Francischetti et al v. Unison Agreement Corporation et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
SCOTT FRANCISCHETTI, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Civil No.: 1:26-cv-03341-JRR
v.
UNISON AGREEMENT CORPORATION,
et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pending now before the court is Defendants’ Motion to Stay Proceeding Pending Transfer
by Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation at ECF No. 12 (the “Motion”).1 	The court has
reviewed all papers. 	Notwithstanding Defendants’ request for same, no hearing is necessary.
Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2025).
I. 	Introduction
Plaintiffs initiated the instant action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on July 21,
2026, alleging Defendants violated the Maryland SAFE Act (Count I), the Maryland Consumer
Protection Act (Count II), the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act (Count III), and otherwise
raising claims of usury (Count IV), unlicensed mortgage lending (Count V), unenforceable
restraint on alienation (Count VI), quiet title (Count VII), and unconscionability (Count VIII)
under Maryland law. (ECF No. 2.) 	Briefly, Plaintiffs allege as follows:
In 2019, Unison sold the Francischettis what it labeled an “option”
in their single family suburban home. In substance, Unison made
them a loan secured by the home, advancing them a fraction of its
value in exchange. Deceived by Unison’s false promises, the
1 Defendants’ Motion also requests expedited consideration of the Motion or, in the alternative, an extension of their
deadline to respond to the Complaint. (ECF No. 12.) Inasmuch as the court has ordered Defendants’ deadline to
respond to Plaintiff’s Complaint held in abeyance pending ruling on the instant Motion, the Motion will be denied as
to the foregoing requests.
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Francischettis signed onto a predatory agreement, granting Unison
far greater interest rates, control over the property, and share in
profits than a traditional mortgage. Years later, when Mr. and Mrs.
Francischetti attempted to end the agreement, they found Unison
had taken their ability to do that away too, by refusing to tell them
how much they owed on the loan or how that amount due was
calculated.
. 	. 	.
In 2026, the Francischettis realized how Unison’s agreement had
bound them. Despite great credit and the go-ahead from another
mortgage lender, the Francischettis’ application was rejected by
Unison for violating the terms of the 4 loan agreement they had
signed. Because of Unison, the Francischettis were blocked from
accessing the value of a home now worth almost one and a half times
what it had been when they first signed Unison’s agreement.
The Francischettis tried to get out, and Unison stopped that too. In
response to a payoff request, Unison sent a payoff statement seeking
amounts 	unsupported 	by 	the 	agreement. 	Without 	accurate
information about how to pay off Unison’s loan, the Francischettis
found themselves completely walled off from the value of the home
they had spent their entire adult lives investing in.
(ECF No. 2 ¶¶ 2, 6–7.)
Defendants removed the action to this court on August 21, 2026. (ECF No. 1.) Shortly
before removal, on August 13, 2026, Defendants filed a motion to transfer and consolidate five
actions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1407 (the “MDL Motion”) with the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation (“JPML”)—Coffin v. Unison Agreement Corp., No. 1:26-cv-01587 (E.D.N.Y., filed
Mar. 17, 2026); Evans v. Unison Agreement Corp., No. 1:26-cv-00999 (D.D.C, removed Mar. 23,
2026); Kane v. Unison Agreement Corp., No. 1:26-cv-01444 (D. Colo., filed Apr. 6, 2026);
Santaniello v. Unison Agreement Corp., No. 2:26-cv-07117 (D.N.J., filed June 15, 2026); and
Cuvellier v. Unison Agreement Corp., No. 3:26-cv-30126 (D. Mass., filed Aug. 5, 2026). 	See
(MDL Case No. 3201, Dkt. No. 1.) Defendants later filed notices of related cases including the
instant action, Greathouse v. Unison Agreement Corp., et al., No. 4:26-CV-00771 (W.D. Mo.),
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Petty et al. v. Unison Agreement Corp. et al., 3:26-cv-00749 (W.D.N.C.), and Allen et al. v. Unison
Agreement Corporation et al., 0:26-cv-04268 (D. Minn.), asserting that these actions involve
“substantially the same factual allegations and claims as those pending before the [JPML] in the
[In re: Unison “HomeOwner Agreement” Equity Option Contract, Marketing, and Sales Practices
Litigation].” 	(MDL Case No. 3201, Dkt. Nos. 7, 17, 24, 25.)
