Reynolds v. United Parcel Service, Inc.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
SHERRI D. REYNOLDS,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 25-2423-JWB
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on Defendant’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. 7.) The motion is
fully briefed and ripe for decision. 	(Docs. 8, 12, 15.) 	The motion is DENIED for the reasons
stated herein.
I. 	Facts
Sherri D. Reynolds (“Plaintiff”) is a former employee of United Parcel Service, Inc.
(“UPS” or “Defendant”) and worked as a preload charge supervisor in Kansas City, Kansas. (Doc.
1 ¶¶ 1, 14.) Plaintiff is a Caucasian female born in 1964. (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff was employed by
Defendant from July 9, 2018, to August 23, 2024. 	(Id. ¶ 1.) 	Plaintiff alleges age and sex
discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation, and constructive discharge, in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. and the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, et seq. (“ADEA”). (Id. ¶¶ 4, 17, 34–45, 46–56.)
Plaintiff exhausted all applicable administrative remedies by filing a charge of discrimination with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on December 13, 2024, and receiving
a notice of right to sue on May 22, 2025. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 10.) The following facts are taken from the
complaint and serve as the basis for Plaintiff’s claims.
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Plaintiff alleges she was one of the only females in her supervisor position and the oldest
supervisor by “20 or more years.” (Id. ¶ 18.) The discriminatory treatment occurred on an almost
daily basis in the form of ridicule, ageist and sexist comments, assignment of physical tasks, and
sexual harassment. (Id. ¶ 19.) In August 2023, Plaintiff overheard her supervisor, Karen Martin,
report to another supervisor that they needed to do whatever it took to make Plaintiff quit. (Id. ¶
20.) 	Plaintiff routinely reported the harassment and discrimination to her supervisors and co-
workers. (Id. ¶ 22.) Other employees observed this treatment and also believed that Plaintiff was
being discriminated against.
In 2024, Plaintiff alleges that Mike Bayers became one of Plaintiff’s primary supervisors.
(Id. ¶ 23.) On several occasions, Mike Bayers picked on Plaintiff and screamed at her in front of
other employees, which Plaintiff understood to be targeting her on the basis of her age and sex.
(Id. ¶ 24.) 	These displays of hostility and ridicule encouraged other employees to harass and
ridicule Plaintiff on an almost daily basis, to the point she frequently retreated to her car and broke
down into tears. 	(Id. ¶ 25.) 	In her EEOC complaint, Plaintiff asserts that she was subjected to
ridicule by both Bayers and Martin and that they both allowed others to ridicule Plaintiff due to
her age and sex. (Id. at p. 13.) Defendant also allegedly reduced Plaintiff’s hours and assigned
her to undesirable work and unsafe tasks in an effort to induce her to resign. (Id. ¶ 26.) Plaintiff
was discouraged by an unnamed supervisor from applying for a full-time supervisor position due
to her age and sex. (Id. ¶ 27.) Defendant also “refused to consider [Plaintiff] for the position due
to her age and sex.” (Id.)
In August 2024, Plaintiff reported her complaints about the discrimination and harassment
to Kelly Cessay, plant manager, and Chelonda Barrett, one of her supervisors, and asked them how
to get in touch with Human Resources (“HR”). 	(Id. ¶ 29.) 	Plaintiff eventually obtained
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information about making a report to HR and did so in August 2024. (Id. ¶ 30.) After receiving
her report, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s HR representatives told Plaintiff that it would not
address these concerns. (Id. ¶ 31.) Instead, Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff after receiving
these protected reports—culminating in her discharge a few weeks later on August 23, 2024. (Id.
¶¶ 32, 33.) 	According to Plaintiff, after making the complaints, she was assigned to excessive
work and a reduction of hours. Other younger, male employees were not treated similarly. (Doc.
1 at 13.) Following exhaustion of her administrative remedies, the instant action commenced.
II. 	Standard
To defeat a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain enough facts to state a claim of
relief that is plausible on its face to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 	Robbins v.
Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007)). At the motion-to-dismiss stage, a reviewing judge accepts all well-
pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Albers v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Jefferson Cnty.,
Colo., 771 F.3d 697, 700 (10th Cir. 2014). The reviewing judge also views all well-pleaded facts,
and the reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Archuleta
v. Wagner, 523 F.3d 1278, 1283 (10th Cir. 2008). 	Conclusory allegations, however, have no
bearing upon the court’s consideration. Shero v. City of Grove, Okla., 510 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th
Cir. 2007).
Rule 12(b)(6) “does not require that Plaintiff establish a prima facie case in [her] complaint,
but rather requires only that the Plaintiff allege enough factual allegations in the complaint to set
forth a plausible claim.” 	Pueblo of Jemez v. United States, 790 F.3d 1143, 1171–72 (10th Cir.
2015) (internal citations omitted). 	In the end, the issue is not whether Plaintiff will ultimately
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prevail, but whether Plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support her claims. Beedle v. Wilson,
422 F.3d 1059, 1063 (10th Cir. 2005).
III. 	Analysis
Plaintiff alleges four Title VII claims based on sex discrimination, including (1) hostile
work environment, (2) retaliation, (3) disparate treatment, and (4) constructive discharge. (Doc. 1
¶¶ 34–45.) Plaintiff also alleges three ADEA claims based on age discrimination, including (1)
hostile work environment, (2) retaliation, and (3) constructive discharge. (Id. at 46–56.) The court
will address these claims in turn.
A. Sex Discrimination and Hostile Work Environment
Plaintiff has alleged a claim of sex discrimination including hostile work environment and
disparate treatment. 	(Id. ¶¶ 34–45.) 	Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s sex discrimination and
hostile work environment claim ought to be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim.
(Doc. 8.)
Title VII prohibits a hostile or abusive work environment predicated on a person’s sex. See
Chavez v. New Mexico, 397 F.3d 826, 833 (10th Cir. 2005). 	To prove a prima facie case of
discrimination under Title VII, Plaintiff must establish that: (1) Plaintiff suffered an adverse
employment action, and (2) the circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action give
rise to an inference of discrimination on the basis of her race. See Ford v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins.
Co., 45 F.4th 1202, 1215 (10th Cir. 2022).1 Sex discrimination can also form the basis of a hostile
work environment claim if (1) Defendant discriminated against her on the basis of sex and (2) the
1 Courts often include a third element: that the plaintiff belongs to a protected class. However, that element can be
misleading. Title VII does not limit its protections to disfavored groups or classes of people. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a). Rather, it prohibits certain categories of discrimination, such as discrimination on the basis of race or sex. See
id.; see, e.g. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (“Title VII's prohibition of
discrimination ‘because of...sex’ protects men as well as women.”)
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discrimination was sufficiently severe or pervasive that it altered the terms or conditions of her
employment. 	Throupe v. Univ. of Denver, 988 F.3d 1243, 1251 (10th Cir. 2021).2 	“[T]he
alteration to a term or condition of employment is itself the hostile work environment.” King v.
Koch AG & Energy Sols., LLC, No. CV 25-1017-KHV, 2025 WL 2106828, at *5 (D. Kan. July
28, 2025) (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116 (2002)). 	A hostile
work environment claim is “composed of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one
unlawful employment practice.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117. “An employer creates a hostile work
environment when the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and
insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment
and create an abusive working environment.” Iweha v. State of Kan., 121 F.4th 1208, 1221 (10th
Cir. 2024). 	Whether a hostile work environment exists “depends not only on the number of
incidents, but also on the severity of the incidents.” Tademy v. Union Pac. Corp., 614 F.3d 1132,
1143 (10th Cir. 2008).
In determining whether a work environment is sufficiently hostile under Title VII, courts
look to the totality of the circumstances and consider “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct;
its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). “Isolated incidents of discriminatory conduct and ‘run-of-the mill
boorish, juvenile, or annoying behavior that is not uncommon in American workplaces’ are
2 As Plaintiff points out, the United States Supreme Court recently decided Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Mo., 601
U.S. 346 (2024). In that case, the Court held that when plaintiffs bring suit under Title VII’s discrimination prong,
they need not show that harm was sufficiently severe or pervasive or “any similar adjective suggesting that the
disadvantage to the employee must exceed a heightened bar,” and instead, plaintiffs need only show “some harm” or
“some disadvantageous change.” Id. at 355. Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the Tenth Circuit has not analyzed the
scope of Muldrow and whether it alters the elements of hostile work environment claims under Title VII. Nevertheless,
in the current matter, the court holds that Plaintiff’s allegations rise to the level of “sufficiently severe or pervasive.”
