USA v. Joseph

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	CRIMINAL ACTION
VERSUS 	NO. 26-103
BRANDON JOSEPH 	SECTION: N
ORDER AND REASONS
Before 	the 	Court 	is 	Defendant 	Brandon 	Joseph’s 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss
Indictment.1 The Government filed a response in opposition,2 and Joseph submitted
a reply.3 The Court held a hearing at which both parties presented argument. After
careful consideration of the parties’ memoranda, evidence and argument presented
at the hearing, the record, and the applicable law, the Motion to Dismiss Indictment
is denied.
I. 	Background
A grand jury charged Brandon Joseph as a felon in possession of a firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8).4 Count 1 alleged that Joseph,
knowing he had been previously convicted of crimes punishable by imprisonment for
a term exceeding one year, knowingly possessed a firearm that had been in and
affecting interstate commerce.5 The predicate convictions for Count 1 are (1) illegal
use of a firearm, La. R.S. 14:94, on December 5, 2012; (2) conspiracy to distribute and
possess with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841,
1 Rec. Doc. 21.
2 Rec. Doc. 28.
3 Rec. Doc. 29.
4 Rec. Doc. 1 at 1.
5 Id. at 1-2.
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846, on March 20, 2019; (3) conspiracy to possess firearms in furtherance of drug
trafficking crimes on the same date; and (4) possession of firearms in furtherance of
a drug trafficking crime on the same date.6
Joseph 	moved 	to 	dismiss 	the 	indictment.7 	He 	argues 	principally 	that
§ 922(g)(1) violates the constitutionally mandated separation of powers. He further
contends that the statute is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment both
facially and as applied, exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause,
and is unconstitutionally vague.8 Joseph acknowledges that each ground for his
motion other than his separation-of-powers argument is foreclosed by binding
precedent, and preserves the arguments for further review.
II. 	Legal Standard
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allows parties to
“raise by pretrial motion any defense, objection, or request that the court can
determine without a trial on the merits.”9 “The propriety of granting a motion to
dismiss an indictment ... is by and large contingent upon whether the infirmity in the
prosecution is essentially one of law or involves determination of fact.”10 “If a question
of law is involved, then consideration of the motion is generally proper.”11 Motions to
dismiss that question the constitutionality of a statute are such questions of law that
are proper for the court to review at this stage.12
6 Id.
7 Rec. Doc. 21.
8 Rec. Doc. 21-1 at 1-2.
9 Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 12(b)(1).
10 United States. v. Flores, 404 F.3d 320, 324 (5th Cir. 2005) (citation modified).
11 Id. (citation modified).
12 See United States v. Fontenot, 665 F.3d 640, 644 (5th Cir. 2011).
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III. 	Analysis
Section 922(g)(1) has been the subject of a massive wave of litigation following
the Supreme Court’s holding in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen
that the government must justify any firearm regulation by demonstrating that it
aligns with the nation’s historical tradition.13 Joseph’s motion is part of that wave. In
it, he argues that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the principles of separation of
powers.14
The Supreme Court reaffirmed in Bruen that the constitutional right of law-
abiding, responsible citizens to bear arms for self-defense is not a “second-class
right.”15 The Court established a framework for courts confronting constitutional
challenges to firearm regulation.16 When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers
an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. To
justify a regulation, the government must demonstrate that the regulation is
consistent with our nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Applying this
framework to § 922(g)(1), the Fifth Circuit rejected a categorical determination of
constitutionality and instead held that the statute is constitutional only as applied to
those 	felons 	whose 	particular 	predicate 	offenses 	have 	a 	historical 	analogue
supporting disarmament.17 In the present motion, Joseph relies on United States v.
13 See generally United States v. Luna, No. 25-40272, 2026 WL 2507689 (5th Cir. Aug. 25, 2026);
United States v. Landrum, 168 F.4th 771 (5th Cir. 2026).
14 Rec. Doc. 21-1 at 4, 7; see United States v. Celestine, No. 25-30506, 2026 WL 1349581, at *1 (5th
Cir. May 14, 2026) (acknowledging that Fifth Circuit “ha[s] not previously addressed” whether “case-
by-case application of § 922(g)(1) in the Second Amendment context violates separation of powers
principles”).
