Anaya v. Hudson et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
JUSTIN ANAYA,
Plaintiff,
v. CASE NO. 25-3122-JWL
(fnu) HUDSON, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff, a federal prisoner, brings this pro se civil rights action under Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Plaintiff is
currently incarcerated at FCI-Beckley in Beaver, West Virginia, but his claims arose during his
detention at FCI-Leavenworth in Leavenworth, Kansas (“FCIL”). The Court granted Plaintiff
leave to proceed in forma pauperis. On September 2, 2025, the Court entered a Memorandum and
Order to Show Cause (Doc. 7) (“MOSC”), ordering Plaintiff to show good cause why his
Complaint should not be dismissed for the reasons set forth in the MOSC. This matter is before
the Court on Plaintiff’s response (Doc. 11).
Plaintiff alleges that he was repeatedly subjected to excessive force, denied medical
attention, and otherwise mistreated at FCIL beginning on March 29, 2023, and continuing through
October, 2023. See MOSC, Doc. 7, at 1-7. Plaintiff names 64 defendants, all staff at FCIL.
Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of $20 million or $10 million and immediate release.
The Court found in the MOSC that Plaintiff has not shown that a Bivens remedy is available
for his claims and that his claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
In his response, Plaintiff first argues that the limitations period should be tolled because he
was “in transit” for a portion of the time, he suffered from “severe mental illness,” and Bureau of
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Prisons personnel made it difficult for him to exhaust his administrative remedies.
State law governs the length of the limitations period and tolling issues for both § 1983 and
Bivens actions. See Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 (1989); Roberts v. Barreras, 109 F. App’x
224, n.1 (10th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Kansas recognizes the doctrine of equitable tolling.
Matter of Bell, 529 P.3d 153, 157 (Kan. 2023). The Kansas Supreme Court (“KSC”) explained in
Bell that “[u]nder certain circumstances, ‘equitable estoppel can be applied to bar a party from
relying on the defense of the statute of limitations.’” Bell, 539 P.3d at 157 (quoting Rockers v.
Kansas Turnpike Authority, 991 P.2d 889 (1999). The burden is on the party claiming application
of equitable estoppel. Id. That party must show that another party induced it to believe certain
facts existed, by action or silence; it rightfully relied and acted on such belief; and it would be
prejudiced if the other party were allowed to deny the existence of such facts. Id. The KSC also
noted that equitable tolling under federal law requires a plaintiff to show “(1) that he has been
pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and
prevented timely filing.” Id. (quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645-46 (2010)). The KSC
then applied both tests to the question of whether equitable tolling applied to toll the statute of
limitations in a state wrongful conviction action. Id. at 154.
Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants affirmatively induced him into delaying his filing
of this civil rights action or that despite pursuing his rights diligently, some “extraordinary
circumstances” prevented the timely filing. Dartez v. Peters, Case No. 15-3255-EFM-DJW, 2018
WL 1138282, at *6 (D. Kan. March 2, 2018) (citation omitted). Extraordinary circumstances that
could warrant equitable tolling include “when the defendant's conduct rises to the level of active
deception; where a plaintiff has been lulled into inaction by a defendant, and likewise, if a plaintiff
is actively misled or has in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his or her
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rights.” Farhat v. United States, No. CIV-19-401-SPS, 2020 WL 5751618, at *4 (E.D. Okla. Sept.
25, 2020) (quoting Impact Energy Res., LLC v. Salazar, 693 F.3d 1239, 1246 (10th Cir. 2012);
United States v. Clymore, 245 F.3d 1195, 1199 (10th Cir. 2001)). Plaintiff’s asserted bases for
equitable tolling do not demonstrate an extraordinary circumstance that would entitle him to toll
the limitation period.
However, even if Plaintiff had established a basis for equitable tolling of the statute of
limitations, it would not matter because Plaintiff has not shown that he may bring his claims under
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 288 (1971).
Thus, Plaintiff has failed to show that a cause of action exists for his claims.
“Constitutional rights do not typically come with a built-in cause of action to allow for
private enforcement in courts.” DeVillier v. Texas, 601 U.S. 285, 291 (2024) (citation omitted).
