USA v. Boatright

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SOUTHERN DIVISION
LONDON
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
KATELYNN NICHOLE BOATRIGHT,
also known as Katie Boatright,
Defendant.
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No. 6:25-CR-10-REW-HAI
OPINION & ORDER
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In two separate motions, Defendant Katelynn Nichole Boatright moves to suppress all
evidence seized from a Tennessee traffic stop that occurred on December 2, 2024. 	See DE 25;
DE 26. In her first motion, Boatright argues that police relied on a facially deficient warrant to
place a tracking device on her car and collect evidence that ultimately prompted the traffic stop.
See DE 25 at 6–7. In her second motion, Boatright argues that police unreasonably delayed the
traffic stop, securing proof in violation of her rights. 	See DE 26 at 4–5. 	The Court referred
suppression proceedings to United States Magistrate Judge Hanly A. Ingram. See DE 36. After
conducting two evidentiary hearings, see DE 54; DE 59, Judge Ingram recommended that the
Court deny both motions, determining that the warrant was not constitutionally deficient, see
DE 58 at 6–11, and that the traffic stop had a lawful duration, see DE 60 at 7–10.1
1 The record before Judge Ingram included all of the briefing (DE 25, DE 26, DE 32, DE 33, DE 34, and
DE 35). The exhibits included the GPS tracking warrant, the affidavit used to obtain that warrant, the data
that police relied upon to justify the traffic stop, and all relevant police reports (DE 25-1, DE 25-2, DE 25-
3, DE 25-4, DE 25-5, DE 25-6, DE 25-7, DE 26-1, DE 26-2, and DE 26-3). The transcript of the hearings
are at DE 54 and DE 59. This Court has read and considered all of the paper, including the objection
exchanges. 	The remaining legal disputes are essentially whether the initial warrant used to install the
tracker was constitutional, and whether the traffic stop was unconstitutionally prolonged.
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Boatright timely and particularly objected to each of Judge Ingram’s recommendations.
See DE 61; DE 62. The Government responded to both sets of objections in a single filing. See
DE 64. On Boatright’s first motion, the Court finds the warrant invalid. However, the Court will
not decide whether the good faith exception spares exclusion until it receives further briefing from
the parties. On Boatright’s second motion, the Court, after conducting a de novo review, adopts
with modifications Judge Ingram’s recommendation. 	The Court adjudges no infirmity in the
temporal aspects of the stop. As such, in substance, the Court OVERRULES Boatright’s second
set of objections, DE 62, ADOPTS, on terms, Judge Ingram’s second recommendation, DE 60,
and DENIES Boatright’s second suppression motion, DE 26.
I. 	B ACKGROUND
On November 15, 2024, a judge in Bell County, Kentucky issued a search warrant
authorizing the installation of a GPS tracking device on Katelynn Nichole Boatright’s 2013
Chevrolet Camaro.2 See DE 25-2. Accompanying the warrant was an affidavit stating that two
controlled methamphetamine buys had recently occurred between Boatright and law enforcement.
See DE 25-1 at 2. 	The affidavit also highlighted the frequent short-term visitors that Boatright
received in her home, along with her repeated and brief trips away from the residence. See id. The
affiant indicated that, in his experience, Boatright’s behavior was consistent with that of a drug
trafficker. See id.
The warrant authorized the installation of a tracking device on Boatright’s vehicle, but it
did not specify a deadline for installation or the duration of warranted monitoring. See DE 25-2.
The parties do not dispute probable cause. A law enforcement officer with the Kentucky State
2 Boatright has not objected to any of Judge Ingram’s factual findings. See DE 61; DE 62. As such, the
Court adopts Judge Ingram’s well-reasoned conclusions as to the underlying facts of this dispute. 	See
DE 58; DE 60.
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Police installed the device on November 21, 2024, six days after the warrant issued, at the
Middlesboro mall parking lot. See DE 54 at 16, 72. The device remained active until Boatright
was stopped on December 2, 2024. See id.
Tracking data showed that on December 1, 2024, Boatright’s Camaro traveled from
Kentucky to Atlanta, Georgia. See id. at 25. On belief that Boatright might have been transporting
drugs, Kentucky State Police alerted the Claiborne County, Tennessee Sheriff’s Office that the
vehicle would be returning through their county. See id. at 21, 60. The next day, an automated
license plate reader alerted to the Camaro’s presence in the county. See id. at 30. Upon learning
that Boatright had an outstanding arrest warrant for methamphetamine trafficking from 2019, local
officers conducted a felony traffic stop of the vehicle. See id. at 32–33. Boatright was sitting in
the passenger seat, and two men were also present in the vehicle. See id. at 49.
