Askins v. Proffit et al

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
ZACKERY J. ASKINS,
Plaintiffs,
v. 	CASE NO. 26-3048-JWL
LAURA A. PROFFIT, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Zackery J. Askins is a military prisoner currently incarcerated at the Midwest Joint
Regional Corrections Facility (“MJRCF”) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Plaintiff brings this pro
se civil rights action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma
pauperis.1
I. Background
The Court screened Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 11) (“SAC”) and entered
a Memorandum and Order (Doc. 12) (“M&O”) ordering Plaintiff to show good cause why his
request for monetary damages, his requests for Defendants’ reassignment or termination, any
individual capacity claims, and his claims against Defendant Hansen, Deputy Commander, should
not be denied or dismissed for the reasons set forth in the M&O. (Doc. 12, at 13.) Plaintiff filed
a response (Doc. 17). Plaintiff has also filed a Motion to Submit Support Document (Doc. 28).
The Court grants the motion to the extent that the Court has considered the attached documents as
part of his response to the M&O and his response to the Martinez Report.
1 The Court notes that Plaintiff filed a “Notice to the Court” (Doc. 18) setting forth his difficulties receiving a certified
account statement for purposes of seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis in his case in the Western District of
Oklahoma. Plaintiff attached an account statement to his ifp motion in this Court (Doc. 2–1) and the Court granted
him leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 7). The Court will not be taking any further action on Plaintiff’s notice
at Doc. 18. If Plaintiff needs an extension or other relief in his case pending in the Western District of Oklahoma, he
should seek relief from that court in that case.
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 1 of 35

2
The Court also found in the M&O that the proper processing of Plaintiff’s claims seeking
injunctive relief could not be achieved without additional information from appropriate MJRCF
officials. 	See Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978); see also Hall v. Bellmon, 935
F.2d 1106 (10th Cir. 1991). The Court ordered the MJRCF officials to prepare and file a Martinez
Report addressing Plaintiff’s requests for injunctive relief and including any information
pertaining to exhaustion and justiciability. See Nauman v. Wormuth, 2024 WL 776100, at *6 (D.
Kan. 2024) (discussing two-part test to determine whether a military plaintiff’s claim is
justiciable). The M&O provides that “[o]nce the report has been received, the Court can properly
screen Plaintiffs’ claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.” 	(Doc. 12, at 10.) 	The Martinez Report
(Docs. 19, 20) (the “Report”) has been filed, and Plaintiff has filed a response to the Report
(Doc. 27). The Court’s screening standards are set forth in the Court’s Memorandum and Order
at Doc. 10. See Doc. 10, at 5–6.
Plaintiff’s claims in the SAC are set forth in detail in the M&O.2 	Plaintiff names as
defendants: Laura A. Proffit, Commander; and Stephen Joseph Hansen, Deputy Commander. For
relief, Plaintiff seeks “return or replacement items; financial recompence, as outlined; removal,
reassignment, or relief of parties.” (Doc. 11, at 5.)
II. Motion for Appointment of Counsel
Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 26). Plaintiff argues that he
is a layman at law, he is indigent, he has limited access to the law library, and his case is unique
and will require extensive research and investigation. (Doc. 26, at 1–2.)
2 The Court notes that Plaintiff has filed a “Declaration in Support of SAC” (Doc. 25) in which he sets forth allegations
regarding responses to DD Form 510s regarding the facility’s policy on educational books. Plaintiff acknowledges
that this issue was not ripe “as Plaintiff was in the process of fully exhausting remedies as is required by the Prison
Litigation Reform Act.” (Doc. 25, at 1.) This claim is not part of the operative complaint, and the Court will not be
taking any action on Plaintiff’s Declaration.
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 2 of 35

3
The Court has considered Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel. The Court denies
the current motion for the same reasons set forth in the Court’s Memorandum and Order denying
his previous motion for appointment of counsel. See Doc. 10, at 1–3. Thus, the Court denies the
current motion without prejudice to refiling if this matter survives screening.
III. Claims Subject to Dismissal
The Court found in the M&O that Plaintiff is only entitled to assert official capacity claims
for injunctive relief. The Court ordered Plaintiff to show good cause why his request for monetary
damages, his requests for Defendants’ reassignment or termination, any individual capacity claims,
and his claims against Defendant Hansen, Deputy Commander, should not be denied or dismissed
for the reasons set forth in the M&O. (Doc. 12, at 13.) Plaintiff has filed a response (Doc. 17) to
the M&O.
The Court ordered Plaintiff to show good cause why any request for monetary damages
should not be denied based upon the Feres doctrine. 	(Doc. 12, at 3–4) (citing Feres v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)). In his response, Plaintiff points to the opinions by Justices Thomas
and Sotomayor in Beck v. United States, calling into question the relevancy of the doctrine.
(Doc. 17, at 1–2.)
In Beck, the United States Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari. See Beck v.
United States, 146 S. Ct. 405 (2025). The statement by Justice Sotomayor addresses the denial of
certiorari, stating that Justice Thomas rightly explains in his dissent that Feres “is a difficult
decision to justify.” Id. at 405 (citing THOMAS, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). In the
statement, Justice Sotomayor explains that Feres has worked harm in depriving “servicemembers
and their families of redress for serious harms they have suffered during service to this country . .
. even in in circumstances far removed from the expected risks of military service.” Id. (citation
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 3 of 35

4
omitted). The statement provides that “[i]t has, for example, barred recovery for claims arising
from medical malpractice, sexual assault, and (as here) car accidents, even when those harms occur
on U.S. soil, bear little relation to the military itself, and just as easily could have befallen any
American civilian.” Id. (citation omitted). However, Justice Sotomayor states that:
Even so, out of respect for the Court’s rules of stare decisis, and in
recognition of the reliance interests that Feres has generated, I vote
to deny this petition for a writ of certiorari. Beyond the “special
justification” that is needed to overrule any of our precedents, stare
decisis 	has 	“enhanced 	force” 	on 	questions 	of 	statutory
interpretation. Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U.S. 446,
456, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 192 L.Ed.2d 463 (2015). 	That is because,
unlike 	with 	decisions 	of 	constitutional 	dimension, 	“Congress
exercises primary authority” over statutory questions “and ‘remains
free to alter what we have done.’ ” Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian
Community, 572 U.S. 782, 799, 134 S. Ct. 2024, 188 L.Ed.2d 1071
(2014); see Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S. A., 563 U.S. 754,
765, 131 S. Ct. 2060, 179 L.Ed.2d 1167 (2011) (explaining the
“ ‘ “special force” ’ . . . of stare decisis with regard to questions of
statutory interpretation”). This “respect for Congress’s decision not
to intervene promotes the separation of powers by requiring
interested parties to resort to the legislative rather than the judicial
process to achieve their policy goals.” Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447,
474–475, 	143 	S. 	Ct. 	2279, 	216 	L.Ed.2d 	1041 	(2023)
(SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring). 	Moreover, the “justification for
statutory stare decisis is especially strong” when Congress has
considered but “spurned multiple opportunities to reverse” the
Court’s interpretation of a statute. Id., at 475, 143 S. Ct. 2279.
That is the case here. Congress has often considered legislation that
would overrule or limit the Feres doctrine. 	See, e.g., H. R. 1517,
112th Cong., 1st Sess., § 4 (2011); S. 1347, 111th Cong., 1st Sess.,
§ 2 (2009); H. R. 2684, 107th Cong., 1st Sess., § 1 (2001); S. 347,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). Indeed, Congress most recently did
so in 2019, see S. 1790, 116th Cong., 1st Sess., § 729 (amendment
as passed in the House), but ultimately decided to provide payments
for certain service-related medical-malpractice claims under the
Military Claims Act rather than the FTCA, see National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, § 731, 133 Stat. 1457–1460,
10 U.S.C. § 2733a.
Congress, therefore, is “undoubtedly aware of ” the problems posed
by Feres and “can change [Feres] if it likes.” Allen v. Milligan, 599
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 4 of 35