15 597 U.S. 1, 70 (2022).
16 Id. at 17.
17 United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458 (5th Cir. 2024).
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Reese,18 a Supreme Court case from 1875, to argue that the judiciary is prohibited
from saving a broadly written penal statute (here, § 922(g)(1)) by judicially narrowing
it to cover only constitutional conduct.19 Essentially, he argues that case-by-case
determination of the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as applied to an individual felon
is an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power by the judiciary. Joseph fails to
distinguish, however, between declining to enforce a statute against a specific
defendant where the Constitution forbids it and judicially altering the text of the law
itself. 	Even 	accepting 	Joseph’s 	premise 	that 	Reese 	applies, 	his 	argument
misconstrues the appropriate course when courts face unconstitutional applications
of a statute.
A. 	Declining to apply a statute as unconstitutional in a particular
case does not amend the law but constitutes a core judicial
function.
Joseph relies heavily on Reese to support his motion to dismiss. In Reese two
inspectors of a municipal election were indicted for refusing to receive and count the
vote of an African American who met the voting qualifications. Congress had passed
the statute at issue under the grant of legislative power in the Fifteenth Amendment
to enforce the prohibition on denying voting rights based on race, color, or previous
servitude. Because the statute punished the denial of voting rights generally, and not
solely on account of one’s race, color, or previous servitude, the Supreme Court held
that Congress had attempted to criminalize acts beyond the scope of its constitutional
authority. 	The 	Court 	found 	that 	the 	statute 	could 	not 	be 	limited 	by 	judicial
18 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
19 Rec. Doc. 21-1 at 3.
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construction to make it operate only within Congress’s authority without “mak[ing]
a new law,” rather than “enforce[ing] an old one.”20 To that point, the Court
admonished, courts cannot “introduce words of limitation into a penal statute so as
to make it specific, when, as expressed, it is general only.”21
Joseph argues Reese is analogous to § 922(g)(1) because the statute uses
“general language”22 to prohibit firearm possession by “any person … who has been
convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year.”23 Joseph contends that because the Fifth Circuit has recognized in previous
decisions that this statute covers conduct that Congress cannot constitutionally
prohibit under the Second Amendment, the statute casts an unconstitutionally wide
net.24 Accordingly, he argues, any attempt by this Court to parse the statute’s
constitutional applications from its unconstitutional ones constitutes an unlawful
rewriting of the statute and an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the
judiciary.25 	Joseph 	acknowledges 	the 	general 	rule 	is 	“when 	confronting 	a
constitutional flaw in the statute, [courts] try to limit the solution to the problem,”
and that “partial, rather than facial, invalidation is the required course.”26 But
20 Reese, 92 U.S. at 221 (citation modified).
21 Id.
22 Rec. Doc. 21-1 at 3.
23 18 U.S.C § 922(g)(1).
24 See United States v. Hembree, 165 F.4th 909, 918 (5th Cir. 2026) (holding § 922(g)(1)
unconstitutional as applied to predicate felony for simple possession); United States v. Mitchell, 160
F.4th 169, 194 (5th Cir. 2025) (holding that § 922(g) is unconstitutional as applied to predicate
felonies that involved “present” intoxication with marijuana but not as applied to those that involved
“habitual” intoxication); United States v. Doucet, No. 24-30656, 2025 WL 3515404, at *5 (5th Cir.
Dec. 8, 2025) (holding that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to predicate felony for
marijuana cultivation).
25 Rec. Doc. 21-1 at 4.
26 Id. at 7-8.
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partial invalidation, he argues, is unavailable where the legislature has enacted an
inseverable statute, and is permissible only where “what is left is fully operative as a
law.”27 Section 922(g)(1), he observes, does not have a severability clause and is a
single sentence. In his view, no limiting construction can be applied that would cure
the constitutional problem while leaving an operative prohibition against a felon
owning a firearm.
1. 	The as-applied approach to § 922(g)(1) is consistent with
separation-of-powers principles.
