Doe v. Choice Hotels International, Inc. et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure by defendants Choice Hotels International, Inc. and Choice Hotels International
Services Corp. (together, “Choice”).1 	Plaintiff Jane Doe (P.T.L.) (“Plaintiff”) responds in
opposition,2 and Choice replies in further support of its motion.3 Having considered the parties’
memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court issues this Order & Reasons granting
the motion in part and denying it in part.
I. 	BACKGROUND
This case concerns claims arising under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization
Act (“TVPRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). Plaintiff alleges that, from January 2013 to December 2014,
she was trafficked for sex at a Sleep Inn located in Kenner, Louisiana (the “Kenner Sleep Inn”).4
Choice is the franchisor of the “Sleep Inn” brand.5 The Kenner Sleep Inn was owned and operated
by defendant TAMS of Kenner, Inc. d/b/a Sleep Inn (“TAMS”), as a franchisee of the Sleep Inn
brand.6 	Plaintiff alleges that Choice and TAMS “derived financial benefit from facilitating sex
1 R. Doc. 50.
2 R. Doc. 69.
3 R. Doc. 73.
4 R. Doc. 1 at 3, 7.
5 Id. at 4.
6 Id. at 4-5.
JANE DOE (P.T.L.), an individual
VERSUS
CHOICE HOTELS
INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al.
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 25-1812
SECTION M (3)
Case 2:25-cv-01812-BWA-DPC Document 77 Filed 11/25/25 Page 1 of 19

2
trafficking by providing a venue where traffickers could exploit victims, including [her], with
minimal risk of detection or interruption,” and “continued providing support for traffickers,
including her own trafficker, despite obvious and apparent signs of sex trafficking at these hotels,”
specifically at the Kenner Sleep Inn, meaning that defendants “knowingly receiv[ed] a benefit from
participating in a venture that [they] knew or should have known was engaged in sex trafficking.”7
In her complaint, Plaintiff outlines the general prevalence of sex trafficking in the hotel
industry and states that, as hotel proprietors, Choice and TAMS “were aware or should have been
aware of” the signs of sex trafficking and “knew or should have known” that it was occurring at
the Kenner Sleep Inn.8 She claims that defendants “had a responsibility to adopt, implement, and
adequately enforce policies to avoid facilitating sex trafficking and train hotel staff to identify and
respond to ‘red flags’ of sex trafficking” and to avoid benefiting from room rentals for commercial
sex acts.9 Plaintiff then chronicles reported incidents of “widespread” sex trafficking at “Choice
hotels’ branded properties.”10 None of the cited news reports or online reviews are specific to the
Kenner Sleep Inn.11 	Plaintiff claims that, due to these reports that Choice allegedly monitored,
Choice “knew, or should have known,” that its properties, including the Kenner Sleep Inn, were
being used for sex trafficking and that “[t]he common use of Choice … branded hotels for sex
trafficking 	became 	a 	nationwide 	problem 	that 	stemmed 	from 	decisions 	made 	at 	the
corporate/franchisor level.”12 The complaint further alleges that Choice “chose to earn revenue by
continuing conduct that [it] knew or should have known would facilitate [sex] trafficking.”13
7 Id. at 3.
8 Id. at 8-13 (quotes at 11).
9 Id. at 11, 13 (quote at 13).
10 Id. at 13-22 (quote at 13).
11 Id.
12 Id. at 14, 21.
13 Id. at 22.
Case 2:25-cv-01812-BWA-DPC Document 77 Filed 11/25/25 Page 2 of 19