Once Boatright was removed from the vehicle and police began the arrest process, officers
observed a pistol in plain view on the passenger-side floorboard. See id. at 33–34. Boatright then
admitted to having cocaine in her pocket; a search incident to arrest subsequently revealed both
cocaine and psychoactive mushrooms on her person. 	See id. at 33. 	A K-9 unit proceeded to
conduct an exterior sniff of the vehicle and alerted three times. See DE 26-2. Believing they had
probable cause to do so, the officers then searched Boatright’s vehicle and discovered three
firearms, drug paraphernalia, and a large quantity of suspected methamphetamine in the trunk. See
id.; DE 26-4; DE 54 at 36. A federal grand jury subsequently indicted Boatright for “conspir[ing]
with others to knowingly and intentionally distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance
containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), all in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.” DE 1.
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On May 7, 2025, Boatright filed two motions to suppress. In her first motion, she argues
that the GPS tracking warrant was constitutionally deficient because it failed to include temporal
limitations, see DE 25 at 6–7, that the good faith exception could not apply due to the warrant’s
facial deficiencies, see id. at 7–8, and that police impermissibly invaded the curtilage of Boatright’s
home in order to install the tracking device, see id. at 8–9. In her second motion, she argues that
police searched the trunk of her vehicle without probable cause, as they began the search prior to
the three K-9 alerts, see DE 26 at 4, and that the stop was unconstitutionally prolonged after the
completion of her arrest, see id. at 4–5.
After holding two suppression hearings, see DE 46; DE 55, Judge Ingram recommended
that the Court deny both motions. See DE 58; DE 60. Boatright objects to those recommendations,
preserving two main arguments: 	(1) police relied on a facially deficient warrant that lacked
temporal limitations to place and to operate the tracking device on her vehicle, see DE 61; and
(2) police unconstitutionally prolonged the traffic stop, improperly conducting the fruitful search,
see DE 62. Boatright has now conceded that the tracking device was installed while her car was
on public property, and that the K-9 alerted prior to the search of her trunk. See DE 61 at 1; DE 62
at 1. The Government responded in opposition to both of Boatright’s objections. See DE 64. The
matter, on a fulsome record, is now ostensibly ripe for review.
II. 	L EGAL S TANDARD
When a party timely objects to a magistrate judge’s dispositive recommendation, the Court
must make “a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings
or recommendations to which objection is made.” 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also F ED. R.
C RIM. P. 59(b)(3) (“The district judge must consider de novo any objection to the magistrate
judge’s recommendation.”). 	The Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the
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findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). However,
the Court need not “review . . . a magistrate[ judge]’s factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo
or any other standard, when neither party objects to those findings.” Thomas v. Arn, 106 S. Ct.
466, 472 (1985).
When seeking suppression in the context of a warranted search, the defense typically bears
the burden of proof. United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo, 346 F.3d 637, 643 (6th Cir. 2003). That
is, the defendant must provide evidence of “a violation of some constitutional or statutory right
justifying suppression.” Id. (citing United States v. Feldman, 606 F.2d 673, 679 n. 11 (6th Cir.
1979)). Importantly, the substantive issues determine burden allocation. See, e.g., United States v.
Johnson, 482 F. App’x 137, 143 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Ultimately, ‘[i]t is the [Government’s] burden
to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion was
sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure.’”
(quoting Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1326 (1983))).
A. The Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. C ONST. amend. IV.
Searches conducted without a valid warrant “are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment
– subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United
States, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514 (1967). A warrant is valid when issued “upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.” U.S. C ONST. amend. IV.
The probable cause inquiry is a flexible one: “Finely-tuned standards such as proof beyond
a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence . . . have no place in the magistrate’s
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decision.” Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2330 (1983). While probable cause requires more
than mere suspicion, it does not require prima facie proof. See United States v. Abernathy, 843
F.3d 243, 249 (6th Cir. 2016). So long as the totality of the circumstances indicates that there is a
fair probability of contraband or evidence of a crime being found at a particular place, there exists
probable cause. See Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2328 (“This totality-of-the-circumstances approach is far
more consistent with our prior treatment of probable cause than is any rigid demand that specific
‘tests’ be satisfied . . . .”); see also United States v. Williams, 544 F.3d 683, 686 (6th Cir. 2008).
However, even when issued upon adequate probable cause, a warrant may still be
constitutionally deficient if it fails to describe the place to be searched or things to be seized with
particularity. See Groh v. Ramirez, 124 S. Ct. 1284, 1289–93 (2004) (holding that a search warrant
was facially invalid because it utterly failed to describe the persons or things to be seized). Such
warrants are akin to general warrants, “the immediate evil[] that motivated the framing and
adoption of the Fourth Amendment.” 	Payton v. New York, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1378 (1980). 	In
analyzing whether a warrant is sufficiently particularized, courts are limiting to examining the
“four corners” of the warrant and any other incorporated documents. Abernathy, 843 F.3d at 249.
The degree of specificity required to satisfy the particularity requirement is flexible, and it will
necessarily “vary depending on the crime involved and the types of items sought.” United Sates v.
Hanna, 661 F.3d 271, 286 (6th Cir. 2011).
