Oden v. Commissioner, Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
TIMOTHY J. SULLIVAN
CHIEF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
6500 Cherrywood Lane
Greenbelt, Maryland 20770
Telephone: (301) 344-3593
October 8, 2026
LETTER TO ALL PARTIES:
RE: Lachelle O., on behalf of L.F., a minor v. Bisignano
Case No. 1:25-cv-02848-TJS
Dear Parties:
On August 29, 2025, Lachelle O., on behalf of her minor child, L.F. (“Plaintiff”), filed this
action seeking review of the Social Security Administration’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s
claim for Social Security benefits. ECF No. 1. The case has been assigned to me for all proceedings
with the parties’ consent pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rule 301.1 Having considered the
submissions of the parties (ECF Nos. 15, 16 & 20), I find that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R.
105.6. This Court must uphold the decision of the agency if it is supported by substantial evidence
and if the agency employed the proper legal standards. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Mascio
v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 634 (4th Cir. 2015). Following its review, this Court may affirm, modify,
or reverse the Commissioner, with or without a remand. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Melkonyan v.
Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89 (1991). Under that standard, I will construe Plaintiff’s submissions
collectively as a motion for remand, grant the motion, and remand the case for further proceedings.
An application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) was filed on L.F.’s behalf on
November 30, 2017. See ECF No. 20 at 2. The application was denied at the initial level and on
reconsideration. Id. On April 23, 2020, an ALJ issued a written determination finding that L.F.
was not disabled, and the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. Id. Plaintiff
applied for SSI on L.F.’s behalf again on June 2, 2021. Id. This application was denied initially
and upon reconsideration. On October 10, 2023, an ALJ determined that L.F. was disabled, but on
its own motion the Appeals Council remanded the case for additional proceedings. Id. On remand,
an ALJ held another hearing on June 27, 2024. Id. On February 18, 2025, the ALJ issued a written
decision finding that L.F. was not disabled. Tr. 9-15. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s
request for review. ECF No. 20 at 3. Plaintiff filed this action to obtain review of the ALJ’s
February 18, 2025 decision finding that L.F. is not disabled.
Under the Social Security Act, an individual under the age of 18 will be considered disabled
if that individual has a medically determinable physical or mental impairment,
which results in marked and severe functional limitations, and which can be
1 This case was originally assigned to Judge Douglas R. Miller. On March 30, 2026, it was
reassigned to me.
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expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months.
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i).
But if the individual engages in substantial gainful activity, they will not be considered
disabled. Id. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(ii).
To evaluate whether a child is disabled, an ALJ must follow a three-step sequential
evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924. At step one, the ALJ determines whether the child is
engaged in substantial gainful activity. Id. § 416.924(b). If the child is engaged in substantial
gainful activity, the ALJ will find that they are not disabled. At step two, the ALJ determines
whether the child has medically determinable impairments that are severe. Id. § 416.924(c). If a
child does not have severe medically determinable impairments, the ALJ will find that they are
not disabled. At step three, the ALJ determines whether the child’s impairments meet, medically
equal, or functionally equal a listed impairment. Id. § 416.924(d). To meet the requirements of a
listing, a child “must have a medically determinable impairment(s) that satisfies all of the criteria
of the listing.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.925(d). A child’s impairments are medically equivalent to a listing
if the medical findings regarding the impairments are at least equal in severity and duration to the
criteria of any listed impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926(a). For a child’s impairments to functionally
equal a listing, the child must have severe impairments that result in “marked” limitations in at
least two of six identified domains, or an “extreme” limitation in one domain. 20 C.F.R. §
416.926a. The six domains are:
(i) Acquiring and using information;
(ii) Attending and completing tasks;
(iii) Interacting and relating with others;
(iv) Moving about and manipulating objects;
(v) Caring for yourself; and,
(vi) Health and physical well-being.
Id. § 416.926a(b)(1).
Because L.F. was born in May 2010, the ALJ followed the three-step process for
determining whether a child is disabled under the Social Security Act. Tr. 10. At step one, the ALJ
determined that L.F. was not engaged in substantial gainful activity. Id. At step two, the ALJ found
that L.F. has the following severe impairments: explosive anger disorder, bipolar disorder, and
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). Id. At step three, the ALJ found that L.F. does
not have impairments that meet or medically equal a listed impairment. Tr. 10-11. And the ALJ
further determined that L.F. does not have impairments that functionally equal the severity of the
listings. In making this determination, the ALJ considered how L.F. functions in the six domains
identified in 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1).
The ALJ found that L.F. had less than a marked limitation in acquiring and using
information; attending and completing tasks; interacting and relating with others; and the ability
to care for herself. Tr. 11. And the ALJ found that L.F. had no limitation in moving about and
manipulating objects or in health and physical well-being. Id.
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Plaintiff is self-represented. She filed two briefs, but they are nearly identical. ECF Nos.
15 & 16. Plaintiff’s arguments are not presented in a traditional format, but she clearly identifies
her primary complaint with the ALJ’s decision: the ALJ gave “partial to great persuasive value”
to the opinion of Maryann Kristin Price, Ph.D., a consulting medical source who did not examine
or treat L.F., but gave only “limited persuasive value” to the opinion of Rachel Murray, CRNP, a
medical source who has examined and treated L.F. See ECF No. 16 at 4-5, 9; Tr. 14. Relevant
here, Dr. Price opined that L.F. had either no limitation or a less-than-marked limitation in each of
the six domains. Tr. 987-89. Conversely, Rachel Murray opined that L.F. had extreme limitations
in attending and completing tasks; interacting and relating with others; and health and physical
well-being. Tr. 750-51.
