Jefferson (ID 2000015928) v. Moore et al

1
In the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas
_____________
Case No. 23-cv-03263-TC
_____________
ANTHONY JEFFERSON,
Plaintiff
v.
LEONARD MOORE ET AL.,
Defendants
_____________
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Anthony Jefferson, proceeding pro se, sued several corrections of-
ficers and a private healthcare provider, claiming their response to his
emergency medical condition violated his constitutional rights. Doc. 1;
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Two of the individual officers, Christopher Finch
and Sara Thatcher, and the healthcare provider, Centurion, moved to
dismiss. Docs. 46 & 50. For the following reasons, the defendants’
motions are granted.
I
A
1. The defendants seek dismissal for failure to state a plausible
claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). A federal district
court may grant a motion to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the complaint need only
contain “a short and plain statement . . . showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief” from each named defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2);
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Two “working prin-
ciples” underlie this standard. Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656
F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678–79 (2009). First, a court ignores legal conclusions, labels, and any
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formulaic recitation of the elements. Penn Gaming, 656 F.3d at 1214.
Second, a court accepts as true all remaining allegations and logical in-
ferences and asks whether the claimant has alleged facts that make his
or her claim plausible. Id.
A claim need not be probable to be considered plausible. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678. But the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the
claimant, must move the claim from conceivable to plausible. Id. at
678–80. The “mere metaphysical possibility that some plaintiff could
prove some set of facts in support of the pleaded claims is insufficient;
the complaint must give the court reason to believe that this plaintiff
has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these
claims.” Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177
(10th Cir. 2007).
Plausibility is context specific. The requisite showing depends on
the claims alleged, and the inquiry usually starts with determining what
the plaintiff must prove at trial. See Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Assoc. of African
Am.-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327, 332 (2020). In other words, the nature
and complexity of the claim(s) define what plaintiffs must plead. Cf.
Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248–49 (10th Cir. 2008) (compar-
ing the factual allegations required to show a plausible personal injury
claim versus a plausible constitutional violation).
2. These rules do not operate in a vacuum. When a plaintiff, such
as Jefferson, proceeds pro se, a court must construe his or her plead-
ings generously. See Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1096 (10th
Cir. 2009). That generosity means a court should overlook the failure
to properly cite legal authority, confusion of various legal theories, and
apparent unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Id. But it does not
permit a court to construct legal theories on the plaintiff’s behalf or
assume facts not plead. See id.; Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer,
425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005).
And because Jefferson filed his lawsuit pro se while incarcerated,
an additional pleading standard applies. Ordinarily, a motion to dismiss
is decided on the basis of the pleadings alone. See Swoboda v. Dubach,
992 F.2d 286, 290 (10th Cir. 1993); Routt v. Howry, 835 F. App’x 379,
380 n.2 (10th Cir. 2020). But “[w]hen the pro se plaintiff is a prisoner,
a court authorized investigation and report by prison officials (referred
to as a Martinez Report) […] may be necessary to develop a record
sufficient to ascertain whether there are any factual or legal bases for
the prisoner’s claims.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir.
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1991) (referring to a report prepared consistent with Martinez v. Aaron,
570 F.2d 317, 318–19 (10th Cir. 1978)).
Usage of the information at the motion to dismiss stage depends
on the plaintiff’s allegations. Generally speaking, a district court re-
viewing a 12(b)(6) motion may not use a Martinez Report to refute facts
pled by the plaintiff or otherwise resolve factual disputes. Gee v. Pacheco,
627 F.3d 1178, 1186 (10th Cir. 2010); Winkel v. Hammond, 704 F. App’x
735 (10th Cir. 2017) (reversing a district court for dismissing a de-
tainee’s claim on a 12(b)(6) because it relied on contested facts from
the Martinez Report). But a district court may use uncontroverted facts
from a Martinez Report to dismiss a claim. Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d
1063, n.7 (10th Cir. 2009). A fact is uncontroverted if the plaintiff fails
to provide information that would contest that particular fact. Nickel-
berry v. Pharaoh, 221 F.3d 1352 (10th Cir. 2000); cf. Hall v. Bellmon, 935
F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir. 1991) (“A bona fide factual dispute exists
even when the plaintiff’s factual allegations that are in conflict with the
Martinez [R]eport are less specific or well-documented than those con-
tained in the report.”).