Any search conducted pursuant to a constitutionally deficient warrant necessarily violates
the Fourth Amendment, unless one of the specifically established exceptions to the warrant
requirement applies. 	See Katz, 88 S. Ct. at 514. 	When evidence is obtained pursuant to an
unconstitutional search or seizure, the exclusionary rule generally forbids the use of that evidence
at trial. See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 699 (2009). The rule similarly extends to
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evidence derivatively obtained from an unconstitutional search or seizure under what is known as
the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine. 	See United States v. Galaviz, 645 F.3d 347, 354 (6th
Cir. 2011) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417 (1963)). Notably, the Supreme
Court has incorporated the protections of the Fourth Amendment, including the exclusionary rule,
against the states and state officials. 	See Elkins v. United States, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 1447 (1960);
Mapp v. Ohio, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1691–94 (1961).
But the exclusionary rule will not automatically or categorically apply to any evidence that
was obtained as a result of an unconstitutional search or seizure. 	Through its exclusionary rule
jurisprudence, “[t]he Supreme Court has effectively created a balancing test by requiring that in
order for a court to suppress evidence following the finding of a Fourth Amendment violation, ‘the
benefits of deterrence must outweigh the costs.’” United States v. Master, 614 F.3d 236, 243 (6th
Cir. 2010) (quoting Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 700). Moreover, in United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct.
3405, 3416–19 (1984), the Supreme Court explicitly held that, in most instances, an officer’s good
faith reliance on a defective search warrant will counsel against application of the exclusionary
rule since suppression there would serve no deterrent purpose. 	The Leon Court did, however,
articulate a non-exhaustive list of scenarios in which an officer’s reliance on a warrant would not
avoid exclusion, one being when the warrant is “so facially deficient – i.e., in failing to
particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized – that the executing officers cannot
reasonably presume it to be valid.” Id. at 3421.
As a final aside, while federal warrants are subject to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, state warrants are not. 	See United States v. Hopper, 58 F. App’x 619, 628 (6th Cir.
2003) (“[A]lthough the police failed to comply with [federal] procedural requirements . . . , the
search was nevertheless ‘reasonable’ in the constitutional sense, because it was conducted pursuant
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to a valid state warrant and met the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.”). Thus, even though
Rule 41(e)(2)(C) mandates the installation of tracking devices “within a specified time no longer
than 10 days,” and permits tracking for a “reasonable length of time” that may not “exceed 45 days
from the date the warrant was issued,”3 states are free to impose different requirements on their
own courts, all subject to constitutional limits. 	Although Kentucky courts are bound by the
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure, those rules do not address tracking devices distinctly.
They do not mandate a specific range of time in which tracking devices must be installed, nor do
they set limits on the overall period that a tracking device may be used. See KY. R. C RIM. P. 13.10.
B. Traffic Stops and Automobile Exception to the Warrant Requirement
Because traffic stops are seizures within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, they must
be conducted in a reasonable manner. See Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996).
A traffic stop is reasonable when there exists “probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has
occurred,” Id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1399 (1979); Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
98 S. Ct. 330, 332 (1977) (per curiam)), or “reasonable suspicion of an ongoing crime,” United
States v. Collazo, 818 F.3d 247, 254–55 (6th Cir. 2016). But that is not to say that traffic stops
can persist indefinitely – an otherwise-completed traffic stop may not be extended beyond the
catalyzing mission absent some ongoing, reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. See
Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614, 1616 (2015) (describing the proper grounds for
extending traffic stops and analogizing to Terry stops).
While “reasonable suspicion” entails less certainty than “probable cause,” reasonable
suspicion is similarly reliant on the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Arvizu, 122
S. Ct. 744, 751–52 (2002) (citing United States v. Cortez, 101 S. Ct. 690, 694–95 (1981)) (“When
3 Unless there exists good cause for one or more extensions. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(C).
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discussing how reviewing courts should make reasonable-suspicion determinations, we have said
repeatedly that they must look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the
detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.”).
When determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, officers are permitted “to draw on their
own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the
cumulative information available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’” See id. at
750–51 (quoting Cortez, 101 S. Ct. at 695).
During a lawful traffic stop, police may conduct a search of the stopped vehicle without a
warrant so long as there is probable cause to believe that evidence of criminal activity will be
found in the vehicle. See Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1669 (2018) (citing Carroll v. United
States, 45 S. Ct. 280 (1925)). This “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement is based on
the simple reality that a “vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought.” United States v. Hall, 20 F.4th 1085, 1099 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting
Carroll, 45 S. Ct. at 285).
III. 	ANALYSIS
Boatright raises two arguments. 	First, she asserts that the state warrant authorizing the
placement of a tracking device on her car was unconstitutional because it lacked temporal
limitations, and the absence of those limitations amounted to a facial deficiency obviating
application of the good faith exception. 	See DE 25 at 6–8. 	Second, she contends that police
continued the traffic stop after the mission of the stop had been completed, violating her Fourth
Amendment rights pursuant to Rodriguez. See DE 26 at 4–5.
