "[t]here is no magic to this test;
it is merely one way of culling the relevant evidence needed to demonstrate
whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that an employer engaged in an
adverse employment action based on the plaintiff's race or other proscribed
factor." 	Id. at 894.
Here, Ms. Granger proceeds under the McDonnell Douglas approach. Dkt.
50 at 10–11. 	To establish her prima facie case, she must show that she (1)
belonged to a protected class, (2) met CATS's legitimate expectations, (3) suffered
an adverse employment action, and (4) was similarly situated to other employees
who were not members of the protected class and who were treated better.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. 	If Ms. Granger makes out a prima
facie case, the burden shifts to CATS to give a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for the adverse employment action. Id. If CATS does so, the burden shifts
Case 1:23-cv-01548-JPH-TAB Document 59 Filed 11/17/25 Page 7 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

8
back to Ms. Granger to present evidence that the defendant's explanation was
pretext for unlawful discrimination. 	David v. Bd. of Trs. of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No.
508, 846 F.3d 216, 225 (7th Cir. 2017).
1. Prima facie case
CATS argues that Ms. Granger cannot show that she was subjected to an
adverse employment action and that she has not designated evidence sufficient
to show that a similarly situated employee outside her protected class was
treated more favorably. 	Dkt. 42 at 11–12; dkt. 58 at 1–7.
a. Materially adverse action
CATS argues that the March 2021 written reprimand was not an "adverse
action" actionable under Title VII. 	Dkt. 58 at 3 n.1.
"[A] documented reprimand alone is not an adverse action 'absent some
tangible job consequence.'" Scaife v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affs., 49 F.4th 1109,
1119 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Sweeney v. West, 149 F.3d 550, 556 (7th Cir.
1998)). 	And "oral or written reprimands received by an employee under an
employer's progressive discipline system do not implicate job consequences
tangible enough to establish an independent basis for Title VII liability." 	Fuller
v. McDonough, 84 F.4th 686, 690 (7th Cir. 2023) (citing Oest v. Ill. Dep't of Corr.,
240 F.3d 605, 613 (7th Cir. 2001), rev'd on other grounds, Ortiz, 834 F.3d 760).
Here, 	the 	designated 	evidence 	does 	not 	show 	that 	the 	March 	2021
reprimand 	was 	an 	actionable 	adverse 	employment 	action. 	Although 	Ms.
Granger's 	March 	2021 	written 	reprimand 	moved 	her 	further 	along 	the
progressive discipline system, dkt. 49-1 at 55, a reprimand that does not result
Case 1:23-cv-01548-JPH-TAB Document 59 Filed 11/17/25 Page 8 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

9
in "any immediate consequence . . . such as ineligibility for job benefits like
promotion, transfer to a favorable location, or an advantageous increase in
responsibilities" is not an adverse action actionable under Title VII. 	Fuller, 84
F.4th at 690; see also Oest, 240 F.3d at 613. Thus, her March 2021 "2nd offense"
is not an adverse action actionable under Title VII.3
Therefore, the January 2022 suspension is the only actionable adverse
employment action identified by Ms. Granger that could support her disparate
treatment claim. See Nagle v. Village of Calumet Park, 554 F.3d 1106, 1120 (7th
Cir. 2009).
b. Similarly situated employee
CATS next argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because Ms.
Granger has not designated evidence to identify a "similarly situated" comparator
under the McDonnell Douglas framework. 	Dkt. 58 at 1–7.
In this context, a comparator is another employee outside the protected
class who engaged in similar conduct but was "subject [] to less severe discipline"
for that conduct. Perez v. Thorntons, Inc., 731 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 2013). "A
suitable comparator is an employee who is directly comparable to the plaintiff in
all material respects." 	Palmer v. Ind. Univ., 31 F.4th 583, 590 (7th Cir. 2022).
"There 	must 	be 	'enough 	common 	factors' 	between 	the 	plaintiff 	and 	his
comparator 'to allow for a meaningful comparison.'" 	Id. at 590 (citing Warren v.
Solo Cup Co., 516 F.3d 627, 630–31 (7th Cir. 2008)). 	"[W]hether employees are
3 For this reason, the Court need not address CATS's argument that the minutes from
the hearing where the union upheld this "2nd offense" are inadmissible and don't
support an inference of disparate treatment. Dkt. 58 at 2–4.
Case 1:23-cv-01548-JPH-TAB Document 59 Filed 11/17/25 Page 9 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