5
U.S. 1, 39, 143 S. Ct. 1487, 216 L.Ed.2d 60 (2023). “[U]ntil and
unless it does, statutory stare decisis counsels our staying the
course.” Ibid. 	I write, however, to underscore that this important
issue deserves further congressional attention, without which Feres
will continue to produce deeply unfair results like the one in this
case and the others discussed in Justice THOMAS’s dissenting
opinion. See post, at 409–410.
Id. at 405–06.
In his dissent, Justice Thomas states that the court did not need to overrule Feres because
“Staff Sergeant Beck was not killed incident to military service at all . . . [h]e was killed in Missouri
while off duty and going home to eat lunch with his family.” Id. at 406. Although Justice Thomas
states that the Supreme Court should have granted certiorari in the case, nothing in his dissent or
Justice Sotomayor’s statement overrules Feres.
In Plaintiff’s case, his claims are based on his conditions while incarcerated at the MJRCF.
This Court has stated that a plaintiff’s status as a military prisoner dictates that his constitutional
claims arise incident to military service. Coleman v. Johnston, 2021 WL 638020, at *2 (D. Kan.
2021). The Court cited the Tenth Circuit’s findings in Ricks as follows:
At the time he filed the original complaint, Ricks was serving his
sentence at the USDB in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The USDB is
the Army Corrections System maximum custody facility and
provides long-term incarceration for enlisted and officer personnel
of the armed forces. No civilians are confined at the USDB. The
USDB is run by the Commandant, a United States Army military
police officer. Military police serve as correctional officers at the
USDB, which does not employ civilian guards.
Id. (quoting Ricks v. Nickels, 295 F.3d 1124, 1126 (10th Cir. 2002) (rejecting military prisoner’s
Bivens claim under the Feres doctrine; plaintiff, although discharged, remained subject to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)). 	This Court noted that the Tenth Circuit “held that
Ricks’ alleged injuries stemmed from his military relationship such that it is incident to his military
service, where he was convicted in a military court for offenses committed during active duty; was
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 5 of 35

6
confined in a military institution commanded and operated by military personnel, subject to the
USDB’s rules and regulations; and was subject to the UCMJ and could be tried by court-martial
for offenses during incarceration.” Id. at *3. 	“Likewise, any claim Plaintiff may be making for
monetary damages is ‘incident to military service’ and therefore barred by the Feres doctrine.” Id.
Justice Sotomayor’s statement notes that Congress has often considered legislation that
would overrule or limit the Feres doctrine, “but ultimately decided to provide payments for certain
service-related medical-malpractice claims under the Military Claims Act rather than the FTCA .
. ..” Beck, 146 S. Ct. at 405–06. Plaintiff acknowledges in his response that he attempted to file
claims under the Military Claims Act. Those claims are addressed below. Plaintiff has not shown
good cause why his request for monetary damages is not barred by the Feres doctrine. Plaintiff’s
claims for monetary relief are denied.
The Court also ordered Plaintiff to show good cause why any request for Defendants’
reassignment or termination should not be denied. (Doc. 12, at 5) (citing Nicholas v. Hunter, 228
F. App’x 139, 141 (3rd Cir. 2007) ( “The remaining relief requested is not available as the District
Court lacks authority to order a federal investigation and prosecution of the defendants or the
termination of their employment.”); Goulette v. Warren, No. 3:06CV235-1-MU, 2006 WL
1582386, at n.1 (W.D. N.C. June 1, 2006) (“The Court notes that even if Plaintiff’s claims
prevailed in this case, this Court would not, based upon this law suit, have the authority to order
the termination of the Defendant’s employment or to grant Plaintiff an immediate, early release
from jail.”); Martin v. LeBlanc, No. 14-2743, 2014 WL 6674289, at n.1 (W.D. La. Nov. 24, 2014)
(finding that where plaintiff requested an investigation, the termination of the defendants’
employment and the closure of the prison, “[s]uch relief is not available in this action”); Merrida
v. California Dep’t of Corr., 2006 WL 2926740, at n.1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2006) (finding that
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 6 of 35

7
where plaintiff prays for the termination of defendant’s employment, “the court cannot award this
form of relief to plaintiff) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A)).
In his response, Plaintiff addresses his request to have Commander LTC Laura A. Proffit
reassigned, and states that she has been reassigned and replaced by LTC Kraut. (Doc. 17, at 4.)
He argues that new commanders should inherit the issues of their predecessors. Id. Plaintiff also
continues to argue that Deputy Commander Hansen should be terminated. Id. at 5. In support of
his request, he attempts to distinguish cases cited by this Court in the M&O. Id. He argues that in
Goulette, the case was dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and therefore
“failed to reach a stage in which a Court could take actions of Mr. Goulette’s claims.” Id. He also
argues that in Martin, the court found that that Deputy Warden Poret did not in fact use excessive
force. Id. Plaintiff asks the Court to refer the findings of this case to the District Attorney’s office
to coordinate with the Fort Leavenworth Staff Judge Advocate General to pursue criminal charges
against Deputy Commander Hansen. Id. at 5–6. Plaintiff argues that the Deputy Commander is a
general services civilian employee and therefore the Court has jurisdiction over him. Id. at 6.
Plaintiff’s attempt to distinguish the cases cited in the M&O is unpersuasive. 	Although
Plaintiff seems to be arguing that the statements made in those cases were dicta and not necessary
to the ruling, those statements were still made and reflect that courts do not have authority to grant
such relief. Furthermore, the Court cited other cases to support the conclusion that this Court does
not have authority to terminate employment or transfer defendants to other locations. 	See
Nicholas, 228 F. App’x at 141; see also Stugart v. Wiebers, 2026 WL 18616, at *4 (D. Neb. 2026)
(finding that the court lacks authority to terminate or force a defendant to resign from their
employment) (citations omitted); Nicholas v. Heffner, 228 F. App’x 139, 141 (3rd Cir. 2007) (“The
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 7 of 35

8
remaining relief requested is not available as the District Court lacks authority to order a federal
investigation and prosecution of defendants or the termination of their employment.”).
Further, the Court is not authorized to direct state or federal prosecutorial authorities to
bring a criminal case against any of the Defendants. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 136 (1986)
(“the United States and its attorneys have the sole power to prosecute criminal cases in federal
courts”); Lynn v. Cline, 2019 WL 2578241, at *2 (D. Kan. 2019) (“This Court cannot order the
initiation of criminal charges, which is a decision within the discretion of prosecuting attorneys.”)
(citing Presley v. Presley, 102 F. App’x 636, 636–37 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that a court order
for “investigation and prosecution of various people for various crimes” would “improperly
intrude upon the separation of powers”)).
Plaintiff has failed to show good cause why his request for monetary damages, his requests
for Defendants’ reassignment or termination, any individual capacity claims, and his claims
against Defendant Hansen, Deputy Commander, should not be denied or dismissed for the reasons
set forth in the M&O. Plaintiff’s requests for monetary damages and requests to have Defendants
terminated, reassigned, or criminally charged are denied. 	Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims
and claims against Defendant Hansen are dismissed.
III. Remaining Claims
The Court found in the M&O that Plaintiff may be entitled to injunctive relief. See Walden
v. Bartlett, 840 F.2d 771, 775 (10th Cir. 1988) (allowing claims for injunctive and declaratory
relief against military officials); Rios v. Commandant, 100 F. App’x 706, n.1 (10th Cir. 2004)
(unpublished) (noting that the court has held that “[a military prisoner’s] claims for injunctive and
declaratory relief [were] not barred by the Feres doctrine.”) (quoting Walden, 840 F.2d at 774).
Plaintiff states that he is seeking the return or replacement of his property. 	In the
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 8 of 35

9
attachment to his SAC, he mentions that his religious texts and a religious pendant (Valknut) were
seized. (Doc. 11–1, at 1.) Plaintiff claims that other property was seized such as legal documents,
or religious items, “or in some cases items required per the MWJCRF packing list, that were
brought to MWJCRF.” Id. The return or replacement of his religious text and Valknut is the only
specific injunctive relief Plaintiff seeks in his SAC.
The PLRA contains new standards for awarding prospective relief, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3626(a), and provides a mechanism for defendants to seek termination of prospective relief, see
18 U.S.C. § 3626(b). 	Federal law provides for appropriate remedies with respect to prison
conditions as follows:
(a) Requirements for relief.--
(1) Prospective relief.--(A) Prospective relief in any civil action
with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular
plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any
prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly
drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of
the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to
correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall give
substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the
operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a). Any request for injunctive relief must specify the relief requested. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1)(B) and (C) (requiring any order granting an injunction to state its terms
specially and “describe in reasonable detail—and not by referring to the complaint or other
document—the act or acts restrained or required”).
The Court noted in the M&O that:
Plaintiff has not shown that prospective injunctive relief
would remedy some of his complaints. He argues that his medical
records were not sent to MCFP Springfield while he was in custody
there.3 (Doc. 11–1, at 3.) He also claims that he was not allowed to
3 MCFP Springfield is a BOP administrative security federal medical center located in Springfield, Missouri. See
https://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/spg/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2026).
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 9 of 35

