Stephens v. Day et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SPENCER VARDARMAN STEPHENS III CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 25-1982
TRAVIS DAY, ET AL. SECTION “I” (2)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Spencer Vardarman Stephens III filed a complaint (ECF No. 3) pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 which was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct a hearing,
including an evidentiary hearing, if necessary, and to submit proposed findings and
recommendations for disposition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), § 1915e(2), and
§ 1915A, and as applicable, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) and(2). Having considered the record,
including plaintiff’s complaint, § 1983 fact response, and the applicable law, the undersigned
recommends that the matter go forward for further proceedings.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Stephens, a convicted inmate housed in Elayn Hunt Correctional Center in St. Gabriel,
Louisiana, filed this pro se and in forma pauperis § 1983 complaint against defendants Warden
Travis Day, Warden Bickham, Security Warden Kevin Luper, Assistant Warden Karla Wheat, Dr.
Juan Martinez, and Col. Rigdon (“Defendants”) pertaining to events that occurred while he was
housed at Rayburn Correctional Center. ECF No. 4 at 1, ¶II, at 3, ¶III(B)-(G), at 4.
Broadly construing his complaint, Stephens alleges multiple instances where his rights
were violated under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and that he was subject to cruel
and unusual punishment due to inadequate housing conditions while at Rayburn Correctional
Center. Id., ¶IV, at 5. Stephens states he has been paralyzed for 20 years and is wheelchair bound.
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ECF No. 3-3 at 2. Stephens describes several instances in which he was placed in cells at Rayburn
Correctional Center that were inadequate for his disability. These instances include, but are not
limited to, a period in October of 2024 when he was housed in a cell for over a month where the
toilet seat was so low that he could not use the restroom, he could not look in the mirror, the railing
on the wall was not close enough to the toilet, he was denied his property and a medical mattress
and he had to sleep in his wheelchair for an entire night. Id. at 1-2. Additionally, he was unable to
shower as his wheelchair could not cross a ramp into the shower, he was unable to reach the water
nozzles in the shower, and the provided shower chair was a toilet. Id. He states he developed a
bedsore as a result of being without his medical mattress as well as daily pain and suffering for
having to adapt to inhumane living conditions. ECF No. 7 at 11. Stephens alleges that Defendants
had personal knowledge of these living conditions.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Statutorily Required Screening
As soon as practicable after docketing, the court must review a prisoner’s § 1983 complaint
for a cognizable claim, or dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous and/or fails to state a claim.1 A
claim is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.”2 A claim lacks an arguable basis in
law if it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such as if the complaint alleges the
violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.”3 A factually frivolous claim alleges only
facts that are “‘clearly baseless,’ . . . are ‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’ and ‘delusional’ . . . [or] rise to the
1 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Martin, 156 F.3d at 579-80.
2 Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998); Reeves v. Collins, 27 F.3d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1994). The law
“accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the
unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual
contentions are clearly baseless.” Macias v. Raul A., 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327).
3 Davis, 157 F.3d at 1005 (quoting McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997)).
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level of the irrational or wholly incredible . . . .”4 A court may not dismiss a claim simply because
the facts are “unlikely.”5
A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted when the factual
allegations do not rise above a speculative level, with the assumption that all factual allegations in
the complaint are true, even if doubtful.6 The Rule 12(b)(6) analysis is generally confined to a
review of the complaint and its proper attachments.7 The Fifth Circuit has summarized the
standard for Rule 12(b)(6):
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” A claim
for relief is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” A claim for relief is implausible on its face when “the well-
pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct.”8
“[W]hen evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept[ ] all well-
pleaded facts as true and view[ ] those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”9 Thus, the
court should assume the veracity of all well-pleaded allegations, viewing them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, “‘and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement
to relief.’”10
4 Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992)).
5 Id.
6 Garrett v. Thaler, 560 F. App’x 375, 377 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)).
7 Walch v. Adjutant Gen.’s Dep’t, 533 F.3d 289, 293 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
8 Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544).
