USA v. Tsegay et al

1
In the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas
_____________
Case No. 25-cr-40047-TC-1
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff
v.
YONAS TSEGAY,
Defendant
_____________
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
The Government filed an Indictment charging Yonas Tsegay with
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, possession with intent to distribute co-
caine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), possession with intent to
distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and interstate
travel and transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3). Doc. 1. Tsegay moves to suppress the evi-
dence uncovered during a traffic stop. Doc. 28. For the following rea-
sons, that motion is denied.
I
A
Tsegay alleges that the evidence was obtained in violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights. The Fourth Amendment protects the
“right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const.
amend. IV; see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334 (1985) (rec-
ognizing incorporation against the states). Absent a recognized excep-
tion, the Fourth Amendment prohibits suspicionless seizures or war-
rantless searches that violate a person’s objectively reasonable expec-
tation of privacy by invading a constitutionally protected space or
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thing. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012); see also United States
v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1307 (10th Cir. 2016). Traffic stops are
seizures for Fourth Amendment purposes, United States v. Pettit, 785
F.3d 1374, 1379 (10th Cir. 2015), and in a traffic stop “a passenger is
seized as well and so may challenge the constitutionality of the stop.”
Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007).
A warrantless stop is valid where the officer has reasonable suspi-
cion to believe that a traffic violation occurred. Kansas v. Glover, 589
U.S. 376, 380 (2020). In particular, the officer must have “a reasonable
articulable suspicion that this particular motorist violated any one of
the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations of the
jurisdiction.” United States v. Salas, 756 F.3d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 2014)
(quotation marks omitted). The stop also must be “reasonably related
in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place.” United States v. Morales, 961 F.3d 1086, 1090–91 (10th Cir.
2020).
Ordinarily, the traffic stop is circumscribed by the traffic violation
giving rise to the initial encounter. That means officers may conduct
unrelated inquiries during a stop only if that conduct does not prolong
the stop. United States v. Frazier, 30 F.4th 1165, 1173 (10th Cir. 2022)
(citing Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 355 (2015)). For example,
it is accepted that officers may reasonably inquire as to the driver’s
license, automobile’s registration and proof of insurance, identity of
the individuals, and driver’s travel plans. United States v. Cates, 73 F.4th
795, 806 (10th Cir. 2023) (citations omitted). But once the mission of
the stop has concluded, the motorist is generally free to leave. Morales,
961 F.3d at 1091.
There are, of course, justifications for continued detention. For ex-
ample, the driver may consent to further questioning. United States v.
Woody, 45 F.4th 1166, 1173 (10th Cir. 2022). Or an officer may develop
reasonable suspicion of other illegal activity distinct from the traffic
violation. See United States v. Munoz, 162 F.4th 1210, 1219 (10th Cir.
2025). “To satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard, an officer need
not ‘rule out the possibility of innocent conduct,’ or even have evi-
dence suggesting ‘a fair probability’ of criminal activity.” Pettit, 785
F.3d at 1379 (citations omitted). Instead, the officer needs only “a par-
ticularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal conduct under a
totality of the circumstances.” Munoz, 162 F.4th at 1219 (quotation
marks omitted); see id. at 1222 (finding that police developed reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity after initiating a traffic stop based on the
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totality of the circumstances). A non-exhaustive list of factors that the
Tenth Circuit has recognized as supporting reasonable suspicion in-
clude nervousness, unusual travel plans, criminal history, and travel
route. See id. at 1220–22; see also Pettit, 785 F.3d at 1380–83 (holding
that no one factor is determinative of reasonable suspicion of illegal
activity). Accordingly, an officer who develops reasonable suspicion of
illegal activity “may initiate an investigatory detention even if it is more
likely than not that the individual is not involved in any illegality.” Pettit,
785 F.3d at 1379–80 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 364 F.3d 1185,
1194 (10th Cir. 2004)) (emphasis in original).
As a general matter, the authority to detain a motorist while inves-
tigating reasonable suspicion does not include the right to search the
vehicle. Instead, a search of the vehicle must be justified by, for exam-
ple, probable cause. United States v. Phillips, 71 F.4th 817, 823 (10th Cir.
2023); see also United States v. Pinder, 121 F.4th 1367, 1371 (10th Cir.
2024) (allowing contemporaneous search incident to a lawful arrest).
“Probable cause to search a vehicle is established if, under the totality
of the circumstances, there is a fair probability that the car contains
contraband or evidence.” Phillips, 71 F.4th at 823 (quotation marks
omitted). When an officer smells drugs, such as marijuana emanating
from the vehicle, that observation is “entitled to substantial weight in
the probable cause analysis and can be an independently sufficient ba-
sis for probable cause.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Additional ob-
servations—such as nervous behavior and vague travel plans—obvi-
ously strengthen the existence of probable cause. See Munoz, 162 F.4th
at 1220–22.