3
As to the Kenner Sleep Inn, Plaintiff alleges that Choice and TAMS “knew or should have
known about the pervasive sex trafficking at the [property] based on obvious indicators of this
activity.”14 She cites a 2014 Yelp review in which the customers stated that they chose the hotel
because they “were looking to stay in an affordable room that wasn’t frequented by hookers.”15
The rest of the review mentioned positives related to price, free Wi-Fi, cleanliness, and free airport
shuttle, along with negatives related to flat pillows, a slick tub, light pollution, and lobby and
interstate traffic noise.16 Plaintiff asserts that sex traffickers selected the Kenner Sleep Inn because
it had “policies and practices that created a favorable environment for trafficking and because hotel
staff turned a blind eye to signs of trafficking [or] well-known ‘red flags’ for sex trafficking in the
hospitality industry.”17 	Without referencing any specific instances besides her own, Plaintiff
claims that there were “multiple trafficking victims” at the Kenner Sleep Inn during the relevant
time and that Choice “learned or should have learned about the obvious signs of widespread
trafficking” at that hotel through surveillance of the property, internal investigations, customer
complaints, monitoring customer feedback, information from law enforcement, and the obligation
of hotel staff and management to report suspected sex trafficking to Choice.18
Plaintiff lists “obvious signs” of her own trafficking, including: (a) rooms paid for with
cash or prepaid card; (b) “other girls” being trafficked at the same time; (c) extended stays during
which housekeeping was kept away with the “Do Not Disturb” sign; (d) housekeeping being
prevented from performing regular cleaning, towel exchanges, or other standard room services;
(e) the trafficker’s presence with Plaintiff at check-in and his lingering around the hotel or parking
14 Id. at 22.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 22-23.
17 Id. at 23.
18 Id. at 24-25.
Case 2:25-cv-01812-BWA-DPC Document 77 Filed 11/25/25 Page 3 of 19

4
lot when Plaintiff was with a “john”; (f) heavy foot traffic to Plaintiff’s room involving men who
were not hotel guests; (g) Plaintiff being “forced to see” nearly every day at least five “johns” who
came and went at unusual hours but were on the property for only brief periods; and (h) “[o]ther
obvious signs of trafficking consistent with the modus operandi of her traffickers and which
included well known ‘red flags’ for trafficking in a hotel.”19 	Plaintiff says that employees and
managers of the Kenner Sleep Inn were aware of these signs of trafficking, and as a result, Choice
knew or should have known that she was being trafficked at the hotel because it had a policy
requiring that hotel staff report such activity.20 	Plaintiff alleges that, even with this actual or
constructive knowledge, TAMS and Choice continued to profit by renting rooms to sex traffickers,
thus facilitating her victimization.21 She faults TAMS for failing to adopt adequate hiring, training,
supervising, managing, and disciplinary policies for its employees and proper notice-and-reporting
policies for suspected sex trafficking, which omissions encouraged sex traffickers, who could
freely operate at the property.22 Plaintiff further imputes TAMS’s alleged failings to Choice as the
franchisor, which, she claims, exercised significant control over the day-to-day operation and
management of the Kenner Sleep Inn, including renting rooms, training staff, and setting policies
regarding the response to human trafficking.23 	According to Plaintiff, Choice “had a direct
business relationship with traffickers operating at the [Kenner] Sleep Inn because [it] directly
rented rooms at the hotels, directly received payment, and received real-time guest information,”
along with “developing brand loyalty [by] creat[ing] a favorable environment for trafficking.”24
19 Id. at 26.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 27-34.
22 Id. at 27-28.
23 Id. at 28-39.
24 Id. at 30-31.
Case 2:25-cv-01812-BWA-DPC Document 77 Filed 11/25/25 Page 4 of 19

5
Plaintiff filed this action in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland,
Southern Division, on December 30, 2024.25 Against TAMS, she asserts TVPRA perpetrator and
beneficiary liability claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a).26 	Against Choice, Plaintiff brings a
TVPRA beneficiary liability claim and a claim for vicarious liability for TAMS’s alleged actions.27
The case was transferred to this Court because the federal court in Maryland lacked personal
jurisdiction over TAMS.28 Choice now moves to dismiss.
II. 	PENDING MOTION
A. Choice’s Motion to Dismiss
Choice argues that Plaintiff’s TVPRA beneficiary claim and vicarious liability claim
against Choice are insufficiently pleaded under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
because Plaintiff does not provide any details of her alleged trafficking, including her identity, that
of her alleged traffickers, or any potential witnesses with respect to her allegations.29 Choice urges
the Court to consider its exemplar franchise agreement, which, says Choice, is central to Plaintiff’s
claims, “contains all of the key terms relevant to the instant case,” and has been found by other
courts to contradict the very same allegations made here.30
Choice argues that Plaintiff did not plead a viable TVPRA beneficiary claim against Choice
because Plaintiff failed to “plead a cognizable venture, much less Choice’s affirmative and
knowing participation in any venture that involved [her] alleged trafficking.”31 	Reciting the
elements of a TVPRA beneficiary claim articulated by the Eleventh Circuit in Doe #1 v. Red Roof
Inns, Inc., 21 F.4th 714, 719, 723 (11th Cir. 2021), Choice contends that alleging “participation in
25 Id. at 1.
26 Id. at 39-40.
27 Id. at 40-41.
28 R. Doc. 42.
29 R. Doc. 50-1 at 8-9.
30 Id. at 10-12 (quote at 11) (citing R. Doc. 7-3).
31 Id. at 9-10, 13-28 (quote at 9-10).
Case 2:25-cv-01812-BWA-DPC Document 77 Filed 11/25/25 Page 5 of 19