10
similarly situated is a 'flexible, common-sense, and factual' inquiry." David, 846
F.3d at 225 (citing Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 841 (7th Cir. 2012)).
Factors that can guide the inquiry include "whether the employees (i) held the
same 	job 	description, 	(ii) 	were 	subject 	to 	the 	same 	standards, 	(iii) 	were
subordinate 	to 	the 	same 	supervisor, 	and 	(iv) 	had 	comparable 	experience,
education, and other qualifications." 	Crain v. McDonough, 63 F.4th 585, 592
(7th Cir. 2023).
Here, Ms. Granger identifies two comparators: Randy Wiggins and Warren
Lane. 	Dkt. 50 at 3–4. 	CATS argues that neither is a suitable comparator. 	Dkt.
58 at 1–7.
A. 	Randy Wiggins
Ms. Granger states that CATS discriminated against her based on her race
and sex when it disciplined her for failing to promptly report an incident where
a passenger fell on her bus. 	Dkt. 50 at 4–5. 	Ms. Granger argues that Randy
Wiggins, a white male, was treated more favorably than her when he was not
disciplined after failing to immediately report that he ran over a "No Parking"
sign and separately when he drove a Nifty Lift van into a pole, totaling the vehicle.
Id.
It's undisputed that Mr. Wiggins had the same position and supervisor as
Ms. Granger and was subject to the same disciplinary policy. CATS argues that
Ms. Granger has not designated evidence to show that Mr. Wiggins engaged in
materially similar conduct to her, so he cannot be used as a comparator. 	Dkt.
58 at 4–7.
Case 1:23-cv-01548-JPH-TAB Document 59 Filed 11/17/25 Page 10 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

11
Ms. Granger must show that Mr. Wiggins "engaged in similar conduct
without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish
their conduct or the employer's treatment of them." Anderson v. Street, 104 F.4th
646, 653 (7th Cir. 2024) (internal citations omitted). 	Ms. Granger first argues
that Mr. Wiggins engaged in similar conduct when he failed to immediately report
that he ran over a sign. 	Dkt. 50 at 5. 	She designates her deposition testimony
regarding a conversation she heard between Mr. Wiggins and a CATS mechanic
where the mechanic said to Mr. Wiggins, "You just ran down a sign and there
are parts of the bus laying in the grass here," and Mr. Wiggins responded, "Oh,
yeah. I was going to report that." 	Dkt. 49-1 at 133–34.
The designated evidence shows that Ms. Granger's suspension under the
progressive disciplinary policy was imposed for "[f]ailure to complete accident
report in prescribed time" and "[f]ailure to immediately report any accident or
injury involving any City employee, equipment, or property." 	Dkt. 41-10 at 1.
Regarding Mr. Wiggins' incidents, Ms. Granger has not designated evidence
showing that he also failed to complete accident report in prescribed time,
whether or when he reported the accidents to management, what management
knew about the circumstances surrounding those incidents, or whether Mr.
Wiggins was disciplined for either incident.4 	See dkt. 50 at 4–5. 	Without this
4 Although Ms. Granger states in her briefings that "when Defendant produced Wiggins's
personnel file as part of discovery, it did not contain an accident report card or any
record of discipline for either of the two incidents," dkt. 50 at 6, she has not designated
corresponding evidence. 	As the evidentiary record does not substantiate this statement
as required, the Court does not consider it. 	S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1; Patterson v. Indiana
Newspapers, Inc., 589 F.3d 357, 360 (7th Cir. 2009) ("The district court is within its
discretion to strictly enforce compliance with its local rules regarding summary-
Case 1:23-cv-01548-JPH-TAB Document 59 Filed 11/17/25 Page 11 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