B
In June 2025, Junction City police department K-9 officer, Nicho-
las Blake, told Undersheriff Justin Stopper of the Geary County Sher-
iff’s Department that a white tractor-trailer would be driving through
his area on Interstate 70 and that it “looked good.”1 Stopper testified
that he took this tip to mean that the tractor-trailer fit certain (but un-
specified) drug trafficking criteria that made it a candidate for an
1 The following facts were found based on the witness’s testimony and the
evidence produced at the suppression hearing.
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interdiction stop. Stopper therefore sought to find, stop, and inspect
the vehicle.2
Stopper subsequently located the tractor-trailer traveling east-
bound on Interstate 70 while he was also traveling eastbound in his
department-issued unmarked silver pickup truck. Stopper passed the
tractor-trailer and noticed that it had a California registration plate and
that the letters “AZK” were displayed on the side of the truck. He
testified that these markings triggered his interest because he did not
recognize them as the markings of a reputable operator. He also testi-
fied that he was intrigued by the tractor-trailer’s lights based on his
understanding of the history of this particular type of light.
The tractor-trailer was traveling immediately behind Stopper and,
in his opinion, closer to Stopper than Kansas law permitted. Stopper
then noticed that a car passed the tractor-trailer on the left and then
the tractor-trailer moved into the left lane behind it. Stopper observed
that the tractor-trailer followed that car too closely, too, leaving less
than one second behind it and the car in front of it. Finally, once the
tractor-trailer passed Stopper’s patrol vehicle, Stopper observed that it
quickly merged in front of him, leaving less than two seconds between
the vehicles.
Stopper initiated a traffic stop based on these observed actions. In
particular, he witnessed that the tractor-trailer followed his patrol ve-
hicle and another car too closely in violation of K.S.A. § 8-1523(a) and
that it later committed an unsafe passing maneuver in front of him in
violation of K.S.A. § 8-1516(a). Stopper testified that he ran the trac-
tor-trailer’s license plate through the automated license plate reader
system shortly before activating his lights and learned that the tractor-
trailer was traveling northbound on Interstate 15 coming out of South-
ern California the day before the stop.
2 Stopper’s testimony suggested that he subjectively and intentionally sought
the vehicle for the purpose of identifying a colorable basis to stop it for a
traffic infraction even though he only sought to undertake an investigation
as to potential drug trafficking. Tsegay makes no argument that this pursuit
of his vehicle was unlawful. Instead, he only asserts that the stop exceeded
the permissible scope of the traffic violation giving rise to the encounter.
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As the traffic stop unfolded, Stopper became suspicious that the
tractor-trailer was engaged in criminal activity. The following high-
lights observations that he made that contributed to that suspicion.
As he approached the cab of the tractor-trailer, Stopper took note
of the seal number on the back of the trailer so he could compare it to
the bill of lading to confirm the numbers matched. Based on his train-
ing and experience, a seal number that failed to match the bill of lading
meant that the load had been accessed and the cargo potentially adul-
terated. Once he arrived at the passenger side of the tractor-trailer, he
made contact first with the driver, Tsegay, and eventually with the co-
driver (and co-defendant), Samson Haliab, who was lying on the bunk
in the sleeper berth.
Stopper asked Tsegay for his driver’s license and inquired about
his travel plans. He briefly looked at the bill of lading that was located
on the front passenger seat, which he believed Tsegay encouraged him
to review. Although the automated license plate reader data placed the
tractor-trailer in Southern California, the bill of lading said the truck
was coming from Sacramento. And upon inquiry, Tsegay told Stopper
that he was traveling from Sacramento, which is in Northern Califor-
nia.
Stopper also noticed that Tsegay and Haliab were extremely nerv-
ous. He testified that Tsegay seemed stressed based on his wide-eyed
appearance, rapid and deep breathing, and his heartbeat causing “his
shirt to bounce off his stomach,” and that Haliab seemed to be dis-
playing similar signs of stress. Stopper testified that the occupants’
nervousness was uncharacteristic for members of the commercial ve-
hicle motoring public who, in Stopper’s experience, are accustomed to
being stopped for inspections.
Stopper asked Tsegay to join him in his patrol car. In doing so, he
brought Tsegay and Haliab’s driver’s licenses, the registration, and the
documents located on the front passenger seat, which included the bill
of lading. As he walked back to the patrol vehicle, Stopper talked to
his partner, Blake, who had arrived at the scene in the intervening time,
about the discrepancies between the automated license plate reader
data and Tsegay’s purported travel plans. Blake asked Stopper if the
travel plans Tsegay provided were reflected in the tractor-trailer’s log
book, and Stopper responded that he had not yet reviewed it.
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Stopper’s suspicion increased during the discussions he had with
Tsegay in his patrol vehicle. The first thing that caught his attention
was the inconsistent—if not contradictory—travel plans. Tsegay ini-
tially responded that he was coming from Sacramento. But then he
changed his story, explaining that he originated in Oakland, went to
Denver and then back to Sacramento, and was now going to Georgia.