6
a venture” requires more than a statement that the defendant failed to observe or prevent the
plaintiff’s alleged trafficking, or trafficking in general, and also requires more involvement than a
buyer-seller transaction at the franchisor level, especially in light of the terms of the exemplar
franchise agreement which places responsibility for the day-to-day operations and control of the
hotel on the franchisee.32 Choice contends that, as a franchisor, it had no direct interaction with
Plaintiff’s alleged trafficker and, thus, could not have participated in a venture with him. 33 In other
words, Choice maintains that Plaintiff’s claim of “participation in a venture” collapses into the
following “deficient allegations: that traffickers purportedly rented rooms from [TAMS], and
Choice tangentially benefitted from those rentals by receiving royalties from [TAMS] under the
terms of the contractual [f]ranchise [a]greement.”34 Further, says Choice, allegations that it failed
to prevent sex trafficking across its franchised hotels are insufficient to allege participation in a
venture with any individual sex trafficker.35 Additionally, Choice contends that Plaintiff did not
properly allege a commercial venture because she did not allege that Choice harbored her or
knowingly assisted her traffickers.36
Choice also asserts that, under Doe #1, “the knowledge elements require victim-specific
knowledge,” rendering insufficient Plaintiff’s allegations regarding its knowledge of, or willful
blindness to, sex trafficking in general.37 	According to Choice, Plaintiff attempts to show
knowledge by improperly relying on news reports and customer reviews that purport to show that
Choice knew, in general, that sex trafficking occurred at its branded hotels. 38 	And she fails to
32 Id. at 13-19.
33 Id. at 13, 19-20.
34 Id. at 18-19.
35 Id. at 15-17.
36 Id. at 20-24.
37 Id. at 13, 24-27 (quote at 13).
38 Id. at 24-25.
Case 2:25-cv-01812-BWA-DPC Document 77 Filed 11/25/25 Page 6 of 19

7
allege that Choice knew or should have known about her trafficking in particular.39 Choice further
argues that Plaintiff’s allegations of “red flags” are insufficient because they could indicate
prostitution, rather than sex trafficking, and Choice could not have observed the “red flags” from
its distant corporate headquarters.40 Moreover, Choice says that Plaintiff’s allegations of Choice’s
knowledge based on “information and belief” are contradicted by the terms of the exemplar
franchise agreement, which places the ownership and operation of the hotel with the franchisee –
here, TAMS. 41
As to Plaintiff’s vicarious liability claim, Choice argues that the TVPRA does not
explicitly recognize such a claim and the Supreme Court “has cautioned against reading forms of
‘secondary liability’ into federal statutes.”42 	Next, Choice contends that Plaintiff’s vicarious
liability claim against it fails because she has not asserted a viable TVPRA claim against TAMS.43
Choice further argues that vicarious liability requires agency, which is not established by the mere
existence of a franchise agreement, especially where, as here, the exemplar franchise agreement
disclaims any agency on Choice’s part and assigns the day-to-day management of the hotel to
TAMS. 44 Choice characterizes Plaintiff’s agency allegations as references to “nothing more than
irrelevant policies [designed to protect the brand and so] wholly unrelated to trafficking … much
less any trafficking experienced personally by Plaintiff.”45
Lastly, Choice argues that all of Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred under the TVPRA’s 10-
year statute of limitations.46 Choice points out that Plaintiff claims to have been trafficked at the
39 Id. at 24-25.
40 Id. at 25-27.
41 Id. at 26-27.
42 Id. at 29 (citing Cent. Bank of Denv., N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denv., N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 177, 184
(1994)). 43 Id.
44 Id. at 10, 30-31.
45 Id. at 31.
46 Id. at 10, 31-32.
Case 2:25-cv-01812-BWA-DPC Document 77 Filed 11/25/25 Page 7 of 19

