GRIFFIN v. PRESQUE ISLE HOUSING AUTHORITY et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
JOURDEN GRIFFIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF PRESQUE ISLE, et al.,
Defendants.
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1:25-cv-00420-SDN
ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS
Plaintiff Jourden Griffin alleges in her amended complaint that Defendants, a
municipality 	(“Presque 	Isle”) 	and 	a public housing 	entity 	(Presque 	Isle 	Housing
Authority, “PIHA”), retaliated against her based on her reports of health and safety
concerns regarding her federally subsidized housing unit. ECF No. 13. Presque Isle and
PIHA move to dismiss the amended complaint. ECF Nos. 54 & 55. Ms. Griffin moved for
leave to file a surreply as to the motions to dismiss. ECF No. 72. Ms. Griffin also recently
filed a motion for a temporary restraining order. ECF No. 102.1 After review of the record
and consideration of the parties’ arguments, for the reasons that follow, the Court
1 The pending motion for temporary restraining order is one of multiple motions Ms. Griffin has
filed seeking injunctive relief. In September 2025, Ms. Griffin filed a motion for a temporary
restraining order, ECF No. 14, which the Court denied on procedural grounds, ECF No. 16. In
October 2025, Ms. Griffin filed a similar motion addressing the procedural deficiencies. ECF No.
20. The Court deferred ruling on the motion to permit the parties to attend a judicial settlement
conference, ECF Nos. 33 & 45, after which Ms. Griffin withdrew her motion. ECF No. 46. In
October 2025, Ms. Griffin filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. ECF No. 18. After the
Magistrate Judge recommended denying the motion, ECF No. 63, Ms. Griffin initially objected,
ECF No. 71, but then voluntarily withdrew the motion. ECF No. 74. In March 2026, Ms. Griffin
filed another ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order, ECF No. 83, which motion the
Court denied. ECF No. 84.
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DENIES Ms. Griffin’s motion to file a surreply and motion for a temporary restraining
order, and GRANTS the Defendants’ motions to dismiss.
I. 	Motion for Leave to File a Surreply
Ms. Griffin asks the Court for leave to file a surreply in support of her opposition
to the motions to dismiss. ECF No. 72. District of Maine Local Rule 7 allows parties to file
dispositive motions, opposing parties can file a response, and the moving party can file a
reply. “Absent highly unusual circumstances, sur-replies are not favored.” In re Light
Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Pracs. Litig., 832 F. Supp. 2d 74, 78 (D. Me. 2011).
Here, Ms. Griffin has not cited, and the Court cannot discern, any exceptional
circumstances that would warrant a surreply. Rather, the circumstances demonstrate the
reason surreplies are disfavored. In her response to the motions to dismiss, Ms. Griffin
raised claims and arguments that were not included in the amended complaint. ECF Nos.
65 & 68. In reply, Presque Isle and PIHA urged the Court not to consider the new claims
and arguments but also addressed the merits of the new claims and arguments. ECF Nos.
69 & 70. Through a surreply, Ms. Griffin evidently wants to assert more new factual
allegations and arguments. ECF No. 72. A review of the record reveals that Ms. Griffin has
had sufficient time and opportunity to assert her arguments in opposition to the motions
to dismiss. Additional filings are not warranted.2
II. 	Motions to Dismiss
Presque Isle and PIHA move to dismiss the amended complaint for various
reasons, including Ms. Griffin’s failure to allege facts that would support her claims. ECF
Nos. 54 & 55.
2 The Court’s cursory review of the proposed surreply reveals that filing would be futile because
Plaintiff’s arguments would not yield a different result.
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A. Factual Allegations3
Ms. Griffin rents a housing unit at 29 Micmac Drive in Presque Isle (“the property”)
where she resides with her five children. Amended Complaint at 1, ECF No. 13. Ms. Griffin
is a participant in the Section 8 voucher program funded by the United States Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Id. at 2. Ms. Griffin has been diagnosed with
multiple health conditions, including bipolar 1 disorder, general anxiety disorder, post-
traumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder, a sleep disorder, and a ruptured left
biceps tendon. Id. at 4–5. Defendant Presque Isle Housing Authority (PIHA) manages the
housing facility where Ms. Griffin lives. Id. at 2. Defendant Presque Isle is the
municipality in which the property is located and appoints the board members who
govern PIHA. Id. at 8.