Stopper testified that Tsegay’s answers conflicted not only with the
automated license plate reader data he had prior to the stop, but also
with Tsegay’s prior statement that he was traveling from Sacramento
to Georgia.
The next thing that Stopper found peculiar was Tsegay’s com-
ments concerning the contents of the trailer. Tsegay told Stopper that
he did not know what he was hauling and that someone else loaded his
trailer. This was unusual, according to Stopper, because based on his
experience it would be highly unusual for someone in the commercial
trucking industry to be unaware of what was loaded in his trailer.
Related to Tsegay’s purported unawareness of the contents of his
load was the discrepancy between the seal number on the truck and
the bill of lading. In the patrol vehicle, Stopper noticed that the seal
number on the trailer did not match the bill of lading. He then shared
this discrepancy with Blake, who had been talking to Haliab. Blake no-
ticed an additional discrepancy with the date listed on the bill of lading.
Blake then left Stopper’s patrol vehicle momentarily to ask Haliab for
the correct bill of lading. But when Haliab gave Blake another bill of
lading and the officers reviewed it, they noticed that it corresponded
to the seal number on the trailer but that the bill of lading indicated
that the trailer was destined for Aurora, Colorado (which was west of
their eastbound tractor-trailer). Stopper testified that the seal should
not have remained on the trailer if Tsegay had previously unloaded in
Aurora.
Believing that criminal activity was afoot, Stopper asked Tsegay if
he had anything illegal in the truck. Tsegay responded that he did not
and told Stopper that he could check inside the vehicle. Tsegay later
reconsidered after he told Stopper that the trailer contained a U-Haul
and unknown items and Stopper responded that the officers would
search the truck based on his prior consent, telling Stopper that he
would need to ask Haliab if they could search the truck. To confirm
his suspicion, Stopper then asked Blake to deploy his K-9—Chera—
around the truck and trailer for an exterior sniff. Blake reported that
Chera had indicated to the odor of drugs and Stopper told Tsegay that,
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based on Chera’s indication, the officers were going to search the
truck.
In order to search the trailer, Blake retrieved bolt cutters from his
patrol vehicle and used them to break the seal on the trailer doors.
Upon opening the trailer door, the officers could smell raw marijuana
coming from within. The officers observed several loose boxes and a
large U-Haul container. Blake then entered the trailer, looked inside a
few of the boxes, and located marijuana.
Based on this discovery, the officers took the tractor-trailer to the
nearby Special Operations Warehouse. There, the truck and trailer
were processed and the officers ultimately found 110 cardboard boxes
with 1,487.8 kilograms of marijuana and marijuana products, and seven
cardboard boxes containing 100 packages of cocaine with a gross
weight of approximately 118 kilograms.
The United States indicted Tsegay and Haliab. Doc. 1. The Indict-
ment contained four counts: conspiracy to possess with intent to dis-
tribute cocaine and marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, posses-
sion with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), possession with intent to distribute marijuana in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and interstate travel and transportation in aid
of racketeering enterprises in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3). Doc.
1; Doc. 44 (memorializing Haliab’s guilty plea).
Tsegay now moves to suppress. The only argument he made in his
motion to suppress was that Stopper unlawfully prolonged the traffic
stop by diverting from the mission of the traffic stop and into general
law enforcement activities. See Doc. 28 (asserting the stop violated Ro-
driguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015)). The Government opposes
that argument. Doc. 32. An evidentiary hearing was held on April 1,
2026, where Stopper testified.
II
Although Stopper initiated a traffic stop based on violations of
Kansas traffic laws, the stop quickly morphed into an investigation of
drug trafficking. That expansion of the purpose of the stop was justi-
fied based on the reasonable suspicion Stopper obtained during the
course of the traffic stop. Accordingly, Tsegay’s motion is denied.
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A
Tsegay argues that suppression is required because Stopper unrea-
sonably extended the stop in violation of Rodriguez v. United States, 575
U.S. 348 (2015).3 Doc. 28 at 9. To understand Tsegay’s argument, it is
helpful to begin with the basic doctrine concerning the lawfulness of
traffic stops and the scope of inquiry permitted.
1
As noted, a traffic stop constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure
and, as a result, must be reasonable. United States v. Baker, 108 F.4th
1241, 1246 (10th Cir. 2024). This means that it must be “justified at its
inception and . . . the officer’s actions during the stop must be reason-
ably related in scope to ‘the mission of the stop itself.’” Id. (quoting
United States v. Mayville, 955 F.3d 825, 829 (10th Cir. 2020)).
In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court held that a traffic stop “becomes
unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to com-
plete” it. Baker, 108 F.4th at 1246–47 (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 350–
51) (citations omitted). And while there is no de minimis exception to
3 After the testimony at the suppression hearing concluded, Tsegay made an
oral request to challenge the basis for the stop. The Government objected.
