Cahail et al v. United States of America, The et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
KAREN CAHAIL and RACHEL CAHAIL,
Plaintiffs,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-1016-JWB-BGS
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ two Motions for “Reconsideration of
Appointment of Counsel and for Accommodation under ADA.” (Docs. 79, 81.) Having reviewed
Plaintiffs’ motions, the Court DENIES their request to reconsider its prior rulings as to their
multiple requests for counsel.
The factual background of this case has been summarized numerous times by the
undersigned Magistrate Judge – most recently in the Order denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Order
Compelling Address and Motion for Protective Order. (Doc. 71, at 1-3.) That factual summary is
incorporated by reference and will not be repeated herein.
Throughout this litigation, Plaintiffs have filed numerous requests for the appointment of
counsel in this case. (See e.g., Docs. 16, 33, 37, 41, 45, 47, 48, 64.) These requests have been denied
by the undersigned Magistrate (Doc. 20, 42, 50, 70) on the basis that Plaintiffs have failed to
establish a basis to distinguish themselves from the many other untrained individuals who represent
themselves pro se on various types of claims in courts throughout the United States. 1 (See id.)
1 The Court notes that the District Court has also overruled Plaintiffs’ objection to the undersigned Magistrate Judge’s
denial of appointment of counsel. (See Doc. 73.)
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Plaintiffs again ask the Court – twice (Docs. 79, 81) – to reconsider the Court’s prior denial of their
request(s) for counsel.
As an initial matter, these two motions seek the same relief and are virtually identical other
than the inclusion of ¶ 20 in the “grounds for relief” portion of the second motion. (See Doc. 81, at
4 (“Anybody could find out if they only asked only 3% of pros say that against win their cases in
federal court I supposed to 50% when they have representation. It is clear to me that all prose
litigant’s [sic] cases are prejudiced.”).)2 Thus, Plaintiff’s first motion to reconsider (Doc. 79) is
DENIED as moot given that it is repetitive of the second motion (Doc. 81).
Next, the Court is not certain that Plaintiffs truly intended for this request to be framed as a
motion to reconsider a prior ruling of the undersigned Magistrate Judge. Rather, Plaintiffs may have
merely intended this to be a renewed motion requesting the appointment counsel.
To the extent Plaintiffs are seeking reconsideration of a prior Order, the motion was not
filed in a timely manner as required by D. Kan. Rule 7.3. Per that Rule, a party seeking
reconsideration of a court Order “must file a motion within 14 days after the order is served unless
the court extends the time.” Id. (emphasis added). The Court’s most recent Order denying the
request for counsel was entered on November 14, 2025 (Doc. 70) and Plaintiff Karen Cahail (who
filed the motions at issue) received email notice via CMECF notification on that date. This means
any request to reconsider was due fourteen days later – on or before November 28, 2025. The
present motions were not filed until December 4 and 5, 2025 (Docs. 79, 81), making them untimely.
Again, however, because Plaintiffs are representing themselves pro se, the Court will consider the
2 Plaintiffs’ second motion also has a supporting “memorandum” (Doc. 82), although there is nothing in that filing that
provides a new substantive basis for the Court to grant the motion. While that memorandum mentions Plaintiff Rachel
Cahail’s “sudden refusal to communicate” (id., at 2), this personal matter is not an issue that requires the involvement of
an attorney.
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motion to be a renewed motion requesting appointment of counsel and will analyze it on its
substantive merits.
The Court has included the legal standards for requests for the appointment of counsel in
numerous prior Orders, most recently in its written Order of August 12, 2025. (See Doc. 50, at 2-4.)
Those legal standards are incorporated herein by reference.
The Court has previously indicated that there is no constitutional right to have counsel
appointed in civil cases such as this one. Beaudry v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 331 F.3d 1164, 1169 (10th Cir.
2003). The Court again acknowledges Plaintiffs cannot afford to hire counsel, the first of Plaintiffs’
“grounds for relief” in their present motion. (Doc. 81, at 2, “grounds for relief” ¶ 1.) While this
weighs in favor of Plaintiffs’ request, the Court has already explained that this is not a sufficient
basis, by itself, to appoint counsel. (See Doc. 42, at 9.) The Court also acknowledges Plaintiffs’
attempts to obtain counsel. (Doc. 81, at 2, “grounds for relief” ¶ 2.)