8
Kenner Sleep Inn between January 2013 and December 2014, but she did not file her complaint
until December 30, 2024.47 	Thus, says Choice, “only two possible alleged dates fall within the
ten-year statute of limitations: December 30th and 31st .” 48 Choice concludes that, given the tight
window and because she does not plead that she was present at the Kenner Sleep Inn on either of
those two days, “it strains both credulity and the limits of plausibility that Plaintiff has any viable
claim left.”49
B. Plaintiff’s Opposition
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the Court should not consider the exemplar franchise
agreement because it was not attached to her complaint and is not central to her claim.50 	She
argues that “central” in this context means that the claim is necessarily based on the proffered
evidence, not just that the evidence is relevant to the claim.51 	Further, Plaintiff argues that the
exemplar franchise agreement is not the entire agreement between Choice and TAMS and cannot
be read in insolation without considering other documents and regulations that govern the franchise
relationship.52
Plaintiff contends that she pleaded a valid TVPRA beneficiary claim against Choice by
alleging that Choice “negligently facilitated trafficking by renting hotel rooms to traffickers
despite obvious signs of their trafficking activity and/or operating a hotel in ways it knew or should
have known would facilitate trafficking at its hotels.”53 Plaintiff argues that Choice advocates for
“a narrow, atextual view of beneficiary liability” by “insist[ing] that a franchisor cannot be liable
47 Id. at 32.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 R. Doc. 69 at 4-7.
51 Id. at 5-6.
52 Id. at 6-7.
53 Id. at 7-8 (quote at 8).
Case 2:25-cv-01812-BWA-DPC Document 77 Filed 11/25/25 Page 8 of 19

9
even if it knew or should have known it was profiting from facilitating trafficking at its hotels.”54
Plaintiff says that the majority of courts to consider the issue have held that the TVPRA requires
only that the hotel negligently failed to take reasonable steps to respond to a known sex-trafficking
problem in its operations, not that the hotel share the trafficker’s purpose, commit specific acts in
furtherance of trafficking, or have actual knowledge of a specific plaintiff’s victimization.55 Citing
A.B. v. Wyndham Hotel & Resorts, Inc., 2025 WL 1920417, at *3 (M.D. Pa. July 11, 2025),
Plaintiff argues that stating a TVPRA beneficiary claim against a franchisor requires alleging that
the defendant: “(1) knowingly benefitted; (2) from participating in a venture; (3) that it knew or
should have known was engaged in sex trafficking.”56 	According to Plaintiff, the “knowingly
benefitted” prong requires only that the defendant received a financial benefit from renting a room
to a trafficker.57 	Similarly, Plaintiff asserts that the “participating in a venture” prong requires
only that the franchisor facilitate the venture by engaging in a continuous business relationship
with a trafficker by renting him a room, even if it had no knowledge of the trafficking.58 In other
words, Plaintiff says that a TVPRA beneficiary claim requires simply that the defendant “provid[e]
commercial services that facilitate sex trafficking.”59 	Plaintiff claims that the TVPRA does not
require an in-person relationship between the defendant and the trafficker and she alleges that
Choice, as the franchisor, participated in renting rooms to sex traffickers at the Kenner Sleep Inn
when it should have known that sex trafficking was occurring at that hotel due to the manner in
which the hotel was operated.60 	Further, Plaintiff argues that the mens rea element must be
interpreted broadly and her complaint allows for “reasonable inferences” that Choice had sufficient
54 Id. at 9.
55 Id. at 9-12.
56 Id. at 12.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 12-17.
59 Id. at 15.
60 Id. at 13-17.
Case 2:25-cv-01812-BWA-DPC Document 77 Filed 11/25/25 Page 9 of 19

