BW Fleet Management PTE LTD et al v. Tug Justice et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
BW FLEET MANAGEMENT PTE
LTD ET AL.
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 23-2492
C/W: 23-2867
TUG JUSTICE ET AL. 	SECTION: “J”(4)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 41) filed by
Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff Kirby Inland Marine, LP. Plaintiffs, BW Fleet
Management Pte Ltd, Hafnia Pools Pte Ltd, and BW Aldrich Pte Ltd (hereinafter
collectively “Hafnia Interests” or “Plaintiffs”), opposed the motion (Rec. Doc. 44), and
Defendant Kirby Inland Marine, LP filed a reply memorandum (Rec. Doc. 45). Having
considered the motion and legal memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the
Court finds that genuine disputes as to material facts exist, and therefore, the motion
for summary judgment should be DENIED.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This litigation arises out of a fueling (“bunkering”) operation between the
parties that resulted in an oil spill in the Mississippi River. Plaintiffs in this matter
are BW Fleet Management Pte Ltd, the operator/manager of the vessel that was
receiving the fuel, the M/T HAFNIA RHINE; Hafnia Pools Pte Ltd, the bareboat
charterer of the M/T HAFNIA RHINE; and BW Aldrich Pte Ltd, the owner of the M/T
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HAFNIA RHINE. Defendant Kirby Inland Marine, LP (“Kirby”) is the owner and
operator of the tugboat JUSTICE and the bunker barge PBL 3010 that was supplying
the fuel to the M/T HAFNIA RHINE on July 28, 2022, when the fuel overflowed and
spilled into the river.
Prior to the bunkering operation, the parties entered into a pre-bunkering
agreement whereby they determined the amount of very low sulfur fuel oil (“VLSFO”)
to be transferred—700 metric tons—and the rate at which the transfer would take
place throughout the process. Defendant Kirby concedes that the tankerman aboard
the bunker barge transferred more fuel than the parties had agreed to, but Kirby also
alleges that this breach of the pre-bunkering agreement did not proximately cause
the overflow of the receiving vessel’s starboard fuel oil tank (“FOT(S)”). Instead, Kirby
claims that the M/T HAFNIA RHINE’s crew acted with extraordinary negligence
such that the crew’s conduct was the “superseding and sole proximate cause” of the
overflow and subsequent oil spill. (Rec. Doc. 41-1, at 20).
In July of 2023, Plaintiffs, the Hafnia Interests, brought the instant action
against Kirby Inland Marine, LP in personam, and against the JUSTICE and the
PBL 	3010 	in 	rem, 	for 	“damages, 	clean-up 	costs, 	expenses, 	claims, 	and
reimbursements” associated with the fuel spill. (Rec. Doc. 1, at 1). Plaintiffs asserted
a claim for negligence and unseaworthiness under general maritime law, and they
also brought a claim under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Defendant Kirby filed a
counterclaim against the Hafnia Interests alleging that the M/T HAFNIA RHINE’s
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crew’s negligence was the proximate cause of the fuel spill and seeking contribution
and indemnity for the damages it sustained.1
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075
(5th Cir. 1994). When evaluating whether a dispute as to any material fact exists, a
court considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility
determinations or weighing the evidence.” Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide
Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). The
moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the
burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing
out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an essential element
of the nonmoving party’s claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. When the moving party
meets this burden, the non-moving party “must go beyond the pleadings and
designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Little, 37 F.3d
1 Additionally, American River Transportation Company, LLC filed a complaint against Kirby and
M/T HAFNIA RHINE, in rem, for damages it sustained due to the fuel spill. The case was
consolidated with the instant suit, although since that time, American River Transportation reached
a settlement with Kirby and M/T HAFNIA RHINE and dismissed all claims against these parties.
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at 1075 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor
of 	the 	nonmoving 	party, 	but 	a 	party 	cannot 	defeat 	summary 	judgment 	with
“conclusory allegations” or “unsubstantiated assertions.” Id. (citations omitted). To
grant a motion for summary judgment, a court ultimately must be satisfied that “a
reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Delta, 530 F.3d
at 399 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
DISCUSSION
The 	parties 	in 	this 	case 	agree 	that 	general 	maritime 	law 	governs 	the
negligence claim because the alleged tort “occurred on navigable waters and bears a
‘significant relationship to a traditional maritime activity.’” (Rec. Doc. 41-1, at 16
(quoting Creppel v. Shell Oil Co., 738 F.2d 699, 701 (5th Cir. 1984)). The Fifth Circuit
has explained that the “elements of a maritime negligence cause of action are
essentially the same as land-based negligence under the common law.” Withhart v.
Otto Candies, L.L.C., 431 F.3d 840, 842 (5th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). This means
that a plaintiff must establish the following: (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a
duty; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) the plaintiff suffered an injury; and
(4) the defendant’s breach caused the plaintiff’s injury. In re Great Lakes Dredge &
Dock Co., LLC, 624 F.3d 201, 211 (5th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Here, the parties’
dispute turns on the issue of proximate cause.
The Hafnia Interests and Kirby entered into a pre-bunkering agreement
whereby they determined that Kirby would transfer 700 metric tons (“MT”) of VLSFO
to the M/T HAFNIA RHINE. Further, the agreement specified that the tankerman
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would begin the transfer at a flow rate of 150 m 3/hour, increase to a maximum flow
rate of 400 m 3/hour, slow to a 150 m 3/hour rate when the amount of fuel delivered got
close to the nominated amount of 700 MT, and complete the transfer with a flow rate
of 100m 3/hour. Based on this agreement, Kirby had the duty to deliver the correct
amount of VLSFO and to abide by the agreed-upon flow rates during the transfer.