The ALJ explained her assessment of these medical opinions:
As for the opinion evidence, the undersigned gives partial to great persuasive value
to Dr. Price’s medical interrogatory. Dr. Price’s findings are generally consistent
with the evidence of record and supported by specific references to objective
evidence.
The undersigned accords limited persuasive value to the medical source statement
by Rachel Murray, CRNP. The opinion finds mostly extreme mental limitations,
which is not supported by the evidence of record. By the claimant and her mother’s
own report, the claimant is able to engage in numerous activities of daily living,
perform relatively well in school, and interact with others without significant
difficulty. Moreover, the claimant’s performance on cognitive testing is not
consistent with extreme limitation.
Tr. 14.2
Plaintiff’s claim for disability was filed after March 27, 2017. For such claims, “an ALJ
must follow certain procedures when assessing the weight to which medical opinions are entitled.”
Adrianna S. v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. SAG-20-3136, 2022 WL 112034, at *1 (D. Md. Jan.
12, 2022) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)). An ALJ must articulate how they considered the
medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings relevant to a plaintiff’s claim. 20
C.F.R. § 416.920c(b). In evaluating the opinion of a medical source, an ALJ considers multiple
factors, including supportability, consistency, relationship with the claimant, and specialization.
Id. § 416.920c(c). The most important factors that an ALJ considers are supportability and
consistency. Id. § 416.920c(b)(2).
When assessing the supportability of a medical opinion, the ALJ considers the substance
and relevance of the opinion on its own merits. “The more relevant the objective medical evidence
and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical
2 The ALJ also alluded to “State agency consultants [who] limited the claimant to less than
marked or no limitation in every domain,” and stated that “this is supported by the evidence of
record.” Tr. 14.
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opinion(s) . . ., the more persuasive the medical opinions . . . will be.” Id. § 416.920c(c)(1). When
considering the consistency of a medical opinion, the ALJ looks beyond the opinion itself and
compares it to other evidence. “The more consistent a medical opinion(s) . . . is with the evidence
from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical
opinion(s) . . . will be.” Id. § 416.920c(c)(2).
In assessing Rachel Murray’s medical opinion, the ALJ considered its consistency with
other evidence. Tr. 14. And in doing so, she found that the opinion was not consistent with other
evidence, including evidence about L.F.’s activities of daily living, her performance in school, her
interactions with others, and her performance on cognitive tests. Id. The ALJ’s analysis was
sufficient to address the consistency factor under 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(2). But the ALJ failed
to address the second of the most important factors: supportability. See id. § 416.920c(c)(1). The
ALJ did not address whether the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented
by Murray supported her opinion. In failing to do so, the ALJ did not comply with the governing
regulations. See generally Latasha L. o/b/o P.L. v. Kijakazi, No. BAH-23-673, 2023 WL 6963072,
at *5 (D. Md. Oct. 20, 2023) (remanding a disability appeal because the ALJ failed to address
whether a medical opinion was consistent with other evidence pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §
416.920c(c)(2)).
The Commissioner argues that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s functional-
equivalence determination, including Dr. Price’s opinion, the opinions of the state agency
psychologists, L.F.’s performance in school, and L.F.’s activities of daily living. See ECF No. 20
at 7. The Commissioner also correctly notes that the Court may not reweigh conflicting evidence.
Id. at 3. These arguments do not resolve the problem created by the ALJ’s failure to comply with
the regulation requiring her to articulate her consideration of both the supportability and
consistency of Murray’s opinion.3
The ALJ’s omission was not harmless. Murray opined that L.F. had marked or extreme
limitations in several domains of functioning. Tr. 750-53. Her report identifies the conditions and
symptoms that have affected L.F., including ADHD, combined type; bipolar disorder; explosive
disorder; difficulty focusing; mood disorder; passive suicidal ideation; isolation; aggression; and
mood swings. Tr. 749. And in Murray’s assessment of L.F.’s functioning in the six domains, she
provides some explanation (albeit minimal) for each of her conclusions. Tr. 750-51. Had the ALJ
considered and analyzed the supportability of Murray’s opinion, the functional-equivalence
determination may have been different. Because the Court cannot supply this analysis in the first
instance, this matter must be remanded for further proceedings.
3 Although the Commissioner argues generally that the ALJ sufficiently explained her
findings and that substantial evidence supports the functional-equivalence determination, the
Commissioner does not specifically address Murray’s opinion or § 416.920c(c)(1)’s supportability
requirement in its brief. The Court notes that Plaintiff’s arguments on these points were not well
presented and that her other arguments were difficult to follow. Still, Plaintiff’s objection to the
ALJ’s differential treatment of the opinions of Dr. Price and Murray is sufficiently discernible for
the Court to find that the argument was not waived, as the Commissioner argues. See ECF No. 20
at 6 n.3. Plaintiff may wish to consider retaining counsel to represent her and her daughter on
remand.
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The Court declines to address Plaintiff’s alternative arguments for remand.
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s submissions (ECF Nos. 15 & 16) are construed
collectively as a motion for remand, and that motion is GRANTED. Pursuant to sentence four of
42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Commissioner’s decision is REVERSED due to inadequate analysis. The
case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The Clerk shall CLOSE this case.
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Timothy J. Sullivan
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
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