12
critical information, which could be mitigating or differentiating, Ms. Granger's
deposition testimony does not establish that Mr. Wiggins "had a comparable set
of failings." 	Abrego v. Wilkie, 907 F.3d 1004, 1013 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding that
plaintiff's offered comparator was not similarly situated because he "fail[ed] to
show that [the coworker] had the same shortcomings").
Similarly, Ms. Granger has not designated evidence showing what CATS
management knew about Mr. Wiggins's accidents and whether and when he may
have reported them. 	In contrast, the designated evidence shows that CATS
management knew the facts and circumstances surrounding Ms. Granger's
incident, including that a passenger went to the hospital for medical treatment.
Dkt. 41-10 at 1–2 (discipline notice and memo from Jim Carpenter). 	The
designated evidence further shows that CATS management knew when and how
Ms. 	Granger 	reported 	the 	accident 	and 	that 	based 	on 	those 	facts, 	CATS
management found her sufficiently culpable to warrant disciplinary action. Id.
With no designated evidence showing what CATS's management knew of the
facts 	and 	circumstances 	surrounding 	Mr. 	Wiggins's 	accidents, 	including
whether and when he reported them and whether management concluded that
he 	was 	sufficiently 	culpable 	as 	to 	warrant 	discipline, 	it's 	impossible 	to
judgment motions."). Indeed, Plaintiff's designated evidence in opposition to summary
judgment, dkt. 49, consists of exhibits and an appendix identifying them. There are no
cites to any pages of any exhibits. Moreover, the appendix does not include any records
purporting to be from Mr. Wiggins's "personnel file", written discovery responses from
Defendant about whether Mr. Wiggins was disciplined for either incident, or depositions
of Mr. Wiggins or any CATS management with knowledge as to whether and when Mr.
Wiggins 	reported 	those 	incidents, 	management's 	evaluations 	of 	the 	facts 	and
circumstances surrounding those incidents, and whether Mr. Wiggins was disciplined.
Case 1:23-cv-01548-JPH-TAB Document 59 Filed 11/17/25 Page 12 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

13
meaningfully compare management's treatment of Mr. Wiggins to its treatment
of Ms. Granger. 	See Anderson, 104 F.4th at 653 (finding that plaintiff did not
meet the comparator burden when plaintiff "cite[d] only her own deposition
testimony 	that 	customers 	complained 	to 	her 	more 	than 	once 	about
[comparator's] conduct" and she did not "present evidence or even allege that
management knew").
Ms. Granger also argues that Mr. Wiggins was treated more favorably than
her because his accidents could be classified as "Destruction of City property,"
which is listed as a "dischargeable offense" under CATS's CBA. 	Dkts. 50 at 5;
49-6 at 30 (collective bargaining agreement). 	Ms. Granger was disciplined for
failing to report an incident where a passenger fell on her bus and required
medical treatment. Dkt. 49-9 at 1. Mr. Wiggins had two accidents that damaged
the vehicles he was driving, but no passengers were involved. Dkts. 49-1 at 153
("No, he did not have any passengers on the bus."); 49-5 (Granger Interrogatories
at 1–2); 49-11 (pictures of busses after Mr. Wiggins's accidents). 	So, the
underlying incidents that Ms. Granger asks the Court to use as comparator
evidence are not "directly comparable . . . in all material respects." Coleman, 667
F.3d at 846; see also Bless v. Cook County Sheriff's Off., 9 F.4th 565, 576 (7th
Cir. 2021) (stating that an offered comparator is not suitable when "there are
clear 	differences 	between 	[plaintiff's] 	actions 	and 	those 	of 	the 	proposed
comparators").
Ms. 	Granger 	has 	therefore 	not 	"isolate[d] 	the 	critical 	independent
variable—discriminatory animus." 	Mitchell v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 143 F.4th 800,
Case 1:23-cv-01548-JPH-TAB Document 59 Filed 11/17/25 Page 13 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