9 Id. at 803 n.44 (quoting True v. Robles, 571 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted)); accord
Murchison Capital Partners, L.P. v. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc., 625 F. App’x 617, 618 n.1 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Wood
v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 755 n.5 (2014)); Maloney Gaming Mgt., L.L.C. v. St. Tammany Par., 456 F. App’x 336, 340
(5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Elsensohn v. St. Tammany Par. Sheriff’s Ofc., 530 F.3d 368, 371 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 696); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d at 205 n.10 (5th Cir. 2017)).
10 Jabary v. City of Allen, 547 F. App’x 600, 604 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664); see also Dorsey v.
Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008)).
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In comparing a dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and FED. R.
CIV. P. 12(b)(6), Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 319, held that a claim that is dismissed under one rule does
not “invariably fall afoul” of the other.11 If an in forma pauperis complaint lacks even an arguable
basis in law, dismissal is appropriate under both Rule 12(b)(6) and § 1915(e).12 “When a complaint
raises an arguable question of law which the district court ultimately finds is correctly resolved
against the plaintiff, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate; however, dismissal under [§
1915(e)’s] frivolousness standard is not.”13
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
Under the ADA, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”14 A plaintiff
must show “(1) that he has a qualifying disability; (2) that he is being denied the benefits of
services, programs, or activities for which the public entity is responsible, or is otherwise
discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that such discrimination is by reason of his
disability.”15 Further, under the ADA, a plaintiff may assert a claim for failure to make “reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual.”16 A plaintiff bringing a failure-to-accommodate claim must sufficiently plead that
11 Moore, 976 F.2d at 269 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
15 Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 499 (5th Cir. 2011).
16 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
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(a) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (b) the disability and its consequential limitations
were known by the covered entity; and (c) the entity failed to make reasonable accommodations.17
In this case, Stephens asserts that he is wheelchair bound and paralyzed. In light of this
disability, Stephens claims that the Defendants failed to make reasonable accommodations for him
and that all the Defendants had personal knowledge of his disability and housing conditions.
The Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard also applies to claims of
inadequate medical care.18 A plaintiff must allege both that he faced “objective exposure to a
substantial risk of serious harm” and “that prison officials acted or failed to act with deliberate
indifference to that risk.”19 Deliberate indifference requires a showing that the prison official
(a) knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious bodily harm and (b) disregards that risk
by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.20 To meet this “extremely high standard,” the
plaintiff must allege that the defendants “refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally
treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton
disregard for any serious medical needs.”21
Stephens claims that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs
resulting from his disability. He states he filed multiple grievances about his living conditions and
that the Defendants failed to take reasonable measures to move him to handicapped accessible
housing. As a result, Stephens alleges that he suffered daily pain and suffering due to these
conditions, was denied showers, and developed a bedsore from being without his medical mattress.
17 Sligh v. City of Conroe, 87 F.4th 290, 304-05 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Ball v. LeBlanc, 792 F.3d 584, 596 n.9 (5th
Cir. 2015)).
18 Damond v. City of Rayville, 127 F. 4th 935, 940 (5th Cir. 2025) (citing Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 345-46
(5th Cir. 2006)).
19 Id.
20 Id. (citation omitted).
21 Id. (quoting Domino v. Tex. Dep’t. of Crim. Just., 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001)).
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Accepting his assertions as true, Stephens states a non-frivolous ADA claim against the
Defendants as well as § 1983 claims for conditions of confinement and deliberate indifference
under the Eighth Amendment. Stephens’s ADA and Eighth Amendment claims regarding the
conditions of his confinement and deliberate indifference against all Defendants should be allowed
to proceed forward for further proceedings.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons,
It is therefore RECOMMENDED that plaintiff Spencer Vardarman Stephens III’s ADA
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Eighth Amendment claims against all Defendants be allowed to proceed and
remain referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for further pretrial proceedings.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within fourteen (14) days
after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from
attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by
the district court, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will
result from a failure to object.22
Dated this 9th day of March, 2026.
_____________________________________
DONNA PHILLIPS CURRAULT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
22 Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Assn., 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996). Douglass referenced the previously
applicable ten-day period for the filing of objections. Effective December 1, 2009, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) was amended
to extend the period to fourteen days.
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