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A. GPS Tracking Warrant and the Good Faith Exception
While the warrant provided police with sufficient guidance on the installation of the
tracking device, its failure to limit the duration of tracking renders it unconstitutional. But instead
of determining whether suppression is appropriate at this time, the Court directs additional briefing
from the parties on whether the good faith exception should apply.
1. 	Constitutionality of the GPS Tracking Warrant
Boatright contends that the GPS tracking warrant was unconstitutionally overbroad, and
that all evidence obtained pursuant to that warrant – including the derivative evidence gathered at
the resulting traffic stop – should be suppressed. 	See DE 25 at 6–8, 9–11. 	In support of her
argument, Boatright cites two deficiencies in the warrant: (1) its failure to specify the particular
period during which police could install the tracking device; and (2) its failure to specify the length
of time over which GPS tracking could occur. See id. at 6. Judge Ingram ultimately determined
that neither of these deficiencies rendered the warrant unconstitutional, see DE 58 at 12, and
Boatright objects to that determination, see DE 61 at 7–14.
Boatright is essentially claiming that the GPS tracking warrant was akin to a general
warrant. 	Prior to the founding, the notorious “general warrant” was ubiquitous; these warrants
“specified only an offense . . . and left to the discretion of the executing officials the decision as to
which persons should be arrested and which places should be searched.” Steagald v. United States,
101 S. Ct. 1642, 1651–52 (1981).
With respect to the GPS tracking warrant’s failure to specify the period during which police
could install the tracking device, Boatright’s argument is not persuasive. 	Police were afforded
sufficient guidance, within the warrant, on when to conduct the installation, and the failure to
define a specific period in which to install the device did not transform the GPS tracking warrant
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into a general warrant. However, the warrant’s failure to specify the length of time over which
GPS tracking could occur is significantly more concerning. While that failure alone may not be
enough to make this warrant a general warrant, under particularity concepts, it is certainly enough
to render the warrant unconstitutional under Sixth Circuit binding authority.
i. 	Failure to Include a Temporal Limitation for Installation
The Court agrees with Boatright that the warrant failed to identify a particular period during
which police were required to install the tracking device. See DE 25-2 at 1. But that fact does not
imply, as she argues in her objections, that police lacked any guidance on when to install the
device. 	See DE 61 at 2. 	To the contrary, the warrant expressly commanded police to act
immediately. 	See DE 25-2 at 1 (“[Y]ou are commanded to make immediate search of the
premises . . . .”).
Of course, police waited six days to install the device. 	They did not take “immediate”
action, in the temporal sense. However, authorities could not act against the vehicle when parked
within Boatright’s curtilage – the warrant did not authorize entry into that area (as Boatright’s
now-abandoned curtilage theory notes, see DE 25 at 8–9). 	When authorities, within six days,
received information that Boatright was traveling toward Middlesboro, they tailed her vehicle to a
public parking lot, where they lawfully installed the device. See DE 54 at 16–17. In summary,
the warrant did provide guidance to police, and Boatright has not established that police failed to
comply reasonably with that guidance. 	Prompt lawful installation suffices to adhere to the
direction of immediate installation.
ii. 	Failure to Include a Temporal Limitation for Tracking
Neither party has identified controlling authority on the issue of whether a warrant’s failure
to specify the permissible duration of tracking will render it unconstitutional. 	See DE 61 at 8;
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DE 64 at 7. For that reason, Boatright supports her motion by citing three analogous cases. See
DE 61 at 7–9. However, these cases are not as “directly on point” as she claims. See id. at 9.
Boatright begins by citing United States v. Ford, 184 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 1999). See DE 61
at 7–8. 	Specifically, she references the court’s statement that the “[f]ailure to limit broad
descriptive terms by relevant dates, when such dates are available to police, will render a warrant
overbroad.” Id. at 576. But the Ford decision involved the search of a bingo hall and the seizure
of documents that were more than a decade old – many of which were created before the owner of
the bingo hall and the subject of the gambling investigation even purchased the relevant business.
See id. at 571–73; see also United States v. DSD Shipping, A.S., No. 15-00102, 2015 WL 5164306,
at *8 n.9 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 2, 2015). The court took issue with the warrant’s failure to identify the
specific documents subject to seizure by reference to their creation date. 	See Ford, 184 F.3d at
576–77. 	But the present matter is factually distinct in that the GPS tracking warrant only
authorized the seizure of a single, particularized type of data. While the warrant failed to specify
the permissible duration of tracking, it did not create any ambiguities as to what data could be
collected. In that regard, the Ford decision is about a different issue.
This criticism also applies to the other cases, United States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554 (6th
Cir. 2006), and United States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541 (1st Cir. 1980), that Boatright cites in her
objections. See DE 61 at 9. Each of those cases also involved a warrant authorizing the seizure
of physical documents without limiting that authorization to records that were created within a
specific time frame. See Abboud, 438 F.3d at 561–62, 576; Abrams, 615 F.2d at 543–45. Neither
decision stands for the proposition that GPS tracking warrants failing to limit the permissible
duration of tracking are automatically invalid.
