Cook v. Hudson et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DWAYNE ANTHONY COOK 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 24-2916
CHRISTOPHER HUDSON AND
INGRAM INDUSTRIES, INC.
SECTION “R”
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a summary judgment motion by defendants
Christopher 	Hudson 	and 	Ingram 	Industries, 	Inc. 	(Ingram). 1 	Plaintiff
Dwayne Anthony Cook opposes the motion. 2 For the following reasons, the
Court grants the motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The record establishes that the undisputed facts are as follows. 	On
August 31, 2024, Hudson was backing out of a private driveway driving a
vehicle for Ingram in the scope of his employment. 3 Cook was driving down
the street, and Hudson’s vehicle contacted Cook’s vehicle.4 	Cook sued
1 	R. Doc. 24.
2 	R. Doc. 42.
3 	R. Doc. 1-1, at 1.
4 	Id.
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Hudson and Ingram for injuries allegedly arising from the collision in state
court. The defendants removed to this Court on December 19, 2024. 5
Defendants deposed plaintiff in May 2025. 6 Plaintiff submitted neither
an expert report under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B), nor summary disclosures
of the opinions of his treating physicians under 26(a)(2)(C) before the expert
report deadline of October 17, 2025.
Defendants now move for summary judgment. The defendants allege
that Cook cannot bear the burden of proving that the car collision was a
cause-in-fact of Cook’s injuries. 7
The Court considers the motion below.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 	The Court considers the evidence in
the 	record 	without 	making 	credibility 	determinations 	or 	weighing 	the
evidence. Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins., 530 F.3d
395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of
5 	Id.
6 	R. Doc. 26-2, at 1.
7 	R. Doc. 24-1, at 4.
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the nonmoving party. 	Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216
(5th Cir. 1985). If the record could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for
the nonmoving party, there is no genuine dispute of material fact. EEOC v.
Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2014).
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear
the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by
pointing out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an
essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim. 	See Celotex, 477 U.S. at
325. 	The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by
submitting or referring to material admissible in evidence or capable of being
made admissible, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists.
See id. at 324; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (c)(2)(B). The nonmovant may not
rest upon the pleadings but must identify specific facts that establish a
genuine issue for resolution. See, e.g., id.
III. 	DISCUSSION
Plaintiff sued defendants for negligence. 	To establish an action for
negligence under Louisiana law, Cook must prove five elements by a
preponderance of the evidence: 1) the defendant had a duty to conform
conduct to a specific standard; 2) the defendant’s conduct failed to conform
to that standard; 3) the defendant’s conduct was a cause-in-fact of the injury;
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4) the defendant’s conduct was a legal cause of the injury; and 5) proof of
damages. 	Campbell v. Orient-Express Hotels Louisiana, Inc., 403 So. 3d
573, 580 (La. 2025).
As plaintiff must prove all five elements, the failure of any one element
legally entitles defendants to summary judgment. Here, defendants contest
that the car crash was a cause-in-fact of Cook’s injuries. 8 	Defendants
contend that plaintiff has not and cannot point to any competent summary
judgment material that the car crash was the cause-in-fact of Cook’s
injuries. 9
The causation element is one on which Cook would bear the burden of
proof at trial. 	Thus, defendants satisfied their burden by pointing out that
the material in the record on causation is insufficient. See Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 325; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). The burden shifts to Cook, who must, by
submitting or referring to material admissible as evidence or capable of being
made admissible, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists as
to causation. 	See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; see also Stelly v. Dep’t of Pub.
Safety & Corr. 149 F.4th 516, 521 (5th Cir. 2025) (“The non-movant cannot
satisfy this burden merely by denying the allegations in the opponent’s
8 	R. Doc. 24-1, at 1.
9 	Id.
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pleadings but can do so by tendering depositions, affidavits, and other
competent evidence to buttress its claim.”) (quoting 	Lindsey v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 16 F.3d 616, 618 (5th Cir. 1994)).
Cook has not borne his burden. 	Cook’s opposition to the motion for
summary judgment neither submits nor points to any material in the record
on the issue of causation. 10 Cook has not tendered depositions, affidavits, or
any other material to buttress his causation claim. 	See Stelly, 149 F.4th at
521. 	Instead, Cook has rested on the pleadings while arguing about the
meaning of medical records not in the record before the Court. This does not
establish a genuine issue of material fact as to causation. 	See, e.g., Celotex,
477 U.S. at 324; Stelly, 49 F.4th at 521. Further, Cook has not moved for the
Court to defer consideration of the motion on the ground that Cook cannot
yet present facts essential to justify its opposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)(1),
(2).
Cook argues that to grant a motion for summary judgment here is an
inappropriate 	discovery 	sanction 	for 	plaintiff’s 	failure 	to 	make 	expert
disclosures. 11 	The lack of expert disclosures is not the basis for the Court’s
order. 	Instead, the Court looks to Cook’s failure to submit or point to
10 	R. Doc. 42.
11 	R. Doc. 42, at 4.
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material capable of being made admissible on the issue of causation and the
lack of any such material in the record.
Because Cook has not established a genuine issue of material fact as to
causation, Cook cannot bear the burden on an essential element of his claim.
Thus, defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of December, 2025.
_____________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
9th
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