14
810 (7th Cir. 2025). 	In conclusion, Mr. Wiggins is not a suitable comparator.
See Nigro v. Ind. Univ. Health Care Assoc's, Inc., 40 F.4th 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2023)
(affirming summary judgment grant that coworkers were not similarly situated
because plaintiff did not point to a coworker that engaged in similar conduct and
had similar conduct-related complaints).
B. 	Warren Lane
Ms. Granger also identifies Warren Lane as a comparator, stating that she
was forced to use personal sick time to seek medical treatment after an injury at
work, while Mr. Lane, a white male, did not have to use personal sick time to
treat an injury that occurred at work. 	Dkt. 50 at 3. 	In support, Ms. Granger
states in her brief that Mr. Lane told her he was "leaving to go to the doctor and
would return after that appointment" after he was injured at work. 	Id. 	In
comparison, Mr. Carpenter told Ms. Granger that she needed to clock out and
use personal sick time to seek medical care for an injury that occurred at work.
Dkt. 49-2 (Granger Aff. at 1 ¶ 5–6).
The problem, however, is that Ms. Granger does not designate evidence
that Mr. Lane was permitted to go to a medical appointment after being injured
at work without using personal sick time. See generally dkt. 50 at 3. In support
of Mr. Lane being treated more favorably than her, Ms. Granger cites to page 11
of dkt. 49-5. 	Id. 	But this page does not exist; there are only two pages of Ms.
Granger's interrogatory responses, dkt. 49-5. 	Ms. Granger has not designated
admissible evidence regarding Mr. Lane, so no reasonable jury could find that
he was treated more favorably than her.
Case 1:23-cv-01548-JPH-TAB Document 59 Filed 11/17/25 Page 14 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

15
2. Pretext
Even if Ms. Granger could make out a prima facie case for race or sex
discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework, she has not designated
evidence that rebuts CATS's stated legitimate reasons for disciplining her. Under
McDonnell Douglas, once CATS "articulate[d] a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason 	for 	the 	adverse 	employment 	decision," 	Ms. 	Granger 	"must 	provide
evidence establishing a genuine dispute about whether the employer's stated
reason was a pretext for prohibited discrimination." Anderson, 104 F.4th at 653
(internal citations omitted). 	"A pretext is a lie, specifically a phony reason for
some action, not just faulty reasoning or mistaken judgment." 	Mitchell, 143
F.4th at 811 (internal citations omitted).
Here, 	CATS 	provided 	a 	legitimate, 	nondiscriminatory 	reason 	for 	Ms.
Granger's five-day suspension. Dkt. 42 at 11–12. CATS management disciplined
Ms. Granger for her failure to immediately report that a passenger fell on her bus
and failure to timely submit the required written accident report. 	Dkt. 49-9 at
1.
To meet her burden, Ms. Granger must "demonstrat[e] by a preponderance
of evidence that the stated reasons for her [discipline] were false, not that they
were unfair or baseless." Anderson, 104 F.4th at 653. She has not done so. Ms.
Granger does not even argue that CATS's discipline was pretextual. See dkt. 50
at 11–12. She only argues that she was disciplined for not reporting an incident
promptly while Mr. Wiggins was not. Id. "[C]omparator evidence can do 'double-
duty' at both the prima facie and pretext stages." Coleman, 667 F.3d at 858.
Case 1:23-cv-01548-JPH-TAB Document 59 Filed 11/17/25 Page 15 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

16
However, as discussed above, Mr. Wiggins is not a suitable comparator because
there's no designated evidence that can be used to do a meaningful comparison.
Ms. Granger's comparison to Mr. Wiggins therefore does not create a genuine
issue of material fact as to pretext. 	See Brooks v. Avancez, 39 F.4th 424, 437
(7th Cir. 2022) ("Brooks' examples do not provide apt comparisons to her
conduct, nor do they offer sufficient evidence of pretext.").
Ms. Granger has not met the burden of showing that the reasons given
for her suspension were false. 	Ms. Granger admits that she did not submit an
accident report card until "a week later, maybe seven to ten days later," but
CATS's company rules require the report to be turned in "as soon as possible,
like the same day, maybe the next day." Dkt. 49-1 at 148. 	So, Ms. Granger's
testimony corroborates the reasons given in the designated evidence for her
suspension. 	See Dkt. 49-9 at 1.
In sum, Ms. Granger has not designated comparator and pretext evidence
sufficient to meet her burden under the McDonnell Douglas framework. 	Under
that approach, no reasonable jury could find that CATS discriminated against
Ms. Granger based on her sex or gender when it suspended her.
C. 	Ortiz's Holistic Approach
In 	Ortiz, 	the 	Seventh 	Circuit 	instructed 	district 	court 	to 	focus 	in
employment discrimination cases on "the only question that matters: when
looking at the evidence as a whole, 'whether the evidence would permit a
reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff's race, ethnicity, sex, religion,
or other proscribed factor caused the discharge or other adverse employment
Case 1:23-cv-01548-JPH-TAB Document 59 Filed 11/17/25 Page 16 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