Tsegay’s attempt to challenge the lawfulness of the stop fails for at least two
reasons. One concerns waiver. Tsegay timely filed his opening brief on Jan-
uary 2, 2026, and a reply on January 30, 2026. See Docs. 28 & 41. No addi-
tional briefs were permitted by the briefing schedule. Tsegay could have
raised an argument concerning the lawfulness of the traffic stop either his
opening brief or reply. He did not do so. That constitutes a waiver. See United
States v. Vance, 893 F.3d 763, 770 (10th Cir. 2018) (providing that waiver ap-
plies “when a defendant fails to assert a particular argument in a pretrial sup-
pression motion”). The other reason concerns the merits. Even if Tsegay had
timely presented the argument, it would have failed. Tsegay argued that Stop-
per’s application of the two-second rule to determine that he had followed
the vehicles too closely did not provide an objective basis for the stop. But
that argument is foreclosed by application of Kansas and Tenth Circuit prec-
edent to Stopper’s testimony. See State v. Moore, 154 P.3d 1, 7 (Kan. 2007);
United States v. Hunter, 663 F.3d 1136, 1143 (10th Cir. 2011); see also United
States v. Figueroa, No. 24-40031, 2026 WL 746378, at *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 17,
2026) (concluding that the deputy’s application of the two-second rule pro-
vided an objective basis for the stop); United States v. Jones, No. 24-40032, 2025
WL 2996793, at *3 (D. Kan. Oct. 24, 2025) (same).
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the rule, Mayville, 955 F.3d at 830, the question is only whether “police
diligently pursued the [traffic] investigation,” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354,
and not whether they took the quickest route humanly possible to con-
cluding the stop. Mayville, 955 F.3d at 827. Thus, courts are not per-
mitted to “second-guess the logistical decisions of officers so long as
their actions were reasonable and diligently completed within the con-
fines of a lawful traffic stop[ ] . . . because reasonableness—rather than
efficiency—is the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment.” Id.
The Tenth Circuit has established a three-part test for analyzing
the lawfulness of a delay under Rodriguez: In particular, an unlawful sei-
zure occurs when an officer diverts from the traffic-based mission of
the stop to investigate ordinary criminal conduct, does so in a way that
“prolongs” (i.e., adds time to) the stop, and the investigative detour is
unsupported by any independent reasonable suspicion. Baker, 108
F.4th at 1248 (quoting Frazier, 30 F.4th at 1173). In other words, “the
government prevails if the officers’ actions did not divert from the
traffic mission, the search was not prolonged, or reasonable suspicion
existed.” Id. An officer may extend the stop if he or she has, at a min-
imum, reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. Baker, 108 F.4th
at 1247 (citing Mayville, 955 F.3d at 830). The moment reasonable sus-
picion becomes necessary is referred to as the Rodriguez moment. Leon,
80 F.4th 1160, 1165 (10th Cir. 2023) (citing United States v. Batara-Mo-
lina, 60 F.4th 1251, 1255 n.1 (10th Cir. 2023)).
Although the Government bears the burden of satisfying the rea-
sonable suspicion standard, it is not an onerous one. Munoz, 162 F.4th
at 1219 (citing United States v. Pettit, 785 F.3d 1374, 1379 (10th Cir.
2015)). Courts frequently describe the minimal standard of reasonable
suspicion by contrasting it with the easy-to-satisfy probable cause:
Where probable cause requires a “substantial chance of criminal activ-
ity,” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983), reasonable suspicion
requires only “some minimal level of objective justification,” United
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
The inquiry depends on “the totality of the circumstances.”
Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014) (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S.
411, 417 (1981)). The emphasis is on the “whole picture,” Cortez, 449
U.S. at 417, and rejects a “divide-and-conquer analysis” of a situation’s
relevant factors, United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002). Rea-
sonable suspicion “depends on the factual and practical considerations
of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal techni-
cians, act,” allowing officers to make “commonsense judgments and
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inferences about human behavior.” Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 380–
81 (2020) (emphasis in original) (cleaned up).
This low bar has been explained in recent Supreme Court cases
concerning the greater intrusion of stopping a motor vehicle’s travel.
For example, the Supreme Court held an officer had reasonable suspi-
cion to initiate a traffic stop for driving with a revoked license based
on the fact that the registered owner of the vehicle had a revoked li-
cense even when it was unclear who was driving the vehicle. Glover,
589 U.S. at 381. More recently, the Supreme Court reversed a lower
court’s conclusion that reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop was lack-
ing where an officer encountered a vehicle, its occupants fled the ve-
hicle, and the driver began backing out of a parking space even though
a passenger door had been left open. District of Columbia v. R.W., 2026
WL 1052344, 608 U.S. ___ (2026) (per curiam) (summarily reversing
lower court’s conclusion that reasonable suspicion was lacking). That
makes sense given the purpose of an investigative detention is merely
to dispel that suspicion. See generally Cortez, 449 U.S. at 421 (recognizing
the purpose of the stop is limited by the suspicion).