Defendants summarize:
Specifically, all seven complaints allege Defendants falsely markets
itself as a “partner” with homeowners, advertises the product as
involving 	“no 	debt,” 	“no 	interest,” 	and 	“without 	monthly
payments,” and represents that it shares equally in the risk of home-
value changes. See, e.g., Francischetti Compl. ¶¶ 29–36, 50–59;
Evans Compl. ¶¶ 34–40, 45–47; Coffin Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 6, 66, 77–
80, 82, 84–87, 260, 262–263; Kane Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 140–147, 169;
Santaniello Compl. ¶¶ 76, 115, 133–138; Cuvellier Compl. ¶¶ 6,
102, 	136, 	278; 	Greathouse 	Compl. 	¶¶ 	3, 	25–27. 	All 	seven
complaints also allege Defendants obscure the true cost of the
transaction through mechanisms such as a “Risk Adjustment” that
artificially lowers the appraised value at origination, an illusory
“Balance Payment” that is never actually paid to the homeowner,
and opaque fee structures. See, e.g., Francischetti Compl. ¶¶ 29, 40–
44, 48– 49, 96–98; Evans Compl. ¶¶ 104, 123–127, 131–132, 158–
159; Coffin Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 45–47, 53–54, 76, 238; Kane Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 109, 112, 114–116, 141; Santaniello Compl. ¶¶ 93, 103–
106, 114, 126–128, 151, 155; Cuvellier Compl. ¶¶ 83–84, 109–110,
115–119, 125; Greathouse Compl. ¶¶ 28–33. Similarly, all seven
cases allege Defendants failed to comply with requirements as
mortgage 	lenders 	under 	applicable 	state 	or 	federal 	law. 	See
Francischetti Compl. ¶¶ 118, 128, 145–149; Evans Compl. ¶¶ 177–
178, 228(b), 271, 280; Coffin Am. Compl. ¶¶ 93, 180(e), 193– 194,
205–206, 224, 247–249; Kane Am. Compl. ¶¶ 27(b), 29(d), 76;
Santaniello Compl. ¶¶ 77, 179, 215–219; Cuvellier Compl. ¶ 264(b);
Greathouse Compl. ¶¶ 76, 83–85.
(ECF No. 12-1 at p. 3.)2 Defendants’ MDL Motion will be heard by the JPML on December 3,
2026. (MDL Case. No. 3201, Dkt. No. 27.)
2 The New York, Colorado, Massachusetts, Missouri, and New Jersey actions have all either been stayed (without
opposition) or, by stipulation of the parties, the deadline for Defendants to respond to the Complaint was extended
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II. 	Analysis
“[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to
control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for
counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). “How this can best
be done calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an
even balance.” Id. at 254–55 (first citing Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S.
760, 763 (1931); and then citing Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379, 382 (1935)).
The court must “balance the various factors relevant to the expeditious and comprehensive
disposition of the causes of action on the court’s docket.” Maryland v. Universal Elections, Inc.,
729 F.3d 370, 375 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Ga. Pac. Corp., 562 F.2d 294, 296
(4th Cir. 1977)).
In considering a discretionary motion to stay, courts generally consider three factors: (1)
“the impact on the orderly course of justice, sometimes referred to as judicial economy, measured
in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which could be
expected from a stay,” (2) “the hardship to the moving party if the case is not stayed,” and (3) “the
potential damage or prejudice to the non-moving party if a stay is granted.” Int’l Refugee
Assistance Project v. Trump, 323 F. Supp. 3d 726, 731 (D. Md. 2018) (citing cases). Defendants,
as movants, bear the burden of showing of the necessity of a stay here, see id., and they must show
same “by clear and convincing circumstances outweighing potential harm to the party against
whom it is operative,” see Williford v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 715 F.2d 124, 127 (4th Cir.
1983).
until after resolution of the MDL Motion. Motions to lift stay are pending in the Colorado and New Jersey actions.
As of this writing, no stay motions are filed in the North Carolina or Minnesota actions.
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The court finds that judicial economy and the hardship on Defendants both weigh in favor
of a stay. Where Defendants have sought to transfer and consolidate the cases under 8 U.S.C. §
1407, “[i]n the absence of a stay, the parties will likely engage in duplicative discovery and
litigation, and judicial resources will be wasted.” 	Prepared Food Photos, Inc. v. N & K Foods,
Inc., No. CV JKB-22-3372, 2023 WL 2652270, at *1 (D. Md. Mar. 27, 2023). See also Maryland
v. 3M Co., No. CV RDB-23-1836, 2026 WL 1084894, at *3 (D. Md. Apr. 22, 2026) (“[A] stay
pending the JPML’s transfer decision is an efficient use of judicial resources . . . .”) (quoting
Yearwood v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., Civ. No. RDB-12-1374, 2012 WL 2520865, at *4 (D. Md.
June 27, 2012)). 	Similarly, Defendants face hardship where they “will be forced to duplicate
[their] litigation efforts and perhaps face inconsistent decisions in the different courts.” 3M Co.,
2026 WL 1084894, at *4 (quoting Davis v. Biomet Orthopedics, LLC, No. CIV. 12-3738-JKB,
2013 WL 682906, at *2 (D. Md. Feb. 22, 2013)). Further, “in the event consolidation of all cases
for pre-trial litigation is ordered, there is consistent treatment of the numerous lawsuits and []
judicial resources are not wasted.”3 Prepared Food Photos, 2023 WL 2652270, at *1 (quoting
Namovicz v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 225 F. Supp. 2d 582, 585 (D. Md. 2001)).