B
Plaintiff Anthony Jefferson is an inmate residing at El Dorado
Correctional Facility in Butler County, Kansas. Doc. 1 at 1.1 Jefferson
brought this civil rights lawsuit against several corrections officers and
a private healthcare contractor after he experienced a medical emer-
gency at the prison in July 2023. Id. at 1–3.
On the day of the emergency, Jefferson was experiencing pain and
had trouble breathing. Doc. 8-2; Doc. 8-3; see also Doc. 25 at 2. At some
point, Jefferson fell to the floor of the dayroom in his cell block. Doc.
8-9; Doc. 25 at 2. Jefferson asked a corrections officer, Christopher
Finch, for assistance. Doc. 8-9. Finch called in a medical code to alert
other prison officials that additional assistance was needed in the day-
room. Id.
In response to Finch’s call, other officers began arriving to help.
One of the first to arrive was Daniel Romero. Doc. 8 at 3. When
Romero arrived, he saw Jefferson “screaming in the dayroom and
1 All citations are to the document and page number assigned in the CM/ECF
system.
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displaying violent behavior.” Id. He also observed that another of-
ficer—Trenton Burk—“was attempting to gain control” of Jefferson.
Id. Jefferson, who had stood back up, fell back onto the ground. Id.; see
also Doc. 25 at 2. While Jefferson was on the ground, Romero applied
hand restraints to Jefferson’s wrists and double locked them “for safety
purposes.” Doc. 8 at 3. And because Jefferson was exhibiting violent
behavior, Romero grabbed his legs and held them until another officer
brought leg restraints. Id. When the leg restraints arrived, Romero put
them on Jefferson’s ankles and double locked those, too. Id.
The first alleged instance of excessive force happened while Jeffer-
son was on the floor with his legs restrained. Doc. 1 at 4, ¶ 5; Doc. 25
at 3. At that time, one of the officers, Bryan Buchman, dropped from
a standing position onto his knees so that he landed on Jefferson’s
thigh and hip area. Doc. 1 at 3–4. Jefferson also alleges that Buchman
grabbed his throat. Id. at 4, ¶ 5.
Romero held Jefferson’s legs until another officer, Austin Merz,
arrived with a restraint chair. Doc. 8 at 4. Four officers, including the
defendants Romero, Merz, and Buchman, participated in placing Jef-
ferson into the restraint chair. Id. at 3. During that process, the second
alleged instance of excessive force occurred. Doc. 1 at 2. Specifically,
while the officers were placing Jefferson into the restraint chair, Jeffer-
son’s body “seized up from the pain in [his] lower back area and [his]
body became stiff.” Doc. 25 at 3. As a result, Merz applied a “hypo-
glossal nerve pressure point,” which is a technique that involves plac-
ing pressure underneath an individual’s jaw. Doc. 8 at 4. Merz has been
trained to apply that technique. Id. Jefferson alleges that the pressure
caused him to become semi-unconscious and start spitting up blood.
Doc. 1 at 2; Doc. 25 at 3. Romero and another officer secured Jeffer-
son into the chair with a lap belt and shoulder straps. Doc. 8 at 3.
That Jefferson was screaming and exhibiting violent behavior dur-
ing this process is uncontested. Doc. 25 at 5–6; Gallagher v. Shelton, 587
F.3d 1063, 1067–68 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting that uncontroverted facts
in a Martinez report may be relied on at the motion to dismiss stage).
In particular, Jefferson concedes that his behavior was abnormal, non-
compliant, and that he was screaming in the dayroom. Doc. 25 at 6
(“Yes my behavior was abnormal, yes my behavior could be looked at
as non compliant.”). Jefferson emphasizes, however, that his “behav-
ior requiring the use of the mobile restraint chair was due to [his] two
herniated disc[s]” in his lower back. Id. at 4.
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In addition to the aforementioned officers, Jefferson states that
other individuals were present in the dayroom during these events. For
example, Finch—who initially called for assistance—was present and
observed while the other officers restrained Jefferson. Doc. 1 at 5. Jef-
ferson alleges that Finch watched other officers “knee, choke, and use
excessive force without saying stop or stepping in to stop the abuse.”
Id. at 3. And he makes similar allegations against another corrections
officer who was present, Sara Thatcher. Id. In particular, Jefferson
states that Thatcher “was on response and stood back and watched”
other officers use force against him but “did not stop or step in to stop
the excessive use of force.” Id.