Under this commonsense approach, “factors consistent with inno-
cent travel may collectively amount to reasonable suspicion.” Leon, 80
F.4th at 1165. Courts generally defer to the officer—the individual
with specialized training and experience—to distinguish between in-
nocent and suspicious behavior unless “an officer relies on a circum-
stance incorrigibly free of associations with criminal activity.” Id. (quot-
ing Frazier, 30 F.4th at 1174) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Cortez, 449 U.S. at 419 (“[W]hen used by trained law enforcement of-
ficers, objective facts, meaningless to the untrained, can be combined
with permissible deductions from such facts to form a legitimate basis
for suspicion of a particular person and for action on that suspicion.”).
“As long as an officer has a particularized and objective basis for sus-
pecting an individual may be involved in criminal activity, he may ini-
tiate an investigatory detention even if it is more likely than not that
the individual is not involved in any illegality.” Munoz, 162 F.4th at
1219–20 (quoting Pettit, 785 F.3d at 1379) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (alterations in original). But an officer must point to the spe-
cific, articulable facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion; “inchoate sus-
picions and unparticularized hunches” will not do. Leon, 80 F.4th at
1165 (quoting United States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140, 1147 (10th Cir.
2010)).
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2
The thrust of Tsegay’s Rodriguez and reasonable suspicion argu-
ment concerns Stopper’s consideration of documents in the cab of the
tractor-trailer. Again, for context purposes, it is helpful to understand
the general parameters governing an officer’s review of ordinary travel
documents during a stop for an alleged traffic violation.
Generally speaking, an officer’s authority to investigate is con-
strained by the mission of the traffic stop, which is to ensure that ve-
hicles are operated safely and responsibly. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355
(citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658–59 (1979)). As a result, law
enforcement officers are permitted to inquire as to the driver’s author-
ity to lawfully and safely operate that vehicle. See United States v. Dawson,
90 F.4th 1286, 1292 (10th Cir. 2024) (citing Prouse, 440 U.S. at 658); see
also Glover, 589 U.S. at 381 (citing Prouse, 440 U.S. at 658, and holding
that there was reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle to confirm
whether the driver could lawfully operate the motor vehicle). This also
includes an officer’s inquiry into travel plans and other constrained
questions that would allow the officer to gauge the relative safety of
the officer during the encounter. United States v. Cortez, 965 F.3d 827,
838–39 (10th Cir. 2020) (permitting officers to make limited inquiries
into travel plans and the like and inquiries relative to officer safety).
The scope of the documents pertinent to that inquiry necessarily
depends on the vehicle. In Prouse, for example, the Supreme Court ex-
plained the importance of specific types of documents that should be
considered when performing a traffic stop on an ordinary passenger
vehicle: A driver’s license ensures that an individual is familiar with the
rules of the road and is physically qualified to operate a motor vehicle,
and the vehicle registration is designed to keep dangerous vehicles off
the road. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 658; see also Mich. Dept. of State Police v. Sitz,
496 U.S. 444, 451, 455 (1990) (recognizing that states have a significant
interest in regulating the vehicles on its roadways by preventing drunk
driving).
That changes a bit when the passenger vehicle is a rental. In addi-
tion to the driver’s license, officers are allowed to request and review
the rental agreement because it provides similar assurances. United
States v. Dawson, 90 F.4th 1286, 1292 (10th Cir. 2024) (citing Rodriguez,
575 U.S. at 355). This makes sense because inspecting a rental agree-
ment is “akin to inspecting a privately-owned vehicle’s registration.”
Id.
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The universe of relevant documents is different when the stopped
vehicle is a commercial tractor-trailer.4 The First Circuit, for example,
has recognized that the Prouse rationale as applied to commercial vehi-
cles permits an officer to request a commercial driver’s medical certif-
icate and log book because these documents fall in the same category
as a driver’s license and registration—that is, “they are documents that
the trucker is legally required to possess.” United States v. Maldonado, 356
F.3d 130, 134 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Henderson, No. 18-312,
2018 WL 4920772, at *5 (D. Neb. June 19, 2019) (applying Maldonado).
And other courts have applied this rationale to permit officers to re-
view a variety of documents required by the commercial trucking in-
dustry during a traffic stop of a commercial tractor-trailer. See, e.g.,
United States v. Acosta, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1197 (N.D. Ga. 2011)
(“[O]fficers may obtain and review the bill of lading and log book and
other items related to the operation of the truck.”) (collecting cases);
United States v. Pauyo, 341 F. App’x 955, 956 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Based on
the officer’s experience with commercial vehicles, the information he
obtained from Pauyo’s log book and the bills of lading, and Pauyo’s
demeanor and reluctance to answer routine questions, Trooper Lan-
caster had a reasonable and objective suspicion that Pauyo was en-
gaged in illegal activity”); United States v. Cantu, 227 F. App’x 783, 785
(11th Cir. 2007) (holding that an officer who stopped a commercial
vehicle for crossing the white line was justified in examining the log
book to investigate whether the driver was impaired); United States v.