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Moreover, there are important distinctions between warrants authorizing the collection of
digital data and warrants authorizing the collection of physical documents. 	Existing case law
acknowledges these differences and suggests that there are legitimate reasons for courts to vary
their treatment of these separate warrants. See, e.g., United States v. Chandler, 571 F. Supp. 3d
836, 843 (E.D. Mich. 2021) (citing Riley v. California, 143 S. Ct. 2473, 2491–93 (2014)) (“The
Supreme Court recognized the impracticality of directly comparing searches for digital data to
searches for items in the physical world.”). To put it simply, the Court does not view Ford, Abboud,
and Abrams as dispositive here.
But despite the parties’ contentions and their failure to mine for precedent successfully,4
there is controlling authority to address. In United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 945–46 (6th Cir.
1980), the Sixth Circuit determined that a warrant authorizing the use of a beeper device, to track
a chemical container, was invalid because it failed to limit the overall duration that the beeper
could be monitored. 	Of course, one could argue that Bailey is distinguishable from the present
matter, as the beeper at issue in Bailey was monitored for 70 days, see id. at 945, while the tracking
device at issue here was monitored for 11 days. 	However, the Bailey court, after conducting a
“search” analysis, made clear that “[b]ecause the warrant permitted surveillance of the movements
of defendants for an indefinite period of time, it authorized an unreasonable search, and, therefore,
was invalid.” Id. In other words, the overall length of the search was irrelevant to constitutionality
– all that mattered was the fact that the warrant authorized tracking for an indefinite period. Bailey,
never overruled, stands for the proposition that warrants authorizing tracking without stated
durational limitations violate the Fourth Amendment. Using that logic, the GPS tracking warrant
issued in the instant matter was unconstitutional.
4 And really, the search involved both counsel, defense counsel’s consultation with a broad defense bar pool,
and the highly effective offices of Judge Ingram.
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In his opinion, Judge Ingram suggested that even if the warrant was overbroad, the infirm
portions of the GPS tracking warrant were severable because the search, in fact, was conducted in
a reasonable manner. 	See DE 58 at 8. 	Boatright objects to that conclusion, stating that it is
impossible to “distinguish any part of the warrant that may be valid from any part that is not”
without implying an arbitrary, post hoc time limitation into the text of the warrant. See DE 61 at
11. The Court agrees with Boatright. In evaluating the constitutionality of a warrant, courts are
generally limited to considering the four corners of the document. 	Abernathy, 843 F.3d at 249.
Reading an implied or as applied limitation into a warrant after the search it authorized has already
been completed would violate that command. Additionally, Bailey’s mandates would have little
meaning if courts later employed such tools in weighing validity – in fact, the Bailey court
specifically contemplated this dilemma, noting that “the fact that the surveillance lasted seventy
days rather than many months [did not] render the omission [of the temporal limitation] harmless.”
628 F.2d at 945 n.12 (citing an exemplar analysis where invalidity existed despite only 13 days of
interception under a temporally overbroad and blanket 60-day warrant and statute). 	The
implication of this language is that the omission of a temporal limitation causes constitutional
harm, irrespective of whether the search itself was conducted in an otherwise reasonable manner.
The Sixth Circuit elaborated on this position, holding:
In our view, the issuance of a search warrant without a termination date seriously
undermines 	the 	very 	[F]ourth 	[A]mendment 	interests 	the 	search 	warrant
requirement is designed to protect. 	To hold that a “beeper warrant” passes
constitutional muster despite the absence of a termination date would exalt law
enforcement needs over rights of individual privacy. 	Requiring that beeper
surveillance warrants contain time limitations is not too high a price to pay for the
protection of citizens from the invasion of privacy inherent in having their every
movement followed by an electronic “eye.”
Id. at 946.
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On account of the preceding analysis, and seeing no discernible space between today’s
tracking device and the beeper addressed in Bailey, the warrant’s failure to limit the overall
duration of tracking must necessarily render it unconstitutional. 	A proper temporal limitation
would have cabined police discretion and ensured a narrow and reasonable intrusion upon
Boatright’s rights. Bailey’s categorical approach renders inapplicable the severance principles that
often might salvage portions of an otherwise overbroad warrant.
2. 	Applicability of the Good Faith Exception
Because neither party discussed Bailey or its implications in their filings, the Court
requires additional briefing on whether the good faith exception applies to police reliance on a
constitutionally deficient GPS tracking warrant. This is the only remaining issue. The following
analysis should guide the parties in their briefing.
Exclusion is a proper remedy only when the benefits of deterrence outweigh its heavy costs.