10
control over the Kenner Sleep Inn such that it should have known of the sex trafficking, especially
given that “TAMS was required to report suspected trafficking to Choice and that the obvious red
flags triggered that obligation.”61 Plaintiff contends that there is no requirement that Choice knew
or should have known of her specific trafficking, just sex trafficking at the Kenner Sleep Inn
generally, and that Choice should have acted reasonably to detect and deter sex trafficking in its
operations.62
As to her vicarious liability claim, Plaintiff asserts that she pleaded such a claim and that
courts apply ordinary agency principles to TVPRA claims.63 	Plaintiff argues that she plausibly
alleges a TVPRA claim against TAMS, as well as an agency relationship between Choice and
TAMS due to Choice’s control over TAMS’s operations, all as would support a TVPRA vicarious
liability claim against Choice.64
Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the Court should not consider Choice’s statute-of-limitations
argument because her complaint plausibly alleges that at least part of her claim occurred during
the limitations period.65 	She also asserts, without explanation, that the continuing violation
doctrine, equitable tolling, and the discovery rule all apply to forestall any time bar.66
C. Choice’s Reply
Choice replies, reurging the Court to consider the exemplar franchise agreement, which it
says is central to Plaintiff’s claims and directly contradicts them.67 Choice points out that, without
a franchise agreement, it has no relationship with TAMS. 68 Choice also argues that Plaintiff has
61 Id. at 17-20 (quote at 18).
62 Id. at 19-21.
63 Id. at 21.
64 Id. at 22-25.
65 Id. at 25-26.
66 Id. at 26.
67 R. Doc. 73 at 6-8, 12-13.
68 Id. at 7-8.
Case 2:25-cv-01812-BWA-DPC Document 77 Filed 11/25/25 Page 10 of 19

11
not pleaded a TVPRA beneficiary claim against it because she has not alleged that Choice, located
in Maryland, directly participated in her alleged trafficking in Louisiana, and Choice insists that
facilitation by room rental, which is a standard commercial transaction, is insufficient.69 Further,
Choice reasserts its arguments that Plaintiff has not pleaded a plausible vicarious liability claim
against Choice and emphasizes that the exemplar franchise agreement makes clear that it did not
have control over room rentals at the Kenner Sleep Inn.70 	Finally, Choice argues that, even if
Plaintiff’s entire claim does not fall outside the statute of limitations, “numerous courts have
curtailed the temporal scope of TVPRA claims based on the untimeliness” of part of the claim.71
Choice also contends that the continuing violation doctrine, which has its roots in employment
law, has never been adopted in the TVPRA context in the Fifth Circuit and, regardless, Plaintiff
has not met her burden of demonstrating that it applies.72
III. 	LAW & ANALYSIS
A. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a complaint to contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule
8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The statement of the claim must
“‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A pleading does
not comply with Rule 8 if it offers “labels and conclusions,” “a formulaic recitation of the elements
69 Id. at 8-11.
70 Id. at 13-15.
71 Id. at 15.
72 Id.
Case 2:25-cv-01812-BWA-DPC Document 77 Filed 11/25/25 Page 11 of 19

12
of a cause of action,” or “‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (alteration omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to move to dismiss
for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 	“To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). 	A claim is plausible on the face of the complaint “when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Plausibility does not equate
to probability, but rather “it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” 	Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 	“Where a complaint pleads facts that are
‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of “entitlement to relief.”’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Thus, if the facts
pleaded in the complaint “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘shown’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’” Id. at 679 (alteration omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court employs
the two-pronged approach utilized in Twombly. 	The court “can choose to begin by identifying
pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions [unsupported by factual allegations],
are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. However, “[w]hen there are
well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “‘[The] task, then, is to determine whether
the plaintiff has stated a legally cognizable claim that is plausible, not to evaluate the plaintiff’s
Case 2:25-cv-01812-BWA-DPC Document 77 Filed 11/25/25 Page 12 of 19