Additionally, the Person in Charge (“PIC”) on the receiving vessel, who was the Chief
Engineer, clearly had a duty to ensure that the FOT(S) was prepared for the transfer,
meaning primarily that there was enough space in the tank to hold the nominated
amount of fuel, and to monitor the transfer from the receiving vessel’s end. Therefore,
as a matter of law, both parties had duties to act prudently and to comply with the
agreement between them, in addition to following their respective company’s policies
regarding fuel transfer, which is governed by regulations that the United States
Coast Guard (“USCG”) promulgates and enforces.
Next, the parties do not dispute that there was a breach of the duty, and in
fact, in their briefs, both Plaintiffs and Defendant refer to multiple breaches of the
duties which resulted in the overflow of the tank and the fuel spill into the Mississippi
River. As mentioned above, the dispute centers on the proximate, or legal, cause of
the spill. Kirby concedes that the tankerman conducting the transfer aboard the
bunker barge transferred 102.79 MT more VLSFO than the Hafnia Interests had
agreed to, for a total of 802.79 MT. However, Kirby also relies on the superseding
cause doctrine to claim that the “extraordinary negligence” of the receiving vessel’s
crew was the proximate cause of the overflow and spill.
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In U.S. v. Reliable Transfer Co., the Supreme Court held that the comparative
fault principle applies to property damages in admiralty cases. 421 U.S. 397, 411
(1975). Later, in Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., the Court clarified this holding and
explained that damages should be apportioned “based upon comparative fault only
among tortfeasors whose actions were proximate causes of an injury.” 517 U.S. 830,
837 (1996). Further, the Court concluded that comparative fault and the superseding
cause doctrine were not mutually exclusive. Id. The superseding cause doctrine acts
to limit a defendant’s liability, even “where the defendant’s negligence in fact
substantially contributed to the plaintiff’s injury,” when “the injury was actually
brought about by a later cause of independent origin that was not foreseeable.” Id.
(quoting Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 5-3 (2d ed. 1994)).
Here, Kirby acknowledges that it was negligent in transferring more VLSFO
than the parties had agreed to, but Kirby also claims that the receiving vessel crew’s
“extraordinary negligence . . . was the superseding and sole proximate cause of the
oil spill into the Mississippi River.” (Rec. Doc. 41-1, at 20). In its brief, Kirby explains
that even with the excess fuel it transferred to the M/T HAFNIA RHINE, the
starboard fuel oil tank should not have overflowed. The 802.79 MT of VLSFO that
Kirby transferred corresponds to approximately 864.21 m 3 of VLSFO by volume, and
Kirby alleges that “[i]t is undisputed that 864.21 m 3 is less than the 100% capacity
(879.6 m 3) of the FOT(S) tank.” Id. at 12. More significantly, Kirby alleges that the
Chief Engineer on the M/T HAFNIA RHINE, who was the designated PIC, and the
Fourth Engineer, who assisted in monitoring the fuel transfer, violated both Coast
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Guard regulations and internal company policies when they “completely cease[d] all
monitoring of [the] FOT(S) tank.” Id. at 19.
Kirby 	claims 	that 	Plaintiffs 	were 	“statutorily 	required 	to 	monitor 	the
bunkering operation” and that company policy required the Chief Engineer and the
Fourth Engineer to call an emergency stop of the transfer (or to request a reduction
in flow rate) when the final ullage2 was reached. Id. In sum, Kirby claims that the
Chief Engineer/PIC and the Fourth Engineer stopped monitoring the fuel tank on the
receiving vessel and failed to notice that the tank’s capacity had been reached. Next,
because of this negligence, the PIC and Fourth Engineer failed to initiate an
emergency stop of the bunkering operations, and this conduct, according to Kirby,
was “the later cause of independent origin that was not foreseeable.” Kirby urges the
Court to apply the superseding cause doctrine and to find that the M/T HAFNIA
RHINE crew’s negligence, and not its own, was the proximate cause of the oil spill.
Conversely, Plaintiffs argue that Kirby was at least contributorily negligent in
causing the fuel spill. According to Plaintiffs, the receiving vessel’s crew did not have
a duty to direct Kirby’s tankerman when to stop the transfer. To support this
assertion, Plaintiffs reveal that two fuel transfers took place on the day in question.
First, Kirby delivered 270 MT of marine gasoil (“LSMGO”). According to Plaintiffs,
the Kirby tankerman completed this transfer without incident and without any
instruction from the M/T HAFNIA RHINE’S crew. This fact, they say, undercuts
Kirby’s argument that the receiving vessel’s crew was obligated to call an emergency
2 “Ullage” refers to the remaining empty space in the fuel tank.
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stop to the later VLSFO transfer. Furthermore, Plaintiffs claim that any negligence
on the crew’s part could not be a superseding cause to relieve Kirby of liability. First,
Plaintiffs argue that the negligence Kirby attributes to the Chief Engineer and the
Fourth Engineer was not a “later” cause because it occurred simultaneously with the
tankerman’s over-transfer of VLSFO. Further, Plaintiffs contend that any negligence
on the part of the vessel’s crew cannot constitute a superseding cause because it was
also foreseeable.
The Court concludes that determining proximate cause in this case requires
resolution of factual issues, and because there are genuine disputes concerning these
material facts, the Court finds that summary judgment is not appropriate.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff Kirby
Inland Marine, LP’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 41) is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 11th day of February, 2026.
____________________________________
CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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