The Court previously found that Plaintiffs’ concerns regarding the complexity of this case do
not justify the appointment of counsel. (See Doc. 50, at 3.) Paragraphs 3-20 of Plaintiffs’ “grounds
for relief” (as well as the information contained in the paragraphs 1-3 of the prior section of
Plaintiffs’ motion (Doc. 81, at 1-2)) are consistent with Plaintiffs’ prior concerns regarding the
complexity of this case. The Court, however, again finds that Plaintiffs’ case is not unusually
complex in comparison to litigants who represent themselves pro se in federal cases on a regular
basis. See e.g. Cox, 924 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (denying the appointment of counsel in a case alleging §1983
claims for violation of right to medical care as pretrial detainee under the 14th Amendment,
deliberate indifference in rejecting a medical request, official custom or policy permitting denial of
medical request, and related state tort claims); McLain v. Sedgwick Co. Sheriff’s Office, No. 25-4036-
JWB-BGS, 2025 WL 1696525, at *2-3 (D. Kan. June 17, 2025) (denying the appointment of counsel
in a case wherein the pro se plaintiffs contend there were “complex federal civil rights claims
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involving multiple government entities, systematic violations of constitutional and statutory rights,
and an alleged pattern of racketeering activity designed to suppress Plaintiffs’ federally protected
rights under the ADA and Fair Housing Act”).
One potentially new “grounds for relief” contained in Plaintiffs’ motion is the assertion by
Plaintiff Karen Cahail that her
personal 	capacity 	has 	been 	drastically 	reduced 	by 	new 	medical
emergencies. As of November 24, 2025, Plaintiff’s mother requires a
bone marrow biopsy for potential leukemia, and Plaintiff is her sole
caregiver. 	Simultaneously, Plaintiff’s ex-husband, who suffers from
cancer and requires oxygen, lost his caregiver to incarceration, forcing
Plaintiff to assume some of his care as well.
(Doc. 81, at 2.) The Court sympathizes with these burdens faced by Plaintiff. That stated, the Court
anticipates that many, if not virtually all, pro se litigants currently representing themselves in federal
Court face their own burdens and responsibilities as well. This is not a sufficient basis for the Court
to distinguish Plaintiff from these other pro se litigants.
Plaintiff Karen Cahail also mentions her “severe chronic PTSD” as well as other physical
impairments. Her allegations of PTSD have been previously addressed in the context of a request
for counsel. (See Doc. 50, at 4.) While the Court is sympathetic to Plaintiff’s mental and physical
health, it again notes that courts in this District have frequently held that allegations of PTSD are
not a sufficient basis for the appointment of counsel. Buffalohead v. Cook, NO. 24-3035-JWL, 2024
WL 4286245 (Sept. 25, 2024); George v. Payne-Delano, No. 24-2132-JWL, 2024 WL 3826124 (D. Kan.
Aug 14, 2024); Sheilds v. Cline, No. 20-3077-SAC, 2020 WL 2557852 (May 20, 2020).
The Court further finds that Plaintiff’s other noted physical impairments (degenerative disc
disease with stenosis, osteoarthritis, and bone spurring) do not establish a valid basis for the
appointment of counsel as they do not impact her cognitive ability to represent herself. See McLain
v. Sedgwick Co. Sheriff’s Office, No. 25-4036-JWB-BGS, 2025 WL 1696525, at *2-3 (D. Kan. June 17,
2025) (where pro se plaintiff alleged to suffer from Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI), stroke-related
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cognitive impairment, and encephalomalacia, in addition to PTSD)). Simply stated, “the type of
assistance Plaintiff’s [physical condition] may require does not necessitate a law degree. Nyanjom v.
Hawker Beechcraft, Inc., No. 12-1461-JAR-KGG, 2013 WL 3967971, at *2 (D. Kan. Aug. 1, 2013)
(holding that blindness does not per se entitle a pro se plaintiff to appointment of counsel).
In short, while the Court does not doubt that a trained attorney would handle the matter
more effectively, the Court again finds no basis to distinguish Plaintiffs from the many other
untrained individuals who represent themselves pro se on various types of claims in courts
throughout the United States on any given day. There is no manifest injustice to Plaintiffs from the
denial of their request for counsel. As such, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc.
81) is DENIED.
Finally, the Court notes that these two most recent motions cumulatively constitute at least
eleven times that Plaintiffs’ have moved the Court for the appointment of counsel in this case
(including Plaintiffs’ objection to the District Court), with each such request being summarily
denied. Plaintiffs are informed that additional such motions that merely reiterate conditions
previously addressed by the Court and/or raise circumstances that previously could have been
brought to the Court’s attention will be summarily denied by the Court.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motions for Reconsideration (Docs. 79,
81) are DENIED for the reasons set forth above.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated December 10, 2025, at Wichita, Kansas.
/S /BROOKS G. S EVERSON
Brooks G. Severson
United States Magistrate Judge
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