The Constitution divides the powers delegated to the three branches of
government into distinct categories of legislative, executive, and judicial powers “to
assure, as nearly as possible, that each Branch of government would confine itself to
its assigned responsibility.”28 When any branch acts, it is presumed to be exercising
the 	power 	the 	Constitution 	delegates 	to 	it.29 	Given 	this 	structure, 	a 	“strong
presump[tion] [of] validity … attaches to an Act of Congress,”30 which represents the
democratic will of the people. To maintain the constitutionally prescribed balance of
power, the judiciary is charged with enforcing the “legislative will when ascertained,
if within the constitutional grant of power.”31 When Congress steps “outside of its
constitutional limitations, … the courts are authorized to, and when called upon in
due course of legal proceedings, must, annul its encroachments upon the reserved
27 Id. at 8-9.
28 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
29 Id.
30 Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 403 (2010) (citation modified); see also Chadha, 462 U.S. at
944 (courts “begin, of course, with the presumption that the challenged statute is valid”).
31 United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875).
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power of the States and the people.”32 Courts, however, must “not nullify more of a
legislature’s 	work 	than 	is 	necessary” 	because 	“a 	ruling 	of 	unconstitutionality
frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of the people.”33
Under our system 	of 	judicial 	review, a court 	may 	uphold a 	statute 	as
constitutional, while simultaneously finding its application unconstitutional as to a
particular defendant in a particular case or controversy.34 “It is axiomatic that a
‘statute may be invalid as applied to one state of facts and yet valid as applied to
another.’”35 The “normal rule” is that “‘partial, rather than facial, invalidation is the
required course,’ such that a ‘statute may ... be declared invalid to the extent that it
reaches too far, but otherwise left intact.’”36 Typically, courts are more easily able to
avoid invading the legislative reign where the background constitutional rules have
been established and the court can articulate a narrow remedy so as to preserve the
will of the people’s democratically elected officials.37
Joseph’s argument conflates two distinct types of judicial acts: (1) judicially
amending a statute to mean something narrower than the text provides, and (2)
holding that the Constitution forecloses application of a statute in a particular case.
32 Id.
33 Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006) (citation modified).
34 Id. (When confronted with a constitutional flaw in a statute, courts can enjoin the unconstitutional
application or “sever…[the] problematic portions.”) (citation modified); see also Jonathan L. Mitchell,
The Writ of Erasure Fallacy, 104 Va. L. Rev. 933, 935-36 (2018) (power of judicial review “permits a
court to decline to enforce a statute in a particular case or controversy,” not to “strike down” a duly
enacted statute).
35 Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329 (quoting Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 289
(1921)).
36 Id.; see also Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 502-03 (1985) (discussing cases in
which the Supreme Court found statutes invalid only as applied to certain conduct at issue).
37 Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329-30; see also HCI Distribution, Inc. v. Peterson, 110 F.4th 1062, 1070-71 (8th
Cir. 2024) (applying Ayotte).
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Reese forbids the former. This Court’s ruling today invokes only the latter. The Fifth
Circuit has found § 922(g)(1) constitutionally inapplicable where there is no historical
analogue for disarming those convicted of certain predicate offenses. In these cases
the defendant’s conviction under § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment as
applied to him.38
When a court determines that a statute and the Constitution both apply to a
case and the two conflict, it decides which rule governs that case.39 This is of the very
essence of judicial duty.40 No text of the statute is modified; no meaning is changed;
and no operation is changed. What changes is whether judgment can be entered
against the defendant before the court.
This is evident from the elements of § 922(g)(1). To obtain a conviction under
§ 922(g)(1), the government must prove four things beyond a reasonable doubt: the
defendant had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year; he knew of that conviction; he knowingly possessed a firearm;
and that firearm had been in or had affected interstate commerce.41
The constitutional inquiry is a different task. When a defendant contends that
the 	Second 	Amendment 	bars 	his 	prosecution, 	the 	court 	asks 	whether 	the
Amendment’s “plain text” covers his conduct and if so, whether the government has
shown that the regulation “is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of
38 See, e.g., Hembree, 165 F.4th 909.
39 Marbury, 5 U.S. 137, 177; id. at 178 (“If, then, the courts are to regard the constitution, and the
constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the constitution, and not such ordinary
act, must govern the case to which they both apply.”).