See Throupe, at 1251. 	Thus, by definition, Plaintiff’s pleadings would also satisfy the lower pleading standard
identified in Muldrow that is potentially applicable to Title VII hostile work environment claims.
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insufficient to support a claim for hostile work environment.” 	King, 2025 WL 2106828, at *6
(citing Throupe, 988 F.3d at 1252).
Finally, and specific to Title VII disparate-treatment claims, Plaintiff must also allege she
suffered an adverse employment action. Throupe, 988 F.3d at 1252. This includes “a significant
change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Id.
(internal quotation and citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff alleges she was “one of the only females” who worked in her position as a
supervisor and typically performed work that was done by “younger workers, who were primarily
men.” (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 18, 39.) She alleges she experienced discrimination that occurred “on an almost
daily basis in the form of ridicule, ageist and sexist comments, assignment of physical tasks, and
age-related harassment and sexual harassment.” (Id. ¶ 19.) These allegations, accepted as true,
are sufficient to raise an inference that the harassment was sex-based. 	Defendant argues that
Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing she was subjected to conduct because of her sex, noting that
three of the four individuals named in the complaint are women (Kelly Cessay, Chelonda Barrett,
and Karen Martin). 	(Doc. 8 at 6.) 	This argument is unpersuasive as same-sex harassment can
support a hostile work environment and sex discrimination claim under Title VII. 	Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79–80 (1998).
Defendant further contends the allegations are conclusory and lack specificity regarding
who made discriminatory comments, when they occurred, and what was said. (Doc. 8 at 2, 4–5.)
This presents a closer call. On one hand, Plaintiff specifically alleges that Mike Bayers, Plaintiff’s
supervisor at UPS, “picked on Plaintiff and screamed at Plaintiff in front of other employees,” on
multiple occasions while at work at her Kansas City location, in a way that Plaintiff understood to
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be targeting her on the basis of her age and sex. (Doc. 1 ¶ 24.) On the other hand, a lot of Plaintiff’s
other allegations are cast in more general terms, without identifying specific individuals. While
such allegations might border on conclusory, the seriousness of other allegations in the complaint
convinces the court that the proper course is to allow the parties to explore and develop the factual
basis underlying these claims through discovery.
As to severity and pervasiveness, Plaintiff alleges the harassment occurred “on an almost
daily basis” throughout her employment. 	(Id. ¶ 19.) 	She alleges that in August 2023, her
supervisor Karen Martin told another supervisor “that they needed to do whatever it took to make
Plaintiff quit.” 	(Id. ¶ 20.) 	Afterward, Defendant reduced her hours and assigned her to
“undesirable work and unsafe tasks” in an effort that Plaintiff believes was meant to get her to
resign. (Id. ¶ 26.) Plaintiff was discouraged from applying for a promotion due to her sex and
Defendant “refused to consider her for the position due to her age and sex.” 	(Id. ¶ 27.) 	Such
allegations, presumed true, are sufficiently severe and pervasive as they exhibit a pattern of sex-
based harassment that altered the terms and conditions of her employment. 	Mathews v. Butler
Cmty. Coll., No. 17-1175-EFM, 2019 WL 4450669, at *7 (D. Kan. Sept. 17, 2019) (“[L]egally
intolerable working conditions include pervasive or severe criticism, ultimatum-like proposals to
quit, work-defeating interference, and undermining an employee’s work.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff
has pled facts sufficient to state a claim for sex discrimination through hostile work environment
and disparate treatment. Therefore, Defendant’s motion to dismiss these claims is denied.
B. Age Discrimination and Hostile Work Environment
Plaintiff has also alleged a claim of age discrimination including hostile work environment.
(Doc. 1 ¶¶ 46–56.) 	Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s age discrimination and hostile work
environment claim ought to be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. (Doc. 8.)
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To state a claim of age discrimination, Plaintiff must show: (1) she is a member of the class
protected by the ADEA; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the challenged
action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. 	Bennett v.
