Mount v. Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center, et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DELORA MOUNT 	CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 25-1377
LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY
HEALTH SCIENCES CENTER
THROUGH THE BOARD OF
SUPERVISORS OF LOUISIANA
STATE UNIVERSITY AND
AGRICULTURAL AND
MECHANICAL COLLEGE, AND
LOUISIANA CHILDREN’S MEDICAL
CENTER (D/B/A CHILDREN’S
HOSPITAL NEW
ORLEANS/MANNING FAMILY
CHILDREN’S)
SECTION “R” (4)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are the partial motions to dismiss plaintiff Dr. Delora
Mount’s 	amended 	complaint 	of 	defendants 	Louisiana 	State 	University
Health Sciences Center, through the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State
University 	and 	Agricultural 	and 	Mechanical 	College 	(“LSUHSC”), 	and
Louisiana Children’s Medical Center, doing business as Children’s Hospital
New Orleans/Manning Family Children’s (“LCMC”). 1 Specifically, LSUHSC
moves to dismiss Dr. Mount’s Title VII retaliation claim and LCMC moves to
1 	R. Docs. 25, 26.
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dismiss Dr. Mount’s Title VII retaliation claim and her claim for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 2 	Plaintiff Dr. Delora
Mount opposes the motions. 3 For the following reasons, the Court denies the
motions.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Dr. Delora Mount sued LSUHSC and LCMC for alleged discriminatory
actions 	and 	contractual 	wrongs 	during 	her 	brief 	employment 	and
subsequent termination by defendants. 	Dr. Mount alleges that, in 2021,
LCMC 	recruited 	her 	to 	work 	at 	Children’s 	Hospital 	New 	Orleans
(“Children’s”), serving as Section Chief of Pediatric Surgery at Children’s and
as 	a 	surgeon 	with 	faculty 	duties 	at 	LSUHSC.4 	She 	alleges 	that 	her
employment was routed through LSUHSC, but that LCMC Health, through
Children’s Hospital, had an oral agreement with Dr. Mount to work as a
physician at Children’s Hospital. 5 	She additionally alleges that LCMC
recruited her, communicated with her regarding her hiring, paid for her
recruitment, negotiated and paid her signing bonus, and was the primary
2 	See R. Docs. 25, 26.
3 	R. Doc. 29.
4 	R. Doc. 24 at ¶ 2.
5 	Id. at ¶¶ 36-58.
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decision-maker in her hiring. 6 	She further alleges that LCMC controlled
many aspects of her day-to-day job, including the number of clinics per week,
appointment times, call schedule, administrative meeting schedule, and
billing.7 She alleges that LCMC provided her office space. 8 She alleges that
her direct day-to-day supervision was Surgeon-in-Chief Dr. Arjmand, and
Business 	Administrator 	Michelle 	Botello, 	and 	that 	these 	individuals
expressed that they were independently her “boss.” 9 She additionally alleges
that 	LCMC 	Health 	had 	the 	ability 	to 	make 	decisions 	on 	doctor
compensation. 10 She further alleges that LSUHSC provided no office space,
administrative support, nursing support, or day-to-day oversight of her job. 11
Dr. Mount states that she began this job in June 2022. 12 	A year later,
in the summer of 2023, she alleges that she injured her hand and wrist
during a fall caused by an underlying spinal condition. 13 She further alleges
that the wrist injury required surgery, and that the spinal condition required
surgery and medical leave. 14 	She alleges that defendants were aware of her
6 	Id.
7 	Id. at ¶ 55.
8 	Id.
9 	Id.
10 	Id.
11 	Id. at ¶ 56.
12 	Id. at ¶ 59.
13 	Id. at ¶¶ 78-79.
14 	Id. at ¶¶ 80-81.
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medical condition throughout the summer of 2023. 15 She further alleges that
in November of 2023, they were aware that she would need spinal surgery
and medical leave, and that she provided formal notice of this need on
December 1, 2023. 16 	She alleges that defendants approved her for Family
and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) leave on January 5, 2024, so she could