Rather, they generally are “invoked defensively in cases arising under other sources of law or
asserted offensively pursuant to an independent cause of action designed for that purpose, see, e.g.,
42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Id. Section 1983 states, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute . . . of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects . . . any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).
By this language, “[s]ection 1983 allows an individual to sue a government actor in his
individual capacity for violating her constitutional rights and recover money damages from
resulting injuries that the actor caused by his violation.” Cuervo v. Sorenson, 112 F.4th 1307, 131-
14 (10th Cir. 2024). In other words, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action or a right of action
for an individual whose constitutional rights are violated by someone acting under color of state
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law. In addition, state law sometimes provides a cause of action for enforcement of constitutional
rights. See DeVillier, 601 U.S. at 292-93 (holding that Texas state law provides a cause of action
by which landowners could seek compensation owed to them under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution).
Prior to Bivens, there was no private federal right of action available for an individual
whose Fourth Amendment rights had been violated by federal agents acting under color of their
federal authority. Put another way, before Bivens was decided in 1971, an individual had no right
to sue in federal court a federal agent who, while acting under color of federal law, violated the
individual’s constitutional rights. In Bivens, the United States Supreme Court “created a cause of
action against federal agents for a violation of the Bill of Rights.” See Logsdon v. U.S. Marshal
Serv., 91 F.4th 1352 (10th Cir. 2024); see also Mohamed v. Jones, 100 F.4th 1214, 1229 (10th Cir.
2024) (“When the Supreme Court decided Bivens, it created a claim for constitutional violations
by federal officials.”). The Bivens Court held that a person whose complaint asserted that his
Fourth Amendment rights were violated by federal agents acting under color of federal authority
“state[d] a cause of action” and therefore that person was “entitled to recover money damages for
any injuries he has suffered as a result of the agents’ violation of the Amendment.” Bivens, 403
U.S. at 397. By so holding, the Supreme Court “implied” a federal cause of action. See Mohamed,
100 F.4th at 1229.
As explained in the MOSC, more recent decisions from the Supreme Court have severely
curtailed the recognition of “a Bivens cause of action” and have, in essence, prohibited its
expansion beyond certain specific contexts, none of which exist here. (Doc. 7, p. 12-16.)
Therefore, unless Plaintiff can identify another legal basis that gives him the right to seek relief
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for the violation of his constitutional rights by the Defendant federal agents, he may not pursue the
claims he asserts in this action.
In his response, Plaintiff asks to supplement his Complaint to “add to [his] Bivens claim”
a Monell claim, Eighth Amendment violation, First Amendment violation, Fourteenth Amendment
violation, and a civil conspiracy claim. (Doc. 11, at 3.) He also mentions the PREA (Prison Rape
Elimination Act). Id. The additional constitutional claims do not help Plaintiff because they would
also need to be brought through a Bivens cause of action, which is unavailable. Likewise, a
conspiracy claim would allege a conspiracy to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, which would
also need Bivens to provide a cause of action. A Monell claim is not applicable as Plaintiff does
not seek to hold a municipality liable under § 1983 for a constitutional violation (see City of
Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385–86 (1989)), and the PREA does not provide a private
right of action (see Haffner v. Geary Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 18-3247-SAC, 2019 WL 1367662,
at *4 (D. Kan. Mar. 26, 2019) (citations omitted) (collecting cases)). Nothing cited by Plaintiff
gives him the legal right to sue federal officials for the violation of his constitutional rights.
The majority of Plaintiff’s response reiterates the factual basis for his claims and continues
to argue that the defendants violated several of his constitutional rights. The Court acknowledges
Plaintiff’s frustration, but even taking all of his factual allegations as true, Plaintiff has not shown
that he has a cause of action by which to bring these claims. Plaintiff has failed to show good
cause why this matter should not be dismissed for the reasons set forth in the MOSC. Thus, this
case must be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
Plaintiff has also filed a “Motion Seeking Leave for Extension of Time on Filing” (Doc.
10), seeking “an extension of time for the filing of this case.” Id. He asserts that the statute of
limitations should be equitably tolled. Id. Because the Court considered and rejected this
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argument above, the motion is denied.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that this matter is dismissed for
failure to state a claim.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion Seeking Leave for Extension of
Time on Filing (Doc. 10) is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated October 28, 2025, in Kansas City, Kansas.
S/ John W. Lungstrum
JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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