10
use the restroom while he was in the hospital for treatment in August
of 2025. Id. at 5. Plaintiff also claims that he was not allowed to
submit paperwork for his parole board proceedings when he was in
the hospital at Research Medical Center.4 Id. at 7. Plaintiff claims
that at his second board he was notified that the paperwork he
handed to the parole office at MJRCF was not received by the board.
Id. at 8. Plaintiff claims that he was again evacuated to the hospital
and told to mail his documents for his third board, but they were
purportedly never received, and this “was the primary reason for the
Plaintiff’s denial for his 2025 parole board.” 	Id. 	Plaintiff also
claims that MJRCF prevents inmates from filing motions to proceed
ifp. Id. However, Plaintiff filed an ifp motion in this case (Doc. 2),
two ifp motions in Case No. 25-3238 (Docs. 2, 5), and an ifp motion
in Case No. 25-3275 (Doc. 8).
(Doc. 12, at 7–8.)
The Tenth Circuit has held that the Court’s “traditional powers of equity . . . to prevent
violations of constitutional rights . . . flow from the long-recognized ‘jurisdiction of federal courts
to issue injunctions to protect rights safeguarded by the Constitution.’” Maehr v. U.S. Dep’t of
State, 5 F.4th 1100, 1106 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting Simmat v. U.S. Bur. of Prisons, 413 F.3d 1225,
1231 (10th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007),
and Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)). “Bell v. Hood held that suits for relief directly under
the Constitution fall within [the] grant of jurisdiction” provided by § 1331.” Id. (citing Simmat,
413 F.3d at 1232). “Section 1331 thus provides jurisdiction for the exercise of the traditional
powers of equity in actions arising under federal law.” Id. (quoting Simmat, 413 F.3d at 1232).
A. Exhaustion
Even in cases where a court has jurisdiction over claims for nonmonetary relief, the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to bringing
4 Plaintiff filed an action in the Western District of Missouri alleging in his amended complaint that he was treated
by Research Medical Center off and on from January 2024 through May 2024. Askins v. Research Med. Ctr., Case
No. 26-cv-00095-DGK-P, Doc. 20, at 1–2 (W.D. Mo. 2026).
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 10 of 35

11
an action regarding prison conditions. 5 See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006) (finding that
“exhaustion of available remedies is required for any suit challenging prison conditions, not just
for suits under § 1983”) (citation omitted); see also Gonzalez v. Ortiz, 2021 WL 308548, at *2 (D.
N.J. 2021) (noting that petitioner could bring a civil rights complaint for injunctive relief under
§ 1331, “but he must first exhaust administrative remedies under the . . . PLRA”). The PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement applies to military prisoners. See Long v. Johnston, 2022 WL 17177348,
at *2 (D. Kan. 2022) (finding that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to military
prisoners) (citations omitted)); see also Murphy v. Hylton, 2007 WL 1201517, at *3 (D. Kan. 2007)
(military prisoner must exhaust under Section 1997e(a) regarding conditions at the USDB).
The bulk of Plaintiff’s response to the Report addresses the administrative grievance
process at the MJRCF, his dissatisfaction with the process, lost forms, or his claims that procedures
are not being followed at the facility. (Doc. 27, at 3–15.) Plaintiff’s documents submitted with his
Motion to Submit Support Documents at Doc. 28 include memoranda from Inmate Advisory
Counsel (“IAC”) meetings in 2024 where inmates expressed concerns about digital 510s
disappearing or being deleted. (Doc. 28, at 1; Doc. 28–1, at 1–15.) One Memorandum includes
a response that “510s are not being deleted . . ..” 	(Doc. 28–1, at 2.) 	Plaintiff also attached a
memorandum from a 2025 IAC meeting dealing with delay in parole and release, but he
acknowledges that he “has not directly been affected” and he “did not address this issue in his
SAC.” (Doc. 28, at 2; Doc. 28–1, at 11–16).
5 In a suit governed by the PLRA, failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense and the defendant has the burden of
proof regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies. Roberts v. Barreras, 484 F.3d 1236, 1241 (10th Cir. 2007).
“Although a defendant bears the burden of ‘proving that the plaintiff did not [exhaust his] administrative remedies,’
once the defendant has carried that burden, ‘the onus falls on the plaintiff to show that remedies were unavailable to
him.”’ May v. Segovia, 929 F.3d 1223, 1234 (10th Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (citing Tuckel v. Grover, 660 F.3d
1249, 1254 (10th Cir. 2011)).
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 11 of 35

12
Plaintiff claims that there is a pattern of leaving open DD Form 510s, losing them, and not
responding to them for in excess of 60 days. (Doc. 27, at 4–5.) Plaintiff claims that “[t]o date, the
Plaintiff has never received a memorandum in response to any of the Grievances he has submitted.”
Id. at 7. Plaintiff states that the “policy of prohibiting inmates from having physical possession of
DD Form 510(s) including grievances is not only counter to Military Correction Command policies
and procedures, but prevent inmate’s from complying with the requirement of exhausting; or
proving that they have exhausted administrative remedies, under the PLRA.” Id. Plaintiff claims
that on the day of his response, he had 370 closed and 4 open DD Form 510s “visible on his
institution provided tablet.” Id. at 11. 	Plaintiff also claims that prisoners are not provided with
information on how to appeal a grievance and are told once it is closed there is no appeal. 	Id.
Plaintiff then attaches DD Form 510s that he claims were obtained through a FOIA request but are
not included in the Report. Id. at 10–11 (citing attached exhibits 1–1, 1–2, and 1–4, and claiming
that his first FOIA request produced one digital 510 and over 40 manual or paper 510s “most of
which are not accounted for in the Defendants’ report” and his second FOIA request produced in
excess of 500 DD Form 510s, including 19 grievances). He claims that “[w]hile there were many
duplicates, there was in fact far more than Defendant’s Martinez Report claims.” 	Id. at 10.
Plaintiff argues that based on the discrepancies with the DD Form 510s, “[t]he Court should take
the Plaintiff’s exhausting of administrative remedies as fact.” Id. at 11.
To the extent Plaintiff makes claims regarding his dissatisfaction with the administrative
grievance process at the MJRCF, Plaintiff fails to state a claim. 	Plaintiff acknowledges that a
grievance procedure is in place and that he used it. Plaintiff’s claims relate to his dissatisfaction
with the grievance system and responses to his grievances. 	The Tenth Circuit has held several
times that there is no constitutional right to an administrative grievance system. 	Gray v. GEO
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 12 of 35

13
Group, Inc., 2018 WL 1181098, at *6 (10th Cir. March 6, 2018) (citations omitted); Von Hallcy
v. Clements, 519 F. App’x 521, 523–24 (10th Cir. 2013); Boyd v. Werholtz, 443 F. App’x 331, 332
(10th Cir. 2011); see also Watson v. Evans, 2014 WL 7246800, at *7 (D. Kan. Dec. 17, 2014)
(failure to answer grievances does not violate constitutional rights or prove injury necessary to
claim denial of access to courts); Strope v. Pettis, 2004 WL 2713084, at *7 (D. Kan. Nov. 23,
2004) (alleged failure to investigate grievances does not amount to a constitutional violation);
Baltoski v. Pretorius, 291 F. Supp. 2d 807, 811 (N.D. Ind. 2003) (finding that “[t]he right to
petition the government for redress of grievances . . . does not guarantee a favorable response, or
indeed any response, from state officials”).
The Court will only address Plaintiff’s response6 and the issue of exhaustion as they relate
to the remaining claims in this case.
B. Count I
As Count I, Plaintiff alleges a violation of his First Amendment right to freely practice his
religion and a violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.7 	(Doc. 11, at 3.) 	For these
violations, Plaintiff is seeking the “[r]eturn of all seized religious items and articles, or recompence
for those items to the sum of $2,000; damages for the loss, time spent attempting to recover, and
consequential injuries therein to the sum of $2,000; and the relief and reassignment of the
MWJCRF Commander LTC Proffit, and the dismissal or firing of Deputy Commander Stephen
Hansen; sanction(s) or order(s) against the facility for these violations.” (Doc. 11–1, at 9.) The
6 Plaintiff continues to argue that he should be able to sue Defendants in their individual capacities. (Doc. 27, at 2–
3.) The Court rejects these arguments and has already ruled that any claims against Defendants in their individual
capacities are dismissed.
7 Plaintiff asserts a claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.).
RFRA provides that a government may not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion unless it demonstrates
that doing so “(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling government interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 13 of 35