undergo surgery. 17 	On January 8, 2024, she allegedly received a “dismissal
letter” during a meeting with LSUHSC employees, providing July 9, 2024 as
her last day. 18 	The letter allegedly stated “you are hereby given notice that
your appointment will not be renewed.” 19 Nonetheless, Dr. Mount states that
she updated defendants regarding her medical clearance in March 2024,
informing them that she could return to work in April of that year. 20 	She
alleges that defendants informed her via email that she was being placed on
administrative leave with no return to work before the July 9 contract end
date. 21 She further alleges that the rationale defendants provided for this was
that they “wanted to give [her] enough recovery time.” 22
15 	Id. at ¶ 85.
16 	Id. at ¶¶ 85, 90.
17 	Id. at ¶ 91.
18 	Id. at ¶¶ 94-96.
19 	Id. at ¶ 96.
20 	Id. at ¶ 114.
21 	Id. at ¶ 115.
22 	Id. at ¶ 117.
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Plaintiff additionally alleges that a key aspect of her recruitment was
defendants’ desire for Dr. Mount to mentor Dr. Masoumy, a surgeon who
had recently completed his clinical fellowship. 23 	Dr. Mount alleges that
despite this, she was paid less than he was paid. 24 	She additionally alleges
that defendants promoted him over her, despite her qualification for and
expressed interest in the position. 25
Dr. Mount also alleges that before being dismissed and placed on
administrative leave, she reported and opposed discrimination on the basis
of sex. 26 Specifically, she alleges that during a July 2023 performance review
of a subordinate, she reported the subordinate’s disparaging comments
regarding a physician’s assistant’s (“PA”) taking maternity leave and that the
subordinate declined to allow the PA additional time off for the maternity
leave.27 	Specifically, she alleges that the subordinate stated “oh well, we’ll
see about [the PA] returning … if she returns” and rolled her eyes.28 She also
alleges that she wrote to Sonia Carter, the Director of Ambulatory and Social
Services regarding the performance review on July 17, 2023. 29 	She alleges
23 	Id. at ¶ 4.
24 	Id. at ¶¶ 5, 175-181.
25 	Id. at ¶¶ 69-77.
26 	Id. at ¶¶ 152-192.
27 	Id. at ¶¶ 158-161.
28 	Id. at ¶ 161.
29 	Id. at ¶¶ 158-159.
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that she informed Carter that the review was “unfortunately not positive
reviews” and she offered to provide Carter “more granular examples or
additional comments.” 30
She additionally alleges that in November 2023 she reported another
surgeon’s experience with sexism/harassment from a male senior orthopedic
surgery colleague.31 Mount alleges that the conduct included inappropriately
demeaning, angry behavior in the operating room, and subsequent angry,
unprofessional text messages. 32 	Dr. Mount alleges that she perceived this
treatment to be gender-specific based on how that colleague treated male
colleagues. 33 	She alleges that she reported this conduct to Dr. David Yu,
Surgeon in Chief, including in a November 17, 2023 meeting with Dr. Yu and
Dr. Tony Gonzales, Service Line Chief of Orthopedic Surgery. 34 	Dr. Yu
allegedly reacted with “again?” and informed Mount that the colleague was
well-known for this misbehavior and that it had previously happened. 35 She
was allegedly told that this colleague, a senior surgeon, had undergone a PIP
and received a “talking to” after identical past behavior. 36 She further alleges
30 	Id. at ¶ 159.
31 	Id. at ¶¶ 163.
32 	Id. at ¶ 164.
33 	Id. at ¶ 165.
34 	Id. at ¶ 167.
35 	Id. at ¶ 168.
36 	Id.
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that she was told that the matter had been dropped and the surgeon was
allowed to remain in good standing. 37 She alleges that Dr. Yu told her to “just
let it go.” 38 Dr. Mount alleges that she did not “let it go.” Instead, she alleges
that she made a formal report of the matter and directed the surgeon who
had allegedly experienced the sexism/harassment to make a BE SAFE report
for the record. 39 In addition to Drs. Yu and Gonzales, Dr. Mount alleges that
other senior leaders including Dr. Mark Kline, Senior Vice-President, Chief
Medical Officer and Physician-in-Chief at Children’s were aware of Dr.
Mount’s reporting of the incidents. 40 	Plaintiff alleges that defendants
retaliated against her for these actions, beginning with giving her the cold
shoulder and culminating in her placement on administrative leave and
termination. 41
On July 3, 2025, plaintiff filed this suit against LCMC and LSUHSC. 42
Defendants then moved to dismiss a selection of plaintiff’s claims. 43 Plaintiff
withdrew multiple claims, 44 and the Court dismissed two of her claims
37 	Id.
38 	Id.
39 	Id. at ¶ 169.
40 	Id. at ¶ 170.
41 	Id. at ¶ 155.
42 	R. Doc. 1.
43 	R. Docs. 8, 11.
44 	See R. Doc. 13.
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without prejudice to plaintiff’s filing an amended complaint: her claim for
violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against LCMC
and her Title VII retaliation claim against both defendants. 45 Plaintiff timely
filed an amended complaint. 46 Defendants once again move for the dismissal
of those two claims. 47 Plaintiff opposes the motions. 48
The Court considers the parties’ arguments below.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead
enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 547 (2007)), and “that, if true, ‘raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.’” 	Franklin v. Regions Bank, 976 F.3d 443, 447 (5th Cir.