13
likelihood of success.’” Body by Cook, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 869 F.3d 381, 385 (5th
Cir. 2017) (quoting Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist., 675 F.3d 849, 854 (5th Cir.
2012)).
A court’s review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “is limited to the complaint, any
documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that
are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” 	Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v.
Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000)). 	A court may also take judicial notice of certain
matters, including public records and government websites. Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540
F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008); see also Kitty Hawk Aircargo, Inc. v. Chao, 418 F.3d 453, 457 (5th
Cir. 2005). 	Thus, in weighing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, district courts primarily look to the
allegations found in the complaint, but courts may also consider “documents incorporated into the
complaint by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of public
record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint
whose authenticity is unquestioned.” 	Meyers v. Textron, Inc., 540 F. App’x 408, 409 (5th Cir.
2013) (citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)).
B. Plaintiff’s TVPRA Beneficiary Claim against Choice
The TVPRA provides a civil remedy to sex-trafficking victims against the “perpetrator” or
“whoever knowingly benefits, or attempts or conspires to benefit, financially or by receiving
anything of value from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known
has engaged in” sex trafficking. 	18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). 	Because Choice is not alleged to be a
“perpetrator,” Plaintiff’s TVPRA claim against Choice is a beneficiary claim, i.e., one brought
against a party that allegedly “knowingly benefited” from sex trafficking. K.H. v. Riti, Inc., 2024
Case 2:25-cv-01812-BWA-DPC Document 77 Filed 11/25/25 Page 13 of 19

14
WL 505063, at *2 (11th Cir. Feb. 9, 2024). To state a civil beneficiary claim under the TVPRA,
“a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the defendant (1) knowingly benefited (2) from taking part
in a common undertaking or enterprise involving risk and potential profit, (3) that undertaking or
enterprise violated the TVPRA as to the plaintiff, and (4) that the defendant had constructive or
actual knowledge that the undertaking or enterprise violated the TVPRA as to the plaintiff.” Doe
#1, 21 F.4th at 719.
Here, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that Choice participated in a venture with the sex
trafficker. In other words, she fails to allege that Choice participated with the sex trafficker in a
common undertaking or enterprise involving risk and potential profit. Plaintiff alleges that Choice
received a financial benefit from her sex trafficker’s room rentals and from collecting real-time
guest information.73 These allegations alone are insufficient to establish that Choice participated
in a sex-trafficking venture. She alleges that some unknown employees saw the “red flags” of sex
trafficking, but she in no way alleges that Choice, TAMS, or any of their employees actively
participated in the sex-trafficking venture. As noted by the Eleventh Circuit, “observing something
is not the same as participating in it.” Id. at 727. In short, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged the
“participation in a venture” element. 	Compare id. at 726-27 (holding that franchisors did not
participate in a venture with sex traffickers where they received rent for rooms, investigated hotels,
took remedial action when revenue was down, read online reviews mentioning prostitution
occurring generally at the hotels, and controlled the training of hotel managers and employees who
were allegedly involved in facilitating sex trafficking at the hotels by acting as police lookouts),
and Riti, 2024 WL 505063, at *2 (following Doe #1 and holding that franchisee did not participate
in a venture with sex trafficker where it received rent from rooms and merely observed the signs
73 R. Doc. 1 at 30.
Case 2:25-cv-01812-BWA-DPC Document 77 Filed 11/25/25 Page 14 of 19