17
action." 	Brooks, 39 F.4th at 433 (quoting Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765); see also Vega
v. Chi. Park Dist., 954 F.3d 996, 1004 (7th Cir. 2020) ("What matters is whether
she presented enough evidence to allow the jury to find in her favor."). Here, the
answer is no.
Ms. Granger argues that CATS discriminated against her because of her
sex and race when it: (1) required her to take personal sick time to receive
medical care for an injury that occurred at work, dkt. 50 at 3, and (2) suspended
her for failing to report a passenger who fell and was injured while on her bus.
Id. at 4–6.
Viewing the designated evidence as a whole, no reasonable jury could
conclude that CATS's actions were because of Ms. Granger's race and sex. 	Ms.
Granger did not designate any evidence showing that Mr. Lane or other co-
workers were allowed to leave work for medical attention without using personal
sick time. See generally dkt. 50 at 3. As for the suspension, Ms. Granger didn't
designate 	sufficient 	evidence 	of 	Mr. 	Wiggins's 	accidents 	to 	be 	able 	to
meaningfully compare CATS's treatment of him to its treatment of her. And she
designated no evidence that CATS's stated reasons for suspending her were
contrived. 	Dkts. 49-9 at 1; 49-1 at 133.
Missing from the designated evidence is any evidence of the facts and
circumstances surrounding Mr. Wiggins's collisions, what management knew,
who made the decisions as to whether Mr. Wiggins would be disciplined, and
importantly, if Mr. Wiggins was disciplined. 	So, from the totality of evidence
provided, no reasonable jury could find that CATS discriminated against Ms.
Case 1:23-cv-01548-JPH-TAB Document 59 Filed 11/17/25 Page 17 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

18
Granger based on her race or sex when it required her to use personal time to
treat a medical condition and suspended her for failing to report an accident
involving an injured passenger on her bus. 	See Igasaki v. Ill. Dep't of Fin. & Pro.
Regul., 988 F.3d 948, 958–59 (7th Cir. 2021) (finding under the Ortiz framework
that no disparate treatment occurred when employee "recite[d] a litany of past
wrongs purportedly probative of race or sex discrimination," but the record did
not show that race or sex had a role in his termination).
In sum, viewing the designated evidence as a whole, no reasonable jury
could find that CATS discriminated against Ms. Granger based on her sex or
race. 	Therefore, 	CATS's 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment 	on 	the 	disparate
treatment claim is granted.
B. Hostile work environment
CATS argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Ms. Granger's
hostile work environment claim because the conduct that she identified was not
severe or pervasive. 	Dkt. 42 at 14–15.
To be actionable under Title VII, sexual or racial harassment must be
severe or pervasive enough to affect the terms and conditions of the plaintiff's
employment. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998);
Swyear v. Fare Foods Corp., 911 F.3d 874, 881 (7th Cir. 2018). 	At summary
judgment, Ms. Granger must designate evidence from which a trier of fact could
conclude that (1) she was subject to unwelcome harassment, (2) the harassment
was based on her sex and/or race, (3) the harassment was so severe or pervasive
as to alter the conditions of her employment and create a hostile working
Case 1:23-cv-01548-JPH-TAB Document 59 Filed 11/17/25 Page 18 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

19
environment, and (4) there is a basis for employer liability. 	Johnson, 892 F.3d
at 900; see also Gates v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 916 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 2019).
Ms. Granger identifies three incidents in support of her hostile work
environment claim: (1) Mr. Stanley calling her a "bitch" to her face in either
March or April 2021; (2) Mr. Jones referring to her a "bitch" outside her presence
in August 2021; and (3) other bus drivers mocking her over the radio system in
December 2022.5 	Dkt. 50 at 6–7. 	For the last incident, Ms. Granger does not
even say what the other drivers supposedly said or otherwise explain how their
comments implicated her sex or race, see id. at 13–15, so this incident does not
support her hostile work environment claim, see Scaife, 49 F.4th at 1117
(requiring plaintiff to show incidents "were based on gender"). So, the remaining
question 	is 	whether 	the 	first 	two 	incidents—where 	Ms. 	Granger's 	general
manager 	and 	co-worker 	called 	her 	a 	"bitch"—add 	up 	to 	a 	hostile 	work
environment.6
Ms. Granger must show that the discriminatory conduct was objectively
severe or pervasive, considering the totality of the circumstances. 	Scaife, 49
F.4th at 1115. 	This includes "(1) the frequency of the discriminatory conduct;
5 CATS contends that the incident with Mr. Stanley and the radio incident with the
bus drivers cannot be considered because she did not include these incidents in her
EEOC charge or her complaint. Dkt. 58 at 8–11. The Court assumes without deciding
that Ms. Granger has properly raised these incidents here and thus considers them in
evaluating whether a reasonable jury could find a hostile work environment. See Fort
Bend County v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 543 (2019) (holding Title VII's charge-filing
precondition is not a jurisdictional requirement).
6 The Court assumes without deciding that the use of the term "bitch" in these
contexts was sex-based.
Case 1:23-cv-01548-JPH-TAB Document 59 Filed 11/17/25 Page 19 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