2020) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 	A claim is facially plausible
“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true
45 	R. Doc. 19.
46 	R. Doc. 24.
47 	R. Docs. 25, 26.
48 	R. Doc. 29.
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and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. 	Lormand
v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 239, 244 (5th Cir. 2009). But the Court
is 	not 	bound 	to 	accept 	as 	true 	legal 	conclusions 	couched 	as 	factual
allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Retaliation Under Title VII
Title VII makes it unlawful to discriminate against an employee who
has opposed an employment practice made unlawful by Title VII. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a). 	To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, plaintiff must
show that: “(1) [she] engaged in conduct protected by Title VII; (2) [she]
suffered a materially adverse action; and (3) a causal connection exists
between the protected activity and the adverse action.” 	Hudson v. Lincare,
Inc., 58 F.4th 222, 231 (5th Cir. 2023). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, a plaintiff need not establish a prima facie case of retaliation, but
she “must plead sufficient facts on all of the ultimate elements to make her
case plausible.” 	Jenkins v. La. Workforce Comm’n, 713 F. App’x 242, 244
(5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Chhim v. Univ. of Texas, 836 F.3d 467, 470 (5th Cir.
2016) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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An employee has engaged in protected activity if she has either “(1)
‘opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice’ by Title VII
[the 	opposition 	clause] 	or 	(2) 	‘made 	a 	charge, 	testified, 	assisted, 	or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing’ under
Title VII [the participation clause].” 	Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300,
304 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). 	The opposition clause
does not require that the complained-of employment practice be unlawful as
long as the employee “demonstrate[s] that she had at least a ‘reasonable
belief’ that the practices she opposed were unlawful.” Id. (quoting Payne v.
McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1140 (5th Cir. 1981)).
Thus, internally complaining about an employment practice may constitute
protected activity, as long as the complainant “reasonably believed the
employment practice to be unlawful.” 	EEOC v. Rite Way Serv., Inc., 819
F.3d 235, 240 (5th Cir. 2016) (finding that “[t]he statute, case law, and
interest 	in 	uniformity 	and 	ease 	of 	application 	support 	applying 	the
“reasonable belief” standard to retaliation cases involving both proactive and
reactive opposition”).
As discussed in this Court’s previous order, plaintiff has sufficiently
alleged that she engaged in protected activity and that she suffered an
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adverse employment action. 49 	Regarding the first element, plaintiff alleges
that in July 2023, she reported derogatory comments regarding a colleague’s
taking maternity leave.50 	She alleges that on July 17, 2023, she wrote to
Sonia Carter, the Director of Ambulatory and Social Services regarding the
“not positive” report, and offered to provide Carter more examples and
comments regarding the report. 51 As detailed above, she additionally alleges
that she reported another surgeon’s experience with sexism/harassment
from a senior male surgery colleague to multiple senior leaders, including
the Surgeon in Chief Dr. Yu during a November 17, 2023 meeting with Drs.
Yu and Gonzales. 52 	During that meeting she alleges she was informed that
the colleague was known for such misbehavior, had undergone a PIP and
talking to in the past but that the matter had been dropped and he was
allowed to remain in good standing. 53 She alleges that she was told by Dr. Yu
that she should just “let it go.” 54 She alleges that she instead made a formal
report of the matter and directed the surgeon who had allegedly experienced
the sexism/harassment to make a BE SAFE report for the record. 55 	These
49 	See R. Doc. 19.
50 	R. Doc. 24 at ¶¶ 158-161.
51 	Id.
52 	Id. at ¶¶ 163-68.
53 	Id.
54 	Id.
55 	Id. at ¶ 169.
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assertions sufficiently allege that plaintiff engaged in protected activity by
reporting sexually discriminatory and harassing behavior and saw that
follow-up actions were taken. 	See, e.g., Foster v. Solvay Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 160 F. App’x 385, 388 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that an employee
engaged in protected activity when the employee reported sex discrimination
to human resources); Dixon v. Moore Wallace, Inc., 236 F. App’s 936, 937
(5th 	Cir. 	2007) 	(holding 	that 	sending 	a 	letter 	to 	human 	resources
complaining of racial discrimination was protected activity).
Defendants argue that plaintiff has not demonstrated that she held an
objectively reasonable belief that the conduct she opposed was unlawful
under Title VII. But plaintiff alleges that she saw that the treatment that the
colleague subjected male and female colleagues to was different. 	This is
more than merely “perceiving” gender-based differences as defendants
argue. Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient.
As to the second element, plaintiff’s allegations include that she was
ultimately terminated, and that she was placed on leave. 56 These allegations
satisfy the second element. 	See Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
White, 548 U.S. 53, 62 (2006) (termination is an “adverse employment
action” under Title VII); Yates v. Spring Indep. Sch. Dist., 115 F.4th 414, 420
56 	Id. at ¶ 152.
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(5th Cir. 2024) (placement on administrative leave can constitute an adverse
employment action).