Windstream Commc’ns, Inc., 792 F.3d 1261, 1266 (10th Cir. 2015) (citing E.E.O.C. v. PVNF,
L.L.C., 487 F.3d 790, 800 (10th Cir. 2007)). Furthermore, under the ADEA, age must be the “but-
for” cause of the adverse treatment at issue. See Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168, 1174 (2020).
Age discrimination can also form the basis of a hostile work environment claim if “(1) the
employee was discriminated against because of her age; and (2) the discrimination created a
workplace so permeated with severe or pervasive intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that it altered
the employment conditions and created an abusive working environment.” Howell v. New Mexico
Dep’t of Aging & Long Term Servs., 398 F. App’x 355, 359 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing MacKenzie v.
City & Cnty. Of Denver, 414 F.3d 1266, 1280 (10th Cir. 2005)).
Here, 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	she 	experienced 	pervasive 	age 	discrimination 	and 	that 	the
“discrimination occurred on an almost daily basis” by way of humiliating ridicule, ageist and sexist
comments. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 19.) She alleges that Mike Bayers subjected her to degrading insults on
account of her age and discouraged her from applying for a promotion “due to her age.” (Id. ¶ 27.)
As with the sex discrimination claim, Defendant’s demand for greater factual specificity conflates
pleading requirements with evidentiary proof. 	The Tenth Circuit has recognized “[i]t is well-
established that ‘we do not mandate the pleading of any specific facts in particular’ to survive a
motion to dismiss a . . . discrimination claim. 	McNellis v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 116 F.4th
1122, 1141 (10th Cir. 2024). And the complaint need only “give the defendant fair notice of what
the plaintiff’s claims is.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, 512 (2002). Plaintiff
has alleged a pattern of age-based harassment and discrimination throughout her employment that
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is severe and pervasive enough to adequately give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination,”
and put Defendant on “fair notice” of the claims against it. In conclusion, Plaintiff has pled facts
sufficient to state a claim for age discrimination and hostile work environment. 	Therefore,
Defendant’s motion to dismiss these claims is denied.
C. Retaliation
Plaintiff has also alleged claims of retaliation brought under Title VII and the ADEA.
(Doc. 1 ¶¶ 8, 29, 33, 41, 52.) 	Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s retaliation claims ought to be
dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. (Doc. 8.)
The elements of a retaliation claim under Title VII require Plaintiff to show: “(1) that [she]
engaged in protected opposition to discrimination, (2) that a reasonable employee would have
found the challenged action materially adverse, and (3) that a causal connection existed between
the protected activity and the materially adverse action.” Reznik v. inContact, Inc., 18 F.4th 1257,
1260 (10th Cir. 2021); see also MacKenzie, 414 F.3d at 1278-79, abrogated on other grounds by
Lincoln v. BNSF Ry. Co., 900 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 2018) (listing nearly identical elements for a
retaliation claim under the ADEA). Protected activity for purposes of a retaliation claim includes
complaining about age or sex discrimination made illegal under Title VII or the ADEA. Iweha,
121 F.4th at 1233.
Here, Plaintiff alleges making multiple complaints—a protected activity. 	Specifically,
Plaintiff alleges she engaged in “routinely report[ing] the harassment and discrimination that she
endured to her supervisors and co-workers.” 	(Doc. 1 ¶ 22.) 	For example, “[i]n August 2024,
Plaintiff . . . took legally protected action and reported her complaints about the discrimination,
retaliation, and harassment . . . to Kelly Cessay, Plant Manager, and Chelonda Barrett, one of her
supervisors, and asked them how to get in touch with the appropriate people at Human Resources.”
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(Id. ¶ 29.) Upon learning of the proper reporting channels, she did make such a report in August
2024. 	(Id. ¶ 30.) 	These allegations establish that Plaintiff engaged in protected activity by
complaining about age and sex discrimination.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege a causal connection between her
protected activity and her materially adverse employment action, asserting that temporal proximity
alone is insufficient. 	(Doc. 15 at 3-4.) 	The court finds this argument unpersuasive. 	Plaintiff
alleges she suffered materially adverse actions following her making complaints. 	To wit, she
alleges that “[a]fter receiving Plaintiff’s protected reports and complaints, Defendant did nothing
to address [them], and Defendant’s Human Resources representatives reported to Plaintiff that it
could not or would not address these concerns.” (Id. ¶ 31.) Eventually, Plaintiff alleges she was
constructively discharged on August 23, 2024, less than a month after making these reports to HR.