20
(2) how offensive a reasonable person would deem it to be; (3) whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating conduct as opposed to verbal abuse; (4)
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance; and
(5) whether it is directed at the victim." 	Id.
CATS argues that Mr. Jones calling Ms. Granger a "bitch" one time is not
severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment. Dkt. 42 at 15.
Ms. Granger responds that along with this incident, Mr. Stanley also called Ms.
Granger a "bitch" to her face, and those actions were "well beyond abusive and
would likely be abusive by any reasonable person's standards." 	Dkt. 50 at 14.
Here, the designated evidence shows that at most, Ms. Granger was called
a "bitch" twice. 	Dkt. 49-1 at 228, 230. There is "no magic number of incidents
required to establish a hostile environment." Boumehdi v. Plastag Holdings, LLC,
489 F.3d 781, 789 (7th Cir. 2007). However, the Seventh Circuit has consistently
required 	more 	than 	two 	sex-based 	comments 	to 	show 	a 	hostile 	work
environment. 	See Patt v. Fam. Health Sys., Inc., 280 F.3d 749, 754 (7th Cir.
2002) 	(holding 	"eight 	gender-related 	comments" 	over 	plaintiff's 	multi-year
employment "were too isolated or sporadic to constitute severe or pervasive
harassment"); Mercer v. Cook County, 527 F. App'x 515, 521 (7th Cir. 2013)
(collecting cases and holding sexually explicit graffiti and eight other incidents—
including being called "bitch" twice—was not severe or pervasive enough); cf.
Boumehdi, 489 F.3d at 786–89 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding "at least eighteen sex-
based comments" over ten months was severe and pervasive enough to survive
summary 	judgment). 	So, 	while 	"[t]here 	is 	no 	question 	that 	gender-based
Case 1:23-cv-01548-JPH-TAB Document 59 Filed 11/17/25 Page 20 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

21
comments and epithets, when used pervasively in the workplace, can meet the
standard for severe or pervasive harassment," Passananti v. Cook Cnty., 689 F.3d
655, 668 (7th Cir. 2012), the designated evidence here that she was called or
referred to as a "bitch" twice over the course of Ms. Granger's multi-year
employment with CATS weighs against finding that she was subjected to a hostile
work environment.
Further, nothing in the designated evidence suggests Mr. Stanley's and
Mr. Jones's remarks were related. 	Instead, they were isolated incidents and
offhand comments that do not amount to a hostile work environment. 	See Patt,
280 F.3d at 754; see also Baskerville v. Culligan Intern. Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431
(7th Cir. 1995) ("A handful of comments spread over months is unlikely to have
so great an emotional impact as a concentrated or incessant barrage."). 	Here,
Mr. Stanley and Mr. Jones' use of the term "bitch" to refer to Ms. Granger
occurred months apart from each other. 	Dkt. 49-1 at 228, 230. 	And the
incidents occurred in different contexts, with Mr. Stanley speaking directly to
Ms. Granger after a union meeting and Mr. Jones saying it on a voicemail
recording to a third party. 	Id. 	That weighs further against finding that Ms.
Granger endured a hostile work environment.
Moreover, neither incident involved Ms. Granger's direct supervisor calling
her a "bitch." 	Dkt. 49-1 at 228. 	"The conduct of a non-direct supervisor or a
department 	lead 	. 	. 	. 	should 	undoubtedly 	be 	given 	more 	weight 	than 	an
employee's co-equal." 	Scaife, 49 F.4th at 1117 (discussing use of racial slurs).
But "a harasser who has direct supervisory control over an employee continues
Case 1:23-cv-01548-JPH-TAB Document 59 Filed 11/17/25 Page 21 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