Merz transported Jefferson to a trauma room. Doc. 8 at 4. Jeffer-
son does not state which officers, if any, accompanied Merz, but he
does not contest that Finch and Thatcher were only present during the
in the dayroom and not any of the subsequent events. See Doc. 8-5
(describing Thatcher’s involvement); Doc. 8-9 (describing Finch’s in-
volvement). In the trauma room, Jefferson was medically evaluated
and strip searched. Doc. 8 at 3–5. Jefferson alleges that a third incident
of excessive force happened while he was in the trauma room. Id. Spe-
cifically, Merz applied the hypoglossal pressure point again, this time
while Jefferson was fully restrained. Doc. 1 at 4; Doc. 25 at 7. After he
was medically cleared, Jefferson was admitted to the prison’s infirmary
for a twenty-three hour observation. Doc. 8 at 3–5. Jefferson arrived
at the infirmary “screaming, crying, [and] wide-eyed.” Id. at 5; Doc. 25
at 9. Jefferson agrees that he was exhibiting this behavior, asserting that
“he was in extreme pain.” Doc. 25 at 9.
After these events, Jefferson filed an injury claim with the prison.
Doc. 1 at 2. Major Leonard Moore, who reviews uses of force at the
prison, organized a meeting with Jefferson and other prison officials.
Id. Jefferson alleges that they reached an agreement to settle his injury
claim. Id. Nonetheless, Jefferson received a denial of his grievance
shortly after he filed it. Id. Jefferson appealed the denial, Doc. 1-1 at 5,
which was rejected, id. at 4. Jefferson further appealed that rejection,
id. at 2–3, which was denied as well, id. at 1.
Jefferson then filed this lawsuit. Doc. 1. He sued several individual
officers who were involved in restraining, transporting, or otherwise
engaging with Jefferson during his medical emergency. Id. And he sued
Centurion, the medical and dental service provider for corrections fa-
cilities in Kansas. Doc. 8 at 4. Jefferson’s claim against Centurion stems
from his allegations that an unnamed member of its nursing staff
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violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to intervene in the
officers’ use of excessive force. Doc. 1 at 6. Jefferson seeks money
damages for his pain, suffering, and emotional distress. Id. at 8. He
alleges that he has panic attacks, shortness of breath, and fears that he
will be killed if he has a medical issue in the future. Id. Three of the
defendants—Centurion, Finch, and Thatcher—moved to dismiss.2
Docs. 46 & 50.
II
Jefferson failed to plausibly allege that Finch, Thatcher, or Centu-
rion violated his constitutional rights. Accordingly, the defendants’
motions to dismiss are granted.
A
Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Jefferson alleges that Finch and
Thatcher, along with several other corrections officers, violated his
Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punish-
ment. Doc. 1 at 6. Section 1983 provides that “[e]very person who,
under color of [state law,] subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citi-
zen . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.”
42 U.S.C. § 1983. It creates no substantive rights but merely provides
a mechanism for enforcing a right conferred by the Constitution or a
federal statute. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002); see also
Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. v. Talevski, 599 U.S. 166, 174–75
(2023).
2 Jefferson had twenty-one days after the defendants’ motions were served to
file a response. See D. Kan. R. 6.1(d)(1). He failed to do so, and he did not
request leave to file a response, either. Normally, such failure to respond leads
to an uncontested motion like the defendants’ motions to be granted. See D.
Kan. R. 7.1(c). But the Tenth Circuit has held that “a district court may not
grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim ‘merely because [a party]
failed to file a response.’” Issa v. Comp USA, 354 F.3d 1174, 1177–78 (10th
Cir. 2003) (quoting Reed v. Bennet, 312 F.3d 1190, 1194 (10th Cir. 2002)). In-
stead, it must “still examine the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint and
determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Id. at 1178. As such, Jefferson’s Complaint is still examined for
whether he has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. See id.
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The Tenth Circuit has held that there is “a need for careful atten-
tion to particulars, especially in [Section 1983] lawsuits involving mul-
tiple defendants.” Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1225 (10th Cir. 2013).