Master, 614 F.3d at 243. 	To reiterate, the exclusionary “rule’s sole purpose is to deter police
misconduct.” United States v. Sanders, 106 F.4th 455, 467 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 603
(2024).5 	Thus, the Court must determine whether suppression would deter misconduct, and to
what degree. 	In his recommendation, Judge Ingram suggested that the exclusionary rule would
serve no deterrence purpose in the present case. See DE 58 at 11–13. Boatright objects, taking
the position that “the good faith exception does not apply [to prevent the application of the
5 Notably, the Bailey court applied the exclusionary rule based on the fact that “electronic surveillance has
such a potential for abuse that the Government must be held accountable for its use.” 628 F.2d at 947.
However, the fact that Bailey was decided four years prior to Leon certainly renders the continuing vitality
of this specific analysis suspect, especially given that the Leon decision is typically credited with creating
the good faith exception. See, e.g., Toward a General Good Faith Exception, 127 HARV. L. REV. 773, 775–
76 (2013). Plainly, Bailey did not apply anything approaching the contemporary exclusionary rule. While
Bailey directly rejected the idea of a good faith carve out and applied instead principles of judicial integrity,
see 628 F.2d at 947, the Sixth Circuit’s modern treatment of the exclusionary rule is entirely reliant on
whether exclusion would deter police misconduct, see Sanders, 106 F.4th 455, 467.
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exclusionary rule] because the warrant is so facially deficient that the executing officer’s reliance
on the warrant was neither in good faith nor objectively reasonable.” DE 61 at 12.
Some of Boatright’s arguments lack traction. Boatright first asserts that “the exclusionary
rule simply does not apply to overbroad warrants that violate the Fourth Amendment particularity
requirement.” 	Id. 	However, Boatright has not provided adequate support for that sweeping
declaration. 	While Boatright cites Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1294, that case is not as helpful as she
claims. 	See DE 61 at 12. 	In Groh, the Court affirmed an application of the exclusionary rule
because “[n]o reasonable officer could claim to be unaware of the basic rule . . . that, absent
consent or exigency, a warrantless search of the home is presumptively unconstitutional.” 124 S.
Ct. at 1294. But that rule is a bedrock principle of Fourth Amendment law that has been “well
established by [the Supreme Court’s] cases.” Id. The principle that GPS tracking warrants must,
as a constitutional principle, limit the permissible duration of tracking perhaps is not similarly
“well established.”
Likewise, Boatright’s citation to Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 99 S. Ct. 2319, 2326 (1979),
is inapposite. In her objections, Boatright notes that the Lo-Ji Sales Court excluded evidence that
had been obtained pursuant to a deficient warrant because the warrant “left it entirely to the
discretion of the officials conducting the search to decide what items were likely [to be relevant
evidence] and to accomplish their seizure.” DE 61 at 14 (quoting Lo-Ji Sales, 99 S. Ct. at 2324).
But just as Ford, Abboud, and Abrams are insufficiently analogous to the present matter, so too is
Lo-Ji Sales. 	While the warrant at issue in Lo-Ji Sales provided police with nearly unfettered
discretion, see 99 S. Ct. at 2324, the warrant at issue in the instant matter imposed strict limits on
the type of data that police were permitted to collect and defined the exact method of collecting
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that data.6 The mere fact that the GPS tracking warrant failed to include a temporal limitation does
not bring it within the ambit of Lo-Ji Sales.
Still, Boatright raises a potentially weighty argument under Leon. 	See DE 61 at 12–13.
Boatright contends that the GPS tracking warrant was so facially deficient that no reasonable
officer could have relied upon it. See id. at 12; Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3421. Of course, the warrant
was not wholly deficient. It described Boatright’s alleged criminal activity, detailed the particular
data to be collected, and identified the precise method of collecting that data. See DE 25-2 at 1.
Clearly, the GPS tracking warrant was a far cry from the prototypical general warrant.
Nevertheless, the warrant was facially deficient in one respect – it failed to impose a temporal
limitation on the duration of GPS monitoring.
Whether that facial deficiency categorically precludes application of the good faith
exception is left to the parties to brief. 	The parties should examine how courts have treated
“facially deficient” warrants in applying Leon and its progeny. They should also bear in mind that
exclusion is, per the cases, only appropriate where it would meaningfully deter culpable police
conduct. 	See United States v. Davis, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2429 (2011) (recognizing the Court has
never applied “the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained as a result of nonculpable,
innocent police conduct”). As it currently stands, the Court struggles to see how suppressing the
evidence obtained pursuant to the deficient warrant – or the fruits of that evidence – would serve
a deterrent purpose. A Bell County judge independently issued the warrant upon a proper finding
of probable cause. Police approached Boatright’s vehicle while it was on public property, not her
protected curtilage. They installed the tracker soon after the warrant issued. And they monitored
6 It is also notable that Lo-Ji Sales involved much more extreme facts. There, the judicial officer authorizing
the search warrant “bec[a]me a member, if not the leader, of the search party which was essentially a police
operation.” 99 S. Ct. 2324. The fact that he abandoned his “neutral and detached” position as a judicial
officer was what caused the Court the most concern. See id. at 2325.