14
Court has already found that Plaintiff is not entitled to monetary damages or Defendants’
termination or reassignment.
The Report provides that “Plaintiff submitted two grievances related to religious articles
referenced in the SAC, namely, a Valknut and a Havamal.” (Doc. 19, at 11.) The Report provides
that Plaintiff failed to fully exhaust the grievance, and “also filed a property claim . . . concerning
lost religious articles, including the Valknut and Havamal.” Id. The Report states that “Plaintiff
failed to appeal that claim when it was denied by the Fort Leavenworth Claims Office.” Id.
The Report provides that while housed at the MJRCF, Plaintiff only requested one
religious accommodation, which was granted. Id. at 14. The Report states that:
Research revealed that, while at the MJRCF, Plaintiff has
requested one religious accommodation, which was granted. Ex. 7
(Askins Religious Accommodation). Specifically, on May 2, 2024,
following 	an 	interview 	with 	a 	chaplain, 	“[i]n 	observance 	of
[Plaintiff’s] Norse Pagan (Asatru) faith,” he was permitted to “wear
a beard in accordance with Army uniform and grooming standards
for Soldiers with approved religious accommodations.” Id. Absent
extenuating circumstances, this accommodation remains valid for
the duration of Plaintiff’s confinement. Id. Contrary to allegations
in the SAC, Plaintiff continues to don the beard that had been
approved prior to his transfer to MCFP-Springfield.
Plaintiff 	has 	not 	submitted 	any 	other 	religious
accommodation requests, but may freely do so. Additionally, based
on a review of Plaintiff’s DD Forms 510, Ex. 6 (Askins Grievance
History), Plaintiff has not asked to procure any religious medallions
or necklaces—such as, a “Valknut”—in accordance with MJRCF
guidance, Ex. 1 (MGI, ¶ 8-2, n. 10). Specifically, inmates may
request religious materials/items on a DD Form 510, including,
among other sacred tokens, “religious medallions” or “religious
necklaces.” 	Id. 	MJRCF 	regulation, 	however, 	places 	specific
limitations on the size and monetary value of such items. Id.
(specifying that religious medallions/necklaces cannot exceed $75
in value and, in the case of medallions, must be no larger than 1.5
square inches). Further, these religious items may not contain
stones. Id. While Plaintiff has submitted requests related to a
missing religious pendant (or “Valknut”), he has not submitted a DD
Form 510 requesting to procure one or to replace it. See Ex. 6
(Askins Grievance History) (Request dated April 17, 2024, Control
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 14 of 35

15
Number 1157246); see also, supra, Table 3 (Line 55).
It also bears noting that, on the DD Form 510 related to the
missing “Valknut” and a religious text called a “Havamal,” Plaintiff
did not assert that these items were deliberately seized based on
religious animus, as the SAC suggests. Id. Rather, he stated “I
assume they are lost.” Id. Going forward, Plaintiff is strongly
encouraged to contact the chaplain to identify and procure a suitable
replacement pendant and text that will promote observation of his
Asatru faith.
Id. at 14–15.
Plaintiff filed a claim relating to his religious items under the Military Claims Act. The
Military Claims Act (“MCA”), “allows the Secretary of Defense to settle claims for property
damage, personal injury, or death caused by military members.” Luckey v. Hegseth, 822 F. Supp.
3d 42, 47 (D. D.C. 2026) (citing 10 U.S.C. § 2733). The Report notes that Plaintiff submitted two
property claims to the Fort Leavenworth Claims Office (“FLCO”). (Doc. 19, at 16.) Claim No. 26-
171-T001 relates to the missing Valknut and Havamal. 	Id. (citing Exhibit 8 at Doc. 19–8).
Although Plaintiff seeks $2,000 for these items in his SAC, on the claim form he values them at
$145. 	See Doc. 11–1, at 9; Doc. 19–8, at 2. 	In a December 30, 2025 denial letter, the FLCO
advised Plaintiff that his claim was being denied as time-barred and for lack of evidence supporting
negligent handling of his property. (Doc. 19–8, at 4–5.) The purported loss occurred in June 2023,
and was barred based on the MCA’s two-year statute of limitations. 	(Doc. 19, at 17) (citing
Exhibit 8 and 10 U.S.C. § 2733). The letter further advised that, if Plaintiff was dissatisfied with
the result under the MCA, he could administratively appeal within 60 days to the U.S. Army
Claims Service (“USARCS”). (Doc. 19–8, at 5.) The Report provides that “[n]o such appeal was
ever filed—and, as such, Plaintiff has failed to exhaust internal administrative remedies on any
claim related to the missing Valknut and Havamal.” (Doc. 19, at 17.)
Plaintiff has failed to show a substantial burden on his right to practice his religion. “To
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 15 of 35

16
state a valid constitutional claim, a prisoner must allege facts showing that officials substantially
burdened a sincerely held religious belief.” 	Williams v. Hansen, 5 F.4th 1129, 1133 (10th Cir.
2021) (citing Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007)). Likewise, a plaintiff asserting
a claim under RFRA must show a substantial burden. See Mostafa v. Bondi, 2025 WL 2734116,
at *15, and n.30 (D. Colo. 2025) (citations omitted) (noting that plaintiff must show a substantial
burden for both RFRA and First Amendment claims).
“A government substantially burdens a person’s religious exercise . . . when it (1) ‘requires
participation in an activity prohibited by a sincerely held religious belief,’ (2) ‘prevents
participation in conduct motivated by a sincerely held religious belief,’ or (3) ‘places substantial
pressure on an adherent either not to engage in conduct motivated by a sincerely held religious
belief or to engage in conduct contrary to a sincerely held religious belief.’” Blair v. Raemich, 804
F. App’x 909, 917 (10th Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (quoting Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d
1301, 1315 (10th Cir. 2010)); see also Mostafa, 2025 WL 2734116, at n.31 (noting that although
Abdulhaseeb dealt with RLUIPA, it is the state equivalent of RFRA and uses the same substantial
burden standard) (citing see Abdulhaseeb, 600 F.3d at 1312; see also Johnson v. Martin, 2005 WL
3312566, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 7, 2005) (“Save for the inserted congressional limitations and
stylistic changes, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (RLUIPA) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (RFRA) are
functional equivalents.”); Henderson v. Elsinger, 2022 WL 21808247, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 19,
2022) (“the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) [is] the federal equivalent of RLUIPA”);
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1138 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (“the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA) [is] a statute that adopts RFRA’s ‘substantial burden’ standard”)).
Plaintiff claims that his Valknut and Havamal were taken from him and then subsequently
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 16 of 35

17
lost. 	The Report provides that there is a procedure in place for requesting a new Valknut and
Havamal within the MGI guidelines, but there is no indication Plaintiff has requested new items
through that process. 	In his response, Plaintiff does not allege that he has used this procedure.
Instead, he acknowledges the option for obtaining new items, but states that it offers “nothing to
prevent future or further harm or discrimination at the hands of their Agents.” (Doc. 27, at 16.)
Plaintiff has not shown a substantial burden on his right to freely practice his religion.
Plaintiff acknowledges in his response that he attempted to file claims under the MCA.
(Doc. 17, at 3.) He states that his claims made about the seizure and destruction of his religious
items were refused. Id. Plaintiff claims that he attempted to resubmit his claims and was told they
were dismissed as untimely. Id. Plaintiff states in his response to the Report that “[d]ue to the
repeated loss of documents and refusal to process timely claims, the Defendant is correct that the
Plaintiff’s claim was untimely citing 10 U.S.C. 2733.” (Doc. 27, at 17.)
The December 30, 2025 letter denying his claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act and his
MCA claim states that “you did not provide, nor did the Fort Leavenworth Claims Office’s
investigation uncover, evidence establishing that negligence by U.S. Army personnel was the
proximate cause of your alleged loss.” (Doc. 19–8, at 4.) The letter further states that:
If you are dissatisfied with the result under the MCA, you may
administratively appeal. 	The 60-day time limit to appeal is
measured from the time you receive this letter. The appeal should
be a letter setting out the factual and /or legal grounds relied upon,
contain any supporting documentation and should respond to the
issues raised in this letter. In the alternative, you may elect not to
submit additional information and state your appeal is based on the
record as it existed at the time of this letter. The appeal must be sent
to the Commander, U.S. Army Claims Service (USARCS), Office
of the Judge Advocate General, 4411 Llewellyn Avenue, Fort
Meade, 	Maryland, 	20755-5360. 	For 	good 	cause 	shown, 	the
Commander, USARCS, at his discretion, or his designee, may
extend the time within which to submit such evidence or argument
to complete the appeal. The extension normally will not exceed 90
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 17 of 35