This means plaintiffs are required to make it “clear exactly who is al-
leged to have done what to whom,” as distinguished from collective al-
legations. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis
in original). That level of detail is necessary to satisfy the causation
element of Section 1983 claim. See Hall v. Witteman, 584 F.3d 859, 864
(10th Cir. 2009); see also Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1163 (10th
Cir. 2011) (quoting Foot v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1423 (10th Cir. 1997))
(“Personal liability under § 1983 must be based on personal involve-
ment in the alleged constitutional violation.”). As such, “[a] plaintiff in
a § 1983 action must allege that each defendant is subject to personal
liability based on his [or her] own actions.” Cuervo v. Sorenson, 112 F.4th
1307, 1314 (10th Cir. 2024).
Personal participation, however, “is not limited solely to situations
where a defendant violates a plaintiff’s rights by physically placing
hands on him.” Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1162 (10th Cir. 2008).
An officer may also be liable under Section 1983 for failing to intervene
in an ongoing constitutional violation. Mascorro v. Billings, 656 F.3d
1198, 1204 n.5 (10th Cir. 2011). In particular, a plaintiff may state a
claim for a constitutional violation in the form of the defendant’s fail-
ure to intervene by alleging that an “officer violated his constitutional
rights,” “a different government actor (the defendant) observed or had
reasons to know about that constitutional violation,” and “the defend-
ant had a realistic opportunity intervene, but failed to do so.” Bledsoe v.
Carreno, 53 F.4th 589, 616 (10th Cir. 2022) (emphasis added). But an
officer may not be liable under a failure-to-intervene theory if no con-
stitutional violation occurred in which he or she could have intervened.
Jones v. Norton, 809 F.3d 564, 576 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Harper v.
Albert, 400 F.3d 1052, 1064 (7th Cir. 2005)).
The focus of Jefferson’s claims against Finch and Thatcher are lim-
ited to the acts and omissions occurring within the dayroom.3 To state
3 As noted, Jefferson does not contest that Finch and Thatcher were present
in the dayroom but not in the trauma room, the infirmary, or during Jeffer-
son’s transport to any location outside of the dayroom. See Gallagher v. Shelton,
587 F.3d 1063, 1067–68 (10th Cir. 2009) (relying on facts in the Martinez re-
port that the defendant did not contest in his response to the report at the
motion to dismiss stage).
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a claim against Finch and Thatcher for a failure to intervene, Jefferson
must have alleged that other officers used excessive force against him
in violation of the Eighth Amendment while he was in the dayroom
and that Finch and/or Thatcher failed to take reasonable steps to pro-
tect Jefferson from those violations. See Mascorro, 656 F.3d at 1204 n.5;
Estate of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405, 421–23 (10th Cir. 2014) (ex-
plaining that a defendant must be present during the alleged constitu-
tional violation to be liable under a failure-to-intervene theory).
During Jefferson’s time in the dayroom, he alleges that two discrete
instances of excessive force occurred. First, Jefferson alleges that
Bryan Buchman, a corrections officer, kneed him in the side and legs
and grabbed his throat. Doc. 1 at 4. Second, Jefferson alleges that Aus-
tin Merz, also a corrections officer, unnecessarily applied the hypoglos-
sal pressure point technique to gain control of Jefferson’s neck while
preparing him for transport to the trauma room. Doc. 1 at 2; see also
Doc. 8 at 4.
Finch and Thatcher persuasively argue that Jefferson did not plau-
sibly allege that Buchman and Merz violated his Eighth Amendment
rights while Finch and Thatcher were present. Doc. 51 at 7. As a result,
he has not plausibly alleged a failure-to-intervene claim against Finch
and Thatcher. See Jones, 809 F.3d at 576 (reiterating that a failure-to-
intervene theory of liability under Section 1983 requires an underlying
constitutional violation).
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of “cruel and
unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. As part of this pro-
hibition, prison officials “may not . . . use excessive physical force
against prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (citing
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992)). A two-step inquiry governs
excessive force claims in the prison context. Ullery v. Bradley, 949 F.3d
1282, 1290 (10th Cir. 2020). The inquiry involves “an objective prong
that asks if the alleged wrongdoing was objectively harmful enough to
establish a constitutional violation,” and “a subjective prong under
which the plaintiff must show that the officials acted with a sufficiently
culpable state of mind.” Redmond v. Crowther, 882 F.3d 927, 936–37
(10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 191 F.3d 1281,
1289 (10th Cir. 1999)). The subjective prong turns on “whether force
was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or
maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Ul-
lery, 949 F.3d at 1290; Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986).