40 Id. at 178.
41 United States v. Ducksworth, 168 F.4th 764, 770 (5th Cir. 2026) (citing United States v. Johnson,
990 F.3d 392, 400 (5th Cir. 2021)).
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firearm 	regulation.”42 At 	that 	second 	step, 	courts 	examine 	the 	nature 	of 	the
defendant’s underlying offense and its relationship to our nation’s historical practice
of regulation.43 This inquiry asks a constitutional question, not a statutory one. It
asks 	whether 	the 	Constitution 	permits 	enforcement 	against 	this 	particular
defendant.44 If the Court determines that the statute is consistent “with the Nation’s
historical tradition of firearm regulation,”45 the constitutional challenge fails and the
statute may be applied to the defendant.
The authorities that Joseph cites do not support his argument. United States
v. Davis involved a statute that provided for prison sentences for using a firearm in
connection with certain other federal crimes; however, the statute did not define the
federal crimes that were included.46 The statute had a residual clause that made an
element of the offense turn on whether the predicate offense “by its nature, involves
a substantial risk that physical force … may be used.”47 The indeterminacy resided
in the statute itself, in a phrase the factfinder was required to determine.48 That
feature 	gave 	rise 	to the 	Supreme 	Court’s 	separation-of-powers 	and vagueness
concerns: where a statutory element supplies no ascertainable standard, judicial
construction of the element operates as a definition of the offense and the legislature
42 Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24.
43 Diaz, 116 F.4th at 468; United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637, 648 (6th Cir. 2024) (“Specifically,
courts must study how and why the founding generation regulated firearm possession and determine
whether the application of a modern regulation ‘fits neatly within’ those principles.”).
44 Diaz, 116 F.4th at 472 (“The government has met its burden to show that applying 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) to Diaz is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.”).
45 Id.
46 588 U.S. 445, 448 (2019).
47 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(B).
48 Davis, 588 U.S. at 448 (“the language provides no reliable way to determine which offenses qualify
as crimes of violence”).
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has in effect “hand[ed] off [its] responsibility for defining criminal behavior to
unelected … judges.”49 Of particular concern to the Court was that a case-specific
reading of the statute would serve to expand the reach of the criminal statute to apply
criminal penalties to conduct the statute was not previously understood to reach.50
Section 922(g)(1) does not leave indeterminacy for the fact finder. Rather the
question is a simple one: whether the defendant was a felon who knowingly possessed
a firearm.51 Only then does the Court separately consider whether disarming that
particular defendant runs afoul of the Constitution. This is clear from the Fifth
Circuit authority Joseph invokes. Rather than construe § 922(g)(1), each case turned
on whether the government carried its burden at Bruen’s second step, and each held
that it had not.52 This was a determination about the sufficiency of a litigant’s
historical showing, not a construction of the statute.
In Hembree, for example, the government offered Founding-era punishments
for stolen horses, mail theft, and counterfeiting as analogues for disarming a
defendant convicted for possession of methamphetamine. The Court found these
inapposite because theft and fraud were not sufficiently similar to intoxicating
substances, and the government’s remaining authorities addressed trafficking rather
49 Id. (citation modified).
50 Id. at 463-64.
51 United States v. Broadnax, 601 F.3d 336, 341 (5th Cir. 2010).
52 Hembree, 165 F.4th at 916 (“Taking each analogue in turn, we find that the government did not
carry its burden.”); United States v. Cockerham, 162 F.4th 500, 504 (5th Cir. 2025).
(“Cockerham’s § 922(g)(1) conviction therefore violates the Second Amendment.”); Mitchell, 160 F.4th
at 194 (“Because we do not have sufficient evidence that confirms Mitchell was intoxicated while
possessing a firearm as to his § 922(g)(1) … conduct, we hold that our Nation's historical intoxication
laws do not impose a comparable burden on him and therefore fail under Bruen.”); Doucet, 2025 WL
3515404, at *6 (“Neither analogue satisfies the Government's burden under Bruen.”).