15
of sex trafficking), and N.G. v. G6 Hosp. Prop. LLC, 2025 WL 1332210 (M.D. Fla. May 7, 2025)
(holding that a hotel’s alleged receipt of a financial benefit was insufficient alone to plead
participation in a venture even when the plaintiff alleged that a male front-desk employee partook
in the sex-trafficking activity), and Doe (A.S.) v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, 2024 WL 6069251,
at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 10, 2024) (holding that “[a]llegations that amount to contentions that a hotel
financially benefitted from renting hotel rooms to plaintiff’s trafficker and that the hotel should
have also observed signs of sex trafficking fail to state a viable [TVPRA beneficiary] claim”), with
I.R. v. I Shri Khodiyar, LLC, 723 F. Supp. 3d 1327 (N.D. Ga. 2024) (denying summary judgment
where there was evidence that the hotel owner’s managerial employee solicited sex from the
plaintiff and other women in exchange for free lodging; traffickers chose hotel because they knew
people there and the owners had allowed trafficking; manager and part-owner saw the plaintiff
chained to bedframe in a trafficker’s room; and managerial employees would visit the rooms of
plaintiff and other women when they were with “johns” to see if they needed anything), and Riccio
v. McLean, 853 F.3d 553 (1st Cir. 2017) (holding that motel owner participated in a venture with
sex trafficker where they had prior criminal dealings and expressed a wish to reinstate the criminal
venture for profit “by exchanging high-fives in the motel’s parking lot while speaking about
‘getting this thing going again,’ in circumstances in which [the sex trafficker]’s coercive and
abusive treatment of [the plaintiff] as a sex slave had become apparent to [the motel owner]”). On
the continuum created by the foregoing cases, Plaintiff’s allegations fall far closer to the cases
holding that the “participation in a venture” element was not sufficiently alleged than those holding
that it was.
Additionally, Plaintiff did not plausibly allege that Choice had constructive or actual
knowledge that the undertaking or enterprise violated the TVPRA as to her. Plaintiff alleges that
Case 2:25-cv-01812-BWA-DPC Document 77 Filed 11/25/25 Page 15 of 19

16
Choice generally knew about sex trafficking in the hotel industry and some of its branded hotels.74
She also alleges that given such general knowledge, combined with the cited 2014 Yelp review
that alludes to prostitution (but does not mention sex trafficking) at the Kenner Sleep Inn and
Choice’s alleged monitoring of the hotel, Choice should have known about the sex trafficking at
the Kenner Sleep Inn.75 	These allegations are too general to sufficiently plead the knowledge
element. 	See, e.g., Doe (K.B.) v. G6 Hosp., LLC, 2023 WL 8650785, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 14,
2023) (holding that allegations of a franchisor’s awareness of online reviews discussing trafficking
at the hotel and regular inspections were insufficient to plead the knowledge requirement).
Moreover, allegations that impute constructive knowledge to Choice on the premise that it would
have detected sex trafficking at the Kenner Sleep Inn if it had exercised diligence in training staff
and implementing and enforcing policies for reporting and responding to sex trafficking are
insufficient because “the TVPRA does not impose an affirmative duty to prevent sex trafficking.”76
Doe (K.B.) v. G6 Hosp., LLC, 2024 WL 4701891, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 5, 2024) (collecting cases).
In sum, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to sufficiently allege the “participation in a venture” and
knowledge elements of a TVPRA beneficiary claim, and her TVPRA beneficiary claim against
Choice is therefore dismissed without prejudice.
74 Id. at 13-22.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 31-34.
Case 2:25-cv-01812-BWA-DPC Document 77 Filed 11/25/25 Page 16 of 19

17
C. Plaintiff’s Vicarious Liability Claim against Choice
Choice contends that Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to support a claim that it had an
agency relationship with TAMS. 77 Neither party undertakes a choice-of-law analysis.78 Therefore,
as other district courts have done, this Court will apply federal common law on agency, which
looks to the Restatement of Agency. See Doe (L.M.) v. 42 Hotel Raleigh, LLC, 2024 WL 4204906,
at *8 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 16, 2024) (collecting cases). 	An agency relationship “is the fiduciary
relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an
‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and
the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD ) OF AGENCY §
1.01. Whether an agency relationship exists is generally a question of fact. Stripling v. Jordan
Prod. Co., 234 F.3d 863, 870 (5th Cir. 2000).
In TVPRA cases, courts have recognized that a plaintiff sufficiently states a vicarious
liability claim against a hotel franchisor by alleging that the franchisor exercised control over the
franchisee’s day-to-day operations of the hotel by being involved in “hosting online bookings,
setting 	hotel 	employee 	wages, 	making 	employment 	decisions 	for 	the 	hotels, 	providing
standardized training methods for hotel employees, and fixing hotel room rent prices.” J.M. v.
Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 2022 WL 10626493, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2022) (collecting cases).
On the other hand, “allegations ‘tending to show that the franchisors’ involvement was limited to
77 R. Doc. 50-1 at 29-31. Choice also argues that the TVPRA does not recognize a vicarious liability claim.
Id. at 29. Choice does not cite, and this Court is unaware of, any case holding that the TVPRA does not support a
vicarious liability claim. Indeed, several district courts have allowed such a claim to proceed, and, absent binding
precedent precluding the claim, this Court will follow suit and allow it to proceed at this time. See, e.g., Doe (A.R.G.)
v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 2024 WL 4224915, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2024) (citing B.J. v. G6 Hosp.,
LLC, 2023 WL 3569979, at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2023)). Additionally, Choice contends, without any analysis, that
Plaintiff’s vicarious lability claim against it fails because she has not stated a valid TVPRA claim against TAMS. Due
to the lack of analysis on this point and because there is no pending motion by TAMS to dismiss the claims against it,
the Court will not consider this argument at this juncture.
78 See R. Docs. 50-1; 69; 73.
Case 2:25-cv-01812-BWA-DPC Document 77 Filed 11/25/25 Page 17 of 19