(Id. ¶ 33.) 	Close temporal proximity between a protected activity and an adverse employment
action can establish a causal connection if it “‘is very closely connected in time.’” See Metzger v.
City of Leawood, 144 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1232 (D. Kan. 2001) (“Constructive discharge can support
a retaliation claim, particularly if the actions leading to the constructive discharge are close in time
to the protected opposition to Title VII violations.”). 	Here, Plaintiff has alleged that she
complained of discrimination in August 2024, that Defendant failed to address her concerns, that
the incidents of retaliation and harassment escalated, and that she was constructively discharged
later that same month. The court finds Plaintiff properly alleged a causal connection between the
protected activity and the materially adverse action. 	Thus, Plaintiff has pled facts sufficient to
state a claim for retaliation. Therefore, Defendant’s motion to dismiss these claims is denied.
D. Constructive Discharge
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Finally, while Plaintiff ties her constructive discharge allegations to her Title VII and
ADEA claims, she has also alleged a distinct or “stand alone” claim of constructive discharge.
(Doc. 1 ¶¶ 33, 41, 52; see also Doc. 12 at 11–13.) 	Again, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s
constructive discharge claims ought to be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim.
(Doc. 8.)
“A claim of constructive discharge has two basic elements: First that the plaintiff was
discriminated against by his employer to the point where a reasonable person in his position would
have felt compelled to resign. Second, that he actually resigned.” Rivero v. Bd. of Regents of Univ.
of N.M., 950 F.3d 754, 761 (10th Cir. 2020) (ellipses, brackets, and internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Neri v. Bsd. of Educ., 860 F. App’x 556, 567 (10th Cir. 2021). 	If Plaintiff
demonstrates constructive discharge, “we treat the employee’s resignation as though the employer
actually fired him.” Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547, 560 (2016). The employment conditions
must be objectively intolerable; accordingly, Plaintiff’s subjective views of the situation are
irrelevant. See Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 342–43 (10th Cir. 1986). Whether Plaintiff
was constructively discharged is “usually a question of fact.” See Isberner v. Walmart Inc., No.
20-2001-JAR-KGG, 2021 WL 4284540, at *18 (D. Kan. Sept. 21, 2021) (citing Heutzenroeder v.
Mesa Cnty. Valley Sch. Dist. 51, 391 F. App’x 688, 693 (10th Cir. 2010)).
Here, Plaintiff alleges a culmination of events that rendered her working conditions
objectively intolerable. She alleges she experienced “pervasive age and sex/gender discrimination
that created a hostile workplace for her” and that occurred almost every day. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 17, 19.)
She further alleges supervisors stating they would take actions to make Plaintiff quit, she was
screamed at in front of other employees causing them to make disparaging comments towards her,
remarks were made to her in employment settings that were “humiliating and degrading,” and that
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as a result “Plaintiff often had to go to her parked vehicle to cry.” 	(Id. ¶¶ 17–21, 24–26.)
Eventually, Plaintiff alleges that she reported these actions and her reports were ignored. Instead,
the aggressive and sexually harassing remarks only escalated, leading to her constructive discharge
on August 23, 2024.
These allegations, taken together, describe working conditions that escalated to the point
where a reasonable person in Plaintiff’s position would feel compelled to resign. 	Plaintiff has
alleged “pervasive or severe criticism,” coupled with Defendants refusal to address her complaints,
that 	amount 	to 	being 	objectively 	intolerable. 	See 	Mathews, 	2019 	WL 	4450669 	at 	*7
(“[U]ndesirable working conditions become legally intolerable once those conditions leave an
employee that seeks relief no other reasonable choice but to quit.”). In conclusion, Plaintiff has
pled facts sufficient to state a claim for constructive discharge. Therefore, Defendant’s motion to
dismiss these claims is denied.
IV. 	Conclusion
THEREFORE, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7.) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated this 28th day of October, 2025.
_s/ John W. Broomes_________________
JOHN W. BROOMES
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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