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the tracker for a narrow period of time. 	In executing the warrant, police acted in a reasonable
manner.
Of course, Boatright can argue that the police’s reliance on a warrant that did not comply
with Bailey’s requirements is deterrable misconduct in and of itself. But it is important to recall,
as Boatright points out in her objections, that there is no Kentucky law that requires a stated limit
on the period of time that police can monitor a GPS tracking device after a warrant is issued. See
DE 61 at 8. As such, it would set a high bar to say that police were on notice – or should have
been on notice – about the unlawfulness of the state warrant. If two highly trained lawyers and a
veteran federal judge were unaware of and unable to find Bailey, and if Kentucky’s warrant
procedures contain no explicit temporal requirement, one may conclude that it would be a tall task
for the Court to reasonably impute awareness of that esoteric limit to a Kentucky State Police
trooper.
With that being said, the Court recognizes that certain authorities suggest it is impossible
to rely on a facially invalid warrant in good faith. See, e.g., United States v. Bateman, 945 F.3d
997, 1005 (6th Cir. 2019) (“Notwithstanding [the good faith] exception, an officer still ‘cannot
reasonably presume’ that a ‘facially deficient’ warrant is valid. . . . Evidence obtained as a result
of a facially invalid warrant cannot be admitted pursuant to the ‘good faith’ exception.” (internal
citation omitted) (quoting Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3421)); United States v. Lazar, 604 F.3d 230, 237–
38 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Despite the government’s argument to the contrary, [Supreme Court
precedent] does not purport to alter that aspect of the exclusionary rule which applies to warrants
that are facially deficient warrants ab initio.”). But this principle is not universally applied in the
relevant law. 	See, e.g., United States v. Cassity, 807 F.2d 509, 512 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing
Massachusetts v. Shepherd, 104 S. Ct. 3424, 3429 (1984)) (“The warrants were not facially invalid
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and the district court did not err in holding that it was reasonable for the police officers to install
and monitor beepers after securing warrants that contained no time limits. The error in the case
was committed by the magistrates in issuing the warrants, not by the police officers in executing
them.”).
The parties’ briefing, which earlier did not discuss Bailey, should focus on whether Leon
applies to the warrant, given its fatal but atypical flaw.
B. Prolongment of the Stop Beyond Original Mission
Boatright objects to Judge Ingram’s conclusion that “there is no evidence to suggest the
stop was unconstitutionally delayed.” DE 60 at 10. Specifically, Boatright argues that “the traffic
stop was unlawfully extended for two or three minutes to permit the dog sniff.” 	DE 62 at 5. She
further asserts that police should have instead “arrested [her] and left the car on the side of the road
or impounded it if permitted by policy.” Id. However, a careful review of the record suggests that
any delay was justified by the officers’ reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Therefore, the
delay did not violate the basic tenets of the Rodriguez decision. 	135 S. Ct. at 1615–16.
Accordingly, the Court overrules Boatright’s second set of objections.7
Both parties agree that the initial mission of the traffic stop was to arrest Boatright; she
faced an outstanding local warrant. See DE 62 at 5; DE 64 at 9. Furthermore, the parties agree
that after Boatright was arrested, the officers continued the stop and deployed a K-9 to sniff around
the vehicle. See DE 62 at 5; DE 64 at 8–9. Finally, it is uncontested that after the K-9 gave three
positive alerts, the officers had probable cause to conduct a search of the vehicle. See DE 60 at 6;
7 One wonders how Boatright would benefit, if authorities had done what she said. If they had simply put
her in the squad car and driven her off, the vehicle would have been left on the road or impounded.
Obviously, officers could, with no constitutional problem, run a drug dog around a car left sitting on the
roadside after the owner has lawfully been taken to the station. No delay or constitutional dimension would
arise. There simply is no harm caused by authorities not doing what Boatright claims they should have.
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DE 62 at 1. The parties only diverge as to whether some new mission justified the continuation of
the traffic stop.
As Judge Ingram recognized in his recommendation, two critical pieces of evidence
afforded police reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot after Boatright’s arrest. First,
the officers discovered multiple illicit substances on Boatright’s person, after they removed her
from the vehicle. 	See DE 60 at 7–8. 	Second, a loose firearm was seen in plain view near the
passenger seat of the vehicle during Boatright’s arrest. See id. at 8. In her objections, Boatright
argues that this evidence did not establish reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify the continuation
of the stop. See DE 62 at 5–7. Boatright’s arguments are unpersuasive.
Boatright claims that the drugs found on her person did not create reasonable suspicion that
other drugs would be found in her vehicle. In support, she raises several points: (1) the Tennessee
officers had limited information about her criminal history or suspected criminal conduct, and
therefore lacked a reason to think she was trafficking drugs; (2) the drugs she possessed were in
small, personal quantities, so there was no basis to believe that more would be found in her vehicle;
and (3) the Kentucky investigation concerned methamphetamine trafficking, making the discovery
of cocaine and psychoactive mushrooms irrelevant. See id. at 6–7.