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than possession.53 Doucet rejected the same analogues as insufficiently similar to
attempted 	marijuana 	cultivation.54 	And 	Mitchell 	declined 	the 	government’s
invitation to treat dangerousness as controlling, looking to Founding-era regulation
of alcohol.55 In none of these cases did the analysis turn on statutory language but
rather on whether the government had shown the Constitution permits enforcement
of the statute as applied to the particular defendant.
2. 	There is no severability bar to an as-applied approach.
Joseph argues that, although the default, partial invalidation is inappropriate
when “the legislature had passed an inseverable Act.”56 Section 922(g)(1), he claims,
is inseverable because it does not contain a severability clause and § 922(g)(1) cannot
be partially invalidated. But Joseph does not contend with the Supreme Court’s
severability jurisprudence.57 In Ayotte the Court addressed a New Hampshire statute
that required parental notification for a minor to obtain an abortion. The statute did
not, however, “explicitly permit a physician to perform an abortion in a medical
emergency without parental notification.”58 The lower courts invalidated the statute
in its entirety due to the absence of a safety-of-the-mother exception, in keeping with
Supreme Court precedent.59 The Supreme Court held this was error.60 Concluding
that only a few applications of New Hampshire’s statute presented a constitutional
53 Hembree, 165 F.4th at 914, 916-17.
54 2025 WL 3515404, at *6.
55 160 F.4th at 194.
56 Rec. Doc. 21-1 at 8 (citing Brockett, 472 U.S. at 506).
57 See, e.g., Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin’l Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. 197, 234-35 (2020); Free
Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 509 (2010).
58 Ayotte, 546 U.S. 324. Violations of the Act were subject to criminal and civil penalties.
59 Id. at 325.
60 Id. at 326.
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problem, 	the 	Court 	held 	that 	the 	courts 	“need 	not 	have 	invalidated 	the 	law
wholesale.”61 Section 922(g)(1) likewise need not be invalidated wholesale.
Joseph’s severability argument fails for another reason. Generally, in crafting
a remedy, a court asks whether the legislature would have preferred for the statute
to apply without the unconstitutional component or to not exist at all.62 Joseph argues
that Congress enacted § 922(g)(1) under an understanding of the Second Amendment
that later court decisions replaced and would not desire a narrowed statute.63 But the
proper question is whether Congress would prefer the statute enforced to its
constitutional limit or not enforced at all.64 Joseph’s own authorities supply the
answer. Even without a severability clause, there is “nothing in the statute’s text or
historical context [making] it evident that Congress would have preferred” no statute
at all.65 The Supreme Court has observed that with § 922(g)(1) Congress “sought to
rule broadly,” through an “expansive legislative approach” designed as “sweeping
prophylaxis” against firearm misuse.66 This authority demonstrates congressional
intent in favor of the statute’s enforcement.
61 Id. at 331.
62 Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329-30; see also HCI Distribution, Inc., 110 F.4th at 1070-71 (applying Ayotte).
63 Rec. Doc. 21-1 at 5.
64 Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 236; see also Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 330 (“After finding an application or
portion of a statute unconstitutional, we must next ask: Would the legislature have preferred what is
left of its statute to no statute at all?”).
65 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. 477, 509 (2010); see Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., 591 U.S.
610, 630 (2020) (even in absence of severability clause, court applies “the presumption of
severability”).
66 Rec. Doc. 21-1 at 6 (citing to Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 572 (1977); Lewis v.
United States, 445 U.S. 55, 61, 63 (1980)).
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Although Joseph invokes the separation of powers to argue that courts must
not intrude upon the legislature, the remedy he seeks is more intrusive.67 Declining
to enforce a statute in particular cases where the Constitution forbids its application
leaves the statute intact and operative in other cases. Holding the statute wholly
unenforceable, 	in 	contrast, 	comes 	nearer 	to 	“substitu[ing] 	the 	judicial 	for 	the
legislative department of the government.”68 “[B]y preserving a statute through a
limiting 	interpretation,” 	a 	court 	does 	“not 	legislate, 	but 	instead 	respects 	the
legislature.”69
B. 	Defendant’s 	argument 	would 	broadly 	foreclose 	as-applied
applications of a statute and is more akin to a facial challenge.