18
days. 	Any request for an extension to submit appellate materials
must be included in the appeal letter or sent under separate cover no
later than 60 days after receipt of this letter. Nothing in the above
should be construed to imply than an appeal, if made, would be
successful.
Id. at 5. 	The letter also provides contact information for “any questions or concerns.” 	Id. The
Report provides that Plaintiff failed to appeal the MCA decision. (Doc. 19, at 11.)
Plaintiff argues that the deadline on his MCA claims should be tolled and asks this Court
to order the JCRF to “handle the harms done in this case under 10 U.S.C.S. 2731.” (Doc. 17, at
4.) Plaintiff’s claim based on the loss of his religious items was denied as untimely and due to no
finding of negligence. Plaintiff has not suggested that he appealed the decision through the
procedure set forth in the December 30, 2025 letter. Section 2735 provides that “[n]otwithstanding
any other provision of law, the settlement of a claim under section 2733, 2733a,2734, 2734a,
2734b, or 2737 of this title is final and conclusive.” 10 U.S.C. § 2735; see also Labash v. U.S.
Dep’t of Army, 668 F.2d 1153 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. den. 102 S. Ct. 2299, 456 U.S. 1008 (finding
that neither the district court nor the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review settlement by the
Secretary of the Army of a medical malpractice claim under this chapter, absent a sufficiently
pleaded allegation that a cognizable constitutional right had been violated).
Thus, the MCA contains a finality provision: 	“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of
law, the settlement of a claim under . . . [the MCA] is final and conclusive.” Luckey v. Hegseth,
822 F. Supp. 3d 42, 47–48 (D.C. Cir. 2026) (citing 10 U.S.C. § 2735 and assuming without
deciding that exceptions may apply, including where there is a violation of a clear statutory
mandate and where a plaintiff’s constitutional rights are violated ). “Under the MCA, to ‘settle’
means to ‘consider, ascertain, adjust, determine, and dispose of a claim, whether by full or partial
allowance or by disallowance.” Id. at 47 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 2731).
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 18 of 35

19
Plaintiff has not cited any authority for this Court to toll his MCA claim, which appears to
be final. Although Plaintiff claims that DD Form 510s were not responded to or were deleted, and
that inmates were not allowed to possess physical copies of their DD Form 510s, nothing in his
response indicates that he attempted to appeal the denial of his MCA claim using the process set
forth in the December 30, 2025 letter. See Doc. 27, at 4–11, 13. He states that “[g]iven that the
Defendant had through their repetitive negligence or malice given cause to documents being lost
and destroyed; the Plaintiff did accept defeat, and the loss of his property.” Id. at 17.
Plaintiff has failed to allege a substantial burden on his right to freely practice his religion,
and has failed to show that the MCA claim is not final. Plaintiff should show good cause why his
First Amendment and RFRA claims in Count I should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
C. Count II
As Count II, Plaintiff alleges an Eighth Amendment violation based upon the alleged denial
of medical care and basic amenities, and indefinite isolation in the SHU. 	(Doc. 11, at 3.) 	As
support for this claim, Plaintiff alleges that while he was housed at MCFP Springfield: 1) he was
denied medical care because the MJRCF refused to share Plaintiff’s medical records with MCFP
Springfield; 2) he was denied access to his appellate attorney(s) for the majority of his time at
MCFP Springfield; and 3) all paperwork including administrative remedies, medical records
requests, parole packets, appeal paperwork, and others were lost, destroyed, or intentionally
misplaced by MJRCF. (Doc. 11–1, at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that the MJRCF should be responsible
for his care at MCFP Springfield because the MJRCF retained sole legal custody of Plaintiff and
he was only in physical custody of the BOP while housed at MCFP Springfield. Id.
Plaintiff claims that when he returned to the MJRCF in May 2025, he was placed in SQ for
eight days for “medical isolation.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff claims that during this time he was denied
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 19 of 35

20
access to recreation facilities, the law library, and “legal access to include attorneys.” Id. Plaintiff
claims that he was denied the ability to bathe, he was denied basic medications, and there was a
“seizure of all property to include legal and religious items, and other property.” 	Id. 	Plaintiff
states that the Deputy Commander visited Plaintiff on two of the days while he was housed in the
SQ, and expressed that he did not want Plaintiff to return to the MJRCF. Id.
Plaintiff also claims that around August 2025, Plaintiff was shackled in the bed while in
the hospital. Id. at 5. Plaintiff alleges that when he asked to use the restroom, the Military Police
escort called the MJRCF for permission to allow Plaintiff to use the restroom, and the Watch
Commander stated that she did not have authority to allow Plaintiff to use the restroom. Plaintiff
claims that after six hours, he was forced to defecate on himself and then after that the Watch
Commander allowed him to use the restroom. Id.
For the alleged Eighth Amendment violation in Count II, Plaintiff seeks $5,000 in damages,
“the relief and reassignment of the MWJCRF Commander LTC Proffit, and the dismissal or firing
of Deputy Commander Stephen Hansen; [and] sanction(s) or order(s) against the facility for these
violations. Id. at 10. Plaintiff does not seek any specific injunctive relief in Count II.
The Report provides that:
Plaintiff placed approximately 11 requests related to medical
needs or policies, which were also met with responses and, where
possible, servicing Plaintiff’s needs.
o 	Notably, 	Line 	31 	(Control 	No. 	589419761,
August 5, 2025) reflects a request seeking to change MJRCF
policy 	related 	to 	security 	protocols 	governing 	escorts.
Specifically, Plaintiff asked to modify a correctional escort
policy after a purported incident where Plaintiff claims he
defecated on himself and was “shackled in a bed in [his] own
mess.” Ex. 6 (Askins Grievance History). This DD Form 510
appears to relate to allegations for Count 2 of the SAC,
which allegedly occurred in August 2025. Doc. 11–1, at 5. If
this type of an event had occurred, it would have been
documented in an Observation Report (“OR”). A diligent
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 20 of 35

21
search revealed no ORs for any time period matching these
facts. Additionally, a medium-security level inmate (like
Plaintiff) would wear a restraint known as a “body cuff” for
an external appointment according to MCC policy—and this
restraint is designed so as to permit for normal evacuation.
o In addition to these requests, Plaintiff’s ACIS
report, Ex. 1, reflects numerous occasions when MJRCF
medical staff, typically prompted by Plaintiff, intervened to
provide care and services, including on an emergent basis.
As Table 1, supra, reflects, these interventions led to
approximately eight admissions at external hospitals as well
as release to MCFP-Springfield for approximately a year so
Plaintiff could receive stabilizing care for his conditions at
the U.S. Medical Center. That Plaintiff sought medical help
from the MJRCF staff undermines allegations claiming he
declines medical care out of fear of retaliation.
o 	Additionally, 	the 	ACIS 	report 	reflects
approximately six external medical appointments, id., which
is in addition to the in-house care Plaintiff receives at the
MJRCF.
(Doc. 19, at 10–11.) The only issue Plaintiff disputes in his response relates to the use of the body
cuff for transporting Plaintiff. Plaintiff claims that “when the Plaintiff had bouts of pancreatitis
the medical staff had instructed the escorts to NOT USE the body cuff as it was a potential hazard
to the Plaintiff’s health and life.” (Doc. 27, at 14.)
The Report includes a list of periods when Plaintiff was admitted to external medical
facilities outside of the MJRCF. 	(Doc. 19, at 3.) 	The Report provides that at times Plaintiff’s
heightened medical needs demanded housing in “Special Quarters” or “SQ”—which is therapeutic
and not punitive. Id. at 19 (citing Exhibit 1, Doc. 19–2 “Manual for the Guidance of Inmates” at
¶ 9–2(a)).8 The Report notes that “in a DD Form 510 dated April 25, 2024 (Control No. 1157406),
8 The Manual is Exhibit 1 to the Report, located at Doc. 19–1. Paragraph 9–2(a) states that:
If determined necessary by an HCP or MHCP, inmates may be housed in SQ if their emotional state,
adjustment to confinement, mental, or physical characteristics warrant such action; or if their medical or
behavioral health condition make them unsuitable to be housed elsewhere in general population or the SHU.
Inmates may also be placed on SQ for pre-operative preparation or post-operative recovery as recommended
by the HCP and the Health Authority. SQ inmates are removed from SQ status when the HCP or MHCP has
determined the condition for SQ no longer exists.
Doc. 19–2, at 141; see also Doc. 19, at n.15 (noting that HCP refers to health care providers and MHCP refers to
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 21 of 35