However, these arguments can be dispatched with relative ease. The Tennessee officers
may have had limited details about the Kentucky investigation, but they knew that Boatright had
an outstanding Tennessee arrest warrant for the sale of illicit drugs and that the Kentucky police
were actively investigating her for drug trafficking. 	See DE 54 at 21, 44. 	They also knew that
Kentucky had an active tracking warrant, a plain signal of probable cause. Although the Tennessee
warrant was relatively dated, it still – when combined with the statements provided by the
Kentucky police – reasonably and particularly alerted the officers to the potential that Boatright
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was transporting illegal drugs. See id. at 45. Moreover, the drugs found on Boatright’s person did
not reduce that suspicion – rather, they strengthened it. While the quantity found on Boatright’s
person is relevant, the mere fact an out-of-state traveler was found in possession of drugs surely
provided ample specific and particularized reason to suspect further criminal activity. See, e.g.,
United States v. Whitley, 34 F.4th 522, 534 (6th Cir. 2022) (holding that presence of marijuana
residue helped to establish reasonable suspicion sufficient to extend traffic stop). It also justified
follow-up inquiries concerning matters such as vehicle ownership, vehicle status, and the presence
of paraphernalia, additional drugs, or other contraband. See United States v. Lott, 954 F.3d 919,
923 (6th Cir. 2020) (noting the parties did not contest defendant’s “admission to having marijuana
in the car provided reasonable suspicion” to prolong traffic stop). Finally, Boatright’s emphasis
on the kinds of drugs that were found on her person is misplaced. 	She cannot claim that the
Tennessee officers received minimal information about the Kentucky investigation while faulting
them for failing to rely on the precise details of that investigation during their traffic stop. Because
the officers did not know which drugs were involved in the Kentucky investigation, the discovery
of any controlled substance was sufficient to create reasonable suspicion that more controlled
substances would be found in the vehicle.
Second, Boatright asserts that her possession of a firearm was not, in itself, suspicious. In
support, Boatright makes three main points: (1) Tennessee law permits resident and non-resident
individuals who are at least 18 years of age to openly carry legal firearms in a motor vehicle, see
TENN. C ODE. ANN . § 39–17–1307(e); (2) carrying a firearm in an apparently legal manner cannot
establish reasonable suspicion, see Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t, 785 F.3d 1128, 1131–
32 (6th Cir. 2015); and (3) while it is true that Boatright was a convicted felon and unable to legally
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possess her firearm, the officers did not know that status at the time they executed the arrest
warrant, so that fact is irrelevant. See DE 62 at 5–6.
The Court accedes to several of these points. 	The officers did not seem to know that
Boatright was a convicted felon, and her possession of the firearm appeared to generally follow
Tennessee law. Yet Boatright overlooks a key point – the reasonable suspicion inquiry is governed
by the totality of the circumstances. See Arvizu, 122 S. Ct. at 751–52. The firearm may not, on
its own, have justified prolonging the stop.8 	But even if lawfully carrying a firearm does not
establish reasonable suspicion, carrying a firearm in a manner that suggests it is being used to
further a drug trafficking offense certainly does. 	See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 	That is, when
considering the drugs found on Boatright’s person and the firearm found in her car, together with
her outstanding trafficking warrant and the extant Kentucky investigation, there was sufficient
evidence to prolong the stop and investigate potential criminal activity via the immediate K-9
open-air sniff. This was not a hunch, but rather, an investigation premised on objective facts. And
again, Boatright has little reason to complain about the duration of her detention given that she
was immediately arrested under valid process. 	Delay did not take her across a line between a
traffic stop and an illegal detention; she was under arrest from the start of the operative analysis,
placing the case beyond the ken of Rodriguez.
In summary, the officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. As such, they were
permitted to continue the traffic stop in order to conduct an investigation, even after the initial
purpose of the stop had been completed. During that investigation, a K-9 gave three quick alerts,
providing probable cause to search the vehicle. The officers therefore acted properly, and there
was no constitutional invalidity in either the manner of or extent of the traffic stop.
8 Of course, it is illegal, under federal law, for a regular user of controlled substances to possess a firearm
in interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3).
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the stated reasons, the Court DENIES Boatright’s second suppression motion, DE 26,
ADOPTS, as modified, Judge Ingram’s second recommendation, DE 60, and OVERRULES
Boatright’s second set of objections, DE 62.
However, Boatright’s first suppression motion, DE 25, is still active. With respect to that
motion, the Court ORDERS both parties to file briefs, not to exceed 10 pages, addressing whether
the good faith exception spares exclusion in light of the Court’s determination that the GPS
tracking warrant was unconstitutional. Each brief is due by November 4, 2025.
This the 21st day of October, 2025.
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