Ramirez, 29 F. App’x 111, 113 (4th Cir. 2002) (affirming suppression
where officer reviewed tractor-trailer’s bill of lading and log book).
And the Tenth Circuit has upheld an officer’s request of a commercial
driver’s log and shipping documents because these documents concern
the travel of the commercial vehicle. United States v. Lopez-Merida, 466
F. App’x 731, 736 (10th Cir. 2012) (concluding that “during a traffic
stop an officer can request the documents concerning the travel—such
as driver’s license, registration, rental contract, or, as here, the driver’s
4 The distinction between the rules governing commercial truck drivers and
those governing operating passenger vehicles is hardly novel. Compare United
States v. Vasquez-Castillo, 258 F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir. 2001) (recognizing
that “commercial trucking is an industry closely regulated by both federal and
state governments”); with United States v. Herrera, 444 F.3d 1238, 1243 (10th
Cir. 2006) (reversing denial of motion to suppress because the officer incor-
rectly believed that the vehicle was a commercial vehicle subject to warrant-
less regulatory search of commercial property and had no reasonable suspi-
cion).
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13
log and shipping documents,” which included a bill of lading in this
case).5
B
With these concepts in mind, it is now possible to identify and ad-
dress Tsegay’s Rodriguez arguments. All told, he argues that Stopper
impermissibly prolonged the stop four times. The first is when Stopper
initially approached the tractor-trailer and reviewed Tsegay’s bill of lad-
ing. Doc. 28 at 2. The second occurs in the patrol vehicle when Stopper
first reviewed Tsegay’s log book and bill of lading and asked what he
was hauling. See id. at 3–4. The third is later on in the patrol vehicle
when Stopper resumed review of his commercial documentation and
asked Tsegay about his cargo. See id. at 5. And the fourth is when Stop-
per once again questioned Tsegay about his route, had Blake deploy
his drug dog Chera, and Chera indicated to the presence of drugs. See
id. at 6. But none of these actions unlawfully extended the stop.
1
The first alleged Rodriguez moment—Stopper’s brief review of
Tsegay’s bill of lading while checking his driver’s license—fails. Contra
Doc. 28 at 9–10. Even Tsegay concedes that he must travel with a bill
of lading—a document containing information about the vehicle’s
cargo and travel route—because of regulatory requirements for oper-
ating a commercial vehicle. See Doc. 52 at 3. And, generally speaking,
the Tenth Circuit has permitted an officer to check documents a driver
is legally required to possess during a traffic stop. See United States v.
Rosborough, 366 F.3d 1145, 1148 (10th Cir. 2004) (“In the context of
routine traffic stops, a law enforcement officer may generally request
a driver’s license, registration, and other required papers, run requisite
computer checks, and issue citations or warnings as appropriate.”).
The Tenth Circuit has even applied this general rule in the commercial
truck context, holding that an officer may request the driver’s log and
shipping documents like the bill of lading during the traffic stop. See
Lopez-Merida, 466 F. App’x at 736 (citing Rosborough, 366 F.3d at 1148).
5 Lopez-Merida is unpublished and is therefore not precedential, but the factual
similarity between it and the instant case makes its reasoning particularly per-
suasive. See, e.g., United States v. Hebert, 159 F.4th 777, 780 n.3 (10th Cir. 2025)
(citing an unpublished case for its persuasive value under Fed. R. App. P.
32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1).
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And, of course, that view is consistent with that of other courts that
have considered the issue. See Acosta, 807 F. Supp. at 1197; Cantu, 227
F. App’x at 785. As a result, Stopper’s review of the bill of lading is
part and parcel of a traffic stop, akin to registration of a passenger ve-
hicle or the rental agreement on a rental vehicle. Maldonado, 356 F.3d
at 134; Lopez-Merida, 466 F. App’x at 736.
Tsegay’s counterarguments are unpersuasive. For instance, he ar-
gues—without authority—that an officer may only ask for things a
driver is required to produce in order to operate the vehicle. See Doc.
52 at 3.6 Not so. Officers may lawfully request and inspect those doc-
uments needed to confirm the safe and lawful operation of the motor
vehicle. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 658 (explaining that one aspect of pro-
moting highway safety is ensuring that “vehicles are fit for safe opera-
tion”). And in the commercial truck context, that frequently includes
a bill of lading, log book, commercial driver’s license, or similar items.
See supra at II.A.2.