Sometime in 2023, Ms. Griffin requested a repayment plan for money that she
evidently owed to PIHA. Id. at 3–4. PIHA had a policy allowing for repayment plans, and
another tenant was provided with a repayment plan, but PIHA denied Ms. Griffin’s
request and initiated eviction proceedings against her. Id. at 4.
Ms. Griffin cites nine lease violation notices that PIHA issued to her, some or all of
which she disputes: (1) an April 2024 violation for allegedly housing multiple homeless
individuals; (2) an April 2024 violation for having a dog without approval; (3) a July 2024
violation for speaking rudely to and making rude gestures to a maintenance staff member;
(4) an October 2024 violation for allegedly allowing more homeless individuals and a
3 The facts are drawn primarily from Ms. Griffin’s amended complaint. ECF No. 13. The Court has
also included some facts from undisputed documents to which Ms. Griffin referred in the
amended complaint and filed elsewhere in the record. See Giragosian v. Ryan, 547 F.3d 59, 65
(1st Cir. 2008) (Without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment,
“[a] district court may. . . consider documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, matters
of public record, and other matters susceptible to judicial notice.”) (quotation modified).
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former household member to live in the residence; (5) an October 2024 violation for trash
in the yard; (6) an April 2025 violation for trash outside on two occasions in the several
months prior; (7) an April 2025 violation involving a smoke detector; (8) an April 2025
violation for having a deadbolt on the front exterior door; and (9) a July 2025 violation
for refusing to schedule work during the previous week. Id. at 4.
At some point, Ms. Griffin made “complaints” about the property, id. at 4, and at
some point, the Maine Center for Disease Control and Prevention became involved,
apparently in connection with a program to prevent childhood lead poisoning, id. at 2, 4.
In March and April of 2025, a contractor for the Maine Department of Health and
Human Services collected samples, performed professional lead testing, and prepared a
report. Id. at 2, 10; ECF Nos. 102-5 & 105-2.4 The test results were negative (below
recommended limits) for the water and for the paint on the walls, doors, windows, and
other structures in the apartment, ECF No. 105-2 at 14–17, 27, but the results were
positive (exceeding recommended limits) for lead in swabs of dust on the basement floor,
the basement stair treads, and the living room floor. ECF Nos. 102-5, 105-2 at 10, 24–25.
In June 2025, Ms. Griffin requested from PIHA certain documents regarding her
tenancy, but counsel for PIHA required Ms. Griffin to provide legal justification to access
the records. ECF No. 13 at 3. According to Ms. Griffin, the attorney also asserted that
PIHA was not obligated to follow HUD rules and guidelines. Id. at 10.
Ms. Griffin asserts that PIHA failed to abate the lead dust hazard. Id. at 2. Ms.
Griffin also alleges other problems with the property, including the presence of mold,
4 Ms. Griffin refers to and relies upon the lead testing report in her amended complaint and filed
a portion of the report as an attachment to the most recent motion for a temporary restraining
order. Presque Isle and PIHA filed the full report in their response to the motion for a temporary
restraining order, the accuracy of which report Ms. Griffin evidently does not dispute.
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leaks, rot in a portion of the bathroom floor, and damaged or inoperable doors and
windows. Id. Additionally, she alleges that PIHA scheduled work or repairs without
proper notice and using unqualified contractors. Id. at 3, 5–6. Ms. Griffin also alleges that
PIHA violated her privacy by disclosing certain information to third parties, and that
PIHA fraudulently obtained federal subsidies by having a dual role as landlord and
voucher 	issuer, 	failing 	to 	use 	the 	proper 	paperwork, 	using 	improper 	inspection
procedures, and forging Ms. Griffin’s signature on documents. Id. at 7–9. Ms. Griffin
further claims PIHA overcharged her rent, retained overpayments from her or HUD, and
imposed late fees over the legal limit. Id. at 6.
