Craige v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
KRISTIAN R. CRAIGE 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO: 24-2954
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC 	SECTION: “H”
D/B/A MR. COOPER
ORDER AND REASONS
As a threshold matter, the Court is duty-bound to examine whether it
has 	subject 	matter 	jurisdiction 	over 	each 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	claims.1 	For 	the
following reasons, the Court reserves ruling on Plaintiff’s pending Motions
until Plaintiff remedies the jurisdictional defects identified in this Order.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Kristian Craige, brings this pro se action arising out of a
dispute regarding the seizure and sale of the property at 1800 Newton Street,
New Orleans, Louisiana. Plaintiff’s deceased mother, Loyce Vincent Craige,
executed a promissory note and mortgage encumbering said property in favor
of American General Finance, Inc. American General Finance, Inc. later
assigned its rights in the mortgage to Springleaf Home Equity, Inc., and
Defendant, Nationstar Mortgage became the servicer of the loan. After Loyce
1 Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 565 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Union Planters Bank Nat’l
Ass’n v. Salih, 369 F.3d 457, 460 (5th Cir. 2004)).
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Vincent Craige passed away, a dispute arose regarding payments on the loan,
and Springleaf filed a foreclosure action in the Civil District Court for the
Parish of Orleans under Case Number 2017-901. In that action, the state court
authorized the seizure and sale of the mortgaged property despite appearances
by Plaintiff’s brothers and alleged co-heirs, Todd Craige and Vincent Craige,
seeking injunctive relief. Todd and Vincent Craige then moved to annul the
sheriff’s sale, but ultimately moved to dismiss same; accordingly, the state
court dismissed their motion with prejudice.
A few days later, Plaintiff made his first appearance in the foreclosure
action, seeking to annul the sheriff’s sale. The state court dismissed his filings
without prejudice and granted him thirty days to amend. Plaintiff did not
amend, but he moved to vacate the dismissal and have the judge recused. After
a hearing, the state court dismissed his motion without prejudice. No state
appeal was filed by Plaintiff or his brothers. Plaintiff filed the instant action
more than four years after the state court’s final judgment.
LEGAL STANDARD
The proponent of federal court jurisdiction—in this case, Plaintiff—bears
the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.2 In determining subject
matter jurisdiction, the court may rely on (1) the complaint alone, presuming
the allegations to be true, (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts,
or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts and by the court’s
resolution of disputed facts.3
2 See Physicians Hosps. of Am. v. Sebelius, 691 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 2012).
3 Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 424 (5th Cir. 2001).
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LAW AND ANALYSIS
The Court now examines subject matter jurisdiction.4 Plaintiff invokes
the Court’s federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.5 Plaintiff’s
Complaint alleges violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution, violations of Article 1, section 2 of the Louisiana
Constitution, “deceptive and fraudulent mortgage loan servicing practices,”
and claims under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), the
Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), and the Consumer Financial Protection Act
(“CFPA”). 	Each 	of 	these 	allegations 	arise 	out 	of 	state 	court 	judgments
authorizing the seizure and sale of Plaintiff’s family home and declining to
annul the sale. In its Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
Defendant argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine forms a jurisdictional bar
to Plaintiff’s claims involving the state court foreclosure action.6 Plaintiff’s
reply does not address subject matter jurisdiction.7
In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,8 the Supreme Court held that federal
district 	courts 	lack 	appellate 	authority 	to 	reverse 	or 	modify 	state 	court
decisions, even if erroneous.9 Six years later, in District of Columbia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman,10 the Supreme Court stated that federal courts cannot
review state court judicial decisions and cannot address claims “inextricably
4 The Court emphasizes that it has an independent duty to examine subject matter
jurisdiction and that it must do so—even when not raised by motion. Here, Defendant
curiously raises defects in the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction in its Opposition to
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment instead of filing a motion to dismiss.
5 While Plaintiff only cites § 1331, the Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s jurisdictional
allegations to invoke the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, as
Plaintiff alleges a Louisiana state constitutional violation.