In addition, Tsegay claims Rodriguez by implication displaced any
rule that would permit an officer to review a commercial driver’s com-
mercial documents pursuant to a traffic stop. See Doc. 52 at 6–10. That
argument fails for many reasons. One is that it lacks legal support be-
cause it ignores the unbroken string of cases applying the Prouse con-
cept in all contexts both before and after Rodriguez. See supra at II.A.2
(citing a string of cases before and after Rodriguez). Another is that it
contravenes a core precept of Rodriguez, where the Supreme Court re-
affirmed Prouse’s recognition that officers may conduct ordinary traffic
stops to advance the mission of ensuring highway safety while recog-
nizing that this mission could not expand absent justification. See Ro-
driguez, 575 U.S. at 355; see also Dawson, 90 F.4th at 1291–92 (recogniz-
ing the traffic mission announced in Prouse within the Rodriguez frame-
work that prohibits unlawful expansions absent independent reasona-
ble suspicion).
Finally, Tsegay argues that Stopper did not have the requisite train-
ing and experience to examine his commercial documents. See Doc. 52
6 At the suppression hearing, Tsegay was permitted to research and submit
supplemental briefing on the issue of whether Stopper could review the bill
of lading pursuant to the traffic stop. See Doc. 50. Tsegay filed a supplemental
brief and a response to the Government’s brief answering the same. See Docs.
52 & 53.
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15
at 10; see also Doc. 53 at 11. In essence, he notes that Stopper is not
permitted to review the bill of lading because commercial trucking is a
heavily regulated industry with highly specialized rules, that Kansas
identifies a group of officers authorized to engage in the regulation of
those vehicles, and that Stopper is not within that class of officers.
Doc. 52 at 10; see also Doc. 53 at 3–11. That argument is a red herring:
Stopper was not undertaking a regulatory inspection; he was conduct-
ing a traffic stop of a commercial tractor-trailer to confirm that the
driver could lawfully and safely operate the vehicle on the roadway.
That inquiry neither required nor relied upon any regulatory training
or experience. It was simply a traffic stop of a commercial tractor-
trailer for a violation of a traffic law applicable to every vehicle on a
Kansas roadway, something Stopper’s testimony confirms he has ex-
perience and training to do.
2
Tsegay’s second Rodriguez argument—that Stopper prolonged the
stop when he entered the patrol vehicle and started looking at Tsegay’s
commercial papers—fails. Contra Doc. 28 at 10. This is because, based
on the totality of the circumstances, Stopper reasonably suspected that
the tractor-trailer was engaged in criminal activity. As a result, Rodriguez
no longer applies and Stopper was warranted in extending the lawful
stop to dispel that suspicion. See United States v. Samilton, 56 F.4th 820,
828–29 (10th Cir. 2022).
The totality of the circumstances confirms that Stopper suspected
that Tsegay’s tractor-trailer was engaged in trafficking. In particular,
Tsegay lied about his travel plans. Tsegay claimed that he and Haliab
were coming from Sacramento (in Northern California) but Stopper
knew, based on automated license plate reader data,7 that Tsegay’s trac-
tor-trailer had been traveling northbound on Interstate 15 from South-
ern California. Implausible or false statements about travel plans are
commonly accepted as a basis for reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., United
7 Tsegay makes no challenge to Stopper’s reliance on automated license plate
reader data. See United States v. Oakes, No. 25-40006, 2026 WL 1020818, at *8
(D. Kan. Apr. 15, 2026) (rejecting defendant’s invocation of Carpenter v. United
States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018), and finding that the defendant had no subjective
expectation of privacy in a license plate).
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16
States v. Munoz, 162 F.4th 1210, 1221 (10th Cir. 2025) (finding that eva-
siveness about travel plans contributed to reasonable suspicion).
Stopper also testified that Tsegay and Haliab were extremely nerv-
ous. He testified that Tsegay had a wide-eyed appearance, that his
breathing was rapid and deep, that he could see Tsegay’s heartbeat, and
that Haliab seemed to be displaying similar signs of stress. This too
served as a basis for reasonable suspicion. See Pettit, 785 F.3d 1374,
1381 (10th Cir. 2015) (finding that “abnormal nervousness” contrib-
uted to reasonable suspicion). Stopper noted that, based on his expe-
rience, Tsegay and Haliab’s nervousness was uncharacteristic for mem-
bers of the commercial motor vehicle motoring public who frequently
experience stops, for example, at weigh stations and for inspections.
That, too, is entitled deference. See Simpson, 609 F.3d at 1146 (giving
weight to the officer’s ability to distinguish between innocent and sus-
picious conduct).
These factors collectively established reasonable suspicion of drug
trafficking that warranted further investigation of the lawful stop. As a
result, Stopper was justified in expanding the mission of the traffic stop
to confirm or dispel his suspicions. See Munoz, 162 F.4th at 1222 (con-
cluding that the troopers were justified in briefly extending the stop to
ask Mr. Munoz additional questions and seek his consent to search the
vehicle based on similar factors in this case, namely the defendant’s
nervousness and purported travel plans).
Tsegay opposes this conclusion but his arguments lack merit. First,
he challenges Stopper’s credibility by arguing that the video evidence
does not show his shirt bouncing off of his stomach. But Stopper tes-
tified that his body camera could not capture what he observed in per-
son. He also testified that his flashlight obscured Haliab from view.