18
uniformity and standardization of the brand have been found to be insufficient to establish
complete control over the day-to-day operations of the franchisee’s business.” Doe (A.R.G.), 2024
WL 4224915, at *8 (quoting H.G. v. Inter-Cont’l Hotels Corp., 489 F. Supp. 3d 697, 708-09 (E.D.
Mich. 2020)).
Against this backdrop, Plaintiff has alleged enough facts to support a vicarious liability
claim against Choice. She alleges that Choice controlled the details of guest reservations, check-
in, identity verification, and payments; controlled a brand-wide “do not rent” system; controlled
room rates, required discounts, mandatory fees, and a rewards program; controlled the franchisee’s
ability to refuse or cancel reservations; collected and analyzed data on guests; established guest
relations protocols; and controlled what computer and internet services were offered at the hotel.79
Specific to sex trafficking, Plaintiff alleges that Choice retained control over the franchisee’s
response to the issue, including training staff on how to spot and respond to suspected sex
trafficking, such as determining when to involve law enforcement.80 These allegations – which
are not limited to uniformity and standardization of the brand – are enough to state a claim at this
motion-to-dismiss stage. 	But Choice protests that the exemplar franchise agreement expressly
disclaims any agency and assigns day-to-day management of the hotels to TAMS. Still, because
agency is a fact-specific inquiry and the exemplar franchise agreement is but one item pertinent to
the agency analysis, the Court cannot use it now to entirely dismiss Plaintiff’s agency claim. Thus,
Choice’s motion to dismiss the vicarious liability claim is denied.
D. Time Bar
The TVPRA provides that claims must be brought within 10 years after the cause of action
arises. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(c)(1). Plaintiff alleges that she was trafficked at the Kenner Sleep Inn
79 Id. at 29-30.
80 Id. at 28-29.
Case 2:25-cv-01812-BWA-DPC Document 77 Filed 11/25/25 Page 18 of 19

19
from January 2013 through December 2014.81 	She filed her complaint on December 30, 2024,
ostensibly within the 10-year period.82 Because Plaintiff’s claims do not appear to be time-barred
on the face of the complaint and neither party offers a fulsome analysis of the issue, the Court will
not dismiss any of Plaintiff’s claims on this basis at this stage of the case. EPCO Carbon Dioxide
Prods., Inc. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 467 F.3d 466, 470 (5th Cir. 2006) (stating that
“[a]lthough dismissal under rule 12(b)(6) may be appropriate based on a successful affirmative
defense, that defense must appear on the face of the complaint”).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Choice’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss (R. Doc. 50) is
GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s TVPRA beneficiary claim against Choice, which is DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint
alleging facts to meet Rule 8’s pleading requirements as to her TVPRA beneficiary claim against
Choice. Any amended complaint shall be filed within fourteen (14) days from the date this Order
is issued, and failure to timely file an amended complaint curing the noted deficiencies will lead
to dismissal with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion is otherwise DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 25th day of November, 2025.
________________________________
BARRY W. ASHE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
81 R. Doc. 1 at 7.
82 Id. at 1.
Case 2:25-cv-01812-BWA-DPC Document 77 Filed 11/25/25 Page 19 of 19