USA v. Chaney

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	CRIMINAL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO: 22-cr-16
DEVIN CHANEY 	SECTION: T (1)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendant Devin Chaney’s pro se Motion for Reduction in Sentence
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). R. Doc. 118. The Government opposes the Motion, R.
Doc. 124, and Mr. Chaney has submitted a reply memorandum in support, R. Doc. 126. Having
considered the parties’ arguments, along with the applicable law and facts, the Court DISMISSES
the Motion without prejudice, to refile upon satisfaction of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion
requirement.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 25, 2022, Chaney pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to two
counts of an eleven-count Superseding Indictment: Hobbs Act Robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(a), (d), and Armed Bank Robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).1 R. Doc. 101, p. 1.
See also R. Doc. 52, pp. 1-6. The Court sentenced Chaney to a term of imprisonment of 188 months
1 In exchange for Chaney pleading guilty to these two counts, the Government agreed to dismiss the remaining counts
in the superseding indictment at the defendant’s sentencing hearing. See R. Docs. 71, 101.
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on June 27, 2023. R. Doc. 101, p. 2. The defendant then filed a direct appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing that he was improperly sentenced as a career
offender. United States v. Chaney, 120 F.4th 1300, 1302 (5th Cir. 2024), petition for cert. filed,
No. 24-6543 (U.S. Feb. 11, 2025). The Fifth Circuit dismissed Chaney’s appeal, finding that the
appellate waiver in his plea agreement was “both knowing and voluntary.” Id. at 1303-04.
On May 2, 2025, Chaney, proceeding pro se, filed the instant Motion for compassionate
release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). R. Doc. 118, p. 1. Chaney makes several arguments in
support of his Motion. Id. First, Chaney argues that, because the Sentencing Guidelines now allow
downward departures “due to the defendant’s youthfulness at the time of the offense or prior
offenses,” the Court should consider his youthfulness at the time he committed a prior offense that
“was used to give defendant a career offender status.”2 Id. at pp. 6-8. Second, Chaney contends
that his disadvantaged youth, considered alongside his behavior while incarcerated, supports a
sentence reduction. Id. at pp. 8-12. Third, Chaney claims that the disparity between the sentence
imposed and future sentencings after Amendment 829 to the Sentencing Guidelines in 2024
warrants relief. Id. at pp. 12-13. Lastly, Chaney argues that his mental health issues, as well as his
post-conviction rehabilitation efforts, support an early release, id. at pp. 13-16. Chaney also
attached a proposed release plan, highlighting his intent to seek drug and mental health treatment,
return to work with his previous employer, and seek the support of family members in New Orleans
if released. R. Doc. 118-1, p. 1.
2 Chaney was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine at the age of 22 on March 7, 2012. R. Doc.
118, p. 7.
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The Government has responded in opposition, asserting that the Motion should be denied
because (1) Chaney “provides no facts nor documentation showing that he has exhausted his
administrative remedies as required under [18 U.S.C. § 3582],” (2) he “has not sufficiently
identified a basis upon which he is eligible for compassionate release,” and (3) “the § 3553(a)
factors require a denial of Chaney’s motion for a sentence reduction.” R. Doc. 124, p. 1. Chaney
has filed a reply, contending, among other arguments, that the exhaustion requirement has been
satisfied because he allegedly submitted his original request to the warden “back in March 2025,
but [it] was ignored and non-processed by BOP staff who waited until September to notify [him]
and request for [him] to resubmit [his] application.” R. Doc. 126, pp. 1-2.
II. LAW & ANALYSIS
As a preliminary matter, a defendant may move the court for compassionate release after
either (a) fully exhausting his administrative rights or (b) upon the lapse of thirty days from a
request for relief to the warden of his facility, whichever occurs earlier. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A).3 Once the exhaustion requirement has been satisfied, the district court may, upon
3The compassionate release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First Step Act on December 21,
2018, provides in pertinent part:
(c) Modification of an Imposed Term of Imprisonment.—The court may not modify a term of
imprisonment once it has been imposed except that—
(1) in any case—
(A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant
after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of
Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such
a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of
imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions
that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering
the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that—
(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction . . .
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motion of the defendant, reduce a defendant’s term of imprisonment if it finds that extraordinary
and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction and, thereafter, a reduction would be in
conformity with the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1); Ward
v. United States, 11 F.4th 354, 359-60 (5th Cir. 2021). The analysis of extraordinary and
compelling reasons is informed by—and must be consistent with—applicable policy statements of
the Sentencing Commission. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The defendant has the burden of
proving he is entitled to a reduction. See Ward, 11 F.4th at 361 (citation omitted).
The exhaustion requirement mandates that a defendant seeking a reduction in sentence
must first either (a) “fully exhaust[] all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of
Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf” or (b) wait “30 days from the receipt of such
a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility” before filing a motion for compassionate
release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). As noted by the Government, the Fifth Circuit has
“clarified that the requirement that a defendant file a request with the Bureau of Prisons (‘BOP’)
before filing a motion in federal court is a mandatory, but non-jurisdictional, claim-processing
rule.” United States v. Sentimore, No. 04-382, 2020 WL 7630778, at *1 (E.D. La. Dec. 22, 2020)
(Lemmon, J.) (citing United States v. Franco, 973 F.3d 465, 468 (5th Cir. 2020)). Accordingly,
“[the requirement] is mandatory if properly raised, but may be waived or forfeited by an opposing
party.” Id. (citing Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, 139 S. Ct. 710, 714 (2019)). Furthermore, “[t]he
defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that he has exhausted administrative remedies.”
and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission . . ..