22
Plaintiff described SQ as ‘medical segregation,’ rather than punitive isolation as the SAC
suggests.” Id. at 19.
The Report provides that Plaintiff’s longest stay in SQ followed his return from MCFP
Springfield, and lasted from May 22, 2025, until approximately July 28, 2025, “and diligence
conducted for this Special Report revealed that SQ was medically necessary according to
Plaintiff’s HCPs.” Id. at 20. During that period, Plaintiff was also admitted to a local hospital for
three days. Id. at n. 16 (citing Table 1, admission to St. John’s Hospital from July 18–20, 2025).
The Report provides that:
The principal purpose for this lengthy stay in SQ was to support the
HCPs’ effort to titrate Plaintiff’s medication regiment, which
needed to be at a more appropriate level before being returned to the
general population. Additional details regarding such titration are
reflected at pages 483 and 488 in Plaintiff’s bates-stamped medical
records filed under seal as Exhibit 10 to this Special Report to
protect his private health information. These records as a whole,
which speaks for itself, demonstrate that the MJRCF prioritizes
inmate care, including in Plaintiff’s case. Further, these records do
not support that Plaintiff is declining care for fear of retaliation.
Additionally, HCPs at the MJRCF have also secured emergent and
long-term 	care 	to 	address 	Plaintiff’s 	specific 	needs 	at 	more
specialized facilities, as reflected above, supra, Table 1. Further,
Exhibit 10 shows communication between the MJRCF and external
facilities to promote continuity of care. E.g., Ex. 10 (Sealed Medical
Records, -158, -172, -224, -337–38, -341, -346).
Id. at 20.
The Report states that inmates housed in the SHU or SQ still have access to law library
materials. Id. In SQ, legal materials are even more accessible because inmates are provided access
to legal materials with a bedside computer cart. 	Id. at 21. 	Also, they may actually attend the
library subject to their health care limitations. 	Id. 	In one of his inmate requests, Plaintiff
acknowledged that he attended the library while housed in SQ. Id. (noting that on his DD Form
mental health care providers).
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 22 of 35

23
510 from April 25, 2024, Plaintiff explained “I am on SQ (medical segregation) and can attend
Library, and other non strenuous appointments[.]”). In his response, Plaintiff alleges that since he
arrived at the MJRCF in 2023, the library cart has been nonoperational. (Doc. 27, at 19.) Plaintiff
argues that for the eight days he was in SQ following his return to the MJRCF, he was not allowed
a tablet to submit digital 510s, use of the law library cart, or to even bathe himself. Id.
Plaintiff does not seek any specific injunctive relief in Count II. He also fails to state an
Eighth Amendment violation. 	A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when two
requirements are met. 	Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 	“First, the deprivation
alleged must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’” 	Id. 	To satisfy the objective component, a
prisoner must allege facts showing he or she is “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial
risk of serious harm.” Id.; Martinez v. Garden, 430 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir. 2005). The second
requirement for an Eighth Amendment violation “follows from the principle that ‘only the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment.’” Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 834. Prison officials must have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” and in prison-conditions
cases that state of mind is “deliberate indifference” to inmate health or safety. Id. “[T]he official
must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. “The Eighth Amendment
does not outlaw cruel and unusual ‘conditions’; it outlaws cruel and unusual ‘punishments.’” Id.
It is not enough to establish that the official should have known of the risk of harm. Id.
“[D]eliberate 	indifference 	to 	serious 	medical 	needs 	of 	prisoners 	constitutes 	the
‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ . . . proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation omitted). However, Plaintiff points to no medical care
that he requested or needed that was denied. He makes general complaints about his medical care
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 23 of 35

24
at MCFP Springfield, alleges that he was forced to defecate on himself on one occasion while
hospitalized, and takes issue with being housed in the SQ. 	However, the SQ is designed for
prisoners needing medical care and placement in the SQ is determined by health care providers.
In his response, Plaintiff alleges that his placement in SQ “cannot be considered to have
been done for the Plaintiff’s benefit.” (Doc. 27, at 18.) He claims that he was often forced to miss
or go without needed medication, “some days being forced to kick the doors when 31E’s; military
correction specialists, would forget to bring the Plaintiff food at meal times.” Id. Plaintiff points
to no specific instances. In his SAC, he claims that this occurred during his eight-day stay in SQ
following his return from MCFP Springfield. 	(Doc. 11–1, at 4.) 	Because the sufficiency of a
conditions-of-confinement claim depends upon “the particular facts of each situation; the
‘circumstances, nature, and duration’ of the challenged conditions must be carefully considered.”
Despain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 974 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726,
731 (9th Cir. 2000)). “While no single factor controls . . . the length of exposure to the conditions
is often of prime importance.” Id. As the severity of the conditions to which an inmate is exposed
increases, the length of exposure required to make out a constitutional violation decreases.
Accordingly, “minor deprivations suffered for short periods would not rise to an Eighth
Amendment violation, while ‘substantial deprivations. . .’ may meet the standard despite a shorter
duration.” Id. (citations omitted). Plaintiff has failed to show that his conditions in SQ violated
the Eighth Amendment.
Plaintiff takes issue with being housed in SQ—a housing determination made by health
care providers. A mere difference of opinion between the inmate and prison medical personnel
regarding diagnosis or reasonable treatment does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. See
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106–07; see also Coppinger v. Townsend, 398 F.2d 392, 394 (10th Cir. 1968)
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 24 of 35

25
(prisoner’s right is to medical care—not to type or scope of medical care he desires and difference
of opinion between a physician and a patient does not give rise to a constitutional right or sustain
a claim under § 1983). Furthermore, Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to dictate where
he is housed, whether it is which facility or which classification within a facility. 	See Schell v.
Evans, 550 F. App’x 553, 557 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing Meachum, 427 U.S. at 228–29; Cardoso v.
Calbone, 490 F.3d 1194, 1197–98 (10th Cir. 2007). Moreover, prison officials are entitled to great
deference in the internal operation and administration of the facility. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 547–48 (1979).
Plaintiff has failed to allege that any staff at the MJRCF were deliberately indifferent to his
medical needs, or that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious
harm. 	Plaintiff must show good cause why his claims in Count II should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim.
D. Count III
As Count III, Plaintiff alleges a violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments
based on the destruction of over 200 administrative remedies, parole packets, EO Complaints, and
the denial of access to counsel and appeals. 	(Doc. 11, at 3–4.) 	Plaintiff also alleges that this
violated 5 U.S.C. § 552 and 10 U.S.C. § 952. 	Id. at 4. 	For these violations, Plaintiff seeks
“damages for the loss of administrative remedies, parole packets, direct interference and
intentional disruption with appeals, and refusal to comply with Court mandated paperwork;
damages to the sum of $15,000; the relief and reassignment of the MWJCRF Commander LTC
Proffit, and the dismissal or firing of Deputy Commander Stephen Hansen; sanction(s) or orders(s)
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 25 of 35