6 Doc. 19 at 8–10.
7 Doc. 22.
8 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
9 See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284–85 (2005).
10 D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
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intertwined” 	with 	the 	state 	court 	decisions.11 	Today, 	“‘the Rooker–
Feldman doctrine holds that inferior federal courts do not have the power to
modify 	or 	reverse 	state 	court 	judgments’ 	except 	when 	authorized 	by
Congress.”12
In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., the Supreme
Court addressed the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and emphasized that it occupies
“narrow ground.”13 The Supreme Court held that the doctrine only applies to:
(1) cases brought by state court losers, (2) complaining of injuries caused by
state court judgments, (3) rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced, 	and (4) inviting 	district 	court 	review and 	rejection of 	those
judgments.14 The two hallmarks of the Rooker-Feldman inquiry are thus: (1)
“what the federal court is being asked to review and reject,” and (2) “the source
of the federal plaintiff’s alleged injury.”15 If the federal court is being asked to
review a decision from a state court judicial proceeding, and the state court
judgment is the source of the injury, then the Rooker-Feldman doctrine denies
the federal court of subject matter jurisdiction.16
In his Complaint, Plaintiff plainly asks the Court to “annul and vacate
the fraudulent sheriff sale.”17 To provide Plaintiff with this relief, the Court
would have to review the state court’s judgments and enter its own judgment
altering the state court’s decision to permit the sale.18 Here, the source of
11 See Exxon, 544 U.S. at 285–86.
12 Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 382 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Union Planters
Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Salih, 369 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 2004)).
13 Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284.
14 Id.
15 Truong, 717 F.3d at 382.
16 See id. at 382–83.
17 Doc. 1 at 17.
18 See, e.g. United States v. Shepherd, 23 F.3d 923, 945 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Cano v.
Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., No. 12-2328, at *4–5, 2013 WL 3930087 (E.D. La. July, 29,
2013).
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Plaintiff’s alleged injury is apparent—the state court foreclosure judgment.19
Accordingly, 	the 	Rooker-Feldman 	doctrine 	prevents 	the 	Court 	from
entertaining Plaintiff’s claims that seek to reverse the state court judgment.
However, “the Supreme Court has cautioned that in light of the ‘narrow
ground’ 	Rooker-Feldman 	occupies, 	it 	does 	not 	prohibit 	a 	plaintiff 	from
‘presenting some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion
that a state court has reached in a case to which he was a party.’”20 With this
in mind, the Court turns to Plaintiff’s other requests for relief—compensatory
and punitive damages, a declaratory judgment, and an injunction prohibiting
future like conduct—to determine if he has any independent claims.
While 	Plaintiff 	cites 	several 	legal 	bases 	which 	could—if 	pleaded—
present independent claims under different circumstances, including fraud,
RESPA, TILA, and CFPA, his requests for damages and declaratory relief do
not correspond to or arise from any independent claim.21 As to Plaintiff’s claims
for damages, Plaintiff attempts to remedy the financial and emotional fallout
from the state proceedings, instead of some other source of injury.22 Likewise,
19 See Morris v. American Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 443 F. App’x. 22, 24 (5th Cir. 2011)
(citing Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284).
20 Id. at 382 (quoting Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284, 293) (citation modified).
21 In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that: Defendant infringed on his constitutional rights by
effecting an unlawful seizure of property; Defendant initiated the state court proceedings
based on its prior fraudulent actions; Defendant’s “deceptive and fraudulent practices . . .
directly led to the theft and loss of Plaintiff’s family property”; Defendant’s fraud caused
financial and emotional distress “as a result of Defendant’s actions that resulted in the
unlawful loss of his family property”; Plaintiff and his family has suffered financial and
emotional damages “when Nationstar initiated the theft of [his] family property . . . and
caused it to be sold without due process”; Defendant violated RESPA, TILA, and CFPA by
failing to accept and credit payments on the mortgage and such fraud led to the seizure of
the property; and “due to the unlawful foreclosure, [Plaintiff and his family] have been
severely and exponentially damaged.” Doc. 1 at 6–16.