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United States v. Singleton, No. 14-168, 2022 WL 3576767, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 19, 2022) (Affrick,
J.).
In 	its 	opposition, 	the 	Government 	points 	out 	that 	Chaney 	has 	not 	attached 	any
documentation to support the assertion that he has exhausted his administrative appeal rights as
required by statute. R. Doc. 124, p. 3. While Chaney’s Motion states, “The defendant has exhausted
all administrative rights of appeal . . .,” this conclusory statement is supported by any further facts
or documentation. R. Doc. 118, p. 1. By noting this deficiency in its opposition, the Government
has properly raised the exhaustion requirement.
Chaney has attached multiple documents to his reply memorandum and contends that these
exhibits demonstrate exhaustion of administrative remedies. See R. Doc. 126-1, pp. 1-8. The first
set of documents is a series of transcripts demonstrating Chaney’s performance in undergraduate
classes while incarcerated. Id. pp. 2-3. It is unclear to the Court how such documents relate to
exhaustion of administrative remedies. The next is a series of emails sent and received by Chaney
in September 2025. Id. at p. 4-8. In early September 2025, Chaney sent an email to the warden of
his facility “inquiring [about] the status of [his] compassionate release,” and the warden’s response
stated that he had not received a compassionate release request from Chaney. Id. at p. 4. Chaney
claimed that he had submitted the request to “Ms. Jackson in Delta B around March/April 2025.”4
Id. at p. 5. The next email Chaney sent to the warden indicates that Ms. Jackson “informed
[Chaney] that she misplaced [his] compassionate release [request]” because Chaney was not on
4 In a later email to the warden, Chaney clarifies that he submitted this original request on March 19, 2025. Id at p. 7.
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her caseload, and she advised him to file it again. Id. at p. 7. Accordingly, Chaney alleges in this
email, he delivered the request to “Ms. Jemensin” by hand that same day, September 23, 2025. Id.
The final “Administrative Remedy Record” attached to Chaney’s reply is a copy of the warden’s
response to Chaney’s request, dated October 21, 2025. Id. at p. 7. The response states, in part,
This is in response to your inmate request to staff received September 24, 2025,
wherein you requested a compassionate release based on changes in law, your
history and characteristics, disparity in sentencing, mental health issues requiring
specialized care not being provided by the BOP, and rehabilitation. . . . Your request
has been evaluated consistent with this general guidance, and you currently do not
meet the criteria for compassionate release. After careful consideration, your
request is denied.
Id. The letter concludes by informing Chaney of his right to appeal the decision by submitting a
BP-9 form within 20 days of receiving the response. Id.
Based on the exhibits presented, Chaney has offered no proof that he submitted his request
to the warden any time before September 23, 2025, several months after filing the instant Motion
on May 2, 2025. BOP staff officially “received” the request on September 24, 2025, meaning that
the 30-day period started to run on that date and would have concluded on October 24, 2025. Fifth
Circuit precedent mandates that the exhaustion requirement must be satisfied before filing a motion
for compassionate release with the district court: “[T]here can be no doubt,” the Fifth Circuit wrote
after reviewing caselaw in Gonzales v. Seal, “that pre-filing exhaustion . . . is mandatory.” 702
F.3d 785, 788 (5th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). See also Franco, 973 F.3d at 468 (“[A]ll requests
for compassionate release must be presented to the Bureau of Prisons before they are litigated in
the federal courts.”) (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit reviewed a decision with similar facts to
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the issue presently before the Court in United States v. Garrett, 15 F.4th 335 (5th Cir. 2021). There,
the district court denied a defendant’s motion for compassionate release because his request to the
BOP was not received until two weeks after he had filed his motion. Id. at 338. Even though the
BOP received the request before the court ruled on the motion, the Fifth Circuit noted that “the
district court was correct that, when his motion was filed . . . [the defendant] had failed to satisfy
the exhaustion requirement.” Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Court held that the district
court’s denial of the motion was proper, making clear that a defendant is “required ‘to properly
exhaust . . . before filing’ the motion.” Id. at 339-40 (citing Gonzalez, 702 F.3d at 788) (emphasis
in original). Whereas the defendant in Garrett filed his motion two weeks before the BOP received
his request, in this case, Chaney filed his motion four months before the BOP received his request.
Accordingly, Chaney has filed his motion prematurely. As noted by the Government in its
opposition, “Leniency in construing Chaney’s pro se motion, as required by precedent, still does
not get Chaney past this ‘mandatory, but non-jurisdictional, claim-processing rule.’” R. Doc. 124,
p. 3 (citing Sentimore, 2020 WL 7630778, at *1).
Based on his failure to exhaust administrative remedies alone, the Court is required to deny
Chaney’s motion for compassionate release. Because exhaustion is a threshold requirement for
compassionate release, the Court does not consider whether Chaney has shown extraordinary and
compelling reasons or whether the sentencing factors favor compassionate release. Chaney may
re-file a motion for compassionate release after satisfaction of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s
exhaustion requirement with respect to each of the grounds raised in his motion.
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Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the defendant’s Motion for Compassionate Release is DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 21st day of January 2026.
GREG GERARD GUIDRY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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