26
against the facility for these violations.” (Doc. 11–1, at 9–10.) Plaintiff does not seek any specific
injunctive relief in Count III.9
1. Court Access
Plaintiff does not cite the First Amendment, but his allegations suggests that he might be
claiming he was denied court access. He claims that he was denied access to counsel and appeals.
Plaintiff has not pointed to any specific instance when he was allegedly denied access to counsel
or his appeals. Regarding the denial of access to counsel and appeals, Plaintiff’s only claim in his
SAC is that when he was transferred to the BOP facility at MCFP Springfield, he was “[d]enied
access to his Appellate attorney(s) for the majority of his time at MCFP Springfield, and
subsequently barred from participating in his appeal(s) and parole hearing.” Id. at 3.
The Report addresses Plaintiff’s appeal of his military convictions as follows:
Plaintiff, through military appellate defense counsel, is
continuing to challenge these convictions on direct appeal to the
Army Court of Criminal Appeals (“ACCA”) and the Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces (“CAAF”). After raising multiple
appellate issues, the ACCA held oral argument on June 18, 2025.[]
On August 25, 2025, the ACCA consolidated two offenses, affirmed
the consolidated and other remaining offenses, and affirmed the
sentence. Id. On October 20, 2025, the CAAF granted the Plaintiff’s
request to file a Petition for a Grant of Review and ordered briefing.
United States v. Askins, 86 MJ. 357 (C.A.A.F. 2025); United States
v. Askins, 86 M.J. 368 (C.A.A.F. 2025). On May 19, 2026, CAAF
heard oral argument from Plaintiff’s military appellate defense
counsel. United States v. Askins, __ M.J. __, No. 26-0014/AR, 2026
CAAF LEXIS 172 (C.A.A.F., May 19, 2026). The case is pending
decision.[]
9 	In addition to the Feres doctrine, the PLRA bars compensatory damages absent a physical injury. 	42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(e); see also Woodward v. Shaw, 2026 WL 406677, at *3 (D. Kan. 2026) (noting that it is unclear whether any
potential claim for property damage could survive § 1997e(e)) (citing Ybanez v. Scott, 2015 WL 1258290, at *7 (D.
Colo. March 17, 2015) (noting that the 10th Circuit does not appear to have addressed the issue of whether 1997e(e)
bars an award of compensatory damages for the loss of property, but in Allen v. Reynolds, 475 F. App’x 280, 283–84
(10th Cir. 2012), the court appeared to reject, in dicta, an argument that an inmate’s demand for compensatory
damages for the destruction of personal photographs survived the lack of a physical injury under the PLRA); see also
Stauffer v. Gearhart, 741 F.3d 574, 583 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding in case involving confiscated magazines that inmate
did not suffer physical injury in connection with his constitutional claims, and allegation that personal property was
lost, confiscated, or damaged does not state a claim where remedy is in state court)).
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 26 of 35

27
(Doc. 19, at 4) (footnotes omitted). The Report includes a list of twelve other cases Plaintiff has
pursued in other courts while housed at the MJRCF. 10 Id. at 5. The list does not include Plaintiff’s
appeals of his military conviction, the multiple Military Claims Act (“MCA”) property claims
pursued by Plaintiff internally at the MJRCF, or Plaintiff’s 215 inmate requests. Id. at 4–5 (“In
addition to the aforementioned criminal appeals (where Plaintiff has appointed military defense
counsel), the instant pro se civil lawsuit, and a lengthy divorce proceeding, Plaintiff has been
actively filing civil lawsuits in multiple jurisdictions during his incarceration at the MJRCF.”).
The Report states that a review of Plaintiff’s DD Forms 510, shows that the MJRCF has satisfied
its responsibility to schedule attorney visits and calls for Plaintiff. 	Id. at 21–22 (pointing to
Plaintiff’s court-martial appeals, thirteen federal civil lawsuits, two property claims with the
FLCO, and the MJRCF’s response to Plaintiff’s FOIA requests). The Report also states that the
MJRCF has not impeded his ability to seek parole or clemency, which is discretionary. Id. at 22.
“Plaintiff has engaged the Army Clemency and Parole Board (“ACPB”) to request parole,
clemency, and other relief (such as restoration and reenlistment).” Id. (citing Exhibit 12).
The Report provides that while in MJRCF custody Plaintiff has submitted approximately
215 requests using the DD Form 510. Id. at 9. The Report includes as Exhibit 6—Plaintiff’s DD
Form 510 History. See Doc. 20–1. The Report provides that “Plaintiff has a tablet through which
he may submit digital DD Forms 510; the tablet also allows him to review prior digital
submissions. . . . [w]hen Plaintiff views a prior electronic submission, it is recorded on the form.”
(Doc. 19, at 9.)
10 In his response, Plaintiff argues that the list of his twelve civil cases is not accurate because some of the cases cited
where the same case that was filed after a prior case was dismissed without prejudice, and two cases represent the
same case that was filed and then transferred to a different court. (Doc. 27, at 2–3.) Based on Plaintiff’s response, he
was still able to file at least eleven cases.
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 27 of 35

28
The Report states that of Plaintiff’s 215 requests, only eight are grievances, and only six
appear relevant to the allegations in the SAC. Id. at 10. The Report provides that Plaintiff failed
to satisfy exhaustion requirements by appealing any of these grievances to the Deputy (or the
Commander). Id. The Report provides:
- Plaintiff placed over 90 requests related to his myriad legal issues.
o This included over a dozen requests for legal
assistance related to landlord-tenant issues (which pre-date
confinement), insurance claims (which also appear to pre-
date confinement), tax filings, a burglary in Oklahoma, and
other matters.
o There were also over 40 requests for contacts with
military counsel, for which MJRCF officials diligently
scheduled meetings and coordinated passes as needed.
o Additionally, at least three requests related to
Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis forms, which MJRCF has also
accommodated.
o Finally, Plaintiff has one grievance and one request
related to an “EO” (or “Equal Opportunity”) complaint. The
grievance, as Table 3 (Line 70) reflects, was not fully
exhausted. Further, in connection with this Special Report, a
diligent search was conducted to locate an EO case or
complaint (whether open or closed) for Plaintiff; none was
found.
Id. at 10.
It is well-established that a prison inmate has a constitutional right of access to the courts.
However, it is equally well-settled that in order “[t]o present a viable claim for denial of access to
courts, . . . an inmate must allege and prove prejudice arising from the defendants’ actions.”
Peterson v. Shanks, 149 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted); Lewis v. Casey, 518
U.S. 343, 349 (1996) (“The requirement that an inmate . . . show actual injury derives ultimately
from the doctrine of standing.”).
An inmate may satisfy the actual-injury requirement by demonstrating that the alleged acts
or shortcomings of defendants “hindered his efforts to pursue” a non-frivolous legal claim. Lewis,
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 28 of 35

29
518 U.S. at 351-53; see also Burnett v. Jones, 437 F. App’x 736, 744 (10th Cir. 2011) (“To state
a claim for violation of the constitutional right to access the courts, a prisoner ‘must demonstrate
actual injury . . .—that is, that the prisoner was frustrated or impeded in his efforts to pursue a
nonfrivolous legal claim concerning his conviction or his conditions of confinement.’”) (quoting
Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1191 (10th Cir. 2010)).
The Supreme Court plainly held in Lewis that “the injury requirement is not satisfied by
just any type of frustrated legal claim.” Lewis, 518 at 354. Rather, the injury occurs only when
prisoners are prevented from attacking “their sentences, directly or collaterally” or challenging
“the conditions of their confinement.” Id. at 355. “Impairment of any other litigating capacity is
simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and
incarceration.” Id. (emphasis in original); see also Carper v. DeLand, 54 F.3d 613, 617 (10th Cir.
1995) (“[A]n inmate’s right of access does not require the state to supply legal assistance beyond
the preparation of initial pleadings in a civil rights action regarding current confinement or a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.”) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff has not alleged that staff at the MJRCF prevented him from accessing the courts
or caused him actual injury. The claim is not plausible, particularly since he was able to file this
action in federal district court and the actions set forth in the Report. Any court access claim that
Plaintiff may assert is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.
2. Loss of Documents
Plaintiff’s remaining claims in Count III concern the loss of documents. Plaintiff claims
that while at MCFP Springfield “[a]ll paperwork including administrative remedies, medical
records 	requests, 	parole 	packets, 	appeal 	paperwork, 	and 	others 	were 	lost, 	destroyed, 	or
intentionally misplaced by the MWJCRF.” (Doc. 11–1, at 3.) 	However, Plaintiff pursued this
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 29 of 35