22
to maintain more weight in the analysis" than either a non-direct supervisor or
a co-equal. 	Id. 	Although Mr. Jones was a supervisor at CATS, the designated
evidence shows that he had a non-direct supervision role over Ms. Granger, as
Jim Carpenter and Barbara Johnson were her direct supervisors. See dkt. 49-1
at 38. 	So, that lack of direct supervisory control by either Mr. Jones or Mr.
Stanley is yet "another weakness" in Ms. Granger's claim. 	Scaife, 49 F.4th at
1117 (holding department lead's use of racial epithet outside plaintiff's presence
was not severe enough to survive summary judgment); Anderson, 104 F.4th 646
(affirming summary judgment for defendants because manager calling employee
a "bitch" did not amount to a severe and pervasive work environment).
Finally, Mr. Jones also did not call Ms. Granger a "bitch" to her face. Dkt.
49-1 at 228. 	"[R]emarks that are stated directly to the plaintiff weigh heavier
than when a plaintiff hears them secondhand." 	Scaife, 49 F.4th at 1116
(discussing secondhand racial epithet). 	Ms. Granger learned about Mr. Jones'
comment secondhand from a passenger's voicemail. Dkt. 49-1 at 224. For that
reason, Mr. Jones' comment carries less weight than it would if, for example, Mr.
Jones called Ms. Granger a bitch in the presence of her and other employees.
In sum, Ms. Granger has not designated evidence from which a reasonable
jury could conclude she was subjected to conduct objectively severe or pervasive
enough to constitute a sex-based hostile work environment.7 	Ms. Granger also
7 For that reason, the Court need not address Ms. Granger's argument that she
subjectively perceived her colleagues' conduct as abusive, dkt. 50 at 14–15, or CATS's
other arguments for why Ms. Granger did not endure a hostile work environment, dkt.
42 at 14–15.
Case 1:23-cv-01548-JPH-TAB Document 59 Filed 11/17/25 Page 22 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

23
does not designate evidence or offer any explanation as to how the incidents she
raises relate to her race, so she has not met her burden as to any race-based
hostile 	work 	environment 	claim, 	either.8 	Accordingly, 	CATS's 	motion 	for
summary judgment as to Ms. Granger's hostile work environment claims is
granted.
C. Retaliation
CATS argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Ms. Granger's
retaliation claim because she has not shown a causal connection between
protected activity and an adverse employment action. 	Dkt. 58 at 12.
To survive summary judgment on this claim, Ms. Granger must designate
evidence of: "(1) a statutorily protected activity; (2) a materially adverse action
taken by the employer; and (3) a causal connection between the two." 	Baines v.
Walgreen Co., 863 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2017).
It's undisputed that Ms. Granger engaged in protected activity when she:
(1) 	filed 	two 	union 	grievances 	in 	late 	2018 	stating 	that 	CATS 	treated 	her
differently based on her "color" and sex; and (2) sent an email in May 2019 to
the president of her union local to report Mr. Williams' behavior toward her. Dkt.
50 at 16–17. 	As with her disparate treatment claim, Ms. Granger offers her
March 2021 written reprimand and January 2022 suspension as adverse actions
supporting her retaliation claim. 	Dkt. 50 at 18. 	But, as explained above, her
8 Because Ms. Granger has not designated evidence in which a reasonable jury could
conclude she was subjected to objectively severe or pervasive conduct and that it
relates to her race or sex, the court need not address the fourth element of a hostile
work environment of whether there is employer liability.
Case 1:23-cv-01548-JPH-TAB Document 59 Filed 11/17/25 Page 23 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