Joseph argues § 922(g)(1) cannot be enforced against any defendant. “The label
is not what matters”;70 a claim is a facial one where the claim and the relief that
would follow “reach beyond the particular circumstances of these plaintiffs.”71
Though styled as an as-applied objection, Joseph’s reliance on Reese functionally
demands the facial invalidation of § 922(g)(1).72 If his challenge were successful, it
would undermine the as-applied approach that is fundamental to judicial review.
67 See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 28 (1960) (Frankfurter, J. concurring) (“To deal with
legislation so as to find unconstitutionality is to reverse the duty of courts to apply a statute so as to
save it”).
68 Reese, 92 U.S. at 221 (citation modified).
69 Skilling, 561 U.S. at 409 n.43 (citation modified).
70 John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 194 (2010).
71 Id.
72 Id. (“The claim is “facial” in that it is not limited to plaintiffs’ particular case, but challenges
application of the law more broadly.”); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 331
(2010) (The distinction between facial constitutional challenges and as-applied constitutional
challenges goes to “the breadth of the remedy employed by the court, not what must be pleaded in a
complaint.”); Barilla v. City of Houston, Texas, 13 F.4th 427, 434 n.4 (5th Cir. 2021)
(“Facial challenges ‘entail ... a departure from the norms of adjudication in federal courts.... [T]o
allow a determination that the law would be unconstitutionally applied to different parties and
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Joseph argues § 922(g)(1) is written in general terms;73 the Second Amendment
renders some applications invalid;74 separating the valid from the invalid requires
the judiciary to supply criteria Congress did not create;75 supplying such criteria is a
legislative act;76 and this 	resulting defect 	cannot 	be severed.77 Each 	of 	these
arguments is true of the defendant in Diaz as it is with Joseph. Because Joseph’s
claim reaches beyond his particular case—it is not merely an as-applied challenge.
Second, in as-applied challenges, the analysis depends on facts particular to
the defendant. Joseph’s Reese argument asks the Court to dismiss the indictment
without regard to his conviction or any fact specific to him.78 Contrast that with his
separately pleaded as-applied challenge, in which he devotes several pages to his
predicate convictions.79 The consequence is that to prevail, Joseph must establish
that no “set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid.”80 “This
is a heavy burden” that he cannot meet.81 The Fifth Circuit held in Diaz that
§ 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional and this logically entails that the statute has
constitutionally permissible applications.82
different circumstances from those at hand.”) (citing Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609–10
(2004)).
73 Rec. Doc. 21-1 at 3.
74 Id. at 4.
75 See id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 7.
78 See generally id.
79 See id. at 11-13.
80 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
81 Id.
82 Diaz, 116 F.4th at 472 (“it is constitutional as applied and facially as well.”); see Kanter v. Barr,
919 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 2019), (abrogated in part by New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v.
Bruen but for different reasons) (“every federal court of appeals to address the issue has held
that § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment on its face.”) (collecting cases); see also
United States v. Hemani, 146 S. Ct. 1677, 1700 (2026) (Alito & Kagan, J.J. concurring) (“I also agree
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C. Joseph’s remaining arguments are foreclosed by precedent.
Joseph raises three additional arguments that he concedes are foreclosed by
binding precedent: (1) § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment, both facially and
as applied; (2) the statute exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause;
and (3) the statute is unconstitutionally vague. Because Joseph acknowledges that
existing precedent bars these claims—raising them solely to preserve the record for
appeal—the Court rejects them.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Brandon Joseph’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment83 is
DENIED.
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this 8th day of October, 2026.
__________________________________
ANNA ST. JOHN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
that nothing in the opinion of the Court should be read to cast doubt on the constitutionality of other
provisions of § 922(g), such as §§ 922(g)(1)”); Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 699 (“prohibitions, like those on the
possession of firearms by ‘felons and the mentally ill,’ are ‘presumptively lawful.’”) (citing District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626, 627, n.26 (2008)).
83 Rec. Doc. 21.
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