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Jefferson did not plausibly allege that Finch and Thatcher observed
other officers applying the type of force that amounts that would sat-
isfy the Eighth Amendment’s objective prong. Jefferson alleges that
Finch and Thatcher failed to intervene when Buchman kneed him in
his side and legs and grabbed his throat, and when Merz applied a tech-
nique involving putting pressure on his jaw and throat area. Doc. 1 at
2–4. Even assuming this conduct occurred, it is insufficient under
Tenth Circuit precedent to suggest that the alleged wrongdoing was
objectively harmful enough to rise to the level of a constitutional vio-
lation. See Norton v. City of Marietta, 432 F.3d 1145, 1156 (10th Cir. 2005)
(finding that an officer’s use of force on a prisoner who declined to
follow the officer’s order to lay on his bed was not objectively serious
enough to violate the Eighth Amendment where the officer “grabbed
[the plaintiff] around the neck and went to twisting it and hurting it”);
see also Marshall v. Milyard, 415 F. App’x 850, 853 (10th Cir. 2011) (de-
scribing uses of force that failed under the objective prong, including
“bumping, grabbing, elbowing, and pushing a prisoner,” “pushing cu-
bicle-cell wall onto [the] prisoner’s leg, causing bruises,” and “a single
blow to [the] prisoner’s head while escorting him into prison”). That
precludes failure-to-intervene liability with respect to Finch and
Thatcher. See Rowell v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Muskogee Cnty., Okla., 978
F.3d 1165, 1174–75 (10th Cir. 2020) (holding there was no failure-to-
intervene liability where a pretrial detainee failed to allege force used
by another officer amounted to a constitutional violation).
Nor did Jefferson plausibly allege that Finch and Thatcher ob-
served or had reason to know that Buchman and Merz used force
against Jefferson “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of
causing harm.” Ullery, 949 F.3d at 1290. Jefferson conceded that he
was screaming and engaging in abnormal behavior. Doc. 25 at 6. In-
deed, he even admits that he was acting in a non-compliant manner
and that he could see how the officers who were attempting to restrain
him could view his conduct as non-compliant. Id. And both instances
of force that he alleges Finch and Thatcher observed occurred while the
other officers were placing Jefferson in restraints and into the restraint
chair. Id. Because Jefferson admits he was non-complaint and required
a restraint chair, it cannot be said that the other officers applied force
maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. Miller
v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1567 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding that a plaintiff’s
allegations were insufficient to meet the Eighth Amendment’s subjec-
tive prong where the plaintiff conceded that he resisted instructions to
place his hands behind his back and admitted that he wrestled with the
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officer while the officer tried to move him to a holding cell); Grissom v.
Palm, No. 19-3178, 2022 WL 3571410, at *6 (10th Cir. 2022) (noting
that clearly established law did not prohibit an officer from using force
to defend himself and regain control of a situation where a prisoner
became violent while the officer was attempting to handcuff him for
transit purposes). This precludes any attempt to impose liability against
Finch and Thatcher under a failure-to-intervene theory.4
B
Centurion, El Dorado’s private healthcare contractor, also moved
to dismiss. Doc. 46. Jefferson’s claim against Centurion is similar to
the ones he brought against Finch and Thatcher. Specifically, he alleges
that an unnamed member of Centurion’s nursing staff failed to inter-
vene while officers applied excessive force. Doc. 1 at 6. Dismissal is
warranted for at least two independent reasons.5
First, Jefferson failed to allege that the unnamed Centurion em-
ployee who was present during his medical incident acted pursuant to
an official policy or custom. Doc. 47 at 13–14. A municipal entity may
be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but not by way of respondeat
superior. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); see
also Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1216 (10th Cir. 2003) (ex-
tending Monell’s holding to private Section 1983 defendants acting un-
der color of state law). Instead, a plaintiff seeking to impose liability on
an entity acting under color of state law must establish that the harm-
causing conduct was undertaken pursuant to an official policy or cus-
tom. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S.
469, 479-80 (1986). The Tenth Circuit has “recognized as policies
4 A defendant cannot be held liable under Section 1983 if he or she did not
personally participate in the constitutional violation, either directly or by fail-
ing to intervene. Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1162 (10th Cir. 2008). Be-
cause Finch and Thatcher did not observe a constitutional violation, it is un-
necessary to address their arguments that qualified immunity provides an-
other reason for dismissal. See Bledsoe v. Carreno, 53 F.4th 589, 616 (10th Cir.