These factors thus weigh in favor of a stay of this action.4
3 The court observes Plaintiffs’ reliance on Gibbs v. Plain Green, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 3d 518 (E.D. Va. 2018), and
Sehler v. Prospect Mortg., LLC, No. 1:13CV473 JCC/TRJ, 2013 WL 5184216 (E.D. Va. Sept. 16, 2013), but the court
ultimately finds them unpersuasive here. Gibbs concerned consolidation of only three cases (thus with a low attending
risk of “needless duplication of work and waste of judicial resources”), and motions were fully briefed or “substantially
briefed.” Gibbs, 331 F. Supp. 3d at 526. 	Neither circumstance is present here. 	Similarly, the Sehler court
acknowledged that the interests of judicial economy may generally be served by a stay, but that was not persuasive
there where the parties were at the conclusion of discovery, with a scheduled pretrial conference. 2013 WL 5184216,
at *2. Again, neither circumstance is present here.
4 To be clear, the court’s opinion does not consider the merits of Defendants’ MDL Motion and, indeed, as Plaintiffs’
note, the JPML’s own rules permit this action continuing. The court’s determination instead turns on the relevant
factors and this court’s exercise of discretion upon consideration of same.
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1. 	Potential Prejudice to Plaintiffs
While the court appreciates that Plaintiffs allege ongoing harm caused by Defendants’
actions, this action is in its early stages and, even absent a stay, Plaintiffs are many months away
from any potential award of relief. In essence, then, the prejudice to them is delay, the impact of
which can be mitigated. 	A hearing on Defendants’ MDL Motion is scheduled for December 3,
2026, with a prompt decision likely to follow. See Radiology Assocs. of Roanoke, P.C. v. Optum,
Inc., No. 7:26-CV-00527, 2026 WL 2667460, at *2 (W.D. Va. Sept. 10, 2026) (noting that “the
JPML typically issues its decisions promptly,” though “decisions are sometimes delayed a few
days”). 	The court may (and ultimately does, as addressed below) limit the stay to mitigate
prejudice.
As Judge Bredar of this court explained:
[A]lthough there may be some prejudice to Plaintiff, “the possibility
of a slight delay for the Plaintiff[ ] is far outweighed by the possible
prejudice faced by the Defendants if this case is not stayed pending
transfer” to the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. Yearwood
v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., Civ. No. RDB-12-1374, 2012 WL
2520865, at *4 (D. Md. June 27, 2012). Moreover, any prejudice to
Plaintiff is tempered by the fact that the Court will not grant an
indefinite stay. Rather, the Court will stay this matter through June
7, 2023, and will reconsider the stay at that time.
Prepared Food Photos, No. CV JKB-22-3372, 2023 WL 2652270, at *1. 	See Maryland v. 3M
Co., No. CV RDB-23-1836, 2026 WL 1084894, at *4 (D. Md. Apr. 22, 2026) (finding no
significant prejudice and noting “[t]here is no evidence that the JPML is delaying resolution of
whether this case should be transferred to the MDL court, nor is there any evidence that the pending
MDL . . . is proceeding slowly”) (quoting Davis, 2013 WL 682906, at *2). This same reasoning
is applicable and persuasive here.
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Although the court is sympathetic to the harm Plaintiffs allege, this factor similarly weighs
in favor of a limited stay.
III. 	Conclusion and Order
In view of the foregoing, when considering judicial economy, Defendants’ hardship, and
prejudice to Plaintiffs, the court is persuaded that a limited stay is warranted. 	Cognizant of
Plaintiffs’ allegations of ongoing harm, the court will limit the stay as set forth below.5
It is therefore this 15th day of October 2026:
ORDERED that the Motion (ECF No. 12) shall be, and is hereby, GRANTED as follows
and is otherwise DENIED: this action is STAYED until the earlier of December 16, 2026, or, in
the event the MDL Motion is denied, within seven (7) days of entry of an order of the JPML
denying the MDL Motion; and further it is
ORDERED that, if the MDL Motion has not been adjudicated by December 16, 2026, the
parties shall file a joint status report on December 16, 2026.
In the event no decision has been made on the MDL Motion by December 16, 2026,
Defendants should be prepared for the court to order their response to Plaintiffs’ Complaint within
seven (7) days thereafter.
/S/
Julie R. Rubin
United States District Judge
5 This amounts to just under a three-month delay in this case based on Defendants’ response deadline of September
18, 2026. (ECF No. 6.)
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