Ms. Griffin’s claims against Presque Isle are based on an alleged “oversight failure”
regarding PIHA’s conduct. Id. at 8. Ms. Griffin asserts that even though Presque Isle is
responsible for appointing the board members for PIHA, the city failed to intervene on
her behalf. Id. Ms. Griffin also alleges: (1) a city code enforcement officer at some time
issued a 30-day correction notice to PIHA but the notice “remains unenforced”; and (2)
when Ms. Griffin was first admitted to the Section 8 voucher program during or before
2019, a city employee told one of PIHA’s employees to change the inspection result from
“fail” to “passed with comment.” Id.
B. Legal Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss test the legal sufficiency of a complaint and
require courts to determine whether the alleged facts show that plaintiffs have pleaded a
plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). To resolve a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts employ a structured, two-step inquiry. Cardigan Mountain
Sch. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 787 F.3d 82, 84 (1st Cir. 2015). First, the Court must “isolate and
ignore statements in the complaint that simply offer legal labels and conclusions.” Schatz
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v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012). The Court need
not credit legal or factual allegations that are “too meager, vague, or conclusory to remove
the possibility of relief from the realm of mere conjecture.” Douglas v. Hirshon, 63 F.4th
49, 55 (1st Cir. 2023) (quotation modified). Second, the Court takes “the complaint’s well-
pled 	(i.e., 	non-conclusory, 	non-speculative) 	facts 	as 	true, 	drawing 	all 	reasonable
inferences in the pleader’s favor,” and determines whether those facts “plausibly narrate
a claim for relief.” Schatz, 669 F.3d at 55. If plaintiffs fail to “nudge[ ] their claims across
the line from conceivable to plausible,” the Court must dismiss those claims. Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Plausibility requires “something more than
merely possible or merely consistent with a defendant’s liability,” Germanowski v.
Harris, 854 F.3d 68, 71–72 (1st Cir. 2017) (quotation modified), but does not impose a
“probability requirement,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
C. Discussion
1. ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and FHA Claims
Ms. 	Griffin 	argues 	Presque 	Isle 	and 	PIHA 	failed 	to 	provide 	a 	reasonable
accommodation for her disabilities and retaliated against her in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Fair
Housing Act (FHA).5
To state a reasonable modification/accommodation claim, a plaintiff must show:
(1) the plaintiff is a person with a disability; (2) the defendant is covered by one of three
statutes; (3) the defendant has a discriminatory policy or practice in effect; (4) the plaintiff
5 Although the various disability discrimination statutes have somewhat different language, courts
often address them together when more than one applies because the “standards are generally the
same under all three statutes[.]” Friedman v. Cent. Me. Power Co., No. 2:20-cv-00237, 2021 WL
1234638, at *2 (D. Me. Mar. 31, 2021).
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requested a reasonable modification in that policy or practice which would have afforded
the plaintiff access to the goods, services, or program; (5) the modification was necessary
to afford that access; and (6) the defendant refused to modify the policy or practice. See
Dudley v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 333 F.3d 299, 307–08 (1st Cir. 2003).
The allegations in the amended complaint do not support a plausible claim of
disability discrimination because there are no facts to support the third, fourth, or fifth
elements. Ms. Griffin alleges three accommodation requests: (1) remote access to
appointments; (2) abatement of lead hazards; and (3) relocation if necessary. ECF No. 13
at 5. Ms. Griffin provides no information regarding the alleged policies she wanted PIHA
to modify, and there are no facts that show the alleged requests were disability-related.
The absence of alleged facts regarding Ms. Griffin’s conditions and any resulting
limitations on major life activities precludes the requisite assessment of whether any
policies effectively restricted access and whether the requested modifications were
reasonable and necessary to provide equal access. Jones v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 696
F.3d 78, 89 (1st Cir. 2012) (“An accommodation request must be sufficiently direct and
specific, and it must explain how the accommodation is linked to plaintiff’s disability.”).
To proceed on a disability retaliation claim under the familiar burden shifting
approach, a plaintiff must first make a prima facie showing that the plaintiff engaged in
protected conduct, was subjected to an adverse action by the defendant, and there was a
causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse action; the burden then
shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory explanation for the
adverse action; and finally, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the
proffered legitimate explanation is pretextual, meaning the defendant was motivated by
a retaliatory animus. See D.B. ex rel. Elizabeth B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26, 41 (1st Cir.