Finally, to sufficiently plead a causal link between her conduct and the
alleged retaliation, plaintiff must allege facts that plausibly suggest that “the
employment 	decision 	and 	[her] 	protected 	activity 	were 	not 	wholly
unrelated.” Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., 238 F.3d 674, 684 (5th Cir. 2001)
(cleaned up). Temporal proximity is one way to plausibly show the link, but
not the only way. See Paul v. Elayn Hunt Corr. Ctr., 666 F. App’x 342, 348
(5th 	Cir. 	2016). 	Moreover, 	to 	establish 	a 	causal 	link, 	plaintiff 	must
“demonstrate that the decision maker had knowledge of the protected
activity.” Tureaud v. Grambling State Univ., 294 F. App’x 909, 914 (5th Cir.
2008) (citing Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 512 (5th Cir. 1999)).
In her amended complaint, plaintiff sufficiently connects the adverse
actions to the protected activity. 	Plaintiff alleges that she directly reported
the 	conduct 	to 	senior 	members 	of 	LSUHSC 	and 	Children’s 	Hospital,
including Drs. Yu and Gonzalez, and Sonia Carter.57 She additionally alleges
that that other senior leaders including Dr. Mark Kline, Senior Vice-
President, Chief Medical Officer and Physician-in-Chief at Children’s, were
57 	R. Doc. 24 at ¶¶ 158-159, 167.
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aware of Dr. Mount’s reporting of the incidents of concern. 58 	She further
alleges that Dr. Yu responded with “again?” and told her to drop it, indicating
that senior leadership was already well aware of the behavior. 59 	Plaintiff’s
complaint plausibly “demonstrate[s] that the decision maker had knowledge
of the protected activity.” Id.
Additionally, 	the 	events 	alleged 	are 	sufficiently 	close 	in 	time 	to
plausibly allege a causal link by timing alone. At a minimum, she alleges that
she reported sexually discriminatory conduct on November 17, 2023, and
that she was told she would be terminated in January 2024, only two-months
after the November report. 	These actions are sufficiently close in time to
allege a causal link. 	See Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 969 F.3d 571,
578 (5th Cir. 2020) (noting that the Fifth Circuit has previously held that a
period of two-and-a-half months, a period of two months, and a period of
six-and-a-half weeks between the protected act and adverse employment
action “are close enough to show a causal connection” in holding that such
events “must be very close in time to establish causation by timing alone”).
58 	Id. at ¶ 170.
59 	Id. at ¶ 168.
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Because plaintiff has plausibly alleged each element of a Title VII
retaliation claim, the Court denies defendants’ motions to dismiss as to this
claim.
B. Breach 	of 	Implied 	Covenant 	of 	Good 	Faith 	and 	Fair
Dealing
Under 	Louisiana 	law, 	good 	faith 	performance 	is 	considered 	an
“implied requirement of every contract.” 	Grisaffi v. Dillard Dep’t Stores,
Inc., 43 F.3d 982, 983 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing La. Civ. Code art. 1983). This
necessarily requires there be a contract between the parties. Here, plaintiff
alleges an oral contract between her and LCMC. Nonetheless, LCMC argues
that plaintiff’s amended complaint contains only a “conclusory allegation”
that there was an oral contract between LCMC and Dr. Mount.
Plaintiff’s allegations are more than conclusory. 	While the amended
complaint does allege that “LCMC Health, through CHNOLA, had an oral
agreement with Plaintiff to work as a physician at the Children’s Hospital in
exchange for pay,” the amended complaint does not stop there. 60 	Plaintiff
additionally alleges that LCMC recruited her, negotiated her signing bonus,
was a principal decision maker in her hiring, provided her office space, and
controlled many aspects of her day-to-day job, including the number of
60 	R. Doc. 24 at ¶ 41.
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clinics per week, appointment times, call schedule, administrative meeting
schedule, and billing. 61 She further alleges that LSUHSC provided no office
space, administrative support, nursing support, or day-to-day oversight of
her job. 62 Plaintiff even included an image of a check written out to her from
Children’s Hospital which she alleges constituted a signing bonus. 	Taken
together, these facts adequately support the allegation that LCMC and Dr.
Mount had an 	oral contract. 	Dr. 	Mount has not merely provided a
“threadbare 	recital” 	of 	the 	elements 	of 	the 	claim 	as 	LCMC 	argues.
Accordingly, as the Court finds that plaintiff has adequately alleged an
enforceable contract, plaintiff’s claim stands.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES defendants’ motions to
dismiss.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of March, 2026.
_____________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
61 	Id. at ¶¶ 36-58.
62 	Id. at ¶ 56.
16th
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