2022) (only addressing the defendants’ qualified immunity arguments on a
failure-to-intervene theory of liability after determining there was an under-
lying constitutional violation).
5 Centurion also argues that Jefferson failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies. Doc. 47 at 4–11. It is unnecessary to address that argument in light
of the conclusion that Jefferson failed to state a plausible claim for relief.
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meeting this standard” those that “aris[e] from a formal regulation or
policy statement, an informal custom that amounts to a widespread
practice, decisions of . . . employees with final policymaking authority,
ratification by final policymakers of the decisions of subordinates to
whom authority was delegated, and the deliberately indifferent failure
to adequately train or supervise employees.” Hinkle v. Beckham Cnty. Bd.
of Cnty. Comm’rs, 962 F.3d 1204, 1239–40 (10th Cir. 2020).
Jefferson has not alleged that any of Centurion’s policies or cus-
toms caused him to suffer a constitutional violation. He alleges that an
unknown member of Centurion’s nursing staff failed to intervene dur-
ing an incident of excessive force. Doc. 1 at 3. But the Complaint con-
tains no allegations that the unnamed nurse acted pursuant to an offi-
cial custom, policy, or any other basis such that Centurion could be
considered responsible for any unconstitutional conduct attributable
to its employee. Lucas v. Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC, 58 F.4th 1127,
1145 (10th Cir. 2023) (affirming the dismissal of a complaint against a
prison’s private healthcare provider where the plaintiff failed to allege
non-conclusory facts that the entity enacted a policy or custom that
caused a constitutional violation); see also Alford v. Harrod, No. 24-3022,
2024 WL 5118227, at *8 (D. Kan. Dec. 16, 2024) (dismissing a pris-
oner’s claims against Centurion because the plaintiff failed to allege “a
formal statement by the company or a persistent, well-settled practice
of unconstitutional misconduct by employees”).
Second, Jefferson’s claim against Centurion fails because a medical
professional cannot be held liable for failing to intervene in an alterca-
tion between a prisoner and law enforcement. That precludes impos-
ing liability on the entity. See Est. of Beauford v. Mesa Cnty., Colo, 35 F.4th
1248, 1275 (10th Cir. 2022) (recognizing that a private medical facility
could not be held liable under Section 1983 because none of its indi-
vidual medical professionals committed an underlying constitutional
violation). As noted, a law enforcement officer may be liable for vio-
lating an individual’s constitutional rights if the officer is “present at
the scene and . . . fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim of
another officer’s use of excessive force.” Krueger v. Phillips, __ F.4th __
(10th Cir. 2025) (quoting Mascorro, 656 F.3d at 1204 n.5); see also Gruen-
wald v. Maddox, 274 F. App’x 667, 674 (10th Cir. 2008) (applying this
principle to corrections officers in the prison context). But the Tenth
Circuit has not extended this duty to medical professionals in a correc-
tional setting. See Myers v. Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC, No. 22-119,
2024 WL 4009660, at *6 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 30, 2024) (noting that Tenth
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Circuit precedent does not suggest that “a nurse has an affirmative duty
to interrupt officers who are engaged in restraining and securing an
individual”). And courts that have directly confronted the issue of
whether such an affirmative duty exists have held that medical profes-
sionals cannot be held liable for violating an inmate’s constitutional
rights by failing to intervene in an altercation between an inmate and
law enforcement. Drumm v. Valdez, No. 16-3482, 2019 WL 7494443,
at *7 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2020) (collecting cases).
That rule makes sense. A prison’s ability to control its internal se-
curity, including dispelling in-the-moment confrontations with in-
mates, “is peculiarly a matter normally left to the discretion of prison
administrators.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321–22; accord Redmond, 882 F.3d
at 938. Requiring medical professionals to intervene in these decisions
regarding how much force is appropriate to restrain an inmate would
contradict the necessary deference given to law enforcement officers’
training and judgment in such situations. See Est. of Beauford, 35 F.4th
1248 at1265 (recognizing that medical professionals and prison offi-
cials have different areas of expertise). Jefferson’s claim against Centu-
rion relies on the existence of such a duty, and as a result, his claim
fails as a matter of law.
III
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, Docs.
46 & 50, are GRANTED.
It is so ordered.
Date: October 31, 2025 s/ Toby Crouse
Toby Crouse
United States District Judge
Case 5:23-cv-03263-TC-JBW Document 76 Filed 10/31/25 Page 12 of 12