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2012). The First Circuit instructs that the prima facie case is not “a rigid pleading
standard,” Rae v. Woburn Pub. Schs., 113 F.4th 86, 109 (1st Cir. 2024) (quotation
modified), but the burden shifting framework and the prima facie case “may be used as a
prism to shed light upon the plausibility of the claim.” Rodríguez-Reyes v. Molina-
Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2013).
Ms. Griffin argues she satisfies the protected conduct element because she made
complaints about the property. However, the amended complaint lacks sufficient facts
regarding the complaints that she made. Ms. Griffin does not allege when she made the
complaints, to whom she made the complaints, or the substance of the complaints.
Without any facts regarding the complaints, a fact finder could not conclude that the
complaints were disability-related and thus protected conduct.
Even if the allegations were sufficient to support a finding that Ms. Griffin engaged
in protected conduct and even if some of PIHA’s alleged conduct qualifies as adverse
action,6 the allegations would not support a causal relationship finding. Ms. Griffin
evidently relies on the temporal relationship between the complaints and the notices of
lease violations and the eviction attempt. ECF No. 13 at 4. In some cases, the temporal
proximity between protected conduct and adverse action can support a plausible
inference of causality, but the proximity must be very close. See Calero-Cerezo v. U.S.
Dep’t of Just., 355 F.3d 6, 25 (1st Cir. 2004). Indeed, even close proximity can be
insufficient “particularly if the larger picture undercuts any claim of causation.” Cordero
6 The alleged eviction attempt in December 2023 involving rent arrears and the alleged refusal to
provide a payment plan could plausibly constitute adverse action, but the mere assertion of a lease
violation without any alleged penalty, lease termination, or attempt to evict, would not qualify as
adverse action. See Shervin v. Partners Healthcare Sys., Inc., 804 F.3d 23, 50 (1st Cir. 2015)
(noting that adverse actions must involve conduct significant enough to deter a reasonable person
from reporting discrimination).
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Ayala v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. CV 20-1239, 2024 WL 2199005, at *12 (D.P.R. Mar. 27,
2024) (quoting Wright v. CompUSA, Inc., 352 F.3d 472, 478 (1st Cir. 2003)). In this case,
the timing alleged in the amended complaint cannot support a causal inference because
Ms. Griffin did not allege any facts regarding the timing of her complaints.7
The other allegations in the amended complaint also undermine the plausibility of
an inference of retaliatory motive based on timing alone. In the amended complaint, Ms.
Griffin asserts that she made reports about living conditions or safety risks (i.e.,
habitability concerns), but not about disability discrimination. ECF No. 13 at 4. While
complaints about landlords allegedly violating habitability rules, codes, or standards
could perhaps be protected under state law, such alleged violations are not considered
bases for an action under the FHA without a clear connection to a protected characteristic.
See Kummerow v. Ohawcha.org, No. 21-cv-635, 2022 WL 873599, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Mar.
24, 2022) (“[T]he [FHA] does not authorize plaintiff to sue defendants in federal court for
claims related to the habitability of the . . . apartment.”) (emphasis in original); Atterbury
v. Sanchez, No. CV 11-4932, 2012 WL 3638571, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2012) (“A
7 Generally, including in cases involving self-represented parties, a court does search the record
from multiple stages of litigation for information that might not be included in the operative
pleading. Even if the Court were to do so here, Ms. Griffin’s other filings are of little assistance.
For example, in Ms. Griffin’s objection to the recommended decision on her since-withdrawn
motion for a preliminary injunction, Ms. Griffin asserted that she made three complaints to HUD:
(1) a December 2023 “complaint regarding coercion into eviction,” (2) a July 2024 “complaint
after PIHA staff yelled at [Ms. Griffin],” and (3) a June or July 2025 “complaint after PIHA
obstructed [Ms. Griffin’s] records request.” ECF No. 71 at 6. The refusal to provide a payment plan
and the eviction attempt evidently preceded the December 2023 complaint because they were
apparently the subject of the complaint and thus could not have been caused by it. The first alleged
assertion of a lease violation did not occur until more than four months later. The first few alleged
lease violations preceded the June 2024 complaint and thus could not have been caused by it.