30
claim through the MCA. Plaintiff acknowledges in his response that he attempted to file claims
under the MCA, and was told by the facility “that no financial loss could be claimed about the
seizure and destruction of legal documents.” (Doc. 17, at 3.)
The Report states that Plaintiff filed a property claim to the FLCO regarding his missing
papers and texts. (Doc. 19, at 17) (citing Army Claim No. 26-171-T024 at Exhibit 9, Doc. 19–9).
On March 1, 2026, Plaintiff signed a certified claims form (the SF-95) seeking $750 for missing
items, including legal papers, legal texts, and religious articles. Id. “Plaintiff asserted that the date
of loss was May 2025 . . . which coincided with Plaintiff’s transfer from MCFP-Springfield back
to the MJRCF following an extended hospital stay.”11 Id. “In a written attachment to the certified
SF-95, Plaintiff further explained that items went missing during the transfer, and he was only
‘partially successful’ in recovering some of his belongings.” Id. “In April 2026, after consulting
the FLCO, Plaintiff increased the amount of his claim from $750 to $840.” Id.
The Report provides that the FLCO investigated the claim but could not locate relevant
inventories for Plaintiff’s return to the MJRCF in May 2025, or the actual property at issue in the
claim. Id. at 18. “[I]n a letter dated May 5, 2026, the FLCO offered $545 to settle Plaintiff’s lost
property claim, which Plaintiff accepted.” Id. The letter expressly stated that “accepting this offer
constitutes a full and final settlement of your claim” and “no additional claims or requests for
compensation will be entertained for this loss.” Id.
Plaintiff executed a DA Form 7500 (“Tort Payment Report”) on May 18, 2026, electing to
receive the full and final settlement payment of $545 for the claim via check. Id. 	Immediately
above Plaintiff’s signature is a comprehensive release, which states in full:
I, 	the 	claimant, 	do 	hereby 	accept 	the 	within-stated 	award,
compromise, or settlement as final and conclusive on my heirs,
11 Plaintiff was in BOP custody at the U.S. Medical Center (MCFP Springfield) from May 29, 2024, through May 20,
2025. See Doc. 19, at 3.
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 30 of 35

31
executors, 	administrators 	or 	assigns, 	and 	agree 	that 	said
acceptance constitutes a complete release by me, my heirs,
executors, administrators or assigns of any and all claims, demands,
rights, and causes of action of whatsoever kind and nature, arising
now or in the future from, and by reason of any and all known and
unknown, foreseen and unforeseen bodily and personal injuries
(including wrongful death), damages to property, breaches of
contract 	or 	law, 	and 	any 	other 	acts 	or 	omissions, 	and 	the
consequences therefrom resulting, and to result, from the same
subject matter that gave rise to the claim for which I or my heirs,
executors, administrators, or assigns, and each of them, now have or
may hereafter acquire against the United States and against the
employee(s) of the Government whose acts or omissions gave rise
to the claim by reason of the same subject matter. I further agree to
reimburse, indemnify and hold harmless the United States, its
agents, servants and employees from any and all claims or causes of
action, including wrongful deaths, that arise or may arise from the
acts or omissions that gave rise to the claim(s) by reason of the same
subject matter.
Id. (emphasis added). “Following Plaintiff’s execution of the DA Form 7500, payment was made
to Plaintiff by check, which cleared on or about June 8, 2026.” Id.
Plaintiff acknowledges in his response that he settled this claim, but argues that it was only
for the items in that claim that were destroyed in May 2025, and does not include the religious
materials and legal materials seized in 2023. (Doc. 27, at 18.)
The Report provides that although Plaintiff has fully released the United States from
liability for claims relating to missing legal papers and texts, “to the extent he seeks physical copies
of his DD Forms 510, they are appended hereto as Exhibit 6 to the Special Report . . . [and] [a]
printed copy of the same will be provided to Plaintiff, which should resolve any of Plaintiff’s
outstanding concerns about procuring a physical replacement.” (Doc. 19, at 18.)
Plaintiff must show good cause why any court access claim should not be denied for failure
to state a claim. Plaintiff must also show good cause why his claims regarding lost documents are
not barred by his settlement and release under the MCA.
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 31 of 35

32
3. Due Process
Plaintiff claims that the loss of his parole packets denied him due process. Because Plaintiff
claims that the loss of his parole packets occurred from 2024 to 2026, it seems likely that they are
covered under his settlement and release under the MCA. Regardless, he has not shown that his
due process rights were violated.
“Where a liberty or property interest has been infringed, the process which is due under the
United States Constitution is that measured by the due process clause, not prison regulations.”
Brown v. Johnston, 2021 WL 4206330, at *9 (D. Kan. 2021) (quoting Brown v. Rios, 196 F. App’x
681, 683 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (citations omitted); see also Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S.
472, 481–82 (1995) (stating that prison regulations are “not designed to confer rights on inmates”
and are “designed to guide correctional officials in the administration of a prison”)).
“Release from confinement prior to expiration of a military inmate’s full sentence may be
possible by way of parole . . ..” Maze v. Ledwith, 2015 WL 5125444, at *6 (D. Kan. 2015) (citing
Huschak v. Gray, 642 F.Supp.2d 1268, 1273 (D.Kan.2009)). A military prisoner “has no liberty
interest in release on parole in the military system . . . [e]arly conditional release of a military
prisoner is discretionary.” Id.; see also DeLacruz v. Curtis, 2025 WL 238869, at *2 (D. Kan. 2025)
(stating that “no procedural due process rights attach in the context of parole proceedings”) (citing
Artis v. United States Dept. of Justice, 166 F. Supp. 2d 126, 131 (D.N.J. 2001)); see also McNutt
v. Sherrod, 2009 WL 1174620, at *4 (D. Colo. 2009) (stating that petitioner “does not have a
liberty interest in the ‘possibility of parole’ under the military parole system”) (citing Artis, 166 F.
Supp. At 131) (“Inasmuch as the military parole regulations do not create any liberty interest in
parole release, Petitioner does not have any procedural due process rights under that system[”])).
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 32 of 35

33
Plaintiff must show good cause why any due process claim should not be denied for failure to state
a claim.
4. Fifth and Sixth Amendments, 5 U.S.C. § 552, and 10 U.S.C. § 952
Plaintiff fails to clarify his claims under these amendments and statutes. 	If Plaintiff is
raising a claim under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, he fails to state a claim. “The
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that ‘private property [shall not] be taken for
public use, without just compensation.’” Hines v. Ferguson, 2019 WL 3504239, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
2019) (citing 	Nat’l Amusements Inc. v. Borough of Palmyra, 716 F.3d 57, 63 (3d Cir. 2013)
(quoting U.S. Const. amend. V) (alteration in original)).
Nothing in the SAC suggests that his property was taken for a public purpose. 	See id.
(where inmates alleged that property was destroyed, lost, or left in disarray after their transfer to a
different facility, court found that “[n]othing in the Complaint suggests that Hine’s property was
taken for a public purpose”). Accordingly, the Takings Clause is not implicated. Id. (citations
omitted). 	Plaintiff should show good cause why his Fifth Amendment claim should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim.
The Sixth Amendment provides that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.
U.S. Const. amend VI. “The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel does not
apply to civil litigation . . ..” Birch v. City of Atchison, Kansas, 840 F. App’x 365, 366–67 (10th
Cir. 2021) (unpublished) (citations omitted). The Sixth Amendment provides rights for criminal
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 33 of 35

34
defendants. Plaintiff fails to allege how his Sixth Amendment rights were violated.
Plaintiff also cites to 5 U.S. C. § 552 and 10 U.S.C. § 952. 	The FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552,
empowers federal courts to order an “agency” to produce “agency records improperly withheld”
from an individual requesting access. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). Section 952 provides that “[t]he
Secretary concerned may provide a system of parole for offenders who are confined in military
correctional facilities and who were at the time of commission of their offenses subject to the
authority of that Secretary.” 10 U.S.C. § 952(a). Plaintiff has failed to allege how these statutes
were violated or explain how he has a cause of action under those statutes.
A pro se litigant’s “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are
insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” 	Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106,
1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to
relief’ requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted).
The complaint’s “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level” and “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570. Plaintiff must
show good cause why any claim under these amendments or statutes should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Plaintiff’s Motion for
Appointment of Counsel (Doc. 26) is denied without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Submit Support Document
(Doc. 28) is granted to the extent that the Court has considered the attached documents as part of
Plaintiff’s response to the M&O and to the Report.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s requests for monetary damages and requests
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 34 of 35

35
to have Defendants terminated, reassigned, or criminally charged are denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims and claims
against Defendant Hansen are dismissed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted until November 9, 2026, in which
to show good cause, in writing to the undersigned, why his remaining claims should not be
dismissed for the reasons set forth in this Memorandum and Order. 	Failure to respond by the
deadline may result in dismissal of this case without further notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated October 9, 2026, in Kansas City, Kansas.
S/ 	John W. Lungstrum
JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 5:26-cv-03048-JWL Document 29 Filed 10/09/26 Page 35 of 35