Although the video footage is not clear enough to identify and evaluate
all of the minute details Stopper offered,8 Stopper credibly testified that
Tsegay seemed nervous based on his wide-eyed appearance, deep and
rapid breathing, and Stopper’s perception of Tsegay’s visible heartbeat.
Stopper’s testimony, despite its unnecessary rhetoric, was sufficiently
credible. See United States v. Kitchell, 653 F.3d 1206, 1220–21 (10th Cir.
8 To the extent Stopper claims to have seen Tsegay’s shirt literally jump or
bounce off of his chest, that contention is rejected as inconsistent with com-
mon sense contrary to the video evidence. Rather, the phrase is accepted as
a hyperbolic way of describing Tsegay’s extreme nervousness.
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17
2011) (finding reasonable suspicion even though the videotape lends
some credence to the defendant’s argument).
He also attempts to undermine reasonable suspicion by claiming
that nervousness, standing alone, cannot constitute reasonable suspi-
cion. Doc. 41 at 5. Fair enough. Cortez, 965 F.3d at 835 (providing that
mere nervousness does not alone generate reasonable suspicion be-
cause it is common for most people to be nervous when confronted
by law enforcement). But so what: Nervousness did not stand alone; it
was part of a broader collection of circumstances that, in totality, jus-
tified Stopper’s reasonable suspicion. And isolating it, as Tsegay seeks
to do, would run headlong into what the Supreme Court recently and
firmly rejected—courts attempting to isolate, discount, and ignore fac-
tors from the total picture confronting the officer. See R.W., 2026 WL
1052344, at *3 (criticizing the lower court for “reviewing facts piece-
meal and without context” instead of considering that all of the facts
(including those disregarded by the lower court) provided the whole
picture establishing reasonable suspicion).
Tsegay also argues that some of the factors the Government relies
on in its brief to support reasonable suspicion at the second Rodriguez
moment surfaced only after the moment had begun. Doc. 41 at 10. It
is true that, throughout the course of the detention, Stopper learned
and uncovered additional details that pointed to the likelihood that
criminal conduct was afoot. For example, these facts include Tsegay
being unfamiliar with the contents of the trailer, the fidelity of the seal,
whether it matched the bill of lading, and the equivocal statements
about where they had been, what stops they made, and the like. But all
of those facts occurred after Stopper already possessed reasonable sus-
picion. In other words, these facts strengthened the initial suspicion
that Stopper already had. See Pettit, 785 F.3d 1374, 1383 (10th Cir. 2015)
(affirming the district court’s finding of reasonable suspicion based on
similar factors that were known to the officer when he extended de-
tention following the stop); see also United States v. Coleman, 483 F. App’x
419, 421 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting that defendant’s argument concern-
ing the officer’s suspicions that the seal number on the trailer did not
match the bill of lading was better suited for a Fourth Amendment
reasonable suspicion analysis).
Finally, Tsegay argued at the hearing that there was a language bar-
rier between him and Stopper. Tsegay’s counsel explained that Tsegay
is a citizen of Eritrea and speaks Tigrinya, which is one of several lan-
guages spoken in Eritrea. But the video evidence and testimony show
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18
that Tsegay was able to communicate with Stopper in conversational
English throughout the stop. And, even if there were language diffi-
culties, Tsegay has not shown that they might do anything more than
offer a plausible innocent explanation to some of the questions Stop-
per posed. Of course, an officer need not subjugate his or her training
and experience to the post-hoc, innocent explanation of an encounter.
See Munoz, 162 F.4th at 1221 (finding that Munoz’s answers with re-
spect to his travel plans “support[ed] a finding of reasonable suspicion
even if there might be an innocent alternative explanation for Mr.
Munoz’s unusual uncertainty” about them); see also United States v. Man-
jarrez, 348 F.3d 881, 886 (10th Cir. 2003) (concluding that a working
knowledge of the English language was sufficient for an encounter to
be consensual).
* * *
The existence of reasonable suspicion precludes Tsegay’s second,
third, and fourth Rodriguez arguments. Stopper developed reasonable
suspicion when Tsegay represented that he was traveling from Sacra-
mento—which contradicted the license plate reader data—and dis-
played unusual nervousness for someone in the commercial trucking
industry. That warranted a limited investigation to confirm or dispel
Stopper’s suspicion. See generally Cortez, 449 U.S. at 421 (recognizing the
purpose of the stop is limited by the suspicion). And each of Stopper’s
attempts to dispel the suspicion only led to greater suspicion—and
commensurate need to undertake additional investigative question-
ing—until the K-9 exterior sniff and subsequent search confirmed it.
That precludes an application of Rodriguez. Frazier, 30 F.4th at 1173.
III
For the foregoing reasons, Tsegay’s Motion to Suppress, Doc. 28,
is DENIED.
It is so ordered.
Date: May 4, 2026 s/ Toby Crouse
Toby Crouse
United States District Judge
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