Only two of the alleged lease violations followed within a month or a few months of a complaint.
In other words, even assuming the overall pattern of asserting meritless lease violations (as
opposed to an individual assertion of a violation) could constitute adverse actions, the length of
the overall period in question and the correlation between the assertions of violations and the
HUD complaints is not suggestive of a retaliatory motive.
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landlord’s actions that are based on a tenant’s complaints” about property conditions “are
not actionable as discrimination under the FHA.”).
In sum, the well-pled facts and reasonable inferences in the amended complaint,
as distinguished from conclusory allegations, do not support a discrimination or
retaliation claim.
2. Criminal Laws, Rules, and Regulations
Ms. Griffin cited at least two criminal statutes as bases for claims she asserted in
the amended complaint. Even if the amended complaint contained sufficient facts to
establish the elements of the crimes, which it does not, the criminal statutes do not
authorize a civil claim against Defendants Presque Island and PIHA. “[I]t is well-settled
that criminal statutes do not provide a private cause of action[.]” Lundgren v. Universal
Wilde, 384 F. Supp. 3d 134, 136 (D. Mass. 2019); Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.
1989) (“Generally, a private citizen has no authority to initiate a federal criminal
prosecution. Only the United States as prosecutor can bring” criminal charges against a
defendant) (quotation modified)).
Similarly, the amended complaint contains several counts based on alleged
violations of federal administrative rules and regulations. None of the cited rules and
regulations suggest a congressional intent to provide a private cause of action based on
the rules, however, and Ms. Griffin provides no authority to support an argument that the
cited regulations are enforceable by a tenant in a civil suit against a lessor. See Padula v.
Freedom Mortg. Corp., No. 19-cv-11666, 2020 WL 4040725, at *5 (D. Mass. July 17,
2020) (discussing cases dismissing claims because the statute did not provide a private
right of action to enforce a HUD regulation).
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Perhaps recognizing that the statutes and rules do not create a private cause of
action, in her response to the motions, Ms. Griffin asserted a new claim, citing a different
statute, 42 U.S.C. § 4852d, and made factual allegations not found in the amended
complaint. Such late attempts to avoid motions to dismiss are not permitted, however.
See Trans-Spec Truck Servs., Inc. v. Caterpillar Inc., 524 F.3d 315, 321 (1st Cir. 2008)
(“Under Rule 12(b)(6), the district court may properly consider only facts and documents
that are part of or incorporated into the complaint.”); Davis v. Theriault, No. 22-cv-
00275, 2023 WL 5628193, at *32 (D. Me. Aug. 31, 2023) (“Parties cannot cure deficiencies
in pleadings by asserting new facts and allegations in response to a motion to dismiss.”).
Even if the Court considered the new claim, the alleged facts in the amended
complaint do not support it. Section 4852d directs the Environmental Protection Agency
to promulgate regulations requiring sellers and lessors of “target housing”—most housing
built before 1978—to (1) provide a lead hazard information pamphlet; (2) disclose the
presence of known lead-based paint or hazards; (3) allow ten days to conduct a lead risk
assessment; and (4) include a specified lead warning statement and signed notification
with the contract. 42 U.S.C. § 4852d(a)(1)(A)–(C), (2), (3). If a person “knowingly
violates” the requirements, the statute authorizes a civil suit by a private individual for
“[triple] the amount of damages incurred by such individual.” Id. § 4852(b)(3). The
amended complaint does not allege that PIHA knowingly failed to provide the requisite
information, disclosures, or warnings. The amended complaint also does not include
allegations that Ms. Griffin incurred damages resulting from the failure to provide the
requisite information, disclosures, or warnings.
Even if the Court considered the new lead paint factual allegations in Ms. Griffin’s
response, Ms. Griffin has not alleged an actionable claim because the factual allegations
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do not state a plausible claim. The relevant portions of Ms. Griffin’s response contain the
mere assertion that “PIHA failed to provide Plaintiff with the required lead hazard
information pamphlet or any disclosure of known lead-based paint hazards” and that
“[a]s a direct result of this failure, Plaintiff and her five minor children were exposed to
lead hazards, causing them harm.” Response at 6–7, ECF No. 68.