24
March 2021 written reprimand is not an "adverse action" under Title VII. So, for
the purpose of her retaliation claim, the only adverse action is her January 2022
suspension.
CATS argues that Ms. Granger has not shown a causal connection between
her protected activities and her January 2022 suspension. 	Dkt. 58 at 11–13.
Ms. Granger argues that CATS's explanation for her suspension—failure to
report accidents—is pretextual "in light of its treatment" of Mr. Wiggins and that
there 	was 	"suspicious 	timing" 	between 	her 	protected 	activities 	and 	her
suspension. 	Dkt. 50 at 19–20.
To demonstrate a "causal connection," a plaintiff must show that the
employer "would not have taken the adverse . . . action but for [the plaintiff's]
protected activity." 	Greengrass v. Int'l Monetary Sys. Ltd., 776 F.3d 481, 486
(7th Cir. 2015). Direct evidence is "sufficient but rare." Baines, 863 F.3d at 661.
A plaintiff can also establish the causal link "through circumstantial evidence
from 	which 	a 	jury 	may 	infer 	intentional 	discrimination." 	Id. 	at 	661.
Circumstantial evidence typically takes three forms: "(1) suspicious timing,
ambiguous statements, behavior towards other employees . . . ; (2) evidence, but
not necessarily rigorous statistical evidence, that similarly situated employees
were treated differently," or (3) evidence of pretext. 	Volovsek v. Wis. Dep't of
Agric., Trade and Consumer Prot., 344 F.3d 680, 689 (7th Cir. 2003).
"[C]omparator 	evidence 	can 	be 	relevant 	in 	showing 	retaliation" 	via
circumstantial evidence. 	Coleman, 667 F.3d at 681 n.9 (citing Volovsek, 344
F.3d at 689). 	However, its relevance depends on whether that comparator "ever
Case 1:23-cv-01548-JPH-TAB Document 59 Filed 11/17/25 Page 24 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

25
complained of unlawful discrimination." 	Id. 	Here, "the record is simply silent,"
id., as to whether Mr. Wiggins—Ms. Granger's only proposed comparator for this
claim—ever complained of unlawful discrimination. 	So, Mr. Wiggins cannot be
used as a comparator for Ms. Granger's retaliation claim. 	See Volovsek, 344
F.3d at 692 n.8 (framing the relevant comparator inquiry in a retaliation claim
as 	whether 	"a 	similarly 	situated 	employee 	who 	did 	not 	file 	discrimination
complaints" did not suffer the same adverse action).
Ms. 	Granger 	also 	offers 	"suspicious 	timing" 	to 	support 	a 	causal
connection. 	But 	her 	2022 	suspension 	occurred 	years 	after 	her 	protected
activities in 2018 and 2019. 	"That interval, standing alone, is too long" to
support an inference of causation. Paluck v. Gooding Rubber Co., 221 F.3d 1003,
1010 (7th Cir. 2000) (one year gap too long to infer causation); see also, e.g.,
Filipovic v. K&R Exp. Sys., Inc., 176 F.3d 390, 399 (7th Cir. 1999) (four months);
Lalvani v. Cook County, 269 F.3d 785, 790 (7th Cir. 2001) (year and a half). But
even if those events were sufficiently close in time, "temporal proximity alone is
'rarely sufficient' to establish causation." 	Castro v. DeVry Univ., Inc., 786 F.3d
559, 565 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting O'Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625,
635 (7th Cir. 2011)). 	Ms. Granger offers nothing else to support a causal
connection, so no reasonable jury could infer one here. 	See Coleman, 667 F.3d
at 861 (explaining that "an interval of a few weeks or even months may provide
probative 	evidence 	of 	the 	required 	causal 	nexus" 	when 	there 	is 	other
"corroborating evidence of retaliatory motive").
Case 1:23-cv-01548-JPH-TAB Document 59 Filed 11/17/25 Page 25 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>

26
In sum, Ms. Granger has not designated evidence from which a reasonable
jury could infer a causal connection between her 2022 suspension and her
earlier protected activities. Accordingly, CATS's motion for summary judgment
as to Ms. Granger's retaliation claim is granted.
IV.
Conclusion
CATS's motion for summary judgment on Ms. Granger's disparate
treatment, hostile work environment, and retaliation claims is GRANTED.
Dkt. [40]. Final Judgment shall issue in a separate entry.
SO ORDERED.
Distribution:
All electronically registered counsel
Date: 11/17/2025
Case 1:23-cv-01548-JPH-TAB Document 59 Filed 11/17/25 Page 26 of 26 PageID #:
<pageID>