22 But cf. Cano v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. Co., No. CIV.A. 12-2328, 2013 WL 3930087, at *5
(E.D. La. July 29, 2013) (finding that the plaintiff’s damages claims were not barred by
Rooker-Feldman where they were “based primarily on affirmative relief sought for
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all requests for declaratory relief stem from the state court’s judgments.23 To
afford Plaintiff the relief he seeks would require the Court to review the state
court’s 	judgment.24 	“Moreover, 	success 	on 	[his] 	claims 	would 	essentially
overturn the state court judgment, including . . . possible awards for equitable
relief. The complained of injuries/harm arise from that judgment, and not
primarily 	from 	the 	alleged 	conduct 	of 	[Defendant].”25 	Thus, 	as 	pleaded,
Plaintiff’s 	claims 	for 	damages 	and 	declaratory 	relief 	are 	“inextricably
intertwined” with the state court judgment. Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction for these claims.
Regarding Plaintiff’s request for “[a]n injunction prohibiting Defendant
from further unlawful practices,” the Court lacks clarity regarding which
“unlawful practices” Plaintiff seeks to enjoin and the legal basis for such an
injunction. Thus, the Court cannot ascertain whether this requested relief
arises primarily out of an independent claim or the foreclosure proceedings. As
the 	Court 	cannot 	determine 	with 	certainty 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	request 	for
injunctive relief prohibiting future unlawful practices is not barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Plaintiff has not met his burden to establish the
Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
A court must dismiss claims “for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when
the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.”26
However, 28 U.S.C. § 1653 provides that “[d]efective allegations of jurisdiction
violations of the FDCPA, RESPA, and the LUTPA” instead of a state court foreclosure
action).
23 Plaintiff asks the Court to “[d]eclare Nationstar’s involvement in the foreclosure
proceedings unlawful and void.” Doc. 1 at 17.
24 Boudreaux v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., No. CV 18-5649, 2019 WL 4752067, at *3 (E.D.
La. Sept. 27, 2019); see Salinas v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n, 585 Fed. Appx. 866, 866–867 (5th
Cir. 2014).
25 Id. (citing Truong, 717 F.3d at 383; Hughes v. Countrywide Home Loans, No. CV 16-17623,
2017 WL 2573958, at *2 (E.D. La. June 14, 2017)).
26 Home Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998).
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may be amended, upon terms, in the trial or appellate courts.” A district court’s
decision to permit amendment under § 1653 turns on the nature of the
jurisdictional defect.27 Where “jurisdictional problems are of the ‘technical’ or
‘formal’ 	variety, 	they 	fall 	squarely 	within 	the 	ambit 	of 	§ 	1653.”28 Thus,
amendment should be allowed where “diversity jurisdiction was not questioned
by the parties and there is no suggestion in the record that it does not in fact
exist.”29 Here, despite Plaintiff’s inartful pleading, the Court sees a potential
independent claim for damages under 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f). Further, the Court
notes the possible availability of a claim seeking injunctive relief enjoining
Defendant’s “unlawful practices.” Accordingly, the Court will grant Plaintiff
leave to amend his Complaint to the extent he is able to allege facts supporting
a claim for damages under 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f). Further, Plaintiff shall amend
his complaint to identify, with particularity, the “unlawful practices” he seeks
to enjoin and the legal basis for such relief. In permitting an amendment, the
Court expressly does not opine on the merits of either claim.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his Complaint
within 30 days of this Order, to address the jurisdictional deficiencies described
herein. If Plaintiff fails to adequately amend his Complaint within 30 days, this
matter will be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
27 Id. at 888.
28 Id.
29 Stafford v. Mobil Oil Corp., 945 F.2d 803, 806 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Leigh v. Nat’l
Aeronautics & Space Admin., 860 F.2d 652, 653 (5th Cir. 1988)).
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New Orleans, Louisiana this 30th day of December, 2025.
_________________________________
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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