Ms. Griffin did not allege that PIHA knowingly failed to provide the requisite
information and there are no alleged facts that would permit a plausible inference of the
requisite knowledge. See Smith v. Coldwell Banker Real Est. Servs., 122 F. Supp. 2d 267,
273 (D. Conn. 2000) (“[S]ince the statute only imposes civil liability for ‘knowingly
violating’ one of the Act’s requirements, they cannot be liable for their inadvertence or
inattentiveness.”). For example, the allegations and test results do not show lead paint on
the walls and other structures of the property, and there are no facts to suggest PIHA had
prior knowledge of the elevated lead levels in the dust in certain locations of the property.8
Furthermore, Ms. Griffin provides no factual support for the conclusory allegation
that she incurred damages related to the lead paint allegations. Ms. Griffin does not allege
any medical injuries, expenses, or mitigation costs, and there does not appear to be any
authority finding damages “incurred” simply from some unquantified exposure to lead in
8 Ms. Griffin also referred to her lease agreement and relied on it to support many of the claims in
the amended complaint, including the new claim first raised in the response to Presque Isle and
PIHA’s motions to dismiss. Ms. Griffin did not attach a copy of the lease agreement, but PIHA
filed a copy of the lease agreement in connection with one of Ms. Griffin’s prior requests for
injunctive relief, and Ms. Griffin did not dispute the accuracy of the copy. The lease agreement
undermines the plausibility of Ms. Griffin’s conclusory allegations because it contains a checked
box reflecting the landlord provided the tenant with an attachment titled “Watch Out for Lead
Paint Poisoning,” and, just above Ms. Griffin’s signature, the agreement states that she received a
copy of a document titled “PROTECT YOUR FAMILY FROM LEAD IN YOUR HOME,” the
information was thoroughly explained to her, and she understood the possibility that lead-based
paint may exist in the property. ECF No. 27-2 at 11–12. Ms. Griffin provided no explanation or
clarification regarding the undisputed documentary evidence refuting the new allegations.
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dust or some unspecified marginal increase in future risk. See Christian v. Warwick
Realty, LLC, No. CA 14-152, 2014 WL 2434626, at *4 (D.R.I. May 29, 2014) (dismissing
because “the Act requires that a claimant must have actual damage” and “[a]s drafted,
this [c]omplaint has no allegation that any member of [p]laintiff’s family has been
damaged by lead exposure or the failure to disclose or that [p]laintiff has been damaged
in some other way by the failure to warn about the risks of lead poisoning”); compare
Kaye v. Acme Invs., Inc., No. 08-12570, 2008 WL 5188712, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 8,
2008) (“Indeed, the clear language of § 4852d (b)(5)(3) itself refers to ‘damages incurred,’
indicating that there must be actual damages, not hypothetical, speculative, or even
nominal damages.”), with Sweet v. Sheahan, 235 F.3d 80, 82 (2d Cir. 2000) (alleging
permanent injury to nervous system and hospitalization from lead poisoning following
failure to disclose the presence of lead paint).
3. Civil Rights Claim
Ms. Griffin cites 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleges that Presque Isle and PIHA violated
her federal rights under color of state law. The only constitutional right mentioned in the
amended complaint is the right to due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits state deprivations of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 1. This protection has both substantive and procedural components.
Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 753–54 (1st Cir. 1990). In either context, “a plaintiff, as
a condition precedent to stating a valid claim, must exhibit a constitutionally protected
interest in life, liberty, or property.” Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc. v. Feliciano de
Melecio, 406 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2005).
Ms. Griffin’s § 1983 due process claim fails because she has not alleged a
deprivation of a protected liberty or property interest. Ms. Griffin does not allege she lost
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her home or was evicted without legal process. To the contrary, the complaint suggests
that when PIHA previously sought to terminate the lease in December 2023, it initiated
legal proceedings against Ms. Griffin. Ms. Griffin argues in her opposition to Presque Isle
and PIHA’s motions that she has a protected property interest in her Section 8 housing
voucher, but even if true, she does not allege that PIHA (or anyone else) has terminated
the voucher.
Even if Ms. Griffin had alleged the deprivation of a legally recognized interest, the
allegations do not support the finding of a constitutional violation. The alleged conduct
(i.e., the issuance of notices of lease violations and the alleged failure to comply with
certain environmental or building codes or regulations) is simply insufficient to support
a substantive due process claim. See Espinoza v. Sabol, 558 F.3d 83, 87 (1st Cir. 2009)
(“The substantive component of the Due Process Clause is violated by executive action
when it can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a
constitutional sense.”) (quotation modified); Pagan v. Calderon, 448 F.3d 16, 32 (1st Cir.
2006) (conduct must be “extreme and egregious,” “truly outrageous, uncivilized, and
intolerable,” or “stunning”). Further, procedural due process claims do not arise every
time a plaintiff alleges an employee of a state or local entity fails to comply with a federal,
state, or local procedural rule, because there are ordinarily post deprivation remedies
available to redress such conduct. See S. Commons Condo. Ass’n v. Charlie Arment
Trucking, Inc., 775 F.3d 82 (1st Cir. 2014) (public employees’ “alleged . . . error—if error
it was—cannot save the [plaintiff]’s procedural due process claim, at least so long as an
adequate, post-hoc remedy is available”). Ms. Griffin does not allege, and there is nothing
to suggest, that the legal process and remedies afforded under Maine law fail to satisfy the
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minimum requirements of due process. In short, Ms. Griffin has not alleged an actionable
§ 1983 claim.
4. State Law Claims
Ms. Griffin asserts many state law contract, quasi-contract, negligence, fraud, and
other tort claims against Defendants Presque Isle and PIHA. Because Ms. Griffin has not
alleged an actionable federal claim, it is not appropriate for the Court to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Rodriguez v. Doral Mortg. Corp., 57
F.3d 1168, 1177 (1st Cir. 1995) (“As a general principle, the unfavorable disposition of a
plaintiff’s federal claims at the early stages of a suit, well before the commencement of
trial, will trigger the dismissal without prejudice of any supplemental state-law claims.”).
Ms. Griffin must pursue those remaining claims, if at all, in state court.
III. 	Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order
A temporary restraining order operates to “preserve the status quo, freezing an
existing 	situation” 	allowing 	the 	Court 	to 	provide 	an 	effective 	remedy 	upon 	full
adjudication of the merits. CMM Cable Rep., Inc. v. Ocean Coast Props., Inc., 48 F.3d
618, 620 (1st Cir. 1995). However, “[i]njunctive relief is an extraordinary and drastic
remedy that is never awarded as of right.” Calvary Chapel of Bangor v. Mills, 459 F. Supp.
3d 273, 282 (D. Me. 2020) (quoting Monga v. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts, 323 F. Supp.
3d 75, 82 (D. Me. 2018)). When evaluating whether to grant a temporary restraining
order, the Court applies the same four-factor analysis as that used for a preliminary
injunction. Monga, 323 F. Supp. 3d at 82. Ms. Griffin must establish a likelihood of
success on the merits, a likelihood of irreparable harm, that the balance of equities favors
an injunction, and that an injunction is in the public interest. See Peoples Fed. Sav. Bank
v. People’s United Bank, 672 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012). “The sine qua non of this four-part
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inquiry is likelihood of success on the merits: if the moving party cannot demonstrate that
[she] is likely to succeed in [her] quest, the remaining factors become matters of idle
curiosity.” New Comm Wireless Servs., Inc. v. SprintCom, Inc., 287 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.
2002) (citing Weaver v. Henderson, 984 F.2d 11, 12 (1st Cir. 1993)).
For the reasons explained above, the Court has determined that the amended
complaint fails to state a claim and dismissal is appropriate. Given the dismissal, the
motion for temporary restraining order is moot.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Ms. Griffin’s motion to file a
surreply, ECF No. 72, DENIES as moot Ms. Griffin’s motion for a temporary restraining
order, ECF No. 102, and GRANTS Presque Isle and PIHA’s motions to dismiss the
amended complaint, ECF Nos. 54 & 55. Ms. Griffin’s amended complaint, ECF No. 13, is
DISMISSED.
S O ORDERED .
Dated this 18th day of September, 2026.
/s/ Stacey D. Neumann
UNITED S TATES DISTRICT J UDGE
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